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ABSTRACT 
The Jubilee year in Leviticus 25 has received a fair amount of attention towards the end of 
the previous millennium with the movements such as the Jubilee 2000, which campaigned 
for the remissions of debt in the so-called Third World. The text thus has a very liberating 
image and this is where the problem lies, because a critical reading of the text creates a far 
more oppressive picture. The question then becomes how the biblical critic is to respond, 
especially when she/he is sympathetic towards the objectives of the Jubilee 2000 
movement.  
In this study it is argued that there is only one way to respond and that is to play the critical 
role that biblical scholars have always attempted to play. This means that it would be 
ethically irresponsible for biblical critics to shy away from exposing the oppressive sides of a 
biblical text. An ideological-critical approach is then proposed which attempts to construct 
the world-view or ideology that could be glimpsed from the text. This kind of reading is 
suspicious of what the biblical text claims and it further attempts to identify political and 
other interests in the text. An ideological critical reading also takes stock of the “ideological 
holdings” of the interpreter. In this regard the author argues that the history of Apartheid and 
specifically the way in which the Bible was used to legitimate Apartheid is one of his main 
ideological holdings that predisposes him to read in a certain manner.  
Leviticus 25 is then subjected to very close synchronic scrutiny. Firstly the most salient 
grammatical features of the text are identified and secondly it is asked how these features 
were used in order to persuade. This second reading is thus a kind of rhetorical reading that 
specifically focuses on ways in which the relationship between the addressees, the land, 
YHWH and other groups in the text is portrayed. This enables the author to describe the 
world-view or ideology of the authors and addressees of Leviticus 25. These same interests 
are also identified in some of the chapters surrounding chapter 25. Eventually this leads to 
dating the composition of this text in the Second Temple Period and it specifically identifies 
the interests of this text with those of the returning Elite.  
This interpretation presents the text as rather oppressive and instead of preventing poverty 
it actually reinstated poverty, which means that some dark sides of the text are exposed. 
The study is then concluded with some theological-ethical observations where it is 
reiterated that one of the tasks of the biblical critic is to give some voice to people that were 
voiceless in the biblical text. The study also shows that despite these dark sides to the text, 
there still is liberating potential in the Jubilee.  
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OPSOMMING 
Die Jubeljaar in Levitikus 25 het veral aandag getrek aan die einde van die vorige 
millennium toe bewegings soos die “Jubilee 2000” beweging hulle beywer het vir die 
afskrywe van skuld in die sogenaamde Derde Wêreld. Die teks het dus ‘n “bevrydende 
beeld” en dit is juis waar die probleem lê, want ‘n kritiese lees van die teks skep ‘n baie 
meer verdrukkende prentjie. Die vraag is nou hoe die bybelwetenskaplike moet reageer, 
veral indien sy/hy die doelwitte van die Jubilee 2000 beweging ondersteun.  
Daar word dan in hierdie studie geargumenteer dat daar eintlik maar net een manier is 
waarop ‘n mens sou kon reageer en dit is deur die kritiese rol te speel wat 
bybelwetenskaplikes nog altyd nagestreef het. Dit beteken dat dit eties onverantwoordelik 
sou wees om weg te skram van die verdrukkende kante van ‘n bybelse teks. ‘n Ideologie-
kritiese benadering word dan voorgestel wat poog om die wêreldbeeld of ideologie te 
konstrueer wat ‘n mens in die teks sou kon bespeur. Hierdie soort lesing staan redelik 
agterdogtig teenoor wat die teks beweer en poog dan om politieke en ander belange in die 
teks te identifiseer. So ‘n ideologie-kritiese lees poog ook om die “ideologiese erfenis” van 
die interpreteerder te verwoord. In hierdie opsig argumenteer die outeur dat die geskiedenis 
van Apartheid en veral die manier waarop die Bybel gebruik is om dit te legitimeer een van 
sy ideologiese erfenisse is wat aanleiding daartoe gee dat hy op ‘n bepaalde manier lees.  
Levitikus 25 word dan onder ‘n deeglike sinkroniese loep geneem. Eerstens word die mees 
uitstaande grammatikale kenmerke van die teks geïdentifiseer en tweedens word gevra hoe 
hierdie kenmerke gebruik sou kon word om te oortuig. Hierdie tweede lesing is ‘n soort 
retoriese lesing wat spesifiek fokus op hoe die verhouding tussen die aangespreektes, die 
land, YHWH en ander groepe in die teks uitgebeeld word. Dit stel die outeur in staat om die 
wêreldbeeld of ideologie van die skrywers en aangespreektes te omskryf. Hierdie selfde 
belange word dan ook in die omringende teks van hoofstuk 25 geïdentifiseer. Uiteindelik 
word die komposisie van hierdie teks in die Tweede Tempeltydperk gedateer en word die 
belange in die teks verbind met die belange van die terugkerende hoërklas.  
Hierdie interpretasie stel dan die teks as redelik verdrukkend voor en in plaas daarvan dat 
dit armoed teengewerk het, het dit armoede teweeggebring wat natuurlik beteken dat 
donker kante van die teks blootgelê word. Die studie sluit dan af met ‘n paar teologiese-
etiese waarnemings waar dit weereens beklemtoon word dat een van die take van die 
bybelwetenskaplike juis is om ‘n stem te gee aan die mense wat in die antieke teks 
stemloos was. Die studie wys ook uit dat daar ten spyte van hierdie moontlike donker kante 
van die teks daar tog nog bevrydende potensiaal in die Jubeljaar is.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The title of this doctorate was formulated towards the end of 1999 when the Jubilee 
2000 movement was making news headlines the world over. The issue was the debt 
of many poor countries in the so-called Third World and this movement demanded 
that all or most of this debt had to be written off. The name “Jubilee” originates in a 
chapter of a book of the Bible that might probably be regarded as one of the least 
read in the whole Bible. The book is Leviticus and the chapter is, of course, chapter 
25. Leviticus 25 became a symbol in this movement of liberation and justice to those 
who needed it most, those who suffered in a world characterised by unfairness and 
injustice. An ancient text came to us and shed its liberating light into our modern, but 
oppressive world, or that at least was the impression that one had when one read 
many of the articles1 that appeared which proclaimed liberation to the poor and which 
used this ancient text to support this proclamation.  
Two things attracted me to this text of which the first had to do with my South African 
context. The current situation in my country was then and still is fairly representative 
of the world. Those discrepancies between a smaller, richer, whiter part of the world 
and a larger, poorer, blacker part of the world which the Jubilee 2000 movement 
attempted to address were and are very much an accurate description of the state of 
affairs in my own country. As in the larger world these discrepancies in my country 
can be explained by means of a colonial history of about 350 years; not that there 
was nobody living here, or that no land existed before these 350 years started; but 
simply meaning that things radically changed in this place 350 years ago. 
Colonialism lived on in South Africa for many decades when other manifestations of 
the species were at long last becoming extinct in the rest of the world. In South Africa 
it survived (and thrived) until the early 1990s cloaked in another guise, but not lesser 
known and that guise was, of course, “Apartheid.” If one could say that Leviticus 25 
has a good image in the world, then one could confidently say that the word 
“Apartheid” has a down right horrible image the world over.  
My problem with this word is that it is taken from my mother tongue; the language of 
my heart and it has become a synonym for evil in this world. I am thus one of those 
people who call themselves Afrikaners and I often think that there is irony in this 
name. The irony lies in the fact that “Afrika” is in the word, but the word has actually 
mostly been used as a synonym for European or non-African. I am thus part of that 
small, rich and white segment of South Africa that has been responsible for the 
                                                 
1 Two very good examples of this kind of presentation would be Padilla (1996) and De Chirico (1999).  
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exploitation of the large, poor and black part of the community. I was and am thus 
very sympathetic towards the Jubilee 2000 movement, because it is clear that if the 
discrepancies in my country are not somehow rectified, then things could still take a 
turn for the worst. That is simply a pragmatic concern, leaving aside the issue of guilt 
for the time being. Yet it should be clear why I found (and still find) the goals of the 
Jubilee 2000 movement attractive, because it represented a movement that could 
remedy and rectify the hurts and injustices of the past in order to change the world 
into a better place and in order to set us free from our terrible past.  
That is one part of the attraction and the other lies in the text itself. The fascinating 
thing here is the fact that parts of the world out there and especially parts of the 
secular world could get carried away with a text from the Hebrew Bible. My own 
problem with this text could best be expressed by means of the following quote from 
David Clines (1995: 19-20): 
It is a measure of our commitment to our own standards and values that we 
register disappointment, dismay and disgust when we encounter in the text of 
ancient Israel ideologies that we judge to be inferior to ours. And it is a measure 
of our open-mindedness and eagerness to learn and do better that we remark 
with pleasure, respect and envy values and ideologies within the biblical texts 
that we judge to be superior to our own.  
“Disappointment, dismay and disgust” are also good words to describe my own 
experience when I actually started reading Leviticus 25. Despite the liberating image 
of this text the world over and the resulting fact that I was hoping to experience 
“pleasure, respect and envy” this simply did not happen. A text that legitimates 
slavery,2 a text that discriminates against the landless (whoever they might be), a text 
that allows people to loose their land for fifty years when the average life expectancy 
                                                 
2 Gerstenberger (1993: 357) is one of the few scholars that hints at the possible Wirkungsgeschichte that 
verses 44-46 might have had: 
Man vergleiche die Begründung der Sklaverei unter den Puritanern des 17. und 18. Jh.s durch Hinweis 
auf die “Fremdgeburt” und “Krieggefangenschaft” der importierten Afrikaner und die nachträgliche 
Ausweitung auf die in den USA geborenen Kinder der Negersklaven. Alles das geschah im bewußten 
Rückgriff auf alttestamentliche Konzepte und unter mancherlei – ebenfalls biblisch begründeten – 
Gewissenbissen hinsichtlich der verletzten Menschenwürde. Lev 25,44-46 hat als die einzige 
ausdrückliche Erlaubnis zur Sklavenhaltung der Bibel in der Wirkungsgeschichte eine verheerende 
Rolle gespielt.  
 That would be another worthwhile study to see whether and how these verses functioned in documents that 
legitimated slavery. Gerstenberger refers to the work by Schmidt (1978) that engages with the issue of the 
role that religion played in slavery. I do not find any specific mention of Leviticus 25:44-46 in his book, 
but when he discusses some of the slave laws then one does find references which sound as if they came 
from these verses and that was what Gerstenberger was referring to (Schmidt 1978: 87): 
In der zweiten Auflage des “Body of Liberties” (1660) wurde die Knechtschaft auch auf die Kinder der 
Fremdlinge ausgedehnt. Damit war ihrer Umwandlung in Sklaverei der Weg geebnet. 
 The problem here is that in the first edition “slavery” was only applied to those who were taken as 
“prisoners of war” and thus born elsewhere. As soon as persons that were born in America could also be 
enslaved, it opened the way for the creation of a whole slave class. Whether Leviticus 25 has anything to 
do with this is not clear, but I am sure that if such a study would ever be attempted it will be extremely 
fruitful.  
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was well below that, a text that when compared to others (i.e. Ex 21 and Dt 15), looks 
like a “retrogression” (Lohfink 1991: 47); such a text should not be allowed to have 
such a liberating image. That is not to mention the kind of historical context that one 
could construct for this text and the possible political and other interests that operate 
within the text. The more I read the text, the more I was reminded of the very 
Apartheid ideology with which I grew up. An ideology or world-view that could be 
presented in nice language, but which was good at hiding the terrible realities that lay 
behind the pretty presentation. Likewise, the language of Leviticus 25 presents a fair 
picture, but I cannot help but think that the possible reality behind it was totally 
different. It seems (to me at least) that the liberating image of this text is the result of 
the effectiveness of powerful slogans in our consumer driven world and not the result 
of really being liberating.  
To illustrate this point further, in a document of the WCC called “Commitment to 
Jubilee. Strategies for Hope in Times of Crisis” (1999), many groups of “Jubilee 
people” are identified (Commitment 1999: 14-18). These Jubilee people I take it are 
those that are in need today of the kind of “freedom” proclaimed in Leviticus 25. The 
document then identifies the following groups “children”, “women”, “uprooted” and 
“marginalized” as those people mostly in need of the kind of liberation proclaimed by 
Leviticus 25. There is no doubt in my mind that these groups of people are really in 
need of liberation in our modern world and that they indeed are the ones that suffer 
most in our world. My discomfort arises from my own understanding of the kind of 
liberation that Leviticus 25 exemplifies. Previously the document described the kind 
of freedom proclaimed as follows (Commitment 1999: 11): 
It was the Year of Restoration and would come round every 50 years. Freedom 
would be proclaimed to all the inhabitants of the land. Debts would be cancelled. 
Property would be returned to its former owners. Slaves would be set free. The 
land would be allowed to rest for a year.  
The main question here is whether “all the inhabitants of the land” really include all 
the people that this document claims it does. My own analysis of the text will show 
that only those with legal claims to the land would have profited. The kind of justice 
that Leviticus 25 propagates is only intended for them and they might have been a 
very small minority. Who these people were and how small a group they were will be 
argued in chapter 6, but the point is that they most definitely did not include children, 
women and strangers. Children and women actually only feature in the text as slaves 
and no slaves will be set free, because those with claims to land can technically 
never be slaves. The addressees are actually allowed to take slaves from the 
surrounding peoples and even from the sojourners living amongst them and they will 
never be set free. The text is very successful at keeping these groups in a state of 
exploitation and landlessness. The people identified in the above-mentioned 
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document who are mostly in need of justice in our modern world were not given that 
in Leviticus 25. The text did not change anything in their lives, to the contrary it kept 
them on the margins.  
Now one might well ask whether I am not being extremely unfair towards this ancient 
text? I am, after-all, judging the text by means of values from the modern world, 
comparing it to the human-rights driven culture from where I am reading it and I 
should not expect it to evoke “pleasure, respect and envy” in me. Is my problem thus 
only a severe case of false expectations and that it will disappear if only I were to 
adjust my expectations to be a bit more modest or realistic? Or, was my problem the 
fact that many people (both secular and evangelical) presented the text as worthy of 
“pleasure, respect and envy”, but when I read it with the eyes of a biblical critic I 
registered the opposite?  
1.1 Problem statement 
My problem has to do with the fact that people presuppose that an ancient text has 
the same or even better values than what we strive for today. It is further complicated 
by the fact that I think that the Jubilee 2000 movement represented laudable 
objectives. I am in favour of the kind of debt-relief that was propagated there, but I 
am uncomfortable with the way in which Leviticus 25 is being used in support of that 
movement.3 I do not think that this reading of the Bible is a fair reflection of the text 
itself and I fear that this might actually cause more damage than anything else in our 
modern world. Presupposing that the text is liberating could be dangerous and the 
danger lies in the things that you smuggle in along with the liberating image, the 
values from another world that will do us no good. My discomfort thus has to do with 
this lack of respect for the distance and difference between the ancient text and its 
values and the values that we strive for today. We cannot create that world again and 
we cannot go back to that world and even the values of that world are strange to 
ours.  
But the problem now is what the biblical scholar should do? What is our vocation, our 
role that we have to play in this process? I do support the values that the Jubilee 
2000 movement strove for, but I am uncomfortable with the way in which the biblical 
text is used. What should I do?  
                                                 
3 Houston (2001: 35) addresses a similar problem: 
My object in this paper is to study the text of Leviticus 25 anew to tell whether and to what extent it 
deserves its status as an icon of justice. 
 I think that he expresses similar discomfort as I just did above with the usage of this text.  
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1.2 Hypothesis  
My answer to this problem should not come as too much of a surprise and I have 
hinted at it above when I referred to the fact that “I read with the eyes of a biblical 
critic.” I would argue that even if we do support the objectives of a movement such as 
Jubilee 2000, then the only role that biblical critics are suppose to play and that 
biblical critics are equipped to play is that of the critic. Has that not always been our 
vocation to read texts critically? This is not really a secret or a surprise, but we do not 
always agree on what “criticism” entails. I think that this is partly what this dissertation 
is about, the role that biblical critics play and the way in which we should go about 
being “critical.”  
We live in a world where religion and especially the Christian religion still play a big 
role. This is the reality, whether we like it or not, and I should probably add that this is 
still the reality in South Africa and Africa and even if things are different in secularised 
Europe, it still is part of my reality. We do not have to mention that religion plays a big 
role in the violence in the Middle East, whether it is Israel, Palestine, Iraq, or 
Afghanistan and whether we think of the conquerors or the conquered, religion plays 
a big role in each different interest group. It is our responsibility to play a critical role 
in these debates where different groups often claim that God and some ancient texts 
are on “their side.” 
I would thus argue that we should not shy away from criticism even if this means that 
we expose sides to a text that are not that liberating, sides that we are not 
comfortable with. I hope that playing this critical role will equip us better to eventually 
make a theological-ethical contribution, which will probably be far more careful and 
more humble. Criticism thus becomes a prerequisit for saying something about 
theology and ethics. Without engaging with the possible dark and oppressive side of 
a text we should not attempt to spell out the liberating sides of a text.  
The question just is what this critical role entails and how far we are to go?  
1.3 Overview of study 
In the next chapter (chapter 2) I will engage with this question as to the critical role 
that we as biblical scholars should play when reading biblical texts. I argue that the 
most responsible way of reading a text is an “ideological-critical” reading. As we will 
see, this includes a very suspicious reading of the biblical text, which attempts to 
reconstruct the world-view or ideology of which one could find glimpses in the biblical 
text. It also includes attempting to identify “distortion” in this ideology, asking whose 
views were represented and whose views were not represented and suppressed? It 
further includes asking whose interests were being served by the text and whose 
interests were neglected or even undermined by the text? I also understand an 
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ideological-critical reading as “ethical” in the sense that the biblical critic somehow 
has to say whether the values exemplified in the text would be liberating or 
dangerous in our modern world. Biblical critics should ask the “relevance” question, 
even if it means that they have to come up with an answer like “irrelevant” or 
“dangerous.” That I argue is the role that biblical critics should consistently play, 
because it is our ethical responsibility. I also think that biblical critics should go 
beyond this kind of ideological criticism in the sense that we should eventually allow 
the text to surprise us with its liberating potential. An initial ideological-critical reading 
might put us in a better position to make a theological-ethical contribution. It will 
definitely make us more careful.  
But this kind of reading also attempts to take stock of the ideological baggage of the 
reader and what role this might play in the reading process. Below I argue that 
“Apartheid” is one of those role-players in my own way of reading a text. It has 
predisposed me to read in a certain manner and I attempt to describe this 
predisposition in order to understand how it influences the way in which I approach 
the text. This is thus where I would want to end up; slightly beyond an ideological-
critical interpretation and the question is how I will get there?  
Before I attempt to answer that question I should first add what I will not do in the 
next chapter is to offer a research overview of the academic work done on Leviticus 
25. The reader will find very good research overviews in recent monographs on the 
Holiness Code;4 for instance, both Ruwe (1999) and Grünwaldt (1999) offer 
extensive descriptions of what their academic forerunners did. Another good essay is 
that by Otto (1999) and some of the other essays in that volume also offer interesting 
overviews of how things have developed in the past decades. The commentary by 
Milgrom (1991, 2000 and 2001) engages with nearly every important exegetical issue 
that has emerged in the past. It will thus be an exercise in repetition to attempt 
something like this, but I will attempt to keep the reader informed by means of 
footnotes if the need arises.5  
                                                 
4 The first person who used the term “Holiness Code” was Klostermann (1893: 385) who used it rather 
casually when he said, “bedenke ich weiter, daß er [i.e. Ezekiel] … mit den Worten unserer 
Gesetzsammlung, die ich von nun an kurz das ‘Heiligkeitsgesetz’ nennen will, redet …” This essay 
(Klostermann 1893: 368-418) was actually an attempt to refute the argument that Ezekiel was the author of 
the Holiness Code. The latter position was represented by Horst (1881).  
5 Another issue that I am not interested in is whether “it ever really happened.” Hartley (1992: 427-430), 
Wright (1992: 1027-1028), Fager (1993: 34-36) and Milgrom (2001: 2242-2243) offer very good 
overviews of these debates, but most of them opt for a fairly early dating of these laws. My own 
constructed historical context differs from theirs and even then I am not interested in whether these laws 
were ever applied. I do not really think that they were ever applied, although that might have been the 
intention.  
 I will not engage with the issue of how the biblical laws are related to other similar laws from the ancient 
Near East. This issue has been addressed by many (see Cardellini 1981, or Chirichigno 1993). Fager (1993: 
24-27) also offers a very brief overview. 
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One trend that is very clear though is that studies on Leviticus and the Holiness Code 
are moving away from the more traditional historical-critical or diachronic 
approaches. This will, of course, come as no surprise to most scholars. As with many 
other texts in the Hebrew Bible the confidence with which biblical scholars 
reconstruct different layers is rapidly being eroded. It is even happening in the 
German-speaking world, that old bastion of Literarkritik. Just to make this point, 1999 
was an extremely fruitful year for both Leviticus and Holiness Code studies. We saw 
no less than four monographs appearing, two on Leviticus (Warning 1999 and 
Douglas 1999) and two on what has traditionally been called the Holiness Code 
(Ruwe 1999 and Grünwaldt 1999). Of these only Grünwaldt (1999) is an example of 
a traditional historical-critical study. He does Literarkritik, he uses terms like 
“Redaktor” and “Tradition” and he constructs a historical context. Yet the kind of 
Literarkritik that he does is far more modest than what was previously done 
especially when compared to scholars like Elliger (1966a) and Cholewinski (1976). 
The other three examples are all more inclined to be synchronic, although Ruwe 
(1999) tends to fall back on diachronic explanations when things are difficult to 
explain on a synchronic level.  
My own initial engagements with Leviticus 25 in chapters 3 and 4 are also 
synchronic, at least in the sense that I do not attempt to identify layers (although that 
is rather tempting at stages).6 At the start of chapter 3 I do explain how I intend to use 
a concept like “synchronic” which does not (for me at least) necessarily mean that 
such a reading has to be a-historical. Chapter 3 is called “grammatical features of 
Leviticus 25” and it offers the kind of reading that some might previously have called 
a “close” reading. One could also simply call it a “thorough” reading and the objective 
was to start somewhere and to get the proverbial “grip” on the text. In that chapter I 
identify certain grammatical and stylistic features in the text on which I build further 
engagements with it. I take it that one does not need to motivate why one wants to 
read a text like this, because all readings of a text have to start somewhere. Even 
traditional historical-critical readings started here at the final form of the text, the 
difference was only that they were looking for different things (i.e. layers) and they, of 
course, always found them.  
Chapter 4 is named “persuasive features of Leviticus 25” and is a kind of rhetorical 
reading of the text. It is thus a further synchronic reading of Leviticus 25 and one 
might now wonder what the exact difference between the two chapters could be? In 
chapter 4 I specifically attempt to identify persuasive strategies that Watts (1999) has 
identified in the Pentateuch. These include “address”, “motivation” and lastly I treat 
“repetition and variation” together, two strategies that he treated separately. I found 
                                                 
6 See especially my discussions in 4.2.4, 4.2.7 and 5.3 below.  
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these categories extremely helpful, because they help us to acquire glimpses of the 
world-view or ideology of the biblical authors and their intended audiences. These 
strategies that authors use to persuade help us to construct the way in which they 
understood themselves and their audiences and especially the way in which they 
defined themselves over and against other groups. It also shows us how they 
understood God (in this case YHWH) and what role he played in their understanding 
of themselves and others. Another useful result of identifying the persuasive features 
in a text is the fact that it becomes clearer what was at stake in that society and what 
interests were involved in writing these texts. It helps us to understand to whose 
advantage the text was written and who would have profited from its reading. Thus at 
the end of chapter 4 we will return to the objectives that I have identified at the end of 
chapter 2. By now I have answered the question that I stated above of how to reach 
this objective of an ideological-critical reading?  
In chapter 5 I will attempt to read the surrounding chapters (of Leviticus 25) similarly. 
I specifically ask what these texts have in common with Leviticus 25 and how that 
helps us to understand Leviticus 25. I point out in that chapter that there is indeed a 
close relationship with chapter 26 and in that sense I concur with what some scholars 
have argued (i.e. Sun 1990). My reading of chapter 26 is far more thorough than the 
other chapters, simply because 26 has so much in common with 25. Yet I also treat 
chapters 23, 24 and 27 individually. Eventually I also identify certain themes and one 
could say “ideologies” throughout what has traditionally been called the Holiness 
Code. These include motives and themes that these texts share with chapter 25, 
although they differ with regards to the grammatical and (to a lesser extent) 
persuasive features that I identified in Leviticus 25 in chapter 3. The aim of this 
reading is still to understand how these people who both wrote the text and for whom 
the text was intended understood themselves. Once again I focus specifically on their 
understanding of themselves in relation to each other, YHWH, the land and other 
groups of people identified in the text. The end-result is to uncover an “ideology of 
land”, which we do not only find in chapter 25, but in many of the surrounding 
chapters as well.  
In chapter 6 I engage with the issue of constructing a socio-historical context for 
these texts. This historical context is thus not only for Leviticus 25, but also for the 
surrounding text including what has traditionally been called the Holiness Code. Like 
many other scholars I argue for the Persian period. This does not mean that I think 
that the Holiness Code was an ex nihilo creation in this period.7 There is obviously 
                                                 
7 This is also against the older view that the Holiness Code was an older independent code that preceded the 
rest of the Priestly document. Jüngling (1999: 29) argues that the change came about after the work of 
Elliger (1966a). Elliger was the first to question this, but afterwards many others followed. See, for 
 9
older material in the code, but the problem is always to identify that material. 
Grünwaldt (1999) is very good at pointing out how precarious these constructions 
can sometimes be, although the same criticism goes for some of his own “additions.” 
The question is when the final composition was composed and with what purposes in 
mind? The safest would probably be to argue that the Persian period provide us with 
a rhetorical context in which one could argue that the persuasive features that I 
identified might have been at their most effective or persuasive.  
My presentation of Leviticus 25 and surrounding texts in that socio-historical context 
eventually radically changes the “liberating image” that the text has in the Jubilee 
2000 movement. In this socio-historical context Leviticus 25 becomes an elitist text of 
the returning Exiles who want their original land back. I argue that they probably 
wanted to do this at the cost of those that stayed behind during the exile, those that 
were, for instance, “invisible” in Leviticus 26. It thus becomes a text that serves the 
interests of the rich returning Elite and probably the larger Empire as well. But this 
turned on its head image then confronts us with a further theological and ethical 
issue of what do we do with this “discovery”?  
I will attempt to answer this question in chapter 7, where I eventually attempt to 
identify some of the “liberating potential” in the text, before I conclude in chapter 8. 
  
                                                                                                                                            
instance, Wagner (1974) or Cholewinski (1976). Ruwe (1999: 14-15) also provides a good overview of the 
contribution of Elliger and the implications thereof.  
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CHAPTER 2 
TOWARDS AN IDEOLOGICAL-CRITICAL READING (AND 
BEYOND)  
Die hele lewe leef in ons: om onsself te ken - en om selfs intel- 
ligent nederig te wees - moet ons al die gestaltes ken wat in ons 
aanwesig is.   N.P. VAN WYK LOUW1 
2.1 Introduction 
As we saw in the introduction, Leviticus 25 is a text with a very liberating image 
world-wide. We also saw that the word “Jubilee” has functioned as a very effective 
rallying cry in movements fighting for a freer and fairer world. Yet as I also pointed 
out, as soon as one starts to actually read the text, other not-so-liberating sides of the 
text emerge. The question then becomes how we ought to react to this? This is the 
issue that will be explored in the rest of the chapter. What role is the biblical scholar 
to play? What does the role of a “critic” entail? This latter question, I would think, is 
one of the fundamental questions that I will address in this chapter and in this 
dissertation. Is it important to play this role and if so, why?  
Another question would be what kind of “factors” are involved when we as biblical 
scholars or critics do our readings? These questions will feature in the rest of the 
discussion, but I will start by contrasting the views of more traditional historical critics 
with those of scholars who could be described as “engaged” or “contextual”, or 
“committed.” My problem is that I am attracted to both sides, in the sense that I want 
to read like both do and my analysis will thus be a conscious search for things in 
common. This will lead the discussion to a scholar (i.e. Robert Carroll) that I think 
embodies many of the different features of the other scholars that I find attractive. 
Discussing his contribution will slowly lead us to the context from where I read 
namely South Africa. It will also become clear in the following discussion that the 
place from where somebody reads is indeed one of those factors that play a role in 
how he/she reads. I will also discuss the views of another scholar (i.e. Daniel Patte) 
who has introduced useful concepts to the debate. My evaluation of his suggestions 
will be done by means of how the biblical text was used in support of Apartheid. This 
will lead us to the question as to how my South African experience has predisposed 
me to approach the Bible in a certain manner? I will then conclude with some 
remarks on what I think is important when approaching a biblical text that might be 
used in modern day ethical debates, or contemporary quests for justice.  
                                                 
1 Quoted from Giliomee (2003). I would translate it as follows: 
The whole of life lives within us: to know ourselves - and in order for ourselves to be humbly 
intelligent - we must know all the configurations (“gestaltes”) that are present within us.  
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2.2 The “critical” task of biblical scholars 
In the discussion below I would like to revisit some terms that are still frequently used 
in biblical scholarship. The main concept under discussion will be the term “critical” 
which I will at first relate to the now rather old distinction between what a text “meant” 
and what it “means.” Some, if not many, would call this like West (1995: 74) a “tried, 
and tired” distinction, but as we will see below these concepts seem to be rather 
“alive and kicking” in biblical scholarship. The handful of essays that I will focus on 
below mostly date from 1998 and 2000 and were either part of the SBL meeting of 
1999 in Finland, or some were published in the “Cambridge companion to biblical 
interpretation” (1998). I would thus think that they are publications, which provide an 
accurate presentation of the contemporary debate in biblical scholarship.  
2.2.1 “Being Critical” as “analysing the past”/ disinterested scholarship 
The often-quoted essay by Krister Stendahl in “The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the 
Bible” of 1962 seems to have been an important articulation2 of the task of the 
exegete. As recently as 1999 the same issues identified by Stendahl again became 
the main issues on the agenda at the International SBL meeting in Helsinki when the 
Finish (New Testament) scholar, Heikki Räisänen, tried to argue a similar point.  
The Stendahl essay is especially known for the distinction between what a text 
“meant” and what a text “means” and for Stendahl the task of an exegete entailed “to 
have the ‘original’ spelled out with highest degree of perception in its own terms” 
which he then called the “descriptive task” (1962: 422). This descriptive task is the 
first task of the exegete. Stendahl was also in favour of “objective”3 scholarship 
where the material itself was the “check whether our interpretation is correct or not” 
(1962: 422). When he (1962: 425-431) discussed the second or “hermeneutic stage” 
he specifically focused on the tension between descriptive theology and what today 
is known as “systematic theology.” He (1962: 427) described systematic theology in 
all its diversity as “hybrids where systematic and biblical categories were hopelessly 
intermingled, …” Descriptive theology was suppose to “judge” whether systematic 
theology “succeeds in communicating the intention implied in the biblical texts, an 
intention which only a precise and uncompromised study of the original could detect.” 
A further important side-effect of descriptive theology would be to expose the church 
                                                 
2 Watson (1994: 31) suggests that this essay was regarded as significant not because it was innovative, but 
because it was understood as a good representation of the practice of biblical studies then.  
3 Stendahl (1962: 422) acknowledges that in the past this was not done when previous scholars “peddled 
Kantian, Hegelian, or Ritschlian ideas, ...” And then he states:  
All this naturally calls for caution; but the relativity of human objectivity does not give us an excuse to 
excel in bias in an introductory chapter.  
 Thus, although he acknowledged the deficiencies of previous scholars he still regards it as a viable option.  
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to the “original” which should have a creative impact on the church.4 This is to make 
a long argument terribly short. 
Räisänen (2000: 9-28) delivering his plenary address nearly forty years later presents 
a similar position, but in stead of engaging with systematic theology he engages with 
what he calls “liberationist approaches.” Historical criticism as exemplified by 
Stendahl above has often been criticised by these approaches. He refers to the work 
of scholars like Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza and R.S. Sugirtharajah and uses a 
quote from the latter to sum up the “chief sin” of historical criticism (which seems to 
be rather close to what Stendahl was arguing): 
In Sugirtharajah’s words: the “original sin of the historical-critical method” is the 
notion of a division of labor “between biblical scholarship and theological 
enterprise”; the “hermeneutical gap” between the biblical milieu and the present 
day is thus a problem created by this method.5 
The main argument of Räisänen in the rest of the paper is that historical criticism 
should not be regarded as an enemy by liberationist approaches, but rather as an 
ally. He does this by refuting some of the criticism aimed at historical criticism. One 
important issue for him (2000: 11-12) is that historical criticism is not monolith and 
that within this “paradigm” one could find different exponents who often differed from 
each other considerably. Furthermore, he (2000: 12-13) is not convinced by the 
accusation that any representative of the approach ever wished “to model his [sic] 
exegesis on the natural sciences.” The whole issue of “objectivity” is also wrongly 
represented in the criticism levelled at historical critics (Räisänen 2000: 12): 
In the words of James Barr, who comments on Stendahl’s approach, 
“‘objectively’ here means: independently of whether one advocates this theology 
[to be studied] or disapproves of it.” Everyone has some purpose or agenda, but 
“we are not speaking about perfect objectivity.” It is simply a question of fairness 
and open-mindedness over against special pleading and propaganda.6  
                                                 
4 Stendahl (1962: 430) regards the Reformation as a very good example of how “exposure” to the original 
had a creative impact on the church. This statement will of course be questioned today. What Martin 
Luther discovered in Paul would not be regarded by many Pauline scholars as the “original” anymore, but 
might have been more influenced by the needs of Luther’s own context. 
5 In Sugirtharajah’s (2000: 49-57) response to Räisänen he articulates his view of historical criticism clearer 
and describes it as “ambivalent.” He actually values historical criticism for “creating a hermeneutical 
distance” which is useful in countering the misuse of biblical texts (2000: 51). But he is also critical of 
these methods (2000: 52): 
To some of us the historical critical method is colonial, because of its insistence that a right reading is 
mediated through the proper use of historical-critical tools alone.  
 It is this arrogance or presumptuousness of historical criticism that causes problems. See especially 
Sugirtharajah’s (2000: 53-57) description of how these methods were used by missionaries to claim the 
superiority of Christianity.  
6 See also Barr (2000: 35-40) for similar remarks. 
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Eventually Räisänen (2000: 12) opts (with Barr) for putting “the emphasis on the 
‘critical’ rather than on the ‘historical.’” He (2000: 13) agrees with Stendahl’s 
distinction, but also with the “goal of global relevance.”  
Then Räisänen (2000: 13-16) criticises Schüssler Fiorenza’s “liberationist reading of 
Revelations’ rhetoric” for the fact that it “seems to make utility the decisive criterion, 
even for historical interpretation.” Along these lines he makes the important point that 
part of the critical exercise is to give honest representations of the “bad-sides” of the 
Bible or what he calls the “anti-dialogical” sides (Räisänen 2000: 16): 
If the strong non-dialogical, and even sectarian, side of the Bible is suppressed 
in exegesis, then it cannot be adequately dealt with. It is better to admit its 
existence, wrestle with it and criticize it openly. It is our questions, not our 
answers, that should be affected by modern concerns.  
Räisänen (2000: 16-20) then identifies “anti-Judaism”, “anti-Canaanism” and the 
“polemic against idols” as examples of these “anti-dialogical” sides of the Bible. He 
(2000: 21) also argues that Sachkritik, especially as criticism of fanaticism and 
intolerance, has always been present in historical-critical studies. He then quotes the 
following text from Stendahl (1984: 4) which was Stendahl’s answer to a question as 
to how his work was so preoccupied with “Jews and women” (Räisänen 2000: 21): 
The Christian Scriptures contain stuff that has proven calamitous to both Jews 
and women. The nonapologetic thrust of descriptive biblical theology allows us to 
face that problem squarely. It suggests a hermeneutic suited for the ‘public 
health’ task of theology, that is, a hermeneutic of suspicion, by which the 
nondesirable side effects, or even effects, of the biblical material can be 
discerned and counteracted. But such a task requires the honesty of not 
‘prettying up’ the original.  
For Räisänen this critical capacity of being honest about the original of historical 
criticism is its greatest asset and therefore it should be acknowledged as “a friend, 
rather than an enemy, of contextual theology” (2000: 25). Räisänen seems to be very 
sympathetic towards contextual theology and especially post-colonialism, but he 
insists that “a colonial attitude is not inherent in the historical approach itself” (2000: 
26).  
Räisänen is thus attempting to muster support for the objectives of historical criticism, 
especially because he thinks that these objectives can serve the objectives of 
“liberationist approaches.” Räisänen’s position is basically the same as Stendahl’s 
although he prefers to engage with “liberationist” theologians whereas Stendahl 
engaged with systematic theologians. Comparing the two of them leaves the 
impression that very little has changed in forty years of biblical criticism, except 
maybe for the impression that the main challenge to biblical criticism is not from 
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systematic theology anymore, but from liberationist theology (whatever we might 
mean with that). 
Another similar position is that of Barton (1998b) in the “Cambridge Companion to 
Biblical Interpretation.”7 He identifies four features that are typical of historical 
criticism. These are 1) the asking of generic questions, 2) the search for the original 
meaning, 3) historical reconstructions and 4) disinterested scholarship (Barton 
1998b: 9-12).  
With reference to the latter Barton (1998b: 11-12) states that “historical criticism was 
meant to be value-neutral, or disinterested. It tried, so far possible, to approach the 
text without prejudice, and to ask not what it meant ‘for me’, but simply what it meant. 
Against any ‘pious’ reading, a historical-critical enquiry is guided by a desire to 
discover the facts as they actually are, as in Ranke’s famous dictum that the 
historian’s task is to establish the fact about the past ‘as it actually was’ (wie es 
eigentlich gewesen).” This formulation is very close to that of Stendahl and Räisänen 
above.  
Barton then continues stating that this is one of the characteristics of historical 
criticism that has received most of the criticism as aptly described in the following 
quote (1998b: 13): 
No-one is really ‘disinterested’; everyone has an axe to grind. We should 
therefore abandon the pretence of academic neutrality, and accept that our 
biblical study serves some interest or other. … at least being honest about our 
commitment - unlike historical critics, who are pretending to be neutral but thus 
smuggle in their commitments under cover of dark. 
But Barton (1998b: 13-14) is not convinced by these critical arguments. He does not 
think that the arguments have been made “rigorous” enough and he thinks that 
historical criticism has not been portrayed accurately. For instance, he does not really 
think that historical criticism was always as “indifferent to the contemporary relevance 
of the biblical text and ‘antiquarian’ in its concerns…” (As the quote of Sugirtharajah 
by Räisänen above also demonstrates.) He (1998b: 15-16) thinks that the reverse is 
actually true in the sense “that criticism has scarcely ever been historical enough, 
                                                 
7 The Cambridge companion to biblical interpretation intends to be a “progress report on biblical 
interpretation in the 1990s” (Barton 1998a: 1). With regards to his own essay in it, Barton (1998a: 2) writes 
that his objective with his essay (1998b) is to ask “whether the ‘historical-critical method’ may not have 
been falsely demonized…” He continues to explain that some people regard historical criticism as outdated 
(1998a: 2): 
When this book was being planned, some advisers suggested that there should be no chapter on 
historical criticism at all, since it was now entirely passé. Against this I have tried to show that 
‘historical’ critics raised (and raise) issues that should still be on the agenda for the student of the 
Bible, and which will not go away.  
 We should thus understand that Barton is attempting to “defend” historical criticism and to give it a 
“fairer” representation than it has had until now. Barton’s essay shares this apologetic trend with that of 
Räisänen.   
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that it has usually been far too influenced by commitments lying outside scholarly 
detachment.” 
Now, one might well ask whether he is not basically saying the same as the 
opponents of historical criticism, that historical critics attempted or aspired to be 
“objective”, but that they never managed to pull it off? What exactly does Barton find 
so unconvincing? Is it the accusation that historical criticism was not really “objective” 
(with which he seems to agree)? Or is it the claim that “objectivity” is an unattainable 
notion that should be abandoned along with other unattainable objectives? It seems 
to be more of the latter, because for Barton this will betray the critical character of the 
discipline (as we will see below) and he does not want to let go of this aim of 
“objectivity.” One of his (1998b: 16-17) reasons for emphasising this aspect is 
because he understands the objectives of historical criticism as very close to those of 
the Reformation and not so much the Enlightenment (as the opponents would like to 
argue). He calls this portrayal “a revisionist account.” The main objective of the 
Reformation was to let the Bible speak for itself, free from the “monopoly on 
meaning” by the church. In the same vein the ultimate aim of historical criticism 
would be to free the text to speak for itself.  
Barton (1998b: 18-19) continues and states that he prefers to speak of “biblical 
criticism” instead of “the historical-critical method” (similar to Räisänen and Barr 
above). The reason being that for him “historical” is not the main characteristic of 
these methods, but “critical” and “its emphasis on asking free questions about the 
meaning of texts unconstrained by alleged authorities – whether the authority of 
Christian or Jewish tradition, the authority of current ecclesiastical structures or the 
authority of received academic opinion.”  
Barton (1998b: 19) is furthermore very critical of the tendency to canonise particular 
approaches, whether it is historical criticism or any other more recent approach. Even 
if this was the case with historical criticism until a few decades ago, this situation 
cannot be “repaired” by banning these methods and canonising new ones (Barton 
1998b: 19): 
It is a shame to an academic discipline if the latter course becomes the norm; 
and the cure is not to defend this or that method as ideologically pure, but to 
revive a true spirit of criticism, for which there is no such thing as ideological 
purity, only open-mindedness and honesty. 
But is that not what the opposing scholars are arguing for, a kind of honesty? Would 
they not (to a certain extent) agree with him? Would they not propose more-or-less 
the same cure of more criticism? There is no “ideological purity” so what shall we do? 
Be “open-minded” and “honest”! The question of course would be what different 
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scholars mean by these same terms? Before we go there I would like to sum up the 
discussion until now. 
1) The above views of Stendahl, Räisänen and Barton are very good examples of 
the position of traditional biblical criticism. Yet, it seems that the focus of 
Räisänen’s and Barton’s views is moving away from “historical” and a 
distinction between “then” and “now” to a reformulation and focus on the term 
“critical.”  
2) Both of them use the word “honest” with regards to scholarship and especially 
with regards to the critical role, but with Räisänen it is very clear what he 
means by that. For him it means being honest about the “non-dialogical” sides 
of the biblical text and not to attempt to hide them or as he says to “pretty them 
up.”   
3) Still Räisänen and Barton do not foresee an essentially different practice of 
biblical criticism, but seem to be trying to do the same things, but to do it better 
or rather to be “more critical” than their ancestors.  
2.2.2 “Being critical” as “analysing the past” and “the present”/ 
engaged scholarship 
These are, of course, not the only voices in modern biblical scholarship. Other 
scholars are more suspicious and are not satisfied with the notion that we should be 
doing the same things, be it “better.” Christopher Rowland, for one, is convinced that 
“all interpretation, in one form or another, manifests the agenda of the modern world, 
…” (1995a: 223). This is reminiscent of Barton’s tongue in the cheek, “everybody has 
an axe to grind” above and it means that for Rowland there is no notion of objectivity 
that Stendahl, Räisänen and Barton strive for. In another essay specifically entitled 
“The ‘Interested’ Interpreter” by Rowland (1995b: 429-444) it is further clear that 
although he acknowledges prejudice he is nevertheless still aiming at critical 
scholarship as the following quote shows:  
A critical reading will involve the ability to acknowledge prejudice and so enable 
the peculiarities and ‘otherness’ of the text to become fully apparent and for the 
text to ‘speak’, if not precisely on its own terms, at least with sufficient respect for 
its own integrity that it does not merely mirror the prejudice of the reader.  
Thus Rowland’s “critical reading” entails a self-critical element which it is often said, 
(as Barton pointed out above) historical-critical scholarship never had sufficiently. But 
still Rowland’s objective is like Barton’s above “for the text to ‘speak.’” He (1995b: 
433) reiterates that biblical scholars should learn from the Third World8 and his chief 
motivation for this is the fact that liberation exegetes have one thing in common with 
                                                 
8 Rowland (1995b: 433) does have some reservations about these approaches. His reservations include their 
reliance on historical reconstruction and also the impression that they sometimes make “the Bible conform 
to twentieth-century concerns.” 
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mainstream biblical exegetes and that is “a concern to be critical.” The following 
quote is a good example of the challenge posed by the liberationist perspective to 
biblical scholarship (Rowland 1995b: 433-434): 
Indeed, Western exegesis can thank the liberationist perspective for the 
incessant reminder of its own partiality. We need to be reminded of the 
ideological character of our study, in particular imagining that we are ‘drawing 
from the text simply what it contains.’ Ideology is not something which belongs to 
the overtly committed readings. Indeed, it is part of the insidious character of 
ideology that those who are in control of the way in which the text is interpreted 
deny that their readings are in any way ideological9 and claim instead that they 
are the product of ‘scientific’ methods.  
To sum up, for Rowland there is also no such thing as “ideological purity”, but that all 
readings have “ideologies” operating below the surface, as Barton said (be it tongue 
in the cheek), “under cover of darkness.” For him (1995b: 434) the marks of “critical 
interpretation” should be “an awareness of its own approach to the text” and “the 
understandable constraints that this method imposes”, but also “the necessity of 
openness to other interpretative methods.” These marks should function as “both 
checks and stimuli for change.” In other words, for Rowland one of the prerequisites 
of being more critical is the ability to have dialogue with other interpretative methods 
and in this regard he considers contextual theologians worthwhile dialogue partners.  
One could therefore say that both Barton and Rowland want more criticism, but for 
Barton it means doing the same things as historical-critics aspired to do, just better. 
Rowland wants to be more critical by having dialogue with a greater range of 
partners, which for him should include contextual theologians. This sounds in a 
sense similar to the things that Räisänen pleaded for, namely a division of labour 
between biblical scholars and contextual theologians, but in Räisänen’s description it 
is the biblical scholars that provide the critical tools for the contextual theologians.10 
In Rowland’s portrayal it is the other way around. This problem becomes clearer 
when we take a look at Schüssler Fiorenza’s response to Räisänen.  
Schüssler Fiorenza (2000: 29-48) does not agree with Räisänen and is very critical of 
his essay. The title of her response is “defending the center, trivializing the margins” 
and the following quote explains why (2000: 29): 
                                                 
9 Rowland’s (1995b: 433-434) use of the term “ideology” could also be translated with something like 
“interest”, but it has a much more “hidden” of “stealthy” feel to it. It is reminiscent of more Marxist 
definitions of ideology where the “distorting” qualities of ideology are often accentuated.  
10 There is the lingering feeling in Räisänen’s presentation that historical criticism is still at the top of the 
academic “food chain” or “pecking order.” Although he states frequently that he is positive towards 
contextual theology, one hardly ever finds any acknowledgement that he learned anything from contextual 
theology. It seems that one of his main points is that the critical noises made by contextual theology were 
unnecessary because they were already present in biblical criticism. 
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This was not a serious engagement of the voices from the margins but a subtle 
attempt by an esteemed colleague to safeguard the center which he rhetorically 
marked as historical criticism and to misrepresent the margins.  
Schüssler Fiorenza (2000: 32-43) calls his strategy the “rhetoric of marginalization 
and misstatement” and she identifies four results of this strategy namely, (1) 
“homogenization”, (2) “co-optation”, (3) “misrecognition” and (4) “misrepresentation.”  
With regards to (1) she (2000: 34) refers to his use of the concept, “liberationist 
approach”, as the “rhetorical strategy of homogenization.” She accuses him of 
constructing a “common Feindbild” by lumping all these different viewpoints together 
under one category and thus ignoring their differences.11 For Schüssler Fiorenza 
(2000: 34-35) co-optation “defines the proposals and the interests of the margins as 
those of the master thereby functionalizing them to achieve the master’s own 
interests.” Räisänen uses this strategy to underplay the challenge for a “paradigm 
shift.” In short, the challenge of the liberationist approach is trivialised. For Schüssler 
Fiorenza it is not really a battle about method, but rather about power.  
“Misrecognition” refers to the fact that Räisänen camouflages the real differences 
between historical criticism and liberationist approaches (Schüssler Fiorenza 2000: 
35-37). The problem here is the fact that Räisänen never really engages with the 
challenge (as posed by Schüssler Fiorenza) that “a decentering of hegemonic biblical 
scholarship has to take place so that practitioners from different social locations can 
move into and reconstitute the center of biblical studies.” Räisänen refuses to 
acknowledge that the method of historical criticism itself should be blamed, but 
instead blames the practitioners. It is especially this differentiation between “method 
and practitioners” that has been challenged and Räisänen’s response is deemed 
inadequate.12 
Schüssler Fiorenza (2000: 37-43) also claims that Räisänen “misrepresented” her 
work on Revelation and the work of Stendahl using “him as a central figure in the 
discursive chess-game of his apologia for historical criticism.”13 Yet her main problem 
                                                 
11 It is significant to note that Räisänen himself complained that this was what critics did with historical 
criticism, that a kind of homogeneity was presumed where in fact there were much more difference and 
variety (see Räisänen 2000: 11-12). 
12 In this regard the following quote form Stendahl’s response is very interesting. He refers to his attempts 
through the years to “discern the tensions within the Scriptures” (Stendahl 2000: 65): 
While feeling that I was helping in the task of unmasking all kinds of Western male and racial 
imperialisms I now must ask to what extent the very method I championed was in itself so wedded to 
Western culture that it was actually part of the post-colonial problematic. 
Thus, it seems that his opinion on this issue is much closer to Schüssler Fiorenza than to Räisänen who 
does not want to acknowledge this. In this light it is especially strange that Stendahl never challenges 
Räisänen on this in his response (unless that is indeed what he is doing in a more “subtle” manner).  
13 Stendahl himself (2000: 61-66) does not claim that he was “misrepresented”, but instead gives a very 
positive response to Räisänen’s address. 
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with his misrepresentation of her work is that he missed the important issue of how 
we account for different interpretations of Revelations (2000: 40-41): 
These differences in interpretation, I have argued, can no longer be settled on 
the level of text or historical “facts” but must be adjudicated on the level of 
hermeneutical and reconstructive models of historical-religious interpretation. 
They can not be settled by retreating to the methodological dualism between 
historical exegesis and contemporary application nor by revalorizing the slogan 
“what the text meant” and “what it means today.” 
Thus, Schüssler Fiorenza rejects the “division of labour” and reiterates that her own 
work has attempted to go beyond this distinction. She (2000: 42) then expresses her 
view of what “critical feminist hermeneutics” should aim at: 
Hence, a critical feminist hermeneutics cannot simply “apply” or translate the 
solutions of the past to the problems of the present. Rather, its historical-religious 
imagination seeks to reconstruct the socio-political worlds of biblical writings and 
contemporary biblical interpretations in order to open them up for critical inquiry 
and critical theological reflection. Studying the biblical past in order to name the 
destructive aspects of its language and symbolic universe as well as to recover 
its unfulfilled historical possibilities becomes a primary task for biblical 
scholarship today. 
For Schüssler Fiorenza it is not as simple as to expose our current context to the 
“original” as Stendahl wanted to do and then to wait for something “creative” to 
happen. Instead for her the process is far more complicated and she does not only 
seek to reconstruct the socio-political world of the past, but also of “contemporary 
biblical interpretations.” To this extent it is considerably different from Stendahl’s 
original proposal. The objective of all of this is also twofold for her. She wants to 
name “the destructive aspects of its language and symbolic universe” and she wants 
to recover “its unfulfilled historical possibilities.” These “destructive aspects” are 
reminiscent of Räisänen’s “non-dialogical” sides, but Räisänen does not offer 
anything similar to Schüssler Fiorenza’s “unfulfilled historical possibilities”, apparently 
because the Bible is usually more culprit than saviour in his eyes.   
2.2.3 Evaluation 
There are obviously two broad perspectives above.  
1) On the one hand we have Stendahl, Räisänen and Barton who are supporters 
of the traditional ideals of historical criticism, these ideals being “objectivity” or 
“scholarly distance” or “disinterested scholarship” and the quest for 
reconstructing the biblical “original.” The preferred way of describing these 
objectives (nowadays) is by using concepts like “being critical.” The content of 
these terms seems to be to “let the text speak for itself” free from other 
“constraints” and for somebody like Räisänen it would specifically mean not to 
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present a “prettier picture” than is the case. These scholars mainly think that 
historical criticism was a good idea, but not always executed properly.  
2) On the other hand there are those who argue that this is not enough. Rowland 
acknowledges that all scholarship is interested, but still he would like the “text 
to speak” by being more critical, which for him means to engage in dialogue 
with contextual partners. Schüssler Fiorenza takes it a step further and insists 
that we need to analyse the context of the interpreter because that plays just as 
big a role in our interpretations as the text itself. But I would think that the most 
striking aspect of her response is that she does not “beat about the bush” and 
that she identifies the main issue at stake here as power.  
The interesting (and hopeful) aspect of this discussion is that some proponents, 
whom I have described as belonging to different perspectives, do share a certain 
range of vocabulary. This is, for instance, the case when we compare Barton and 
Rowland where we find a phrase like “to free the text” and “to let the text speak for 
itself.” The question that surfaces then is to “free the text from what” or “to let it speak 
for itself over against what or whom” and this is where their two ways then apparently 
part. For Barton it is part of his argument that biblical criticism (his preferred term) 
should be understood as continuing the tradition of the Reformation who wanted to 
free the text from the shackles of the church. Yet, for Barton the current threat to the 
text seems to be what he calls the “canonising” of a specific method. Here he 
acknowledges that this was a problem with historical criticism, which sensitises him 
not to repeat this mistake. Rowland’s use of the term gives the impression of being 
less optimistic since he acknowledges that it is not really possible for the text to 
speak on its own terms, but “at least with sufficient respect for its own integrity that it 
does not merely mirror the prejudice of the reader.” Whereas the church or a 
“canonised method” or “authority”14 seems to be the biggest threat to integrity of the 
text for Barton, the prejudice of the reader becomes the threat in the words of 
Rowland. But then one could ask whether the prejudice of the reader and the method 
used by the reader, or the tradition form which she reads, are not really things that 
are so intertwined that we cannot really distinguish between the two? Thus, although 
the different vocabularies sometimes do drift apart, the arguments often boil down to 
the same thing.  
The point that I want to make is that there seems to be common ground between 
some of these scholars that I have initially portrayed as representing two 
perspectives. One could add the use of the term “critical” by Rowland, as well as 
Barton and Räisänen. Or the use of the term “honest” in both Barton’s depiction of 
                                                 
14 The following quote from Barton (1998b: 18-19) explains my use of the concept of “authority”: 
… its [i.e. the “critical” in biblical criticism - EEM] emphasis on asking free questions about the 
meaning of texts unconstrained by alleged authorities - whether the authority of Christian or Jewish 
tradition, the authority of current ecclesiastical structure or the authority of received academic opinion.  
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the critics of historical criticism and his own understanding of the vacancy of biblical 
criticism. We already saw above where he (1998b: 13) used the words “at least being 
honest about our commitment” as a tongue in the cheek way of describing what was 
perceived as lacking in historical criticism, an acknowledgement of some or other 
ulterior commitment. Yet, he (1998b: 19) himself concludes with the plea that “the 
cure is not to defend this or that method as ideologically pure, but to revive a true 
spirit of criticism, for which there is no such thing as ideological purity, only open-
mindedness and honesty.” The question now becomes to be honest about what? Our 
commitment maybe? This seems to be a viable answer, since Barton’s own criticism 
of historical criticism is that it tended to have been “far too influenced by 
commitments lying outside scholarly detachment” (Barton 1998b: 15-16). And what 
does “no such thing as ideological purity” mean? Is Barton acknowledging that 
historical criticism (and his own work included) has never been “ideological pure” and 
can never be? Does that mean that he acknowledges that the argument against 
historical criticism was fair and by doing so he himself adds some “rigour” to the 
argument that he thought was lacking?  
Räisänen (2000: 21) also uses the term “honesty” when he refers to Stendahl and 
the fact that we should have the honesty of not ‘prettying up’ the original. This is thus 
a different kind of honesty about the way in which we present ancient texts. His 
problem is that we often camouflage the dark sides of a text and present it “pretty” in 
order to further modern day quests for justice. But for Räisänen the Bible is often 
more part of the problem than the solution. Towards the end of his paper he uses the 
commentary of the Swiss scholar Luz on Matthew and his notion that even “sacred 
texts are to be evaluated according to their fruits” (Räisänen 2000: 24).  
Thus there are many things that biblical scholars should be “honest” about. For 
Räisänen it is especially about presenting the dark sides of the text. For Barton it is 
not that clear, but the “commitment” of the biblical critic often featured in that 
discussion, or one could probably say the “interests” of the biblical critic. Yet, I cannot 
help but feel that although Barton still defends the old ideals of biblical criticism 
(which is actually his new term), he does it in a way that might make many committed 
or engaged (whatever term we prefer to use) scholars agree with him. Still, with 
Barton and Räisänen one has the impression that they want to say that biblical 
criticism has not been that bad and that it had the elements of “criticism” that 
engaged scholars are arguing for now within it already from the start. This, though, 
smacks a bit of “defending the center, trivializing the margins” as Schüssler Fiorenza 
aptly named her response. It sounds a bit like, “these newcomers are saying what we 
were saying all along”, so we do not really need them! If I put it in this way then the 
claim of Schüssler Fiorenza that it is all about power suddenly sounds alarmingly 
accurate.  
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Would a solution not be to use the plea of Barton at the end of his essay, but to 
define his concepts of “honesty”, “open-mindedness” and “ideological purity” by 
means of the arguments that Schüssler Fiorenza and Rowland came up with? But 
would that be possible? Would Schüssler Fiorenza and many other feminists or 
scholars working in the Third World not claim that what they are doing is “ideological 
pure”? Yes it is about power, but it is about acquiring power for those who have 
never had it! Would they not claim that they represent the moral higher ground and 
that their claims to power are more just than those of the historical-critics (read: 
white-males) who have fortified their positions of power in the academic guild and 
(according to Schüssler Fiorenza) are continuing to do so?   
Are we thus at a standstill where we cannot go any further, where “grand academic 
concepts” are used for rhetorical effect, but where people from different sides actually 
mean different things with these concepts? To a certain extent it does seem so. In 
the rest of this chapter I will try to give my own meanings to these concepts, but first 
we need to take a closer look at a scholar who could be regarded as occupying a 
position somewhere between the two perspectives identified above.  
2.3 “Ideologiekritik” according to Robert Carroll 
In many articles Robert Carroll (see especially 1990, 1994a, 1995, 1996 and 1998a) 
has defined what he meant by the term Ideologiekritik which amongst other things 
often seems to boil down to “expecting the worst” of a biblical text. In the rest of the 
discussion it should become clear what I mean by this not so academic description. 
This is not a reflection on his definition of ideology, but it has more to do with how he 
depicts biblical texts. Yet I think that this is a feature of the work of Carroll that I find 
very “attractive.” Why this is so should also become clear towards the end of this 
chapter. I will start by focusing mostly on one article by him (1995) and this will be 
supplemented by many of the other articles mentioned above. Most of these (i.e. 
1994a, 1995 and 1996) are based on a series of lectures that he delivered in 
Stellenbosch during that (now notorious?)15 visit to South Africa in 1993.  
Carroll (1995: 26) starts this article by stating that to make a list or inventory of our 
ideological holdings “would remind every reader of that collection of books we call 
‘the Bible’ of the often forgotten fact that nobody reads the Bible in a state of 
innocence or without a considerable amount of ideological baggage controlling any 
such reading.”16 He (1995: 26) then continues to argue that most of what we “know” 
                                                 
15 See especially a later essay by Carroll (2001a) which Boshoff (2002: 2) describes as “a scathing article” 
and which he (2002: 3) regards as “partly a tragic misinterpretation of typical South African open door 
hospitality, something which is not typically European.”  
16 What Carroll describes here as a “fact” is of course not accepted as such by many biblical scholars. I do 
think that scholars like Rowland and Schüssler Fiorenza will whole-heartedly agree with this statement. 
Barton and Räisänen might want to qualify this statement somewhat. The difference might lie in what is to 
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about the Bible today “is at best scholarly hypothesis or reconstruction.”17 This then 
leads him (1995: 27-28) to spell out how he understands the term “ideology” which 
he thinks is broadly used in either a “benign sense”, or as a “bad thing.” In the former 
case “ideological is just to say that it belongs to a larger point of view or worldview 
involving general beliefs, outlooks, values and social practices” (1995: 27). The latter 
use is usually found in Marxist and neo-Marxist circles where it is often a term 
“describing false beliefs as opposed to science or knowledge” (1995: 27).  Eventually 
(in the 1995 article at least) it seems that Carroll does not really choose between 
these two different meanings, but is content with acknowledging that these two terms 
are often used in a rather confusing manner (1995: 28): 
While there is much to be said for a word which describes the gap between 
reality (the world as it is — a rather question-begging phrase!) and reality as it is 
culturally per-ceived, the term ‘ideology’ has had so many different uses that 
today it is often more confusing than illuminating when used in the various 
discourses of politics and scholarship. 
Carroll then does not really identify with one of these, but continues to use the term 
Ideologiekritik to “theorise the separation between text and reception or text and 
commentary” which he regards as “a useful fiction for an initial analysis of the Bible 
and its reception” (1995: 28).18 Carroll (1995: 28) regards this as one of the foremost 
assets of this use of Ideologiekritik:  
To go further, if ideology is already built into the text, then Ideologiekritik will 
have to scrutinize that text of ideological traces. Thus Ideologiekritik becomes a 
double scrutiny, of text and reception — of writer and commentator, scrutinizing 
the ideological factors at play in any and all readings of the Bible. There is the 
ideology of the writer of the text or the ideological traces of the writer inscribed in 
the text and then there is the ideology (or ideological traces) of the reader of that 
text.19  
Carroll (1995: 28) also prefers to talk about finding “traces of ideology” within texts 
instead of the “ideology of texts”:20  
                                                                                                                                            
be regarded as “ideological baggage” and what not. One should also add that in the light of the debate 
portrayed above, this issue is at least not forgotten, but still often debated about.  
17 This theme of what Carroll also calls “copy-cat writing of tired textbooks” is more fully explored in an 
earlier article by him (1994a: 1-15).  
18 This “separation between text and reception or text and commentary” is not that far from Stendahl’s 
“meant” and “means.” There is a slight difference, though, in the sense that Carroll calls it a “useful 
fiction.” The main difference I would think is the confidence with which biblical critics construct the past. 
For Stendahl there is probably more “certainty”, while Carroll regards it as nothing more than a fiction, be 
it a very useful one.  
19 It should be obvious that there are similarities here between Carroll and what Rowland and Schüssler 
Fiorenza previously argued. Critical scrutiny is not only directed at the text and world of the text, but also 
at the scholars doing the reading.  
20 This preference is in response to the debate amongst scholars whether texts actually have ideologies. See, 
for instance, Fowl (1995: 15-33) who argues that texts can not have ideologies.  
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That is, they have the ideological traces of the writers who live in an 
ideologically-constructed world (eg, the worlds of humans and of gods where 
communication is set up between the two worlds by means of slaughtered 
animals or a world where human beings communicate by means of the Internet) 
and they are read by readers who have their own ideological traces from the 
world(s) in which they live.  
For Carroll (1995: 28) then the task of Ideologiekritik when applied to the Bible “is to 
scrutinize both sets of ideological traces and to analyze critically all the ideological 
factors at play in any and every reading of the Bible.”  
In the rest of his article he does both. He (Carroll 1995: 29-38) identifies traces of 
ideology in the Hebrew Bible which he regards as “the ideological literature of the 
second temple period” (1995: 29). Yet he also engages with ideological traces found 
in many “interpretative contexts” of the Hebrew Bible. Thus, Calvin’s Institutions are 
critically analysed (Carroll 1995: 31-34),21 or the use of the Bible in the South African 
context (both by Apartheid theologians and liberation theologians) are scrutinised 
(Carroll 1995: 35-39) and he (1995: 40) also discusses his own possible ideological 
holdings.  
Carroll (1995: 36-37) understands liberation theology as a “fundamentalistic reading 
of the Bible.” This becomes especially true with regards to the use of the Exodus 
narrative. Yes, this is about initial liberation, but it also includes other undesirable 
elements (1995: 36):  
It may be true to say that the Bible includes a strand of narrative about liberation 
from slavery, but it also includes the reinscription of slavery in that narrative so 
that the reader of the Bible has to choose between these biblical values. That 
choice can only be determined by extra-biblical values and therefore the Bible 
has to be subjected to Ideologiekritik in order to arrive at a critically determined 
notion of liberation. The Bible can supply a rhetoric of liberation.22  
                                                 
21 His reasons for engaging with Calvin are both his own interpretative context and that of South Africa. He 
interprets the Bible in the context of Scottish Presbyterianism and Apartheid was also born in a context of 
“neo-Calvinism.” His main problem with Calvin is that he does not have the ability to critically scrutinise 
his own position, which is clearly visible in the polemical character of Calvin’s writings. He thinks that 
Calvin’s writings could definitely do with some Ideologiekritik scrutiny (Carroll 1995: 32): 
Calvin’s writings are also full of ideology, some of which belongs to the false consciousness-inducing 
kind of ideology. Very much like the Bible, Calvin’s Institutes, in all their varied editions, are a most 
polemical form of writing. In the writings Calvin is at war. The high level of Kulturkampf in the Bible 
has been internalized by Calvin in his writings (as indeed is the case in so many of the reformers’ 
writings). Hence such ideological readings (Calvin and the other reformers) of ideological writings 
(the Bible) cry out for an Ideologiekritik scrutiny. 
 One could, of course, ask whether this is not to a large extent true of the work of Carroll himself? Is he not 
involved in some or other Kulturkampf himself? “Wolf in the sheepfold” comes to mind! Yet, as we will 
see later, Carroll is willing to acknowledge that and he is willing to take stock of his own ideological 
holdings.  
22 In the rest of the article it seems that Carroll’s main point is that the Bible can only provide a rhetoric of 
liberation and nothing more. This can also be dangerous sometimes when people on “both sides” use 
biblical rhetoric which can create a “deadlock of rhetorical confrontation” (Carroll 1995: 41).  
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Yet, ultimately the Bible remains “a book of slaves for slaves” for Carroll (1995: 37). 
No sooner have the people been liberated from Egypt than we find !yfiP;v]mi on “the 
purchase of Hebrew slaves” in Exod 21 (Carroll 1995: 37). It thus means that the 
Bible is “judged” or “evaluated” by means of values that are foreign to the Bible. This 
is how we choose certain values from the Bible and dismiss others as oppressive. As 
part of this discussion he also mentions Leviticus 25 (Carroll 1995: 38): 
Lev 25, on the other hand,23 tries to avoid enslavement for Israelites by dressing 
up the practice in nicer language and encouraging kindness. Leviticus makes no 
allowance of permanent slavery such as Exodus and Deuteronomy allow. 
Leviticus does however encourage the enslavement of foreigners (25:35-55). 
Perhaps a case of ‘no white slaves’, if we were to translate this biblical ruling into 
a South African context.24 
Following this, Carroll (1995: 38-39) offers a further discussion on why he does not 
think that the Bible is an important source when it comes to social and political 
thinking. This is the result of the Enlightenment and the eventual “radicalization of 
politics in the form of the construction of demands of human rights in the eighteenth 
century” (Carroll 1995: 38). Carroll does not pretend that everything that the 
Enlightenment did was good and he is not advocating the “twentieth century as a 
model of social perfection over against a wicked past”, but he reaches the following 
conclusion (1995: 39): 
On the contrary, I just want to emphasize the fact that life is always a struggle 
and that the struggle for liberation is a constant one. It can never be won 
permanently, but freedom is held in jeopardy all the time. Yet the struggle must 
be engaged in continually and maintained faithfully in every generation. 
It thus seems as if he understands his Ideologiekritik way of reading a text as the 
continued struggle for liberation! Could one call this a kind of “liberation theology”? 
On the next page, in an attempt to describe his own ideological holdings, Carroll 
(1995: 40) shortly describes his republican background in Dublin with members of his 
family dying in the struggle to free Ireland from Britain. For him this means that he 
has “little choice but to be on the side of those who seek liberation from all forms of 
tyranny.” He also adds that in South Africa he “must have some sympathy for the 
Boers who, almost a century ago, fought against the British for their freedom.” Yet, 
                                                 
23 Carroll (1995: 38) seems to follow the mainline diachronic view of Exod 21:1-11 being followed by Deut 
15:7-18 and then Leviticus 25. He at least discusses them in this order and his “on the other hand” above 
contrasts Leviticus 25 with the other two texts.  
24 The only other biblical scholar who related Leviticus 25 to the South Africa context in this manner is 
Rainer Albertz (1990). With regards to Leviticus 25:44-46 he has the following to say (1990: 58): 
Die Ausländer hatten nun einmal an der Befreiungserfahrung, die Israel mit Jahwe gemacht hatte, 
keinen Anteil. Wenn aber bis in jüngste Zeit die weißen Christen in Südafrika gerade diese Verse 
benutzten, um ihr Apartheid – System biblisch zu rechtfertigen, obgleich die Schwarzen, die sie wie 
Sklaven unterdrücken, zum größten Teil ihre christlichen Brüder und Schwestern sind, dann ist dies 
ein so eklatanter Mißbrauch des Textes, daß uns die Schamröte ins Gesicht steigen müßte.  
 26
he expresses regret that the Boers after gaining freedom suppressed the other 
peoples of South Africa. He then continues with the following statement (Carroll 
1995: 40): 
The struggle is permanent, the grasping of freedom temporary. Without a serious 
sense of Ideologiekritik applied continually to one’s own situation the liberative 
moment can quickly turn to the enslavement of others. To take an example from 
the Bible: the people of Israel were no sooner out of slavery in Egypt than their 
leaders were making rules for the purchase and control of slaves!25 
Carroll’s way of reading the Bible is thus aimed at continuing the struggle for 
freedom, against slavery and many other kinds of oppression. It is honest in the 
sense that it exposes the role that the biblical text has played (and still plays) in 
oppressing people. Or as Carroll puts it (1995: 41): 
It is a reading of the Bible informed by modern thought and post-Enlightenment 
values. The Bible is transformed in the reading and all its negative ideological 
factors abandoned in favour of a genuinely liberating modern reading. My 
Ideologiekritik approach to reading the Bible warns me that I cannot read this 
book except in conjunction with a liberating ethic derived from non-biblical 
sources.  
Carroll is thus also a theologian or scholar who seeks “liberation” as liberation 
theologians do, but he does not pretend that the liberation that he aspires is informed 
by the biblical text. “Liberation” for him is a product of our “post-enlightenment” 
society and for Carroll the Bible is often more of a culprit than a provider of 
solutions.26  
One thing that is not that clear from this article is whether Carroll chooses to define 
“ideology” in a “benign sense” or as a “bad thing”? He just describes these two 
opposing views and then continues his argument without choosing. One is tempted 
to say that his use of the term ideology often tends to lean over to ideology as a “bad 
thing.” Or, it will probably be more accurate to say that he tends to present the 
“traces of ideology” that he identifies in the Hebrew Bible in a negative light when 
compared to modern post-enlightenment values. In two later articles Carroll (1996 
and 1998a) specifically opts for the “non-marxian definition”, but “with some gentle 
                                                 
25 I find it slightly ironic that Carroll has this in common with the Apartheid theologians, that he draws fairly 
direct comparisons between the situation in South Africa and the biblical portrayal of the Exodus narrative. 
Yet, his comparison is different. For the Apartheid theologians the comparison was used to motivate why 
we had to build South African society on the biblical example. For Carroll the comparison functions as 
motivation for why the Bible is so dangerous!  
26 The following quote explains why he has this “negative view” of the Bible (Carroll 1995: 37): 
At its starkest level the Bible is a book of slaves for slaves. It may have dreams and fragments of 
liberation in it, but I can assure you that throughout the long history of the Bible’s reception in 
European polity the Bible never generated an ideology of freedom. Such freedom as people found in 
the Bible was of the spiritual or metaphysical variety. Not until after the Enlightenment project of 
liberation via reason emerged in Europe and America did people move towards the emancipation of 
slaves and that was a long and stony road to follow.  
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allowance for distorting or deforming possibilities with its application” (1996: 18). This 
preference is due to the fact that “the word ‘ideology’ has a pre-marxian sense which 
applies to any network or (near) system of ideas …” (1996: 18).27 Later when Carroll 
(1996: 25) discusses the production of the Hebrew Bible, which for him means the 
Hellenistic period, he states the following: 
I would tend to call the literature produced under such conditions (whatever they 
may have been) “ideological literature”, where the word “ideology” approximates 
to worldview or network of viewpoints designed to encourage praxis of a 
particular kind. Such ideology can be extraordinarily rich in complexity and 
possibility, but it still represents a point of view maintained by a power group over 
the rest of the community.  
Thus, in the above quotes Carroll explicitly chooses for ideology as a kind of 
worldview, or network of ideas which does entail some elements of distortions, but 
are not necessarily “false” in the Marxist sense. Yet, it is clear that it is indeed about 
power and about one group attempting to force their worldview unto others in order to 
“encourage praxis of a particular kind.” In the last article published by him in JNSL, 
Carroll (1998a: 106) provides a similar description, which once again points to the 
group- or community character of ideology. Before he arrives at this description he 
reiterates again that he prefers older pre-Marxian definitions of the concept (1998a: 
106): 
In this sense ideology provides a community or group with explanatory, 
evaluative, orientative and programmatic functions, allowing them to situate 
themselves in the world by means of language. For the purposes of these 
reflective remarks I am more interested in whatever may be discerned in the 
Hebrew Bible as possessing elements of a system of thought-praxis or an 
ideology wherein the biblical writers constructed their view of the world and how 
to live in it. Such a world-construction narrative includes their story of the past 
from which the community came to the present in which it existed and a future to 
which it aspired.  
A term that I think could be added here is the “identity” of a group that is formed or 
created or captured by the ideology of that group. This narrative that Carroll talks 
about of who the community is and where they come from is thus part of the identity 
of that group. Of how they understand themselves over and against the other groups 
who are perceived and presented as different. Carroll (1998: 107) further continues 
that his insistence through the years to use the term “ideology” in stead of “theology” 
has to do with “a desire to see the political, which is inherent in the theopolitical 
aspects of the Bible, underlined and exposed to scrutiny.”  
                                                 
27 A further ground for Carroll to choose against the “marxist definition of ideology as ‘an imaginary 
representation’” is “because it is designed to exempt marxism as an science or as knowledge as opposed to 
representing non-marxian systems of thought as ideological and therefore false” (1996: 18).  
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Ideologiekritik should thus be interested in describing the “traces of ideologies” found 
in biblical texts and their interpreters, meaning the kinds of world-view, or group-
identities that present itself in the text and in the interpretation of these. All of this 
also involves politics and power, since groups usually want to maintain their identity 
by forcing other people to understand this world and the “way things work” in a 
similar manner.  
To conclude this discussion on Carroll I would like to summarise the value of his 
contribution as follows:  
1) There is a kind of “honesty” to the proposals of Carroll in the sense that he 
acknowledges that what he understands as “liberation” is something foreign to 
Bible. This means that he has this in common with Räisänen that he does not 
want to “pretty up” the biblical texts, or in Räisänen’s terms that he does not 
hesitate to present the “non-dialogical” sides of the Bible. We have seen this in 
the reference by Carroll to Leviticus 25 or to the Exodus narrative and we will 
revisit Carroll’s views in a later chapter on the dating of the Holiness Code (see 
chapter 6). This was what I initially meant, by “expecting the worst” from the 
biblical text, that Carroll usually evaluates or judges the text in the light of 
modern values of human rights and then finds it terribly oppressing.  
2) Carroll also has much in common with Rowland and Schüssler Fiorenza in the 
sense that he wants to analyse the place from where an interpreter reads in 
order to come to terms with the ideological traces that play a role in interpreting 
a text. I can imagine that Rowland and Schüssler Fiorenza would mostly agree 
with Carroll’s notion of Ideologiekritik entailing a “double scrutiny” of text and 
reception.  
3) Yet, in one important aspect the paths of Carroll and Schüssler Fiorenza will 
probably part. The ultimate aim for Schüssler Fiorenza is both to “name the 
destructive aspects” and to “recover its unfulfilled possibilities.” Carroll would 
probably be content to stop with the first. Or that is the impression that one gets 
from most of his work, of “expecting the worst” from a biblical text. For him the 
Bible is too much culprit and offers too little solution, but for Schüssler Fiorenza 
there is enough of the latter to be used by modern theologians. This is probably 
the biggest limitation to the work of Carroll, the fact that so little positive things 
are left to construct a modern day theology with.  
4) Despite this “dark” side to Carroll’s work there is one aspect that sounds very 
attractive in the (South) African context. Carroll’s description of the struggle as 
constant and liberation as temporary could be extremely valuable in Africa. 
Africa has learned that the removal of the white oppressors has not necessarily 
resulted in constant freedom. Other indigenous and foreign oppressors have 
stepped into the vacuum left by the colonial forces. Freedom and liberation are 
indeed continuously in jeopardy.  
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5) Carroll is lastly very clear that he wants “to be on the side of those who seek 
liberation from all forms of tyranny.” This, in a sense, makes him also a 
committed or engaged scholar.28 
It should thus be clear by now why Carroll is an important discussion partner in this 
debate. To a large extent he bridges the two perspectives that I identified above. He 
has things in common with both, but he also has sensitivity for the South African 
context and he offers analytical tools that could be valuable in Africa. Yet I think that 
Carroll also helps us to define the critical role of the biblical scholar better and this 
became clear in 1) above. He is very frank about the fact that the biblical text can 
only be judged by means of “extra-biblical values” (Carroll 1995: 36) or by means of a 
“liberating ethic derived from non-biblical sources” (Carroll 1995: 41). I will shortly 
treat some other OT scholars who have made similar remarks, but before we do that 
I need to provide a clearer definition of what ideology is.  
Dyck (2000: 109-110) uses the following list of definitions provided by Eagleton to 
define the concept better:  
1. the general material process of production of ideas, beliefs and values in 
social life; 
2. ideas and beliefs (whether true or false) which symbolize the conditions and 
life-experiences of a specific, socially significant group or class: 
3. the promotion and legitimation of the interests of such social groups in the 
face of opposing interests; 
4. the promotion and legitimation of the interests of the dominant group; 
5. ideas and beliefs which help to legitimate the interests of a ruling group or 
class specifically by distortion and dissimulation; 
6. false or deceptive ideas which arise from the material structure of society as a 
whole.  
The only definitions that I would specifically exclude here are 1) and 6). Both are too 
general and 6) has too much of a Marxist ring to it. With regards to 5) I would also 
                                                 
28 Many “contextual” or “liberation” theologians would object that we could not really read on behalf of 
anybody even if they are suffering from tyranny. The problem is that it becomes a patronising act. See, for 
instance, the discussion of this problem in Patte’s (1995: 23-24) second chapter. Patte also attempted to 
produce “pro-women” or “pro-African-American” readings, but eventually realised that they experienced 
this as very condescending. Who gave him the right to speak on their behalf? Eventually Patte opts for 
“reading with them.” A scholar who has also engaged with this issue on many occasions is Gerald West. 
See, for instance, West (1999: 34-62). West (1999: 37) sums up this tension as follows:  
Both an uncritical ‘listening to’, that romanticizes and idealizes the interpretations of the poor and 
marginalized, and an arrogant ‘speaking for’, that minimizes and rationalizes the interpretations of the 
poor and marginalized, must be problematized.  
 I think that Carroll would probably be accused of the latter more arrogant option. Carroll is of course 
further not really interested in dialogue with ordinary readers. His act of criticism is directed at the text and 
at fellow interpreters. The liberation that Carroll strives for originates from his idea of what a liberated 
world should look like. It is thus not really representative of the oppressed people of this world, or that is 
not reflected in Carroll’s work. He continues to play the role of the academic outsider and he does not 
pretend that he could be an insider.  
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want to replace “specifically” with something like “amongst others”. “Distortion” is 
often used, but it is not the only available strategy. From definitions 3) to 5) it is also 
clear that “ideology” entails the “interests” of a group and that accentuates the 
political (as Carroll also did). This will also emerge in my engagements with the text 
that it is about how a specific group understands themselves, often over and against 
other “competing” groups. Dyck (2000: 110) rightly points out that the definitions 
become more specific from 1) onwards to 6). Eventually I will need to describe the 
“ideology” that I identify in the text by means of the specific formulation of 5) above 
which means that I will have to describe the distortion that is taking place. But what 
does distortion entail?  
2.3.1 Ideological criticism as “value-judgement”  
In the introductory chapter of his book, “Interested Parties: The Ideology of writers 
and readers of the Hebrew Bible”, Clines (1995: 20) describes the responsibility of 
biblical critics as follows:  
We have a responsibility, I believe, to evaluate the Bible’s claims and 
assumptions, and if we abdicate that responsibility, whether as scholars or as 
readers-in-general of the Bible, we are in my opinion guilty of an ethical fault.  
Clines is very clear that this evaluation is done by comparing the values identified in 
the Bible with those of the authors and his view is thus very similar to that of Carroll. 
It is rather unfortunate that he does not explore this “ethical fault” further, apart from 
saying that he intends to read “biblical texts according to” his “own cultural and 
ethical values” (1995: 20). As with Carroll “‘critique’ … does imply evaluation of the 
texts by a standard of reference outside themselves—which usually means, for 
practical purposes, by the standards to which we ourselves are committed” (Clines 
1995: 20). Is it thus the responsibility of the biblical critic to make a value judgement?  
In an essay by Dyck (2000: 108-128), where he attempts to provide “a map of 
ideology for biblical critics” (of which we just saw a summary above), he distinguishes 
between the way in which the term “ideology” is used in what he calls “social science” 
and “social criticism.” With regards to the former Dyck (2000: 112) argues that 
ideology “is not something about which one has to make a value judgment—that it is 
objectionable, false or distorted—but is rather something that is found out there in the 
object field of social science; ideology is something that every social group has.” 
Contrary to this, social criticism “involves making value judgments about ideology 
where it is used in a pejorative sense to denote a false or distorted consciousness” 
(Dyck 2000: 116). This is the kind of definition that we saw in 5) above. The question 
then becomes on what grounds these value-judgements are made, or how scholars 
are to detect distortions? When he discusses the implication of social criticism for 
biblical criticism Dyck (2000: 126) has the following to say:  
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The real watershed for biblical criticism occurs with the appropriation of 
definitions of ideology thrown up by social criticism. I say ‘watershed’, because 
taking distortion into account involves a completely different attitude in 
approaching the biblical text. … An awareness that distortion happens means 
that one approaches the text with an attitude of suspicion, an attitude biblical 
scholars are not, generally speaking, conditioned to have.29  
He then also asks how biblical critics are to detect these distortions and then he 
refers to the work of Clines (above) who clearly states that “our own personal 
standards” should be the “standard of reference” (Dyck 2000: 127). Dyck (2000: 127) 
also refers to the fact that ideological criticism of the Bible could be a kind of 
“immanent critique.” Now he refers to the work of Brueggemann (an example that he 
also borrows from Clines) who criticises royal ideology by means of prophetic critique 
that is present within the Bible itself.  
I do think that one could apply this to the work of Carroll (and for that matter Clines 
too). He does not only judge the traces of ideology that he identifies in the Bible by 
comparing it to his own modern values, but at stages he also applies a kind of 
“immanent critique” when he looks for tensions in the text itself that makes him 
suspect that some kind of distortion is happening. This will become clear when we 
discuss the “myth of the empty land” in chapter 6. When Leviticus 26 claims that the 
land will be or is empty, Carroll compares this with other texts that present the 
opposite view and then it is clear that distortion is present. Somebody is telling half-
truths.  
But I would like to return to the first quote from Clines above. He argued that the 
critical task of the biblical critic entails to “evaluate the Bible’s claims and 
assumptions” and he called this our “responsibility.” He also argued that not doing 
this would be to commit some kind of “ethical fault.” Does this mean that not reading 
the Bible ideological-critical, not being suspicious, not making a value judgement 
would mean to be ethically irresponsible? I would think that the answer is “yes” and I 
will argue that below.  
Below, in order to address this question, I will focus on a scholar who like Clines uses 
terms like “responsibility” and “ethics” when it comes to reading the Bible. He is also 
interested in the effect of our biblical readings. Räisänen did touch on the subject 
above when he used the phrase of Luz to “judge ancient texts by their fruits”, and 
Carroll already referred to this problem in the (old) South African context, but Patte 
                                                 
29 I am not sure that “watershed” would be an accurate description here and it sounds like a bit of an 
exaggeration. Biblical critics always tended to be suspicious of biblical texts, in one way or the other. 
Historical critics (especially those of the source criticism or Literarkritik kind) have a long legacy of being 
suspicious about texts which pretend to be a unified composition, but in which historical critics always 
spotted many layers. That was also a kind of suspicion, but I do think that the kind of suspicion that he 
now asks for is somewhat different. 
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writes a whole book about it. This discussion will eventually lead us closer to the 
South African context, the place from where I read and eventually I will have to 
attempt to take stock of my own ideological holdings as Carroll proposed we should 
do. Yet it will also help us to understand that ideological-critical readings should be 
understood as a means of taking responsibility for our readings and as an effort not 
to make the ethical fault that Clines warns against.  
2.4 The “effect” of our biblical readings 
Patte (1995) uses two concepts of “accountable” and “responsible” to describe that a 
biblical critic does not only have a responsibility towards the critical guild, but is also 
accountable towards people that might be effected by our work. The following 
summarising statement by him (which is the first of ten) explains that partly (Patte 
1995: 115): 
An androcritical multidimensional exegesis is a practice of critical exegesis 
envisioned by certain male European-American biblical scholars who seek to be 
accountable to those affected by their work.  
In order to explain his sensitivity to people affected by his work, Patte (1995: 18-36) 
tells his own experience of how he came to realise that his readings of texts 
(especially Matthew) and his teaching practices did in some instances have 
detrimental effects on people. These “people” included Jews, Afro-Americans and 
women. In this first chapter he tells how he came to learn that he really had to listen 
to these different groups, which Patte describes as to “speak with them” (1995: 25). 
One of the problems that he identifies is the pretension of neutrality or objectivity by 
biblical scholars (see Patte 1995: 25). Basically critical exegetes pretend to be 
neutral, but in fact their interpretations are “marked” by the fact that they are male 
and western (European-American) (Patte 1995: 25-29). His story thus serves to 
make the point that nobody is just a biblical scholar, but scholars are defined by 
being, male, female, white, black, Jewish, Christian etc. All these factors play a role 
in how we read, or this is what I take to be the important point that he manages to 
make in this first chapter (Patte 1995: 18-36). The task of a biblical scholar would 
thus include to ask what effect these factors have on our interpretation of the biblical 
text. I can imagine that if I put it like this that Rowland, Schüssler Fiorenza and 
maybe even Carroll might agree with him. In Carroll’s terms it might be part of taking 
stock of our ideological holdings. In Schüssler Fiorenza’s project it might be a way of 
taking the margins seriously and giving them part of the centre-stage. And Rowland 
was a great champion of dialogue between biblical critics and contextual theologians. 
Yet, as we will see later in the excursus below, Carroll and Schüssler Fiorenza 
responded very negatively.  
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In the second chapter by Patte (1995: 37-72) he argues that biblical scholarship 
should accept the fact that our practices must be multidimensional and that we 
should recognise that a given text provides several legitimate ways of reading it. This 
has implications for our reading practices and one of his main solutions for not 
hurting people is a kind of teaching praxis where all readings are allowed to interact 
with each other. Where a teacher does not present himself (“him” because it is part of 
“andro-critical” practice) as a master but allows the students to choose for 
themselves between the different options presented by the teacher. According to 
Patte this would be part of the “cure” for biblical readings having a “bad” effect on 
other people.  
This and the fact that we should accept ordinary readings as legitimate readings 
although a biblical scholar then has the vacancy of bringing these ordinary readings 
to “critical understanding”30 is discussed in his third chapter (Patte 1995: 73-102). His 
fourth chapter (1995: 103-120) consists of his conclusion in which he presents ten 
statements that he understands as a systematic presentation of his main argument. I 
will discuss some of these issues in more detail below.  
One of the lingering impressions after reading this book is that it is not really clear 
when a specific reading would be illegitimate or invalid or let’s say when it should be 
rejected. Throughout the book Patte mentions some constraints or “boundaries” 
within which biblical texts can be interpreted in a responsible or accountable manner. 
One of these “boundaries” would be the effect that the interpretations of critical 
scholars have on “others.” This is clearly stated in statements 1 and 10 (Patte 1995: 
115 and 124). In chapter 1 Patte refers to the fact that his studies on Paul and 
Matthew did convey some anti-Semitic sentiments despite the fact that this was 
against his best intentions. Thus, these readings did harm Jewish people. But does 
this mean that these readings were illegitimate and should therefore be rejected? 
Another boundary would be the constraints of the text itself. In chapter 2 one often 
finds the phrase “meaning-producing dimensions of the text” and in chapter 3 the 
phrase “power-authority of the text” is rather salient. It seems that the former phrase 
is often used when critical readings are under discussion, while the latter phrase is 
used when ordinary readings enter the discussion. Another important feature of 
Patte’s argument is that one gets the impression that ultimately the text “has the final 
                                                 
30 What Patte (1995: 100-107) means is that critical scholars should acknowledge that ordinary readings are 
based on the meaning producing dimension of texts and then critical scholars must help ordinary readers to 
argue for the legitimacy of their readings. Part of the argument is also that all critical readings start with a 
kind of intuitive ordinary reading that scholars then “enhance” with critical arguments. This should be 
done to ordinary readings. The problem with this discussion is that it is rather “up in the air.” Patte never 
uses a concrete example of a reading of a particular text going through this process of “bringing to critical 
understanding.”  
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say” in the meaning-producing process.31 Despite the fact that Patte (1995: 94-95) 
uses metaphors like “text as weaving” over against “text as meaning container” the 
text still limits the number of meanings that are possible. This is very clear when he 
(Patte 1995: 97-99) discusses the difference between Ricœur and Gadamer and 
eventually seems to side with the latter. The context of the reader determines which 
meaning is “selected”, but the text limits the possible number of meanings. Thus, 
although there can be more than one meaning, the possibilities are not limitless. This 
was also very clear when he evaluated the pedagogic practices of critical scholars in 
chapter 1. Even in his “alternative model” students were allowed to choose for 
themselves, but the teacher limited the possibilities. In chapter 2 it is fairly clear that 
he wants to argue that at least the two possible interpretations of discipleship in 
Matthew should both be accepted as equally legitimate, but still both are critical 
readings.32  
When he discusses the relationship between ordinary and critical readings in chapter 
3 everything becomes rather vague. He does not use any biblical examples anymore, 
but just makes general statements like “we should presume that it is legitimate until 
proven otherwise” (Patte 1995: 100). He never gives an actual example of a reading 
that should be rejected, except of course the dogmatic or third-level readings of 
Evangelicals, but this stays a theoretical possibility and he never provides a concrete 
example (see Patte 1995: 90-91).  
So let us say that under two conditions a reading can be regarded as “bad”,33 
meaning “not responsible” or “not accountable” and thus “to be rejected.” These two 
conditions are when they have a negative effect and when they cannot be accounted 
for in the “meaning-producing dimensions” or “power-authority” of the text.  
For a very concrete example, let us turn to the South African context and the history 
of Apartheid, which were detrimental to millions of people. It is well known that the 
                                                 
31 Malina (1996: 81-87) would strongly object to this conclusion. For Malina (1996: 86) “Patte’s concern is 
to have all readers find warrants for their projects in the Bible.” I do not think that this criticism is fair, yes, 
Patte’s formulations are somewhat cumbersome and not always that clear, but I do think that he clearly 
states that the text limits the amount of possible “meanings.” See, for instance, Briggs (1997: 63) who 
reaches the opposite conclusion than Malina: 
Some readings, therefore, are still ungrounded, and I think he successfully holds the flood-doors shut 
against admitting any and every reading. 
 These two conclusions are on two extreme points of a continuum and I find my own reading of Patte more 
in the middle, although definitely closer to Briggs than Malina.  
32 This is also very clear from his book on the Sermon on the Mount (Patte 1996: 362): 
While all postmodern critical approaches recognize the plurality of plausible interpretations (an 
emphasis that is sufficient for decentering interpretations), only a multidimensional approach 
emphasizes that each plausible interpretation is also legitimate in the sense that it is grounded in one of 
the several meaning-producing dimensions of the text. (his italics) 
33 This term is of course “value laden” and many would object to it, including Patte who always strives for 
“equality.” But some interpretations can have very “bad” effects for other people.  
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Dutch Reformed Church and the Bible played an important role in this sad history.34 
The Dutch Reformed Church supported the political policy of Apartheid with 
theological and biblical arguments. This is very clear from many theological 
discussions amongst the majority of South African Dutch Reformed theologians from 
about 1930 to 1960. The OT book of Deuteronomy played a substantial role in this 
theology.  
2.4.1 Dangerous ordinary readings 
It seems as if Patte cannot foresee that an ordinary reading can have a negative 
effect on other people, or can be damaging as such. Plurality becomes his solution, 
be it that he acknowledges that a certain text only offers a limited amount of possible 
interpretations. One has the impression that if all possible readings were left to float 
around in the air, then oppression would be something of the past. Carroll (1998b: 
61-62) describes a post-modern approach (and he regards Patte as a good example) 
as follows:  
Some forms of postmodern approach to biblical readings would insist on an 
egalitarian relationship between competing interpretations whereby everybody’s 
point of view must be respected and acknowledged as equal to everybody else’s 
point of view - every woman will do right in her own eyes (a good biblical trope). 
Thus even a reconstituted South African apartheid-driven reading of the Bible 
would stand on all fours with post-Bakhtinian dialogical, post-Lacanian 
psychoanalytical and post-Derridean deconstructive readings.  
That I suppose is the biggest problem with Patte’s proposals! He wants to limit the 
damaging effects that the readings of biblical critics might have on normal people by 
giving an equal hearing to all ordinary readings. But he does not anticipate that 
ordinary readings could also be andro-centric, or racist or misogynic or colonial or 
whatever. His proposals are especially exposed when one thinks of the Old South 
Africa35 and how many ordinary white people believed that the Bible was in favour of 
Apartheid (which Carroll mentions above). 
In an essay aptly named “The Dangers of Deuteronomy” Ferdinand Deist (1994) 
describes how texts from Deuteronomy were used to justify this political system. 
Deist (1994: 14-20) starts by describing the situation of the Afrikaner readers 
referring to their “socio-economic background”,36 “self-understanding”37 and the 
                                                 
34 For a very good description of this theology, see Kinghorn (1986). For a more secular presentation of this 
development see Giliomee (2001: 447-486) who calls his chapter on the development of Apartheid “The 
making of a radical survival plan.” For the rest of this discussion I will use an essay and an article by two 
South African OT scholars, namely Deist (1994) and Jonker (2001).  
35 The “Old South Africa” is another way of referring to “Apartheid South Africa” and it is opposed to the 
“New South Africa” which was introduced by the first democratic elections in 1994. 
36 According to Deist (1994: 14-15) the Anglo-Boer War, the influence of two World Wars, droughts, 
epidemics, and the great depressions, lead to the rapid urbanisation of the Afrikaans speaking part of the 
South African population. Most of these people were very poor and found themselves at “the bottom of the 
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“hermeneutical background.” With regards to the latter he (Deist 1994: 17-20) 
describes “Boer Calvinism” as a mixture of Kuyperian cultural philosophy and 
Princetonian fundamentalism both of which had their foundation in common sense 
realism. He then (1994: 20-27) describes how a naive realist reading of Deuteronomy 
was used to support Apartheid. This naive reading was based on the fact that 
Afrikaners in their threatened context shared some features with the text of 
Deuteronomy, for instance, a shared sense of promise,38 a shared sense of anxiety39 
and a shared sense of strict obedience to God.40 Other appealing features of the 
book were the notion of a divinely instituted natural order,41 the legality of 
discrimination,42 prohibition against “mixing” with other groups43 and ownership of 
land.44 Deist (1994: 27) accurately concludes: 
It is, of course, easy to tear the sketched naive reading of the Bible apart and to 
laugh or scorn at the people who facilitated this impossible “fusion of horizons.” 
… Moreover, the circumstances in which the readers found themselves made 
their approach and interpretation of the book appear self-evidently rational.  
                                                                                                                                            
social ladder.” They also had to compete with black workers for cheap unskilled labour. “Afrikaans people 
felt themselves threatened by these circumstances …” It is also in the light of these factors that Giliomee 
(2003: 447-486) calls his chapter on the development of Apartheid “the making of a radical survival plan.”  
37 Deist (1994: 15-17) describes how the Boers left the Cape Colony (British oppression) for the Orange Free 
State and the Transvaal (The Promised Land). The Afrikaans readers identified themselves with Israel 
trekking into the Promised Land. See especially the parallels identified by Kritzinger in a sermon on the 
Day of the Covenant (16 December) (Deist 1994: 17).  
38 He (Deist 1994: 20) describes how Afrikaans readers identified with the fact that Deuteronomy is 
presented as Moses’ final address to the Israelites just before they entered the promised land.  
39 A Biblical scholar like Stuhlman describes the content of Deuteronomy as “a great deal of internal anxiety 
and a marked sense of vulnerability” (Deist 1994: 21).  
40 Deist (1994: 21): 
Like the Moses character in Deuteronomy, Afrikaners were convinced that their only hope of survival 
in this hostile, though promising, environment lay in them strictly keeping God’s commandments. 
41 According to Deist (1994: 22-23) texts like Deut 32:8 were used to argue that God created a specific place 
for each people or nation. These arguments were strengthened by texts about Israel’s special calling by 
YHWH which made them different from the other nations (i.e. 14:2, 4:37-38, 7:7-8, 10:14-15): 
If God separated the nations, then no human being had the right to unite them. 
 Or see the popular Reformed theologian (and famous Afrikaans poet) J.D. du Toit (Totius) on Deut 22:9-
11 (Deist 1994: 23): 
Firstly, what God united, no one may divide. This is the basis of our plea for unity among Afrikaners. 
…Secondly, we may not unite what God has divided. The council of God is realized in pluriformity … 
Consequently we do not want any equalization or bastardization. 
42 Here, Deist (1994: 24) refers to Weinfeld’s description of Deuteronomic views of Israel’s identity:  
According to Deuteronomy, the laws of the Torah apply only to the true Israelites, that is members of 
the Israelite nation by blood and race, whereas the resident alien is not deemed to be a true Israelite … 
 Deuteronomy’s distinction between “brother” and “foreigner” was also used in the South African context, 
where “brothers” meant fellow whites and “foreigners” meant non-whites.  
43 Texts like 7:3-4 and 22:5, 9-11 supplied the “scriptural basis” for the clause in the South African 
Immorality Act prohibiting mixed marriages (Deist 1994: 26). 
44 South African Calvinists used Deuteronomy’s description of Yahweh giving the land to Israel to justify 
their own claims to the ownership of South African land (Deist 1994: 27).  
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From a historical-critical perspective it is obvious that these interpreters of the Bible 
“mixed” their historical reality with that of Deuteronomy (whenever we were to date 
the different quoted texts). These readings were definitely not accountable to the 
guild of critical biblical scholars. I am sure that this is what Patte (1995: 75) had in 
mind when he defined his vocation as a critical scholar as “to overcome these 
fundamentalist interpretations and their disastrous alienating consequences through 
critical studies that acknowledge the complexity of the biblical texts due to their 
historicity.”45 He might also call these readings “Fundamentalist Dogmatic 
Interpretations”, his third level of Evangelical readings that attempts to universalise 
their readings as the ultimate truth.46  
Yet would it not be possible to say that these readings were based on the “power-
authority” or “meaning-producing dimensions” of these texts? The dimensions that 
Deist described as “fusing” with the context of Afrikaans speaking people were in the 
text of Deuteronomy and they still are. Many ordinary Afrikaans speaking readers of 
the Bible did indeed read Deuteronomy in this fashion (and some still do). These 
were just ordinary readings which Patte esteems so highly, but they were dangerous 
and they caused a lot of pain and injustice. Would it have been “responsible” to say 
the following words that Patte uses in his book on the Sermon on the Mount to 
ordinary Afrikaans speaking readers in Apartheid South Africa (Patte 1996: 5)? 
Read the Sermon on the Mount [or then Deuteronomy]! You can understand it on 
you own and you can reach appropriate conclusions regarding its teaching about 
discipleship [let’s say: “social policy”]. Do not hesitate to act according to your 
conclusions about this teaching, even though you yourself should constantly 
reassess and reevaluate your understanding of this teaching and your practice of 
it by bringing your interpretation to critical understanding. [parts in brackets mine 
- EEM] 
Patte’s theory about the validity of ordinary readings would not have been applicable 
in Apartheid South Africa. Ordinary Afrikaans readers would probably47 only have 
used these texts to justify their own racism towards black people and they would 
have acted accordingly. It is true that the second part about constantly re-assessing 
                                                 
45 Once again I find it puzzling that Malina (1996: 84) can make the following statement in order to criticise 
Patte’s book:  
Ordinary readings produced with no thought to being considerate of what the authors of the documents 
said and meant in their original time, place and culture are, as a rule, unethical readings. 
 If we look at the quote above it seems that Patte would agree with him.  
46 I did find the sentence “It is well known that it is not what the text says!” (quoted above, from Patte 1995: 
91) that he uses to describe how legitimate ordinary readings are often rejected, strikingly familiar. It is 
reminiscent of the style in which many arguments were presented in the Old South Africa in favour of 
Apartheid. 
47 I use “probably” because it was not true of all ordinary Afrikaans readers of the Bible. There were many 
who realised that the system was evil and they probably came to this realisation through other parts of the 
Bible.  
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and re-evaluating understandings might have provided some control, but I am not 
sure that it is enough. It is also true that this never happened in Apartheid South 
Africa because readers usually read the Bible with people that thought in the same 
way as they did and that had the same interests.  
Eventually I find Patte’s positive evaluation of all (or then most) ordinary readings as 
naïve and even dangerous. I do agree with him that the task of critical scholars could 
be to bring ordinary readings to critical understanding. Yet when he formulates this 
task, he is not clear enough about the critical role that scholars should play and in 
this light he evaluates ordinary readings too positively.  
2.4.2 Dangerous critical readings 
We already mentioned that the Dutch Reformed Church played an important role in 
motivating Apartheid with theological arguments. This was especially done in a 
document called “Ras, Volk en Nasie en Volkereverhoudinge in die lig van die Skrif”48 
(RVN) which intended “to proceed from a sound hermeneutic basis, and to approach 
Scripture from this basis in determining some principles for race relations” (quoted 
from Jonker 2001: 169-170). RVN was published in 1974 and Kinghorn (1986: 129) 
describes this document as the culmination of the development of Apartheid theology 
which started in the 1930s. In this document many different texts from the Old and 
New Testament were used to justify the policy of Apartheid. One of these texts is 
Gen 10-11, which we will discuss now making ample use of the article by Jonker 
(2001: 165-184).49 The objective of this paper was to analyse the use of biblical texts 
by RVN in order to determine what impact social transformation has on biblical 
interpretation. These concerns are not really applicable here, but some very 
interesting developments surfaced that do have implications for this discussion.  
According to Jonker (2001: 171-172) Gen 10-11 played a major role in this document 
in sections 8 (“Unity of mankind”, 13-14) and 9 (“Ethnic diversity”, 14-21). He refers to 
Bax (1983: 117-118) who said that RVN attempted to answer two questions with 
regard to Gen 11:1-9, namely (Jonker 2001: 172): 
(i) What sin does it portray mankind as having committed on the plain of Shinar? 
(ii) What did God intend in His reaction to this sin?  
With regards to the first question the report refers back to God’s command in Gen 
1:28. According to RVN this command meant that mankind should divide into 
different peoples (“volke”) each with their own culture. This means that the sin of man 
                                                 
48 The official English document was called: “Human relations and the South African scene in the light of 
Scripture.” 
49 This article was initially delivered as a Paper at an interdisciplinary colloquium on “Social Transformation 
and Biblical Interpretation” held in Leiden, The Netherlands on 7 April 2000. 
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on the plain of Shinar was that “mankind deliberately attempted to defy God’s 
command in Gen 1:28” (Jonker 2001: 171).   
With regards to the second question RVN answered that God was asserting his 
original command and purpose for mankind to be divided into separate “volke” 
(Jonker 2001: 171): 
The report even asserts: “That the differentiation of humanity into various 
language groups and ‘nations’ was extended further to give rise to race 
differences is not, in fact, mentioned in the Scriptures in so many words, but is 
nevertheless confirmed by the facts of history” (1974: 16-17). The report thus 
argues that God in re-establishing this process of ‘differentiation’ now extended it 
by dividing mankind into different races as well.  
Jonker (2001: 172) continues:  
According to the view of RVN the Babel event really constitutes humanity as it 
should be, namely differentiated into different peoples and races. … the RVN 
report thus constitutes the story in Gen 11 as the norm according to which 
human reality should be viewed.  
It is clear that interpreting Gen 10-11 in this manner made it possible for RVN to find 
a Scriptural basis for a policy of “separate development” (Jonker 2001: 172). In the 
next part of the article Jonker (2001: 172-176) evaluates these readings in the light of 
Biblical scholarship and then sums up his findings in the following three points 
(Jonker 2001: 176): 
1. The interpretation of RVN is not in accordance with the traditional Christian 
interpretation of Gen 10-11. The older commentaries (which were available 
when RVN was written), for example Von Rad and Westermann, confirm this 
point. In both these commentaries the “sin” is understood in a vertical fashion, 
namely mankind pretending or attempting to become like God.  
2. “However, there are many recent exegetical studies that have argued along the 
same lines as RVN with regards to Gen 11:1-9. These recent studies50 affirm 
the view that the sin of humankind on the plain of Shinar should be seen in 
connection with Gen 1:28, namely the resistance to fill the earth. They also 
affirm the positive view of RVN on the intention of God with the diffusion of 
languages, as well as the creation motif in this story.” 
3. It is important to note that Jonker (2001: 176) accentuates that none of these 
recent critical studies make “any conclusions about ethnicity, diversity or a 
                                                 
50 Some of the recent studies that Jonker refers to are Van Wolde (1994), Uehlinger (1990) and Wenham 
(1997). The following quote from Van Wolde (1994: 102-103) is particularly interesting (quoted from 
Jonker 2001: 175):  
“… in Gen 11:1-9 the dispersion is not presented as a punishment. Differentiation, from the point of 
view of the earth, is not a punishment for sins committed, but a necessity. It is as if the obstacle of 
dispersion, namely the single language, is removed because YHWH now sees the consequences for the 
earth that the action of the humans will have.” 
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political policy of separate development.” But, still these studies could “be used 
to make similar conclusions than that of RVN.” He continues that it is not 
exegetical studies by itself that lead to these conclusions, but other factors.51  
Let us return once again to Patte’s first and last statement (statements 1 and 10) and 
the responsibility that critical scholars should take for the effect that their readings 
have on other. Does Patte expect of all biblical scholars to anticipate what effect their 
interpretations of the Biblical text might have on others? And is this a realistic 
expectation?  
The scholars that Jonker quotes above had no idea that the document that 
legitimated Apartheid interpreted Gen 10-11 in a similar manner. They would be 
appalled at this charge and none of them would have intended to justify Apartheid 
and oppression, I presume. But the fact is that it would be possible for these 
interpretations to have a Wirkungsgeschichte in Europe (and other parts of the 
world)52 over which they have no control.53  
On the one hand the article by Jonker illustrates that Patte might have a very strong 
case with his demand that critical scholars should take responsibility for the effect of 
their critical readings. These readings can in fact be dangerous, but how are scholars 
to anticipate these effects? Patte’s suggestions of reading with others, other Male 
European-American critical scholars, other advocacy scholars or even other ordinary 
readers might be helpful. Although it is not exactly clear how this is to be done.  
On the other hand one might use this article to make a case for the fact that Patte’s 
demands are totally unrealistic and even impossible. These critical readings were 
based on sound critical readings of biblical texts and to use Patte’s own words based 
on the “meaning producing dimensions” of the text. Thus, once again, we are faced 
with legitimate readings of texts, but readings that might (and in fact did in South 
Africa) have disastrous effects for some people. But, should scholars realistically hold 
themselves responsible if some people were to use their interpretations (against their 
intentions) to oppress or exploit other people? Modern day biblical scholars usually 
do not think of the Bible as a kind of model on which we should build our society, 
whatever we think the Bible says!  
                                                 
51 He (Jonker 2001: 176) identifies these factors as:  
Certain heuristic keys and interpretative strategies lead to those conclusions, and these keys and 
strategies are formed in the interaction processes with social transformation. 
52 It would not need too much imagination to imagine some die-hard conservative Afrikaners in South Africa 
(who are probably not very comfortable in the New South Africa), reading these exegetical studies and 
responding with: “We told you so!” 
53 Jonker (2001: 176 n. 30) refers to this in a footnote:  
One could, of course, ask whether the processes of social transformation in present-day Europe with 
regards to ethnicity could again lead to a similar usage of these exegetical results. These exegetical 
studies certainly do not aim at the legitimization of any social policy. However, these exegetes should 
certainly take note of the Wirkungsgeschichte of these exegetical results in the South African society. 
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Yet that might actually be the point, that we as biblical critics should be more vocal 
about this, should not keep quiet about the dangers of applying an ancient text to a 
modern society. Is that our responsibility? Is that the ethical fault that we should seek 
to avoid? I would like to argue that the answer to both these questions should be 
“yes”. I thus do think that this discussion of Patte has been useful with regards to the 
following two issues.  
1)  Both these discussions from the South African context lead to the one issue 
that is not convincingly addressed by Patte and that is why he regards the Bible 
as essentially a liberating book? Some scholars (as we already saw with 
Carroll and Räisänen) would argue that there are many oppressive “meaning 
producing dimensions” in Biblical texts, too many to use the Bible as a 
liberating book.54 This is an issue that he manages to ignore throughout his 
book and this makes the contribution of Räisänen and Carroll above very 
important. Although Patte is interested in responsibility he seems to be very 
reluctant to ever make a value-judgement. Above I said that “plurality” seems to 
be his solution to unethical reading practices or to the Bible having a harmful 
effect on ordinary readers. I sense reluctance with Patte to be critical in the 
sense that Carroll, Clines and Räisänen proposed, in the sense of making a 
value-judgement, or playing the role of Dyck’s “social critic.” I would thus argue 
once again that ethical responsibility actually should entail biblical critics 
making value-judgements.  
2) Another useful aspect of this rather long discussion on Daniel Patte’s book, 
was that it introduced the South African context. Yes, Patte’s question as to the 
effect of our biblical readings is relevant, but the way in which he answers it is 
highly inadequate when we engage with that from the South African 
experience. Under 2.5 below I will discuss Apartheid as an “ideological 
holding”, or a “factor” that plays a role in the way in which I read texts in the 
current South African context, something that predisposes me to read in a 
certain fashion.  
Excursus 2.1, A “non-debate” in biblical studies 
A rather disconcerting exercise is to see how two scholars that already featured extensively in 
this discussion responded to Patte’s book. When Robert Carroll tells about his visit to South 
Africa in 1993, he expresses the reservations that he had before his visit as follows (2001a: 
187-188): 
I had many reservations about the visit, mostly having to do with the fact that I was very 
conscious of being a white male and privileged academic from the West, visiting a 
territory where until very recently other white folk had exploited, oppressed and deformed 
the black peoples of the country. This was a period in the West when, among North 
American biblical scholars, one could be forgiven for thinking that to be white and male 
                                                 
54 To name just one further feminist example, Durber (1992: 78) argues that women should write new texts 
instead of trying to salvage biblical texts.  
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was close to being an intellectual crime, a requirement for an act and attitude of self-
hatred and certainly an ideological defect in a person. 
He then adds the following remark in a footnote (Carroll 2001a: 187 n. 3): 
This is how I read a book such as Daniel Patte’s. I think it is high time that this issue was 
discussed with a bit more backbone and “cards on the table” approach rather than in the 
mealy-mouthed fashion of “blaming Whitey” which has characterized the non-debate thus 
far. Nobody, not even whites (pinks), is to blame for the colour of their skin and “inverted 
racist” approaches such as Patte’s are just as racist as any of the racist approaches justly 
condemned by all right-thinking people.  
Thus for Carroll the book by Patte represents an “inverted racist” approach that asks of white-
male biblical scholars to perform an act of self-hatred. I do not think that it is a fair description 
of the book. Patte insists that he is a white male and that he cannot be anything else, but he 
is critical of the role that white males have played and wants to remedy the problem. Still, for 
Carroll his argument is without “backbone” and Carroll accuses him of not putting all his 
“cards on the table.” Yet, for Schüssler Fiorenza (1999: 8) Patte embodies the problem of 
“Euro-American malestream scholarship”: 
The politics of exclusion and silencing that has shaped the very ethos of the discipline is 
overlooked in Daniel Patte’s response to the challenge of my SBL presidential address to 
the academy. Although the book is well intentioned and comes highly recommended, it 
does not grapple with the fact that kyriocentric Euro-American malestream scholarship is 
part of the problem rather than part of the solution. 
This sounds more like what Carroll has described above, that being a white male55 is some 
kind of an intellectual crime. It sounds as if Schüssler Fiorenza does not see much of a role 
for white males in the biblical guild. Schüssler Fiorenza (1999: 8 n. 23) also continues in a 
footnote: 
Rather than critically analyzing the marginalizing discourses of malestream biblical 
studies and their silencing powers, Patte reaffirms the solidarity of white male exegetes 
and claims scientific as well as theological authority for them. Their work has the task to 
bring to critical, i.e. scientific consciousness the interpretations of “ordinary” readers. 
Thereby he re-inscribes not only the status divisions between professional and “ordinary” 
readers that are at the heart of the silencing and exclusionary tendencies of the discipline 
but also those between scientific, i.e., (white male) scholars and hermeneutical, i.e., 
advocacy readings. 
These two remarks by Carroll and Schüssler Fiorenza are not really a good reflection on the 
state of the debate in biblical scholarship. It seriously leaves the impression that biblical 
scholars do not read each other’s work, even if they like to criticise each other. This makes 
dialogue nearly impossible if scholars are not willing to listen to each other. But it probably 
also reflects on the fact that Patte has indeed touched some sensitive issues and therefore 
the two extreme reactions. I would thus think that the book by Patte is an important 
contribution. As I said above he addresses very important questions, I only find his proposal a 
bit lacking. Carroll is right, though, it would be better to describe the state of affairs as a non-
debate than a debate. Does this then mean that it is all about power (as Schüssler Fiorenza 
                                                 
55 Or a “pale male” as some people would call us, be it tongue in the cheek.  
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would argue) and that different groups are simply fighting for their own survival, for their place 
in the sun under their own academic fig tree? A very cynical answer would, of course, be 
“yes.”  
2.5 Apartheid as “ideological holding”  
The Afrikaans word “Apartheid” has become something that represents a political 
system that exploited millions of people. It has a terrible image the world over and it 
has dominated South African history in especially the latter half of the twentieth 
century.56 It has become part of the story of South Africa as well as the story of the 
Afrikaners, of whom I am one. It is also very much part of the story of the Dutch 
Reformed Church (DRC) of which I am a member. Giliomee points out that the “first 
printed record of the term ‘apartheid’, used in its modern sense, dates back to 1929” 
(2003: 454).  
In addressing a conference of the Free State DRC on missionary work, held in 
the town of Kroonstad, the Rev. Jan Christoffel du Plessis said: ‘In the 
fundamental idea of our missionary work and not in racial prejudice one must 
seek an explanation for the spirit of apartheid that has always characterized our 
[the DRC’s] conduct.’  
Thus, this word that has come to mean so many bad things was first used at a 
conference on missionary work in the DRC. It was not meant to be such a bad 
word.57 Nevertheless, this is how things are now and in the rest of this dissertation I 
would like to argue that this word embodies one of the most important “ideological 
holdings” that any critical scholar trying to read the Bible in the twenty first century in 
South Africa should take stock off. Our experience with Apartheid and the role that 
the Bible played in this project of social engineering will taint any interpretation of the 
Bible for a long time in South Africa.  
2.5.1 Of being a “culprit” and a “victim” 
Antjie Krog (1998), a famous Afrikaans poet, dedicates her book on the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission to “every victim who had an Afrikaner surname on her 
lips.” In the rest of the book it turns out that many (if not most) of the victims did 
                                                 
56 According to Giliomee (2003: 475) the word was used for the first time in political circles in 1943: 
Die Burger first used the term ‘apartheid’ in that year when it referred to the ‘accepted Afrikaner 
viewpoint of apartheid.’ In January 1944, D.F. Malan, speaking as Leader of the Opposition, became 
the first person in Parliament to employ it. A few months later he elaborated: ‘I do not use the  word 
“segregation”, because it has been interpreted as a fencing off (afhok), but rather “apartheid”, which 
will give the various races the opportunity of uplifting themselves on the basis of what is their own.’  
57 Giliomee (2003: 475) continues to describe that for Du Plessis “it was not so much a matter of protecting 
privilege or exclusivity than finding a policy that concentrated on the eie, or that which promoted what he 
called the selfsyn, or being oneself.” This quote already introduces us to the old debate of whether 
Apartheid was a “good idea” which was executed “badly” or “selfishly”, or whether the idea itself was 
evil. Giliomee (2003: 454) states further that “Du Plessis envisaged the development of autonomous, self-
governing black churches as a counter to English missionaries, who tried to produce converts by copying 
‘Western civilization and religion.’”  
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indeed have Afrikaner names on their lips. A fascinating aspect of the way in which 
she tells that story is her own struggle with her “Afrikanerhood” and what it means to 
be an Afrikaner and an Afrikaans speaking person in the New South Africa. Is 
Afrikaner a synonym for being a culprit, an evil person who oppressed others, a 
racist, a modern day manifestation of a Nazi?58 When confronted by a not-so-
regretting former President F.W. de Klerk, Krog responds as follows (1998: 99): 
I look at the Leader [i.e. De Klerk -- EEM] in front of me, an Afrikaner leader. And 
suddenly I know: I have more in common with the Vlakplaas five than with this 
man. Because they have walked a road, and through them some of us have 
walked a road. And hundreds of Afrikaners are walking this road - on their own 
with their own fears and shame and guilt. And some say it, most just live it. We 
are so utterly sorry. We are deeply ashamed and gripped with remorse. But hear 
us, we are from here. We will live it right - here - with you, for you. 
If Krog is right that this is part of the road that Afrikaners travelled and are still 
travelling on, this road of “being sorry”, of “fears and shame and guilt”, how will this 
manifest in how male Afrikaner biblical critics read the Bible today in South Africa? In 
what sense will and should this sensitise us to read otherwise? The last two 
sentences of this paragraph sounds like some kind of commitment to South Africa, a 
commitment to be “from here” and to “live it right.” What would it mean for modern 
day biblical scholars to “read from here” or “to read it right”?  
But another question surfaces and that is why she rather identifies with the Vlakplaas 
five; five policemen who committed terrible atrocities; than with the “Leader”? She 
wanted (and needed) of him to say at least the following (Krog 1998: 98-99):  
I didn’t know, but I will take the responsibility. I will take responsibility for all the 
atrocities committed under the National Party’s rule over the last fifty years. I will 
lay wreaths where people have been shot, I will collect money for victims, I will 
ask forgiveness and I will pray. I will take the responsibility. I will take the blame.  
She expected some kind of responsibility, but she had to be contend with a “faked 
innocence”, which makes her feel more attracted to the policemen who murdered 
and tortured, because they at least seemed to be travelling on a road of more 
honesty. The “Leader” represents the majority who claim that they “never knew”, and 
that that is why they did nothing. In the previous quote she mentioned “hundreds of 
Afrikaners” which means that it is only a very small part of this group of more-or-less 
three million that really engage with this history of guilt. The majority of Afrikaners 
                                                 
58 See especially the following quote by her where she asks what the implications of this history might be for 
the Afrikaans language (Krog 1998: 238): 
‘Was Apartheid the product of some horrific shortcoming in Afrikaner culture? Could one find the key 
to this in Afrikaner songs and literature, in beer and braaivleis? How do I live with the fact that all the 
words used to humiliate, all the orders given to kill, belonged to the language of my heart? At the 
hearings many of the victims faithfully reproduced these parts of their stories in Afrikaans as proof of 
the bloody fingerprints upon them.’ 
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was and is probably content with practising a kind of “ostrich tactics” of not-knowing. 
Thus one could say that imbedded in being an Afrikaner is this culprit-identity, of 
having taken part in some evil, but that this identity is often hidden and not that often 
engaged with.  
Yet, the other part of being an Afrikaner, I would think, is a kind of victim-identity; of 
being terribly wronged by the English; even of being inferior59 to the English. This 
tension does manifest in Krog’s story60 between Afrikaners and English speaking 
white South Africans.61 William Beinart (2001: 65) describes the situation after the 
South African war as follows: 
Afrikaners harboured an enormous sense of injustice about British intervention, 
which helped to make them impervious to any criticism about their style of 
control in the Transvaal. Boer self-righteousness comes through powerfully in 
books like A Century of Wrong (Reitz 1900), in which Jan Smuts, youthful 
Attorney-General in the Transvaal after graduating at Cambridge, had a hand. It 
feeds on the version of nineteenth-century history increasingly propagated by 
nationalist intellectuals that asserted unquestioningly the depth and unity of the 
volk and perfidy of the British who seemed to favour Africans. Afrikaner history 
became a search, sanctioned by God, for independence and identity against the 
combined forces of Mammon and Ham. Such ideas about morality and justice 
were powerful spurs to political action in turn-of-the-century South Africa, not 
least because of the violence of the nineteenth. These moral issues 
subsequently recurred in political debate between Boer, Briton, and African: who 
                                                 
59 See especially the following quote from a discussion in Krog (1998: 239): 
‘All I know is that my grandfather wanted to send my mother to Rhodes University so that she could 
learn to speak English “better than an Englishman” - and that my mother refused. She told him she 
doesn’t need to speak English better than an Englishman. But why do you ask about inferiority? Do 
you think Afrikaners are suffering from it?’ 
60 This surfaces for instance in a hearing when General Constand Viljoen makes a presentation shortly after 
De Klerk’s “I-did-not-know” presentation (Krog 1998: 131): 
Viljoen speaks as if he wants to capture something, bring something back, confirm some essence of 
Afrikanerhood that is wholesome. I want it too – but at the same time know it not to be. When Viljoen 
talks about how the British took away the land of the Boers, an English-speaking journalist mutters 
sarcastically, ‘Ah shame!’ 
I cannot help it, I spit like a flame: ‘Shut up, you! You didn’t utter a word when De Klerk spoke … 
Viljoen is at least trying.’ 
‘You must be joking – this poor man is an anachronism.’ My anger shrivels before his Accent. And his 
Truth. 
 It does not take much to bring that very old tension between “Boer and Briton” to the surface. Her anger 
does not only shrivel before his “Truth”, but also before his “Accent”! Krog does not use the excuse of 
“blaming the English”, but still this tension is there between Afrikaans and English speaking whites.  
61 This tension between Afrikaans and English speaking whites is also quite vivid in the way that Giliomee 
tells the story of the Afrikaners. One sometimes gets the impression that there is a bit of “blame-it-on-the-
English” going on, as the following quote illustrates (Giliomee 2003: 481): 
The kind of segregation that most English-speakers supported was less aggressive and blatant than that 
of the NP. They did not agree with crude manifestations, like segregated suburbs and the racial sex 
laws. As the wealthier white community they could buy their apartheid and, unlike Afrikaners, did not 
have to worry about a large section in their community, that had just escaped from acute poverty. 
 Whether this might be “true” or not, on a rhetorical level this paragraph shifts in a subtle fashion blame 
from the Afrikaners to the English. Or, it says at least that “they” are as guilty as “we” are and in that sense 
it shifts blame, or distributes blame “more evenly.” 
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got there first; who invaded whose land; who ignored whose rights; to whom did 
the wealth and resources of the country belong? There is nothing so dangerous 
as people who feel they have been deeply wronged, and are blinded by their 
own sense of injustice. Afrikaners fed on that sense, and the scale of British 
intervention was partly responsible. [my italics - EEM] 
We already saw above that Carroll pointed to some of these issues when he 
described his own ideological holdings. That he thought he had this in common with 
the Boers, this struggle against the English, this sense of being wronged by them. 
But that was where his sympathy ended, because the Boers after gaining freedom 
suppressed the other people of South Africa.62 As Beinart already said above 
“Afrikaner history became a search, sanctioned by God, for independence and 
identity against the combined forces of Mammon and Ham.” Thus God; and we 
should add the Bible; played a fundamental role in what happened in South Africa in 
the twentieth century. Somehow the Bible “supplied a rhetoric of liberation” against 
the English that got out of hand, that contained the seed for exploiting the majority of 
black people after the Afrikaners regained power. This, of course, happened (as 
Beinart aptly put it) in the context of a people who felt that “they have been deeply 
wronged, and are blinded by their own sense of injustice.”  
I think that many Afrikaners grew up with this “world-view” or “ideology” that 
Afrikaners were terribly wronged and that we were victims who suffered under the 
English. This was always part of our identity of how we understood ourselves. It 
might be partially true that Afrikaners did actually suffer under the English, but I do 
think that Beinart is correct when he says that that blinded the Afrikaners. It 
especially blinded us to see the injustices we ourselves were inflicting on others. It 
also diverted attention from the fact that the ultimate victims in colonial South Africa 
were neither the Afrikaners nor the English, but rather the original Khoisan and black 
peoples who lived on this land in the first place.  
The reader might be wondering what my objective might be with constructing my 
ideology or identity as being both culprit and victim? What is the relation to Leviticus 
25? These notions of “victims” and “culprit” will reappear in chapters 6 and 7 and they 
will prove quite useful then, or so I hope. Before we conclude this chapter we need to 
shortly take a further look at how the Bible was used to legitimate Apartheid. We 
have already touched upon this when I discussed the two articles by Deist (1994) 
and Jonker (2001) above. By means of this short overview I just want to accentuate 
                                                 
62 In a discussion on reconciliation and restitution Krog (1998: 113) refers to an Ugandan scholar, Mahmood 
Mamdani, who offers the following analysis of the relation between the Boer war and Apartheid: 
Mamdani asks whether the basis of reconciliation after the Anglo-Boer War was not redistribution to 
Afrikaners, rather than punishment of the English? ‘Were the English and Afrikaners partners in a 
common crime (Apartheid) against humanity or was apartheid a programme for massive redistribution, 
reparation, of today’s loot in favour of yesterday’s victims?’ 
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the point further that biblical scholarship in South Africa has not really faced up to the 
problem of the Bible as a threat to liberation. I do this with the risk of repeating much 
of what has been said already.  
2.5.2 The Bible and Apartheid 
Many people have described the role that the Bible played in the formation of 
Apartheid (see Kinghorn (ed.) 1986, or De Gruchy & Villa-Vicencio (ed.) 1983). It is 
generally accepted that the first63 document that consciously legitimated Apartheid by 
means of the Bible was the one accepted by the Transvaal Synod of the DRC in 
1948 (see Kinghorn 1986: 102-106).64 This happened some months before the 
election in which the NP gained power. Before this time “racial segregation” was 
usually motivated by means of “traditional arguments”, for example, “this is the way 
that it was done from the start” or, “our experience with people of mixed races has 
taught us.”65 This was the start of a process that culminated in the publication of 
“RVN” in 1974 (Kinghorn 1986: 128), to which we already referred to above when we 
discussed the issues raised by the article of Jonker. RVN was only withdrawn when 
the DRC renounced Apartheid in 1986. 
Through the years there was, of course, much criticism of Apartheid from many 
different circles including the ecumenical (see De Villiers 1986: 144-164). Most of the 
voices against Apartheid were theological voices in the sense that the main reproach 
against the Apartheid theologians was that it was contrary to the Gospel.66 The most 
important document that was born in the family67 of Dutch Reformed Churches 
                                                 
63 We already quoted above that the first use of the term Apartheid was in DRC missionary circles and 
Giliomee (2003: 460-461) would indeed argue that the missionary policy of the DRC became a model on 
which the politicians later based their “social congregation.” In support of his argument he quotes D.F. 
Malan who in 1947 remarked (Giliomee 2003: 460): 
It was not the state but the church who took the lead with apartheid. The state followed the principle 
laid down by the church in the field of education for the native, the colored and the Asian. The result? 
Friction was eliminated. The Boer church surpasses the other churches in missionary activity. It is the 
result of apartheid. 
64 Kinghorn (1986: 102-106) argues that in the early forties there was more-and-more criticism against the 
“Apartheid-idea” by some opponents such as B.J. Marais and B.B. Keet in the Transvaal Synods of 1940 
and 1944. The “need” arose amongst the supporters of Apartheid to justify it by means of Scripture. This 
lead to a document by a NT scholar, E.P. Groenewald that was called “Skriftuurlike grondslag van die 
beleid van rasseapartheid en voogdyskap.” [Scriptural foundation for the policy of racial segregation and 
trusteeship.] 
65 Kinghorn (1986: 88-89) refers to a document called the “Federale Sendingbeleid” [Federal Mission Policy] 
of the Federal Mission Council of the DRC of 1935 where the policy is motivated by the “traditional fear 
of the Afrikaner for gelykstelling.” At that stage there was no motivation by means of using the Bible.  
66 One example would be the World Council of Churches in 1968 in Uppsala where racism was condemned 
on the grounds that it contradicts the effectiveness of reconciliation in Christ; it denies the fact that human 
beings were created in the image of God and it alleges wrongly that our identity lies in our race and not in 
Christ (De Villiers 1986: 147).  
67 The result of the mission policy of separate congregations for different racial groups was the development 
of four different Dutch Reformed Churches for four different racial groups. These were the DRC (for 
whites), the Dutch Reformed Mission Church (for coloureds), the Dutch Reformed Church in Africa (for 
blacks) and the Reformed Church in Africa (for Indians). These three non-white churches were referred to 
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against Apartheid was the Confession of Belhar written in 1982 and accepted as a 
Confession by the Dutch Reformed Mission Church in 1986.68 The three main articles 
of this Confession are about “unity”, “reconciliation” and “justice” (see Meyer (2000: 
113) or Jonker (2001: 169)). The first two articles focus on the New Testament and 
the unity that a church should have in Christ which is made possible by the 
“reconciliation” established by Christ. It is thus a Christological argument focusing on 
the centre piece of the Christian faith. The OT only feature in the third article on 
“justice” along with, for instance, many texts from the Gospel of Luke (see Meyer 
2000).  
In short, the criticism of Apartheid that led to the withdrawal of RVN by the DRC 
focused mostly on theology and on the bad use of scripture. One will hardly ever find 
the suggestion that the exegesis of the Apartheid theologians were good reflections 
of the biblical text (or rather some biblical texts) itself. The article by Jonker (2001) 
that we discussed above was the first that clearly pointed the debate in a new 
direction, in the sense that it confronted us with the kind of problem that Carroll was 
so good at formulating. Was it bad exegesis or were the things that they identified not 
part and parcel of the biblical text? Were they not true to what Patte has called the 
“meaning-producing dimensions of the text”?  
I should also add now that my intention is not to “judge” the Apartheid theologians, 
my theological ancestors. I have no doubt that Apartheid was evil, despite the old 
argument that it was well intended, or that it was a good theory that was practised 
selfishly. Yet I cannot judge them, because I am not convinced that I would have 
acted and thought differently if I were in their positions. That I think is what makes 
ideology so dangerous, the fact that it is so pervasive and, of course, persuasive. 
Now in the New South Africa we live with new ideologies, new ways of understanding 
ourselves, new ways of dreaming about the future and the hope is that they will not 
be destructive, but that they will liberate and repair some of the damage done by the 
previous ideologies. The future will teach us whether this will happen or not.  
2.6 Conclusion 
I started this discussion by engaging with the question of the “critical” task of the 
biblical scholar. I did this by focusing on the debate initiated by Räisänen at the 
International SBL meeting in Helsinki in 1999. I added the views of Barton to those of 
Räisänen because both have much in common and both are defenders of the 
objectives of traditional historical criticism. In both I detected a tendency or 
preference to accentuate the “critical” in “historical criticism” instead of the 
                                                                                                                                            
as the “daughter” churches, with the DRC being the “mother.” For overviews of this history, see Loff 
(1983: 1-23) or Botha (1984: 74-90).  
68 Giliomee (2003: 620) also argues that the drafting of the Belhar Confession was a big blow to the DRC.  
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“historical”. Both of them were also reluctant to acknowledge that “engaged 
scholarship” had made a significant contribution to biblical scholarship. I represented 
them thus as modern-day representatives of traditional biblical scholarship. Yes, they 
are more nuanced, but they still would like to keep to the original ideals of historical 
criticism (see also 2.2.3 above).  
I contrasted their views with that of Rowland and Schüssler Fiorenza who both had 
no problem with acknowledging that the place and context from where somebody 
reads plays a role in how she reads. Schüssler Fiorenza was also quite clear that the 
main issue at stake in this debate is power.  
I then attempted to “harmonise” the two positions (see 2.2.3) and tried to use the 
term “honesty” to find some common ground. That was probably not that successful, 
because the ultimate question still is, to be honest, about what? The different 
scholars would probably have responded differently. For Räisänen it would have 
been honest about the “non-dialogical” sides of the Bible. With Barton it was not 
really that clear. Rowland would probably have said something about our agenda and 
commitment. Schüssler Fiorenza left the impression that we should be honest about 
the fact that we want to acquire power. I then concluded that it seemed that the 
debate was at a standstill. I did not really answer the question as to what the “critical” 
role of the biblical scholar should be.  
This was where I introduced Carroll whom I thought occupied a position somewhere 
between the two groups. For him “critical” meant a double scrutiny of both text and 
interpreter. In that sense his view was close to that of Rowland and Schüssler 
Fiorenza and he has no problem with identifying his own “ideological holdings.” Yet 
he also has much in common with Räisänen in the sense that the way in which he 
scrutinises the text often accentuates what Räisänen has called the “non-dialogical” 
sides of the Bible. Carroll is also clear that we should evaluate the biblical text in the 
light of “extra-biblical values”. I then added the views of Clines and Dyck and I asked 
the question whether it is the ethical responsibility of the biblical critic to make, 
amongst other things, a value judgement on the claims of the biblical text? My 
answer to this question was “yes.” 
This lead us to the book by Daniel Patte who used concepts like responsibility and 
accountability but whose execution or implementation was found lacking. He was 
simply not critical enough and he was apparently not willing to acknowledge that 
there are sides to the biblical text that are not so liberating. Yet Patte helped me to 
introduce my South African context and the way in which the Bible was used to 
engineer our society with disastrous consequences.  
I then attempted to take stock of my own “ideological holdings” as Carroll suggested 
and I constructed Afrikaner identity as oscillating between being a victim and being a 
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culprit. But where does this whole discussion leave us? What critical role are we to 
play that will be ethically responsible?  
Carroll argued that the fact that he came from a tradition of people who suffered 
under the English left him no choice but to side with people who were struggling to be 
freed from all sorts of oppression. For me as an Afrikaner who comes from a tradition 
of also “suffering” under the English, but also a tradition of making blacks suffer, the 
choice is even clearer. As Antjie Krog said “we are from here. We will live it right - 
here - with you, for you.” The “you”, I would think, refers to those that suffered, those 
victims who had “Afrikaner names” on their lips. This is part of the ideological 
holdings that I have to read the Bible with, of knowing that I belong to a group of 
people who used the Bible to oppress others. Would the answer thus be to use the 
Bible to liberate others?  
For somebody like Carroll this would not be a viable option, because it would not be 
an honest enough presentation of the Bible. For him the Bible has never managed to 
produce an “ideology of liberation”, because it is a book of slaves for slaves. 
Räisänen’s view was not that far from his in the sense that he also wanted to point 
out the “non-dialogical” sides of the Bible. That was the only honest way to go for 
him. Neither of them sounded very hopeful that the Bible could indeed be used in a 
liberating fashion. Part of the problem for Carroll, I think, was that he was not only 
interested in siding with modern peoples suffering under oppression, but that his 
scrutiny of the text often uncovered distortion in the sense that ancient voices were 
silenced. For him the Bible is an Elitist book in which a power-group wanted to 
enforce their point of view unto others who were less powerful (see especially 
chapter 6). Carroll thus also sided with those who suffered in ancient times and not 
only those who suffer in today’s world.  
Yet, we also had the contribution of Schüssler Fiorenza who identified a “double” 
objective for feminist theology, which consisted of both naming “the destructive 
elements” of a text as well as to “recover its unfulfilled possibilities.” And it is this 
second task that makes her different from Carroll and Räisänen, because for her 
there is still some hope left in the Bible. For her “liberation” is thus not something 
foreign to the Bible (as with Carroll), but something for which we can indeed search 
in the Bible. I suppose that one could address one critical question at Carroll and that 
is whether he has really taken seriously the role that the Bible has played in many 
Third World countries? Did the Bible just supply a “rhetoric of liberation” or might 
there be something more to it? This is where one usually ends up with an ideological-
critical approach, but in the light Schüssler Fiorenza’s position I would still want to go 
further, or beyond ideological criticim. A South African OT scholar, Gerald West, 
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identifies the role of what he calls “socially engaged biblical scholars” as follows 
(1999: 66): 
Recognizing the damage done by the Bible, socially engaged biblical scholars 
insist on critical modes of reading: recognizing that the Bible still possesses the 
power to orient life in a meaningful, truthful, powerful way, socially engaged 
biblical scholars insist on a critical appropriation.  
This is thus similar to the position of Schüssler Fiorenza, on the one hand 
acknowledging the damage and on the other hand recognizing that there is still some 
power left. For West (1999: 67) this is so because “most accept the argument that 
insofar as the Bible is still influential today and insofar as it forms a significant part of 
the personal, cultural and religious reality of poor and marginalized communities, we 
have to engage critically with it.” It is thus a pragmatic acknowledgement that the 
Bible still holds power over people and that the role of the biblical critic is to provide 
checks and balances for this power. To acknowledge that the Bible could be and 
often is a dangerous book, but also to acknowledge that we cannot stop people from 
reading it and that we still hope to discover “unfulfilled possibilities” in the text.  
To sum up, in order to be “ethically responsible” I would think that the critical task of 
the biblical scholar entails at least the following:  
1) Biblical critics need to “be sympathetic” to those people in the modern world 
who are struggling to be freed from all sorts of oppression. In the South African 
context it is very clear who these people are that have suffered under nearly 
350 years of colonial rule. My objective as a theologian should also be to 
improve this country so that they may have a better life. The danger here lies in 
the fact that I understand myself as speaking on their behalf, which would be a 
very patronising thing to do. It would probably be the safest to say that I want to 
make this world more just. That is, for instance, why I still support the 
objectives of the Jubilee 2000 movement.  
2) Yet biblical critics also need to be sympathetic towards the ancient people who 
also suffered under all sorts of oppression and exploitation. We must attempt to 
give a voice to them or to read them into the text where they have apparently 
been invisible to the elitist authors of the text. Part of the role of the biblical 
critic is to identify exploitation and distortion in the biblical text in order to give a 
voice to the ancient voiceless. Biblical critics are much better at doing this than 
at doing what has been described in 1). We are trained to read ancient texts 
and interpret ancient worlds, but we are rather ill equipped when it comes to 
modern societies.  
3) As a biblical critic I should also attempt to construct the world-view and 
ideology of which we find “traces” in the text. I must attempt to describe how 
they understood themselves and how they understood others and in this I 
should attempt to identify distortion. Distortion could entail the authors only 
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presenting their own case and world-view and not acknowledging that there 
were others in their world who had similar claims and thus the kind of people 
that I mentioned in 2). I need to construct the interests (especially political) of 
this group. In this regard it is also important to ask how the deity features in 
their ideology and how they use him (in the Bible it is always a “him”) to forward 
their own political objectives. It would also entail to ask what kind of praxis the 
text encouraged and it will be important to attempt to construct what Carroll 
(1998a: 106) called “a world-construction narrative” which “includes their story 
of the past from which the community came to the present in which it existed 
and a future to which it expired.” 
4) I should also be critical of any unqualified application of an ancient text in 
today’s society. This might have disastrous consequences for people today. It 
might be a threat to their human rights and it might place their freedom in 
jeopardy. I should thus be honest about the “non-dialogical sides” of the text 
and I should indeed do my best to find other dark sides to the text that previous 
scholars have not. I also need to make value-judgements with regards to the 
traces of ideology that I discover in the biblical text. It is my responsibility 
towards the people who have suffered under the uncritical application of the 
Bible and who might suffer in future to read critically, to judge, to be suspicious, 
to identify ideological traces, to be careful how I read. My South African context 
has taught me this.  
5) Yet it is also my responsibility as a biblical critic not to give up hope that there 
might still be some unlocked potential in the Bible as scholars like Schüssler 
Fiorenza and West claim (contra Carroll). I need to keep this hope alive, 
because I cannot stop people from reading the Bible and I cannot ignore the 
fact that the Bible has indeed played a liberating role in many parts of the world 
(including South Africa).  
6) But there is another kind of “honesty” that I need to adhere to. I should be 
honest about my own ideological holdings and I cannot deny the fact that I read 
an ancient text in my current South African context. This context of mine entails 
“ideological baggage” which predisposes me to read in a certain manner. I 
have attempted to identify this baggage when I discussed “Apartheid as an 
ideological holding” above.  
7) It is further important to remember that I cannot pretend that I am from the 
disadvantaged community. I am from the part of a community that has 
exploited the majority and that has richly profited from this exploitation. Nor can 
I change the fact that I am male.  
One of the main objectives in the rest of this study is then to identify ideological 
traces within the text of Leviticus 25. This will entail attempting to construct the kind 
of “world-view” or “network of viewpoints” that the text presents us with. How will I do 
this? In the next chapter (chapter 3) the word “ideology” will disappear for the time 
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being. This chapter will consist of what some might call a “close reading” or even a 
“synchronic reading” of the biblical text which I call the “grammatical features” of the 
text. It will simply serve as starting point, in order to “get a grip” on the text, on which 
all further engagements with the text will be based. One needs to start somewhere 
and the obvious place for me is with the text. 
The word “ideology” will only resurface towards the end of chapter 4, which is a 
rhetorical reading of the text. It will build further on the grammatical features of the 
text identified in chapter 3, but it will specifically ask how these features might have 
been used to persuade. Towards the end of chapter 4 we will then be in a position to 
say more about the “world-view” or “ideology” of the authors and intended 
readers/hearers of the text. My engagement with the text in chapters 3 and 4 thus 
allow me to obtain some of the ideological-critical objectives that I identified above, 
but it also provides me with a foundation for further engagements with text.  
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CHAPTER 3 
GRAMMATICAL FEATURES OF LEVITICUS 25 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this unit is to present a description of the grammatical features of 
Leviticus 25. This description will then serve as the foundation for further 
engagements with the text in following chapters. In order to describe the grammatical 
features of this text special attention is paid to grammatical constructions that occur 
frequently. On four occasions my description of Leviticus 25 is interrupted by an 
excursus focusing on a particular grammatical feature. These four are the so-called 
waw copulative + perfect and the kind of verbal chains that result from their usage, 
the usage of the particle yKi, nominal sentences and the functioning of word order. 
These four are discussed because they occur very often and thus they might have 
some significance for understanding of the text of Leviticus 25. From time-to-time 
other grammatical constructions will also be discussed (for instance, the pendens 
construction and other particles like !ai), but this will not be done in the same detail 
as the first four features. That is why this will not happen in an excursus, but instead 
will be woven into the normal discussion of the text.  
With these objectives in mind the Hebrew text is arranged into clauses, i.e. lines of 
Hebrew with a finite verb in it.1 The Hebrew text will then be discussed in shorter 
units inserted into tables below along with the NRSV translations of this text. This 
chapter should be seen as preparation for what is to follow in the next chapter where 
the argument will shift to focus more specifically on “persuasive” or “rhetorical” 
features of the text.  
It is further important to understand that the following description is thus based on the 
so-called “final form” of the text or some would also name it a “synchronic” study of 
Leviticus 25. Before we do this it would be useful to define what I mean when using 
these concepts.  
3.1.1 Clearing up the concepts 
Recently Ernest Nicholson (1998: 254) in a book attempting to describe the current 
state of the debate on the Pentateuch referred to the above-mentioned concepts as 
follows: 
The term ‘synchronic’ is usually employed for the endeavour of interpreting a text 
as a whole irrespective of what history it has gone through to reach its present 
form, which ‘diachronic’ study seeks to uncover. Scholars adopting the 
                                                 
1 There will be exceptions to this guideline. Most of the exceptions involve the relative pronoun rv,a}.  
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‘synchronic’ approach view a text, for example the Pentateuch, ‘as a concerted 
literary work with its own artistic integrity, composed, as it were, 
contemporaneously under a unitary creative impulse.’ It is for this reason 
sometimes referred to as ‘final form’ interpretation. Employed in such a way the 
term designated the study of the intention and achievement of the final redactor 
of the Pentateuch and thus the study of the final form of the text.  
It thus means that a synchronic study of a text would not be interested in constructing 
the developmental history of a text, but would stick to the text as it is now and would 
attempt to describe the features of this text. One could also add that apart from “final 
form” interpretation, other concepts like “literary criticism” (not to be confused with the 
German Literarkritik, which is actually the exact opposite),2 or “textual immanent” or 
“phenomenological” have been used, and “synchrony” also. The problem with the 
use of synchrony has often been that it has been used as a synonym for “a-chrony” 
or “a-historical.” Ferdinand Deist has argued on two occasions (1995 and 2000), by 
referring to the work Ferdinand de Saussure who actually coined these terms 
(synchrony and diachrony), that biblical scholars have often abused these concepts. 
We do not need to repeat the whole argument, but the following elements of the 
argument are the most important. De Saussure made the important distinction 
between la langue and la parole (which he apparently drew from Hermann Paul). The 
former referred to “the institutionalized repository of a speech community” which 
“dictates the rules of the language at any given stage” (Deist 1995: 41). The latter 
consisted of “particular speech actions” (Deist 1995: 41) or the way in which 
language manifested itself when used by individuals. De Saussure was interested in 
studying la langue and his argument was that one should focus on langue at a 
“specific point in time” (Deist 1995: 41). Deist (2000: 36) quotes De Saussure in this 
regard: 
In the synchronic study of Old French, the linguist uses facts and principles 
which have nothing in common with those which would be revealed by the 
history of the same language from the thirteenth to the twentieth century, but are 
comparable to those which would emerge form the description of a modern 
Bantu language, or Attic Greek in 400 BC, or French at the present day 
[emphasis added by Deist]. 
Deist (2000: 36) then continues that this was in opposition to two linguistic 
approaches of that day of which the second will be relevant for us, namely 
“diachronic linguistics” which tended to “treat facts of different times as though they 
                                                 
2 See, for instance, how Smith (1996: 17) calls his study “literary-critical” which for him is concerned with 
“the characteristics of the book [i.e. Leviticus - EEM] as we know it today.” But, if we were to compare 
this with many of the German studies that appeared on either Leviticus or the Holiness Code and especially 
with the content of the chapter usually called Literarkritik (see, for instance, Grünwaldt 1999: 23-130; 
Feucht 1964: 11-73 or Kilian 1963: 4-147) it becomes clear that it is two opposing ways of reading a text.  
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were simultaneous” (Deist 2000: 36 quoting Wells). Then Deist makes the following 
important point (2000: 36):  
What biblical scholars often do in the name of ‘synchronic’ interpretation, is 
precisely to treat facts of different times as though they were simultaneous. This 
cannot be done with an appeal to de Saussure.  
This means (Deist 2000: 37) that synchrony in the sense that de Saussure used it 
would strictly mean dating3 a text which would imply diachronic and social 
information. Deist even argues that traditional Literarkritik might be the best scholarly 
tool “to allow for synchronic analysis” (Deist 1995: 43): 
In separating earlier from later layers and laying bare the “state” of a text at a 
particular point in time Literarkritik would be a prerequisite for a truly synchronic 
description. But Literarkritik is the one method that “synchronists” avoid. They 
simply declare the biblical text to be an “equilibrium” in order to warrant the 
application of a “synchronic” approach.  
Deist spells out other reservations with regard to using these terms when studying 
ancient near Eastern literature. One problem is that de Saussure used it to study la 
langue, but that literature is a manifestation of la parole (Deist 1995: 44-45)! These 
terms were thus earmarked for studying language as such and not literature or texts. 
The point is that biblical scholars have tended to use these terms rather 
inconsistently and it remains a valid question as to whether they are at all valid for 
the kind of things that biblical scholar do with biblical texts. They were after-all coined 
in an attempt to describe language as such, not texts.  
In order to avoid this pitfall I will attempt to clearly define what I mean by these terms 
and will then attempt to consistently use them in this manner. I will use “synchronic” 
as referring to those kinds of studies that are not interested in constructing the history 
or the development of a text. Thus, scholars that only describe the text as we have it 
now. It does not mean that they necessarily keep from dating a text. Some do date 
the text, while others do not. The famous anthropologist, Mary Douglas (1999), for 
instance is not interested in reconstructing the different layers in the text. She sticks 
to the Masoretic text and calls her book “Leviticus as Literature”, but she dates and 
interprets it in the Second Temple Period (1999: 7). Her approach is thus synchronic, 
but historical. A good example of a biblical scholar would be Watts (1999) who is 
interested in the final composition of the Pentateuch, but who also dates it in the 
Second Temple or Persian Period. He does not claim that the text did not develop, 
                                                 
3 Barr (1995: 1-14) has similarly argued that de Saussure’s notion of synchrony did not exclude the 
“historical” as the following quote illustrates (Barr 1995: 8): 
… the importance, seen from many points of view, of the synchronic aspect in Saussure’s linguistics 
does not provide sufficient arguments in favour of a synchronic approach to biblical exegesis or 
against a diachronic one. In application to an ancient text like the Bible, or more correctly to its 
language, both approaches would in fact necessarily be historical ones. [italics - EEM] 
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he acknowledges that, but his interest is to describe the final form of the text at the 
end of the developmental process. His study is thus also synchronic, but still 
historical. Then there is Warning (1999, “Literary Artistry in Leviticus”) who simply 
attempts to describe the features of the text, but is not interested in the dating it 
whatsoever. Or, we could refer to Ruwe (1999) who actually uses the term 
“synchronic” to describe his book (Ruwe 1999: 134), but who offers no dating for 
these texts. The latter two could thus be described as synchronic, but a-historical.  
“Diachronic” would then refer to the kinds of studies that are interested in 
constructing the way in which a text developed. These studies dominated the 
German speaking academic world in the twentieth century, but they seem to become 
scarcer at the present. A recent example, though, has been Grünwaldt (1999) who 
attempts doing Literarkritik and then also attempts to date the “original” constructed 
layer to a specific historical context. His study is thus diachronical and historical. It 
would also be possible (at least theoretically) to have a diachronic study that is a-
historical. In other words a study that identifies the different layers, but which is not 
interested in dating them to specific time-periods.  
My usage of these terms (synchronic and diachronic) is thus somewhat different from 
how Saussure used them, but I will try to be consistent. I also use the term 
“synchronic” differently from how many biblical scholars have used it in the sense 
that I do not consciously exclude dating the text, to the contrary I will engage with the 
possible historical context in chapter 6.   
3.2 Verses 1-2aα, Introduction4  
These first one and a half verses function as a heading that introduces the direct 
speech that follows. Verse 1 is typical of many other chapters in Leviticus (see for 
instance chapters 4:1, 5:14, 6:1, 6:12, 6:17, 7:22, 7:28, 8:1 etc.).  
Table 3.1 
.rmoale yn"ysi rh'B] hv,moAla, hw:hy“ rBed'y“w" 125
laer;c]yI ynEB]Ala, rBeD' 2  
!h,lea} T;r]m'a;w“  
The LORD spoke to Moses on Mount Sinai, saying: 2 Speak to the people of Israel and say to 
them:5  
Verse 2 starts with an imperative directed at Moses and the imperative is extended 
by means of a waw + perfect, which is the first of many to come, and which justifies a 
closer look and thus the first excursus. 
                                                 
4 According to Ruwe (1999: 370-372) this kind of introduction occurs 69 times (in slightly different 
versions) in the Sinai Priestly Narrative which stretches from Ex 25:1 to Num 10:1. See also Warning 
(1999: 37-46) who identifies 37 divine speeches in Leviticus as such.   
5 All quotations below in English will be from the NRSV.  
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Excursus 3.1, Verb chains 
According to Van der Merwe, Naudé & Kroeze (1999: 163)6 “verb chains are constituted by 
finite verbs that are preceded by a waw.” The second most common7 verb chain in Biblical 
Hebrew, involves a waw and perfect of which we have at least 52 cases in Leviticus 25, but 
there are two kinds of this construction and the difference is important.  
Van der Merwe et al (1999: 168) distinguish between a waw consecutive + perfect and a waw 
copulative + perfect on the grounds of the accent being on either the final or the penultimate 
syllable. If the latter is the case, it is a waw copulative (see also Joüon & Muraoka 1993: 380 
for the same distinction). These latter forms are apparently very rare and their function seems 
to be a mystery. We shall return to this problem later. As we said above there are 52 cases of 
a waw + perfect in Leviticus 25. According to the criteria of Van der Merwe et al, at least 
seven8 of these are waw copulative + perfect while the rest would be waw consecutive + 
perfect.  
In this unit wc. + perfect will refer to the waw consecutive + perfect (also sometimes referred 
to as weqataltí in some grammars as for instance Joüon & Muraoka 1993: 396-406). Waw 
cop. + perfect will refer to the waw copulative + perfect. Joüon & Muraoka (1993: 380-381) 
name these different forms of waw a “simple waw” (thus, the waw cop.) and an “energetic 
waw.” The former expresses “pure juxtaposition” meaning that it connects actions that happen 
simultaneously. The energetic waw introduces nuances of succession, progression, purpose 
etc. 
Van der Merwe et al (1999: 168-170) argue that these chains do not necessarily follow an 
imperfect as a main verb, but often follow a command. In some cases it can also follow “a 
clause that has a perfect, a participle or infinitive as a main verb” (Van der Merwe et al 1999: 
168-169). It may even follow a nominal clause. The important thing is that this construction 
“does not simply continue the meaning of the preceding verb, but is to be understood as 
follows” (Van der Merwe et al 1999: 169). They then identify the following four main 
“functions” (Van der Merwe et al 1999: 169-171): 
1) Waw consecutive + perfect refers to the same temporal spheres and aspect as 
imperfect forms. However, it also has ‘progression’ as a characteristic. 
2) Waw consecutive + perfect can indicate the backbone of one or other discourse type. 
3) Waw consecutive + perfect can introduce the apodasis of a condition. 
4) Waw consecutive + perfect refers to events/actions where no temporal sequence is 
involved. 
                                                 
6 I will often start a discussion of certain grammatical features with this grammar by Van der Merwe, Naudé 
& Kroeze (1999). The main reason being that it is very compact (as introductions go) and provides a good 
starting point. But unfortunately this is also a disadvantage and for this reason I would usually supplement 
their insights by referring to the grammars of Joüon & Muraoka (1993) and Waltke & O’Connor (1990). 
All three grammars are very recent and give a good indication of the current state of affairs in Biblical 
Hebrew grammar.  
7 According to Waltke & O’Connor (1990: 456) the waw + perfect combination (named weqatal by them) 
occurs 6 378 times in the BHS while the wayyiqtol occurs 14 972 times.  
8 The seven examples are the three occurrences of t;arey:w“ (vv. 17, 36 and 43), ytiyWIxiw“  (in v. 21), hg…yCihiw“ (in 
v. 26) and hf;m;W and T;q]zæj>h,w“ in v. 35. 
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As we shall see later it is especially the first two that are important for Leviticus 25. It also 
seems that these different functions do not necessarily exclude each other, for it would be 
possible for a chain of wc. + perfects to express future tense (like an imperfect) and at the 
same time form the backbone of the discourse type.  
Although the description by Van der Merwe et al is very useful in this text, there are some 
problems with using their distinctions. For one, they state that when the wc. + perfect forms 
the backbone of some events, then it is usually not interrupted by other verbal forms (Van der 
Merwe et al 1999: 170). This does happen from time to time in Leviticus 25 and we shall 
return to this problem later.  
All wc. + perfects in the Hebrew texts below will be in italics. In cases where it is a waw cop. + 
perfect the format will be bold and italics.  
3.3 Verses 2aβ-13 
From v. 2ab onwards the speech follows, which Moses will have to convey to the 
people. The direct speech is introduced with a yKi followed by an imperfect (Wabot;) and 
an immanent participle (@tenú).  
Table 3.2: 
!k,l; @tenú ynIa} rv,a} $r,a;h;Ala, Wabot; yKi ¬ 
.hw:hyl' tB;v' $r,a;h; ht;b]v;w“ 
*d,c; [r'z“Ti !ynIv; vve 3 
*m,r]K' rmoz“Ti !ynIv; vvew“ 
.Ht;a;WbT]Ata, T;p]s'a;w“ 
When you enter the land that I am giving you, the land shall observe a sabbath for the LORD. 3 
Six years you shall sow your field, and six years you shall prune your vineyard, and gather in 
their yield; 
Because of the fact that there are no less than 18 yKis in this chapter it might be a 
good idea to take a closer look at this particle before we go any further. 
Excursus 3.2, The particle yKi  
In the 18 examples of yKi in this chapter there are two kinds of yKis namely motivational yKis and 
temporal/conditional yKis. We will start with the latter and then discuss the former.  
Van der Merwe et al (1999: 300-303) make two major distinctions between cases where the 
yKi-clause precedes the main clause and cases where it follows the main clause. Usually 
temporal/conditional yKis would fall into the “yKi-clause preceding the main clause category.” 
The difference between the two (i.e. temporal and conditional) is often not that clear (Van der 
Merwe et al 1999: 300): 
The distinction between a temporal clause and a conditional clause is sometimes vague. 
A temporal clause is one that usually refers to a process that has a good chance of being 
realized. 
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Most yKis in this chapter that would fall into this category should be regarded as temporal yKis. 
This is already true of the first yKi we just encountered. It seems that the authors anticipated 
that these events would happen and this is also true of the second half of Leviticus 25 with all 
the “case like”-law we have there. In most of these cases yKi should simply be translated with 
a “when” and the following sentence can start with “then.” These temporal clauses refer “to a 
process occurring simultaneously with the main clause” (Van der Merwe et al 1999: 300).  
Of the 18 yKis identified in this chapter, nine can be translated as “temporal” while the other 
nine are “motivational.” Motivational yKis usually follow the main clause and in broad terms 
provide the reason for some statement, directive or argument, thus expressing some kind of 
causal relationship between the two clauses. As we shall see later most of the nine 
“motivational” yKis in this chapter can be connected to some kind of directive9 which, of course, 
is not surprising in legal texts with an obvious directive intent.  
In the Hebrew texts below motivational yKis would be indicated with the symbol ±, while 
temporal yKis by the symbol ¬.  
One problem with motivational yKis is the fact that the author is usually not consistent when 
using them. There are cases where we would expect a yKi, but there is none. A good example 
from Leviticus 25 is the following texts in vv. 17 and 38.  
Table 3.3 
wtoymi[}Ata, vyai Wnwto aløw“ 17 
*yh,løa>me t;arey:w“  
.!k,yheløa> hw:hoy“ ynIa} yKi ±
17 You shall not cheat one another, but you shall fear your God; for I am the LORD your God. 
&v,n<B] wlø @TetiAalø *P]s]K'Ata, 37 
*l,k]a; @TetiAalø tyBir]m'b]W  
!k,yheløa> hw:hy“ ynIa} 38 
!yIr;x]mi $r,a,me !k,t]a, ytiaxewhoArv,a} 
@['n"K] $r,a,Ata, !k,l; ttel;   
  s  .!yhiløale !k,l; twyúh]li  
37 You shall not lend them your money at interest taken in advance, or provide them food at a 
profit. 38 I am the LORD your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt, to give you the 
land of Canaan, to be your God. 
The yKi-clause in v. 17 and the clause in v. 38 are exactly the same. Both of them also follow 
directives and both are motivating these directives. But v. 38 does not start with a motivational 
yKi despite the fact that it is fulfilling that function. Does this mean that for the sake of variety 
the authors were not consistent? Or is there some other explanation for the phenomenon? 
For the time being I would regard the first option as the most viable. 
                                                 
9 “Directive” is a term used in speech acts theory. The term usually refers to speech acts which attempts to 
convince the hearer to do something (see Mey 1993: 162-168). They could include actions like questions, 
requests, orders, to beg etc.   
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Another problem is that in Hebrew grammar the description of a particle like yKi has strictly 
been done in terms of syntax. Thus descriptions would often entail describing the kind of 
relationships that one might find between different clauses. Scholars would, for instance, 
argue that a particular clause motivates another clause (which will then be the main clause). It 
should become evident in the rest of this discussion that these descriptions are inadequate 
and that yKi can sometimes be understood as relating larger units than mere clauses.10 In 
some cases the relationship could be even “looser” and can be understood as supporting the 
“thrust” or “purpose” of much more than just a piece of text, but some broader argument or 
objective.  
Later I would also like to argue that the temporal yKis are functioning as structural markers, 
which is quite useful in structuring this text. This is one reason why I regard v. 13 as the 
conclusion of the first part of this text. Another yKi introduces v. 14, but first we need to discuss 
vv. 2ab-13. 
Verses 2ab-13 can also be divided into two smaller parts on the grounds of content. 
Up to v. 7 the text is concerned with the Sabbath year while the rest (v. 8 onwards) 
starts with stipulations on the Jubilee year. This means that both sub-units are 
introduced by a wc. + perfect (v. 2b, ht;b]v;w“ and v. 8, T;r]p's;w“).  
3.3.1 Verses 2ab-7 
Verses vv. 2b-7 are introduced by means of a wc. + perfect which is followed by two 
imperfect forms of the verb and another wc. + perfect (see table 3.2 above). If ht;b]v;w“ 
is a wc. + perfect, where is the main verb, or the verb that starts the chain? The 
answer to the question is fairly obvious namely, Wabot; above. The imperfect 
expresses a future event: “When you will enter the land…” The wc. + perfect (ht;b]v;w“) 
continues that event: “Then the land will rest…” and thus acts like a summary of what 
is to follow.   
In the next three clauses (v. 3) the normal state of affairs is described. Six years you 
will do “this” and six years you will do “that”, on both occasions using imperfect forms 
and concluding with wc. + perfect stating that you will collect the harvest. One of the 
semantic functions of the imperfect identified by Van der Merwe et al (1999: 148) is 
the indication of “habitual actions.” It makes sense to understand these imperfects as 
such. They clearly express actions that will occur year-after-year until the seventh 
year arrives. The two imperfects are followed by a wc. + perfect which continues the 
habitual actions of the imperfects and concludes this description of how things 
usually are.  
Verse 4 then returns to the specific details of the Sabbath year: 
                                                 
10 I have argued this elsewhere (Meyer 2001: 39-62). 
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Table 3.4 
hw:hyl' tB;v' $r,a;l; hy<h]yI @wtoB;v' tB'v' t[iybiV]h' hn:V;b'W 4 
[r;z“ti alø *d]c;~
.rmoz“ti alø *m]r]k'w“~
rwxoq]ti alø *r]yxiq] j'ypis] tae~5 
rxob]ti alø *r,yzIn“ ybeN“[iAta,w“~ 
.$r,a;l; hy<h]yI @wtoB;v' tn"v] 
4 but in the seventh year there shall be a sabbath of complete rest for the land, a sabbath for 
the LORD: you shall not sow your field or prune your vineyard. 5 You shall not reap the 
aftergrowth of your harvest or gather the grapes of your unpruned vine: it shall be a year of 
complete rest for the land. 
Verse 4 states that there will be a @wtoB;v' tB'v' for the land and a tB;v' for YHWH. This 
is followed by four clauses in marked work order (indicated with ~) where the direct 
object (*d]c; and *m]r]k'w“ in the first two) is followed by the verb. The first two clauses 
use the same terms as the two clauses in v. 3, but where the temporal markers 
preceded the verb there, followed by the direct object, the temporal indicators are left 
out now and the direct object precedes the verb. But what exactly is marked word 
order? 
Excursus 3.3, Marked word order 
The last chapter in the grammar of Van der Merwe et al (1999: 336-350)11 is devoted to the 
subject of word order. They discuss this issue in two sub-units. First they focus on the “syntax 
of word order” (1999: 336-343) and then on the “semantic-pragmatic functions of word order” 
(1999: 344-350).  
With regards to the former, the basic presupposition is that BH is a “verb-subject-object” 
language and that when the verb is preceded by any of the other constituents the author is 
trying to express something out of the ordinary. Usually the term “emphasis” is used to 
describe a marked construction, but they do not find this term nuanced enough and attempt to 
offer a more nuanced perspective.  
In order to manage this they distinguish between a “preverbal field” (“Vorveld”) and a “main 
field” (“Hauptveld”). The preverbal field refers to the field that precedes the verb and when 
occupied by a constituent it is called “fronting.”12 Only certain cases are regarded as fronting 
                                                 
11 Because of the fact the neither Joüon & Muraoka (1993) nor Waltke & O’Connor (1991) have much to say 
about the function of marked word order this excursus relies solely on Van der Merwe et al (1999). Joüon 
& Muraoka (1993: 564-577) do mention what kind of word order can be expected in nominal clauses 
(1993: 564-577) and verbal clauses (1993: 579-580), but they do not really bother with what it might 
mean. Waltke & O’Connor (1991: 130) also refer to the word order of nominal clauses (which will be 
referred to in the next excursus), but they do not offer a systematic discussion on the word order in verbal 
sentences and what the function and meaning of this might be.  
12 With regards to fronting they add the following important note (Van der Merwe et al 1999: 337): 
Note that fronting is not the function of a BH syntactic construction. It is the name of a phenomenon in 
which (a) constituent(s) (e.g. subject of object) precede(s) the verb of a BH clause. Fronting may have 
a variety of functions.  
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while others are not13 and in other instances certain entities are obligatory14 in the preverbal 
field. Fronting basically is only at hand when a constituent like the subject, object or indirect 
object occupies the preverbal field. The clauses above in vv. 4 and 5 (Table 4) would be good 
examples because the direct object occupies the preverbal field. In the rest of this unit we will 
focus on fronting as defined along these lines and we will not pay much attention to marked 
word order in the main field of verbal clauses. Marked word order in nominal clauses will enter 
the discussion in the next excursus and then only briefly.  
So if fronting were a mere “phenomenon” what would be the function of this phenomenon? An 
important part of their argument is the presumed communicative interaction between author 
and reader. When two parties communicate only a part of their knowledge of the world is 
activated. For instance, in a narrative “characters, places, states of affairs and events may be 
introduced or activated in the course of the narrative.” With this in mind they distinguish 
between topics that are already “discourse active” and topics that or not and thus are being 
introduced for the first time. They then (Van der Merwe et al 1999: 346-350) refer to the 
semantic-pragmatic functions of fronting. Four main functions are mentioned of which the first 
two are the most important for this chapter (Van der Merwe et al 1999: 346-348).  
i) The fronting signals that an entity, an aspect of an entity or an event is the focus of an 
utterance.  
ii) The fronted complement or adjunct signals that an entity is introduced, activated or 
reactivated to function as the topic of an utterance. The event referred to by means of 
the predicate of that utterance is not discourse active.  
Each one of these main functions has more nuanced sub-functions to which we will refer 
when an example is at hand in the text of Leviticus 25. In the Hebrew text below, marked 
word order will be indicated by the symbol, ~.  
Now, to return to the text above (Table 3.4), if v. 3 depicted how things usually are, 
these last two clauses from v. 4 and the first two from v. 5 state how things should be 
in the Sabbath year. For this very reason exceptional or marked word order is used.15 
The last clause of v. 5 basically sums up what has already been said in the first 
                                                 
13 Van der Merwe et al (1999: 338-339) do not regard subordinated conjunctions and discourse markers, 
negatives and infinitive absolutes, the so-called dislocated construction (which will be mentioned later), 
adjuncts of time, cases where the subject precedes a participle (the latter being the verb), or for instance, 
chiastic patterns in poetry, as fronting.  
14 Entities that have to occupy the preverbal field include: some interrogatives, the demonstrative adverb in 
the messenger formula and when the subject of a clause is realized by means of an independent personal 
pronoun (Van der Merwe et al 1999: 340).  
15 In these four lines the direct object occupies the preverbal field. The first two (*d]c; and *m]r]k'w“) were 
already mentioned in v. 3 and is thus a case of re-activating, while the latter two (j'ypis] ta, and ybeN“[iAta,w“) 
are activated for the first time. But in essence all four are about the “harvest” and therefore the same entity. 
This means that it is probably a case of the second function (ii) mentioned above. It also has the character 
of a list (which apparently often happens, see Van der Merwe et al 1999: 348). The point is that we have 
the same situation as above in v. 3 (the harvest) and the same entities, but the “event referred to by means 
of the predicate of that utterance is not discourse active” as Van der Merwe et al put it (see ii above). This 
simply means that we have a different predicate or a new action which in this case is precisely the opposite 
of what we already had in v. 3, namely to stop doing what were done in v. 3.  
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clause of v. 4, as the “boxes” and arrows above indicate. I understand this structure 
as some kind of inclusio. The laws on the Sabbath year are thus neatly “packaged” 
into a structure that reminds somewhat of a sandwich.  
Table 3.5 
.&M;[i !yriG:h' *b]v;wtol]W *r]ykic]liw“  *t,m;a}l'w“ *D]b]['l]W *l] hl;k]a;l] !k,l; $r,a;h; tB'v' ht;y“h;w“ 6 
 s  .lkoa>l, Ht;a;WbT]Alk; hy<h]Ti *x,r]a'B] rv,a} hY:j'l'w“ *T]m]h,b]liw“ 7
6 You may eat what the land yields during Its sabbath—you, your male and female slaves, 
your hired and your bound laborers who live with you; 7 for your livestock also, and for the 
wild animals in your land all its yield shall be for food. 
An interesting aspect of vv. 6-7 is that we find repetitive elements and that the two 
verses are fairly similar. Verse 6 is about people, while v. 7 mentions the animals, but 
in both we have the roots hyh and lka. In v. 6 hyh is in the form of a wc. + perfect 
while in v. 7 it is an imperfect.16 lka is in the form of a l] + inf. cs. in both cases.17 
Another important feature is that the order of the sentences changes. In v. 6 the verb 
precedes the series of indirect objects, whereas in v. 7 it is the other way around. 
This is definitely a construction intended to read as a unity, because the object 
(Ht;a;WbT]Alk;), thus the food that both the people and the animals will eat, only 
appears in the second clause. The inverted order gives the impression of a chiasm, 
but it also has the characteristics of parallelism because of the repetition. The 
chiastic structure also concludes these verses on the Sabbath year and in the next 
verse the text moves on to the topic of the Jubilee year.  
3.3.2 Verses 8-13 
The part on the Jubilee year starts with a chain of six wc. + perfects in vv. 8 to 10. In 
the following table all the verbs are presented. Six of the clauses start with wc. + 
perfect while three of the clauses have imperfect forms. Two of these imperfect forms 
are used in similar “parallelistic” structures to which we will return later:  
Table 3.6 
 T;r]p's;w“ 8 
Wyh;w“ 
 T;r]b'[}h'w“ 9 
............ Wrybi[}T' ......... 
!T,v]D'qiw“ 10 
!t,ar;q]W  
.......... hy<h]Ti ........ 
                                                 
16 As we shall see later (excursus 4 below) these two clauses should technically be regarded as nominal 
clauses. 
17 The first infinitive (hl;k]a;l]) seems somewhat strange with the h at the end, but BDB (37) does attest a 
similar example found in Jer. 12:9. Joüon & Muraoka (1993: 146) state that one sometimes finds a 
feminine h at the end of an inf. cs. This apparently often happens with stative verbs which, of course, is not 
the case here.  
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!T,b]v'w“ 
.WbvuT; ........ 
We already indicated above that the second semantic function of wc. + perfect 
identified by Van der Merwe et al (1999: 169) is portraying the “backbone of one or 
other discourse type.” This function seems to make sense here. It sketches the 
“broad outline” of the laws namely, “count” (7 X 7 years), “be”, “go through”, 
“sanctify”, “call” and “return.” From v. 11 onwards the syntax of the clauses change to 
nominal sentences and sentences starting with imperfect forms. One important 
question with regards to the first wc. + perfect (T;r]p's;w“) is how is it related to what 
precedes it? In order to answer this question, let us return to vv. 8 and 9 first:  
Table 3.7 
 !ymi[;P] [b'v, !ynIv; [b'v, !ynIv; ttoB]v' [b'v, *l] T;r]p's;w“ 8 
.hn:v; !y[iB;r]a'w“ [v'Te !ynIV;h' ttoB]v' [b'v, ymey“ *l] Wyh;w“ 
vd,jol' rwco[;B, y[ibiV]h' vd,joB' h[;WrT] rp'wvo T;r]b'[}h'w“ 9 
.!k,x]r]a'Alk;B] rp;wvo Wrybi[}T' !yriPuKih' !wyúB] 
8 You shall count off seven weeks of years, seven times seven years, so that the period of 
seven weeks of years gives forty-nine years. 9 Then you shall have the trumpet sounded loud; 
on the tenth day of the seventh month—on the day of atonement—you shall have the trumpet 
sounded throughout all your land.  
Both vv. 8 and 9 consist of “parallelistic” structures. The second clause of v. 8 is 
basically a repetition of the first clause and does not add much in terms of content. In 
both clauses it adds up to 49 years. The same can be said of the two clauses of v. 9. 
In the first clause the rp;wvo will go through (rb[) in the tenth of the seventh month, 
while in the second clause the rp;wvo will do the same thing (again rb[) on the same 
date, but now just called the Day of Atonement. The parallelism in v. 9 is syntactically 
different from that in v. 8, though. In v. 8 both clauses start with a wc. + perfect. In v. 
9 we have a structure akin to what we had in v. 6 above. The same verbal root is 
repeated, but the second occurrence is in the imperfect form. Another interesting 
feature is that the temporal indicator precedes the verb in the second clause whereas 
it follows the verb in the first clause. Once again, chiasm comes to mind. Also 
important is the fact that the place where the ramshorn is suppose to “go through”, 
namely the land (or then, “all of your land”, !k,x]r]a'Alk;B]), is only specified in the 
second clause. As in vv. 6 and 7 I understand this feature as an indication that these 
clauses should be read as a unified stylistic structure.  
This might also provide an answer to the problem that a chain of wc. + perfects are 
not often broken by other verbal forms (referred to above). In this case as in most of 
the cases that follow this “breaking of a chain” happens when there is some kind of 
stylistic feature at hand, like the chiasms we identified here. From now on I will refer 
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to these structures as “parallelistic chiasms.” But to return to a previous question, 
what is the relationship between the first wc. + perfect and the text that precedes it? 
The first and most obvious option would simply be to say that T;r]p's;w“ follows the 
clause that precedes it. It thus, represents progression on the preceding chiastic 
structure which spells out what one is allowed to eat in the Sabbath year and 
concludes these initial laws on the Sabbath year. It builds on this, adding that you 
should “count” seven of these (previously mentioned) years and is progression in that 
sense. This would be the understanding if one were to stick to syntax.  
But would it not be possible to understand T;r]p's;w“ on a larger level than just syntax? 
Could it not function on a text grammatical level or as a marker of relationships 
between units larger than clauses? One is tempted to “squeeze” vv. 2-13 into the 
following structure:  
Table 3.8 
Wabot; yKi 
Start of direct speech that Moses should convey and introduces the “setting” in which all the 
following laws should be understood and obeyed.  
ht;b]v;w“ 
Introduces laws on the Sabbath year (vv. 2ab-7) 
T;r]p's;w“
Introduces laws on the Jubilee (vv. 8-13) 
But the question would now be whether this distinction can really be made by saying 
that the wc. + perfect picks up the line of discussion from v. 2, or whether we are not 
really making this division on the grounds of content? In that case we are reading too 
much into the possible function of a wc. + perfect. The only difference between this 
wc. + perfect and many others in this chapter is that it incidentally occurs along with a 
change in content. It seems to me that the first option (i.e. the wc. + perfect 
continuing the previous clause) would be the safer option and that with the latter we 
are trying to do too much. Now, to return to v. 10 which actually continues with 
another wc. + perfect. 
Table 3.9  
hn:v; !yVimij}h' tn"v] tae !T,v]D'qiw“ 10 
h;yb,v]yúAlk;l] $r,a;B; rwroD] !t,ar;q]W  
!k,l; hy<h]Ti 18awhi lbewyú 
wtoZ…jua}Ala, vyai !T,b]v'w “ 
.WbvuT; wToj]P'v]miAla, vyaiw“ 
10 And you shall hallow the fiftieth year and you shall proclaim liberty throughout the land to 
all its inhabitants. It shall be a jubilee for you: you shall return, every one of you, to your 
                                                 
18 According to Joüon & Muraoka (1993: 122) the third person feminine personal pronoun, ayhi is regularly 
spelled as awhi in the Pentateuch with only 11 exceptions. 
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property and every one of you to your family. 
In v. 10 the previously identified chain of wc. + perfects continues. This chain is 
broken on two further occasions by the use of the imperfect form of the verb. In the 
first case we have the verb hyh added to a nominal sentence at which a closer look 
might be appropriate now.  
Excursus 3.4, Nominal clauses 
Joüon & Muraoka (1993: 564) defines a nominal clause along the following lines: 
The category nominal clause includes every clause the predicate of which is a noun or the 
equivalent of a noun, i.e. for instance, a participle, a preposition with a noun or a pronoun; 
or, put negatively, every clause the predicate of which is not a verb (but with the exception 
of hy;h; in the sense of to be) is a nominal clause.  
The phrase in brackets in this definition is also very important. When the verb hy;h; is used they 
do not regard it as a verbal clause, but rather as a nominal clause. This happens when “one 
wishes to specify the temporal sphere of a nominal clause” (Joüon & Muraoka 1993: 576-
577). It means that in this case the temporal sphere is specified to be future (if this is how one 
understands the function of the imperfect form).19 This is very important for Leviticus 25 for 
nearly half of the nominal clauses in this chapter have hy;h; in them.  
A nominal clause usually consists of a subject and a predicate. This subject is usually a noun 
or a pronoun, but can also be a preposition with a noun or even an inf. cs.20 The predicate is 
usually also a noun, which for Joüon & Muraoka (1993: 565) includes substantives, adjectives 
and participles, but it can also be a pronoun, a preposition with a noun or pronoun, an adverb 
or an inf. cs. with l].21  
According to Van der Merwe et al (1999: 248-249) a nominal sentence consisting of two 
nouns (as is often the case here) usually has two semantic functions. These are 
“identification” and “classification.”22 In the case of the former, both the subject and predicate 
are definite while in the latter the subject is definite, but the predicate indefinite. In v. 10 
above, lbewyú is an indefinite predicate, which means that these three examples are instances 
of “classification.” These clauses answer the question: “What is the subject like?” (see Waltke 
                                                 
19 Similarly Waltke & O’Connor (1991: 72) has the following to say about these clauses: 
In a verbless (or nominal) clause there is no verbal marker of predication. Hebrew, like many other 
languages, including Latin and Classical Greek, may predicate an adjective or noun directly, without a 
copula (i.e., some form of hyh, which corresponds to English ‘to be’). In languages where the copula 
may be optional, it is usually required if the comment is set in past or future time in contrast to present 
time (or in some mood other than indicative), or if the situation is highlighted.  
 Although they call it a copula, a term one usually associates with Aramaic, in essence it also means that a 
clause with hy;h; functions the same as one without any verb. The hy;h; just adds something on the so-called 
surface structure. See also Waltke & O’Connor (1991: 228 and 605) where they distinguish between a 
verbless clause and a clause with hy;h;, but attribute the same functions to them.   
20 See Joüon & Muraoka (1993: 565) for examples.  
21 Once again see Joüon & Muroaka (1993: 565) for examples. 
22 Joüon & Muraoka (1993: 566-567) also distinguish between these categories, but use the terms 
“descriptive” and “identificatory.” Waltke & O’Connor (1990: 130) also use the same terms as Van der 
Merwe et al (1999).  
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& O’Connor 1990: 132). With regards to Leviticus 25 we can rephrase this question: “What is 
this year like?” The answer would be: Like a “Jubilee!” This means that these phrases are not 
examples of marked word order, but just normal nominal clauses with hyh added as temporal 
indicator.  
Waltke & O’Connor (1990: 130-135) offer a much more extensive description of these 
functions. An important distinction that they mention is the fact that in the case of 
classification the word order in a nominal clause is predicate-subject which would be the case 
with these examples in vv. 10, 11 and 12. Thus, lbewyú is the predicate and the third person 
feminine pronoun is the subject. 
The combination of awhi lbewyú and hyh occurs three times (see vv. 10, 11 and 12, or 
Table 3.12 below) in vv. 8 to 13 which introduce the Jubilee. But in v. 10 we find the 
“simplest” construction in the sense that it only consists of !k,l; hy<h]Ti awhi lbewy, 
whereas other elements are added in vv. 11 and 12, but more of that later.  
The first two clauses in v. 10 (see Table 3.9 above) states that the fiftieth year23 
should be hallowed (vdq) and that a rwroD] should be called out for all the inhabitants 
of the land. In the last two clauses of v. 10 we have the third case of a parallelistic 
chiasm. The repetition is nearly exact. The only difference is that in the first line a 
man returns (bwv) to his hZ…jua} while in the second he returns to his hj;P'v]mi. Once 
again we have the same verbal root (bwv) and once again the first occurrence is a 
wc. + perfect while the second is in the imperfect. In the second clause we have 
inverted word order24 and the subject and prepositional phrase precede the verb.  
Verse 11 starts with another nominal sentence followed by three clauses where the 
negative particle is always followed by an imperfect (which as indicated above is the 
normal unmarked Hebrew word order).  
Table 3.10 
!k,l; hy<h]Ti hn:v; !yVimij}h' tn"v] awhi lbewyú 11 
W[r;z“ti alø  
h;yj,ypis]Ata, Wrx]q]ti aløw“  
.h;yr,zIn“Ata, Wrx]b]ti aløw“ 
11 That fiftieth year shall be a jubilee for you: you shall not sow, or reap the aftergrowth, or 
harvest the unpruned vines.  
Three ([rz, rxq and rxb) of the four verbs used in the marked passage in vv. 4-5 
are repeated here, but rmz is left out. Another difference is that the first verb ([rz) is 
                                                 
23 According to Joüon & Muraoka (1993: 539) the repetition of “year” in the expression hn:v; !yVimij}h' tn"v] is 
not exceptional in BH. See, for instance, the following v. 11.  
24 Where a chiasm is at hand the inverted word order is not usually regarded as marked. The order is changed 
with the chiasm in mind and not with any of the other functions of fronting in mind (see Van der Merwe et 
al 1999: 340).  
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not followed by the direct object (*d,c;) which we find in both vv. 3 and 4. These 
commands are followed by a motivational yKi in v. 12: 
Table 3.11 
!k,l; hy<h]Ti vd,qo awhi lbewyú yKi± 12 
Ht;a;WbT]Ata, Wlk]aTo hd,C;h'A@mi  
.wtoZ…jua}Ala, vyai WbvuT; taZúh' lbewYúh' tn"v]Bi 13
12 For it is a jubilee; it shall be holy to you: you shall eat only what the field itself produces. 
13 In this year of jubilee you shall return, every one of you, to your property.  
As we said the commands in v. 11 are motivated by this yKi-sentence and for the third 
time have a similar clause involving the verb hyh and the two terms, awhi lbewyú. To sum 
up, here are the clauses as found in vv. 10, 11 and 12: 
Table 3.12 
!k,l; hy<h]Ti awhi lbewyú 
!k,l; hy<h]Ti hn:v; !yVimij}h' tn"v] awhi lbewyú 
!k,l; hy<h]Ti vd,qo awhi lbewyú yKi ± 
It seems that there is some kind of progression in these three cases. First we find “it 
shall be a Jubilee for you.” Then the year is specified as the fiftieth and then we find a 
motivational yKi with the adjective “holy” (vd,qo) added. This observation is further 
supported when we keep in mind that the command was actually given to “sanctify” 
(vdq) the fiftieth year in v. 10 and now we find these elements again in the nominal 
clauses motivating this command. These two occurrences of the root vdq are the 
only examples in this chapter.  
Another interesting feature of the last clause of vv. 12 and 13 (see Table 3.11) has to 
do with the specific words used. In v. 12 we have the verbal root lka (again) along 
with the term ht;a;WbT]. This is reminiscent of the last two verses concerned with the 
Sabbath year, namely vv. 6 and 7 where we had the “parallelistic chiasm” and where 
we also had lka and ht;a;WbT] used together. In v. 13 we find the term hZ…jua} and the 
verbal root bwv. This recalls the latter half of v. 10 where bwv and hj;P;v]mi were used 
in a similar parallelistic chiasm. It thus seems that the last clause in v. 12 and the 
whole of v. 13 functions as a summary of the introductory laws on the Sabbath and 
Jubilee years. Using words that recall important stylistic features already found above 
enhances the impact of the summary and concludes effectively what has been said 
up to now.  
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3.4 Verses 14-19 
The content of the next subsection is totally different from those above. Above we 
had the “declaration” of laws on the Sabbath and on the Jubilee. What follows now is 
much more akin to “case-law.”25 This passage starts with WrK]m]tiAykiw“ and the important 
question with regards to the function of this temporal/conditional yKi is the function of 
the w“ in front of it. Is this some kind of indication that this section should be seen as 
something following on the previous section introduced by Wabot; yKi? As a matter of 
fact, a more fundamental question would be whether one could actually use a 
temporal yKi as an indicator of the seams of a unit or section? The question will be 
answered below. 
Table 3.13 
*t,ymi[}l' rK;m]mi WrK]m]tiAykiw“ ¬ 14 
*t,ymi[} dY"mi hnúq; wao  
.wyjia;Ata, vyai WnwToAla' 
14 And if you sell to your neighbor or buy from your neighbor, you shall not wrong one 
another.  
Verse 14 starts by sketching the general situation of selling and buying (rkm and 
hnq).26 This is followed by a very general prohibition on a man suppressing (hny) his 
brother. The general prohibition is followed by the introduction of a principle in vv. 15 
and 16 that forms the foundation of the Jubilee law: 
Table 3.14 
*t,ymi[} taeme hn<q]Ti lbewYúh' rj'a' !ynIv; rP's]miB] 15 
.&l;ArK;m]yI taoWbt]AynEv] rP's]miB] 
wton:q]mi hB,r]T' !ynIV;h' bro ypil] 16 
wton:q]mi fy[im]T' !ynIV;h' f[om] ypil]W  
.&l; rkemo aWh taoWbT] rP's]mi yKi ±
15 When you buy from your neighbor, you shall pay only for the number of years since the 
jubilee; the seller shall charge you only for the remaining crop years. 16 If the years are more, 
you shall increase the price, and if the years are fewer, you shall diminish the price; for it is a 
certain number of harvests that are being sold to you.  
Key terms here are obviously rP's]mi, ha;WbT] and !ynIv;. The combination of these terms 
determine the worth or purchase-price (hn:q]mi) of a piece of land. In essence land is 
                                                 
25 I have not used concepts like “apodictic” and “casuistic” until now in this chapter. They will feature in the 
next chapter, because they are closely related to the issues that will be addressed then.  
26 The second verb is actually an infinitive absolute (and thus not technically a verb). Van der Merwe et al 
(1999: 161) point out that an inf. abs. can sometimes be used in the place of a finite verb without a waw. 
This is usually done in utterances of direct speech (as we have here). The reason for the speaker using an 
inf. abs. instead of a finite verb is not that clear. Joüon & Muraoka (1993: 430-431) make similar remarks 
and specifically quote this example and so do Waltke & O’Connor (1991: 596). They add that although it 
is not certain why an inf. abs. is used it might be because of “a desire for variety” or even “a stylistic 
affectation.” In cases like these the inf. abs. has the “same temporal or modal value as the preceding verb.” 
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never sold but only the usufruct or number of harvests that the land will produce until 
the next Jubilee.27 This is followed by a motivational yKi-clause, which only repeats 
what has been said already, but presumably with the aim of “fortifying” or 
accentuating the previous principles. This brings us to v. 17 which is actually closely 
connected to the previous verses: 
Table 3.15 
wtoymi[}Ata, vyai Wnwto aløw“ 17 
*yh,løa>me t;arey:w“  
.!k,yheløa> hw:hoy“ ynIa} yKi ±
17 You shall not cheat one another, but you shall fear your God; for I am the LORD your God. 
The first clause of v. 17 is a repetition of what has already been said in the last 
clause of v. 14, but instead of la' used in v. 14, the negative alø is used now.28 
Furthermore, you should not cheat your neighbour (tymi[}), whereas it was brother in 
v. 14. This directive against cheating your neighbour is followed by another directive 
to fear (har)29 your God and then another yKi-clause where the name YHWH is used 
for the first time in the direct speech (thus excluding v. 1) and the first person singular 
pronoun is used to refer to YHWH.  
In vv. 2-13 the directives were usually motivated with clauses like !k,l; hy<h]Ti awhi lbewyú, 
but now the name of YHWH enters and is used as motivation to the directives. It is 
apparently intended to have some effect on the hearers to motivate them to obey 
                                                 
27 There seems to be a discrepancy between the two clauses in v. 15. The first clause refers to the years after 
the previous Jubilee (lbewYúh' rj'a' !ynIv;), or so it seems. The second clause refers to the number of harvests 
left (taoWbt]AynEv]) presumably until the next Jubilee, because this is what the buyer will gain from acquiring 
a piece of land. If one were to ask to which years does v. 16 refer, i.e. years after the previous Jubilee or 
years of harvests left, it seems obvious that it should be the latter. The more years there is after the 
previous Jubilee the lesser the price should become, because this means that there are fewer harvests left 
for the buyer to gain from. In this light the translation of the NRSV above does not really make sense.  
28 Wnwto in vv. 14 and 17 seems to be a second person masculine Hi imperfect of the root hny. According to Van 
der Merwe et al (1999: 149) the imperfect is often used with alø to express “an (absolute) prohibition.” la' 
is used with the jussive to “express the nuance of a temporally binding prohibition.” This does not make 
sense in the context of Leviticus 25 because both are apparently intended as prohibitions. The only other 
example of la' in this chapter is found in v. 36 and there it seems to be used in the same manner as the aløs 
in v. 37.  
 Another question would be whether one could regard Wnwto above as a jussive? According to Joüon & 
Muraoka (1993: 376) jussives in the second person are very rare. It thus seems that the most appropriate 
answer would be to regard la' and alø as synonyms here.  
29 t;arey:w“ here is one of the seven examples of a normal waw (or waw copulative) with the perfect referred to 
above. Three of these seven are of the verbal root ary, of which we just had the first example. With regards 
to the possible function of these terms, Van der Merwe et al (1999: 170) refer to the work of Revell: 
According to Revell (1989: 24) waw copulative + perfect is usually used after directives in contexts in 
which the speakers do not look down upon their listeners(s). This directive is usually not very urgent.  
 Unfortunately, this does not fit into what we have in Leviticus 25. The directive in this case can only be 
urgent.  
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these laws. This is also true of vv. 18 and 19 and actually of the whole next unit (vv. 
20-24) that follows this one, but more of that later.  
Table 3.16 
yt'QojuAta, !t,yci[}w" 18 
Wrm]v]Ti yf'P;v]miAta,w“ 
!t;ao !t,yci[}w"  
.jf'b,l; $r,a;h;Al[' !T,b]v'ywI 
Hy:r]Pi $r,a;h; hn:t]n:w“ 19 
[b'col; !T,l]k'a}w"  
.h;yl,[; jf'b,l; !T,b]v'ywI 
18 You shall observe my statutes and faithfully keep my ordinances, so that you may live on 
the land securely. 19 The land will yield its fruit, and you will eat your fill and live on it 
securely.  
Again we have a chain of wc. + perfects which is only once interrupted with a clause 
with inverted word order and the imperfect form of the verb. This clause forms a 
chiastic structure with the first and is also a repetition of the content of the first 
clause. The first three clauses are directives motivating people to obey these laws, 
but the next four clauses have a more “promissory” quality to them. It promises that 
when people do these laws then they will live in security (jf'b,), the land will give her 
fruit, they will eat their full and it concludes again with the people living in security.  
The effect of this series of verbs is like a rolling stone that gathers more speed. It 
starts slowly with directives (initially expressed in a chiasm) and then it speeds up 
with promises building on each other. Once again we have an example of a series of 
wc. + perfects which form the backbone of the events, although they are also 
interrupted by a chiastic structure. The verbal chain can be portrayed in the following 
manner: 
Table 3.17 
........ !t,yci[}w"18 
Wrm]v]Ti ........ 
........ !t,yci[}w"  
........ !T,b]v'ywI 
........ hn:t]n:w“ 19 
........ !T,l]k'a}w"  
........ !T,b]v'ywI 
A further distinct feature of this chain is that it falls into two units if one regards the 
repetition of the same verb as an inclusio. The division is also in agreement with the 
content. The first inclusio “includes” the directives and the second the promises.  
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3.5 Verses 20-24 
The division of the next unit is based on the presumption that ykiw“ can function as a 
structural marker that introduces units larger than sentences. But one could also 
interpret this ykiw“ as connecting this part to the previous chain of wc. + perfects. If 
regarded as that, it breaks that chain and provides a kind of pause because of the 
change of style and content. It seems that the text addresses a very practical issue, 
but an issue that the author anticipated might have been lingering in the reader’s 
mind: 
Table 3.18 
Wrm]ato ykiw“ ¬ 20 
 t[iybiV]h' hn:V;B' lk'aNúAhm' 
[r;z“nI alø @he 
.Wntea;WbT]Ata, #soa>n< aløw“
20 Should you ask, What shall we eat in the seventh year, if we may not sow or gather in our 
crop? 
The syntax of these clauses is very straightforward. One finds no examples of 
marked word order. The question is simply “what shall we eat in the seventh year”? 
The reason for stating this question is provided by using the particle @he. Van der 
Merwe et al (1999: 330) state that there “is no essential difference between the 
syntactic and semantic functions of @he and hNEhi.” These particles usually “focus 
attention on the utterance that follows.” This utterance often refers to something that 
is “surprising” or “unexpected” and this is definitely the case here.30 Following @he we 
find two verbs which we’ve had before namely, [rz and #sa. Thus, the question is 
asked as to what will the people eat after this year, when there would be neither 
sowing nor collecting? The answer is provided in the form of another wc. + perfect 
chain: 
Table 3.19 
tyViVih' hn:V;B' !k,l; ytik;r]BiAta, ytiyWIxiw“ 21 
.!ynIV;h' vløv]li ha;WbT]h'Ata, tc;[;w“ 
tnIymiV]h' hn:V;h' tae !T,[]r'z“W 22 
t[iyviT]h' hn:V;h' d[' @v;y: ha;WbT]h'A@mi !T,l]k'a}w"  
.@v;y: Wlk]aTo Ht;a;WbT] awBoAd[' 
21 I will order my blessing for you in the sixth year, so that it will yield a crop for three years. 
22 When you sow in the eighth year, you will be eating from the old crop; until the ninth year, 
when its produce comes in, you shall eat the old. 
                                                 
30 Joüon & Muraoka (1993: 631) agree that @he is a particle that attracts attention, but they regard the present 
example as a @he “with the value of if.” So do Waltke & O’Connor (1991: 637). This might be a possibility, 
but why does the author not use the regular !ai as he often does in the next part of the chapter? It might still 
be possible to regard it as “if” and thus the introduction of a protasis, but then a stronger one than usual 
that really attracts the attention of the readers or hearers.   
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One problematic aspect of the wc. + perfect chain in vv. 21-22 is that the first waw is 
actually a waw cop. The accent falls on the penultimate syllable (see BHS). Why this 
is so, is not clear and for the time being we might as well just regard the whole 
construction as one chain.31 This means that all the following actions build on each 
other, “order”, “yield”, “sow” and “eat.” But in the last line the chain is broken (again) 
with a chiastic parallelism. The verb becomes an imperfect, but still with the same 
root as the previous perfect (lka) and the temporal phrase moves from following the 
verb to preceding it. Content-wise both clauses are the same and in both words like 
@v;y: and ha;WbT] are repeated. To sum up, in order to convince readers of the viability 
of these laws above a chain of wc. + perfects is used with a concluding parallelistic 
chiasm.  
Verses 23-25 are not really strictly “connected” to what precedes it, but it moves 
away from the promise of the previous verse and we still find terms referring back to 
vv. 14-17 like rkm, hz:jua} and then a new word, hL;auG“: 
Table 3.20 
ttumix]li rkeM;ti alø $r,a;h;w“ 23 ~ 
$r,a;h; yliAyKi ± 
.ydiM;[i !T,a' !ybiv;wtow“ !yrig´AyKi ±
  s  .$r,a;l; WnT]Ti hL;auG“ !k,t]Zæjua} $r,a, lkob]W 24 ~
23 The land shall not be sold in perpetuity, for the land is mine; with me you are but aliens and 
tenants. 24 Throughout the land that you hold, you shall provide for the redemption of the land. 
Where v. 22 was still concerned with what will be eaten in the eighth year and thus 
the topic of the Sabbatical year, v. 23 “out of the blue” moves to the basic principles 
of land possession and thus the topic of the Jubilee year. Important features of these 
two verses are that it starts and ends with clauses of marked word order. In the first 
clause the subject ($r,a;h;w“) precedes the verb. This is also the case in the last clause 
where hL;auG“, the direct object, precedes the verb. The term land ($r,a,) is also 
prominent in these four clauses and occurs four times (but for that matter it is 
probably the most salient term in the whole chapter).  
In between these two marked-word-order clauses we find two motivating yKi-clauses 
and both are nominal clauses. The first consists of a noun and a prepositional phrase 
and refers to the status of the land. The second is another example of a “classifying 
clause”32 and refers to the status of the people (addressed with !T,a'). The land is 
(literally) “for YHWH” (or “for me”, yli) and the people are classified as “aliens and 
tenants” (!ybiv;wtow“ !yrig´) “with YHWH” (or “with me”, ydiM;[i). 
                                                 
31 As we shall see later, a very tempting option is to understand at least five of the waw cop. + perfects as 
adversative and thus translate it with “but.” This would also make sense in this case.  
32 See excursus 3.4 above. 
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But one last comment (referred to above already) on the passage might suffice now. 
For the first time the term hL;auG“ is used in this chapter and it “wets the appetite” of the 
reader or hearer for what is to come, because in two of the following passages hL;auG“ 
is fairly high on the agenda.  
3.6 Verses 25-34 
The next section of this chapter is introduced by *yjia; &Wmy:AyKi which is a sentence 
that we will find on three more occasions in this chapter in more-or-less the same 
basic format:  
Table 3.21 
*yjia; &Wmy:AyKi 25 
 
*yjia; &Wmy:Aykiw“ 35 
 
&M;[i *yjia; &Wmy:Aykiw“ 39 
 
&M;[i bv;wtow“ rG´ dy" gyCit' ykiw“ 47 
wMo[i *yjia; &m;W 
The interesting feature here is that every further example is an extension of the 
previous example. The first one is the most basic starting with yKi followed by an 
imperfect of ^wm and then “your brother” (*yjia;). In v. 35 it is slightly extended and yKi 
becomes ykiw“. A further interesting question would now be how the waws function? 
Are these just different cases following each other? Is that why the first example has 
no waw, because it is the first case and the most basic one, while the others build on 
the previous one(s) and presuppose the information of the previous cases? I think 
that the answer to all these questions should be “yes” and that goes not only for this 
half of Leviticus 25, but also for the first half, although it has a different character 
there. I would like to present the first half as follows:  
Table 3.22 
!k,l; @tenú ynIa} rv,a} $r,a;h;Ala, Wabot; yKi ➤ 
This is then followed by apodictic-like laws on the Sabbath year and the Jubilee year 
(vv. 2b-13).  
*t,ymi[}l' rK;m]mi WrK]m]tiAykiw“ ➤ 14 
Following this clause we find laws of a different character (more casuistic), but in 
broad terms referring to issues that could be associated with the Jubilee. Although it 
has formally more in common with the second half of Leviticus 25 (vv. 25ff). This part 
is concluded with a parenetical part (vv. 18 and 19).  
Wrm]ato ykiw“ ➤ 20 
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This clause is followed by a part referring to the Sabbath laws again (vv. 20-22) and 
then vv. 23-24 which refers to the sale of land again and could be regarded as a 
“transition” to the second half of Leviticus 25.   
But to return to Table 3.21 above, in v. 39 the sentence is further extended by a 
preposition with a pronominal suffix (&M;[i). The example in v. 47 is the most 
expansive “extension.” We have all the previous elements like ykiw“ and &M;[i and the 
same verb, ^wm. Yet in this case the verb is not an imperfect but a wc. + perfect in a 
short chain following another imperfect. It introduces the last scenario where a 
foreigner becomes rich and a brother becomes poor with him. Thus the second half 
of Leviticus 25 is clearly structured along these lines and most of the content fits into 
these four cases. But let us turn to the first case.  
Table 3.23 
*yjia; &Wmy:AyKi ➤ 25 
wtoZ…jua}me rk'm;W 
wyl;ae broQ;h' wløa}gO ab;W  
.wyjia; rK'm]mi tae la'g…w“ 
25 If anyone of your kin falls into difficulty and sells a piece of property, then the next of kin 
shall come and redeem what the relative has sold. 
Verse 25 is very straightforward. It is introduced by the above mentioned sentence 
and then a short chain of three wc. + perfects follows. This is the basic rule applied to 
all cases where somebody falls into poverty (^wm) and sells (rkm) his hoZ:jua}. His laego, 
who is his closest relative (wyl;ae broQ;h') will come (awb) and redeem (lag) him. This is 
how things should be in a virtually perfect world, but as we all know the world is far 
from perfect and even the “virtually” is rather optimistic. What, for instance, would 
happen if he does not have a redeemer?  
Table 3.24 
laeGO wLøAhy<h]yI alø yKi vyaiw“ ➤ 26 
wdoy: hg…yCihiw“ 
.wtoL;aug“ ydeK] ax;m;W 
wroK;m]mi ynEv]Ata, bV'jiw“ 27 
wløArk'm; rv,a} vyail; #de[oh;Ata, byvihew“  
.wtoZ…jua}l' bv;w“ 
26 If the person has no one to redeem it, but then prospers and finds sufficient means to do so, 
27 the years since its sale shall be computed and the difference shall be refunded to the person 
to whom it was sold, and the property shall be returned.  
The first clause of v. 26 is an example of the so-called “pendens construction” or 
“dislocated construction” (see Van der Merwe et al 1999: 339 and Joüon & Muraoka 
1993: 586-587). This means that “a constituent stands at the beginning of a clause 
and is taken up again in the clause by a constituent of the clause (called the 
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resumptive)” (Van der Merwe et al 1999: 339). In this case vyai stands at the 
beginning of the clause and is taken up again later as a pronominal suffix (wLo).  
Another interesting feature is the fact that yKi does not stand at the beginning of the 
clause. According to Van der Merwe et al (1999: 300) this happens often in legal 
texts (see also Joüon & Muraoka 193: 630-631). They add that in legal texts both the 
particles yKi and !ai can introduce the protasis of a condition and can thus give the 
impression of being used as synonyms (Van der Merwe et al 1999: 300):  
However, yKi normally precedes the general conditions and !ai the details of these general 
conditions.  
This explanation fits well here, but we will return to that later. With regards to the 
function of the pendens construction, Van der Merwe et al (1999: 339) have the 
following to say:  
The function of the above type of dislocated construction is usually to (re-)activate an 
identifiable referent that is talked about.33 
This means that we are still talking about the brother who fell into poverty, but why he 
is referred to as an vyai now instead of *yjia; is not clear. Or maybe, that was the 
problem that nobody wanted to acknowledge that he is an ja;, but insisted on 
regarding him as a mere vyai. So what is to happen to this man? 
Another uninterrupted chain of wc. + perfects describes his possible fate. If his “hand 
overtakes” (Hi of gcn), and he “finds” (axm) sufficient, then he will “calculate” (Pi of 
bvj) and he will “return” (Hi of bwv) the outstanding amount and then he himself will 
return (bwv) to his hZ:jua}. All of this is of course hypothetical and again the chain 
consisting of wc. + perfects is broken by the next exception. So what happens if his 
“hand does not overtake”?  
Table 3.25 
wlø byvih; yDe wdoy: ha;x]m;Aalø !aiw“ 28 
lbewYúh' tn"v] d[' wtoao hn<Qoh' dy"B] wroK;m]mi hy:h;w“  
lbeYúB' ax;y:w“ 
.wtoZ…jua}l' bv;w“ 
28 But if there is not sufficient means to recover it, what was sold shall remain with the 
purchaser until the year of jubilee; in the jubilee it shall be released, and the property shall be 
returned. 
To return to the difference between yKi and !ai, if one were to agree with Van der 
Merwe et al and regard yKi as a particle that introduces more general conditions, 
                                                 
33 Joüon & Muroaka (1993: 586) describe the casus pendens as follows: 
This construction is sometimes occasioned by the importance of the noun, i.e. it is the element of the 
clause which first springs to the mind of the speaker, and sometimes by a desire for clarity or 
smoothness of expression.  
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while !ai would introduce more specific conditions, then the relation between the yKi in 
v. 27 and the !ai in v. 28 makes sense. In v. 26 the general condition is mentioned 
where there is no redeemer for a person in trouble. In the rest of vv. 26 and 27 one 
other possibility is mentioned which might be open to this person and the relevant 
modus operandi in that event follows. Verse 28 focuses specifically on the scenario 
in the event of the non-fulfilment of this previous possibility. What happens if the 
persons “hand does not overtake”? It is thus more specific than the previous 
condition and once again the resultant action is described with a chain of wc. + 
perfects. In short, the person will wait until the Jubilee and then the man will go out 
(axy) and the man will return (bwv) to his hZ:jua}.  
In the next verse the topic changes from pieces of land to houses in a walled city: 
Table 3.26 
hm;wjo ry[i bv'wmoAtyBe rKom]yIAyKi vyaiw“ ➤ 29 
wroK;m]mi tn"v] !ToAd[' wtoL;auG“ ht;y“h;w“  
.wtoL;aug“ hy<h]Ti !ymiy: 
hm;ymit] hn:v; wlø taløm]Ad[' laeG:yIAalø !aiw“ 30 
wyt;rodol] wtoao hn<Qol' ttuymiX]l' hm;jo wløArv,a} ry[iB;Arv,a} tyIB'h' !q;w“  
.lbeYúB' axeyE alø 
29 If anyone sells a dwelling house in a walled city, it may be redeemed until a year has 
elapsed since its sale; the right of redemption shall be one year.  
30 If it is not redeemed before a full year has elapsed, a house that is in a walled city shall pass 
in perpetuity to the purchaser, throughout the generations; it shall not be released in the 
jubilee.  
The man in poverty, who has to sell his hZ:jua}, is forgotten now and the text focuses 
on the man who sells a house in a walled city. Whether this is also somebody who 
has to sell because of becoming poor (^wm), is not exactly clear, but it should 
probably be understood as such.  
The first clause is followed by a wc. + perfect and this clause is followed by another 
with more-or-less the same content. Thus, we have another of the previous 
parallelistic structures. As previously the verb in the first clause is a wc. + perfect and 
the second an imperfect of the same root (hyh). The structure is also chiastic in the 
sense that the temporal phrase precedes the imperfect (!ymiy:) whereas it follows the 
wc. + perfect (wroK;m]mi tn"v] !ToAd[').  
In the same vein as in v. 28, !ai introduces a more specific condition than the 
previous part introduced by yKi. In this case it focuses specifically on the eventuality 
that the house might not be sold in the allowed year. The result introduced by a wc. + 
perfect is stated quite clearly and that is that the house will stay with the buyer. This 
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result is reiterated again in the last clause using a alø + imperfect: lbeYúB' axeyE alø. The 
Jubilee law does not apply to this case, but it does apply to houses in a village.  
Table 3.27 
bvej;yE $r,a;h; hdec]Al[' bybis; hm;jo !h,l;A@yae rv,a} !yrixej}h' yTeb;W 31 
wLøAhy<h]Ti hL;auG“ 
.axeyE lbeYúb'W 
31 But houses in villages that have no walls around them shall be classed as open country; they 
may be redeemed, and they shall be released in the jubilee.  
Syntactically the character of the clauses changes in vv. 31 and 32. The first clause 
is an example of marked word order. The clause starts with the subject 
(!yrixej}h' yTeb;W), which is extended by means of a relative sentence. The verb (bvej;yE) 
takes the last position in the sentence. The function of the marked word order is 
probably to contrast the houses in villages with the houses in the cities. They are to 
be regarded as different and that is why the word order is different. In terms of Van 
der Merwe et al’s distinctions it is also a case of the introduction of a new topic. In 
any case, these cities will be redeemed and they will “go out” in the year of the 
Jubilee which, is something that is apparently not applicable to Levitical houses:  
Table 3.28  
.!YIwIl]l' hy<h]Ti !l;w[o tL'auG“ !t;Z…jua} yre[; yTeB; !YIwIl]h' yre[;w“ 32 
!YIwIl]h'A@mi la'g“yI rv,a}w" 33 
lbeYúB' wtoZ…jua} ry[iw“ tyIB'ArK'm]mi ax;y:w“  
laer;c]yI ynEB] &wtoB] !t;Z…jua} awhi !YIwIl]h' yre[; yTeb; yKi ±
   rkeM;yI alø !h,yre[; vr'g“mi hdec]W~ 34 
s  .!h,l; aWh !l;w[o tZæjua}AyKi ±
32 As for the cities of the Levites, the Levites shall forever have the right of redemption of the 
houses in the cities belonging to them. 33 Such property as may be redeemed from the 
Levites—houses sold in a city belonging to them—shall be released in the jubilee; because 
the houses in the cities of the Levites are their possession among the people of Israel. 34 But 
the open land around their cities may not be sold; for that is their possession for all time. 
The meaning of the next unit is rather enigmatic with the main problem being v. 33. If 
the author just wanted to say that things are different in the Levitical cities in the 
sense that they would not have the right of redemption for only one year (as above), 
but until the next Jubilee, then he really opted for a very confusing way of expressing 
it.  
Verse 32 is still fairly straightforward and consists of only one clause. It seems to be 
another example of a nominal sentence with the verb hyh added to “specify the 
temporal sphere” (Joüon & Muraoka 1993: 576). But what then would be the subject 
and which part would be the predicate? The subject is !t;Z…jua} yre[; yTeB; and 
!YIwIl]l' hy<h]Ti !l;w[o tL'auG“ the predicate. Thus both elements are nouns; the subject 
being “houses” and the predicate the “everlasting right of redemption” (an abstract 
  
 
80
noun in a construct relation with !l;w[o). The function of !YIwIl]h' yre[;w“ seems to be to 
change the topic from the normal cities surrounded by walls to specifically the 
Levitical cities for which exceptional measures are valid.  
Verse 33 is a mystery. Let’s start by comparing different translations. In the following 
table we find the New Revised Standard Version (NRSV), the New International 
Version (NIV) and the New Afrikaans Translation (NAT) along with my English 
translation (ET) of the latter:  
Table 3.29 
NRSV: 33 Such property as may be redeemed from the Levites—houses sold in a city 
belonging to them—shall be released in the jubilee; because the houses in the cities of the 
Levites are their possession among the people of Israel.  
NIV: 33 So the property of the Levites is redeemable—that is, a house sold in any town they 
hold—and is to be returned in the Jubilee, because the houses in the towns of the Levites are 
their property among the Israelites.  
NAT: 33 Wanneer ‘n Leviet ‘n huis wat hy in ‘n Levietestad gekoop het, terugverkoop aan die 
oorspronklike eienaar wat nie ‘n Leviet is nie, moet die huis in die hersteljaar terugval na die 
Leviet, want die huise in die Levietestede moet in Israel die eiendom van die Leviete wees.  
[ET (with my italics): When a Levite sells a house, which he bought in a Levitical city, back 
to the original owner who is not a Levite, then the house must go back to the Levite in the 
Jubilee. Because the houses in the Levitical cities in Israel must be the property of the 
Levites.] 
It is clear that the NAT translates much more freely than the other two. But the 
biggest problem is that the NAT and the NRSV give a totally different meaning to this 
verse than the NIV. In the NIV it is basically stated that houses of Levites are 
redeemable until the next Jubilee over against other houses that are redeemable for 
only one year (as seen above). In the NAT we find legislation that would mean that 
all houses in Levitical cities will end up in the hands of Levites even if somebody else 
originally owned them. The NRSV is somewhere in-between and does not really 
make sense. It starts with reference to houses that may be redeemed from Levites 
implying that somebody was indebted to a Levite, lost his land, but later managed to 
redeem it thus, buy it back. Then it continues with “houses sold in a city belonging to 
them” implying that “them” is the Levites but this does not make sense. If something 
was redeemed from a Levite then it implies that it originally belonged to somebody 
else, so how can it belong to “them”? Or does it mean that everything in the Levitical 
cities belongs to “them” and then even if somebody else managed to get a foothold in 
there this legislation will mean that it would only be until the next Jubilee? Thus one 
could construe the meaning of the NRSV as similar to that of the NAT although the 
latter is much clearer.   
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The main problem would be how to understand !YIwIl]h'A@mi la'g“yI rv,a}w". The most 
obvious translation would be: “And (with regards to) that which can be (or will be) 
redeemed from the Levites…” This would mean that somebody (presumably a non-
Levite as the NAT expressed) is indebted to a Levite, sells his property to the Levite 
and later redeems it from the Levite (!YIwIl]h'A@mi). The NIV translates the rv,a} as a 
result (which is a possibility),34 but then ignores the !YIwIl]h'A@mi. For the NIV it is about 
Levites redeeming land from other people, but in the NAT and NRSV land is 
redeemed from Levites.  
However one looks at it, it does not make sense. It seems that the New Jerusalem 
Bible (NJB) offers the most justifiable (and most honest) position by acknowledging 
that the Hebrew is “unintelligible” (see NJB 167). They understand this scenario as 
when a Levite buys from another Levite.  
The second line of v. 33 is also problematic. The main problem is how to understand 
the waw in front of “city”? A preposition like B] would have made much more sense. 
Most of the translations simply translate it like that (for instance the NIV and NRSV 
above).  
This clause introduced by a wc. + perfect of axy is immediately followed by a 
motivating yKi-clause which is also another nominal clause. It seems that we have a 
combination of a pendens construction and a nominal sentence here. The basic 
structure of the nominal sentence would be, subject, awhi  and predicate, 
laer;c]yI ynEB] &wtoB] !t;Z…jua}. Then, on the extreme right of the sentence as a pendens 
construction we have !YIwIl]h' yre[; yTeb;. This is one option that does not account for the 
grammatical incongruence between the resumptive pronoun and !YIwIl]h' yre[; yTeb;. 
Another possibility would probably be to regard it as some kind of copula which is 
something that is rather scarce in biblical Hebrew.  
This yKi-clause is followed by another clause with marked word order introducing a 
new topic (!h,yre[; vr'g“mi hdec]W). Another yKi-clause follows this directive and once again 
it is a nominal sentence. In this case the subject would also be a pronoun (aWh) while 
the predicate is !l;w[o tZæjua, with a prepositional phrase added for further description. 
Both these nominal clauses in vv. 33 and 34 are examples of classification.  
                                                 
34 See Van der Merwe et al (1999: 297). 
  
 
82
3.7 Verses 35-38 
Table 3.30 
*yjia; &Wmy:Aykiw“ ➤ 35 
&M;[i wdoy: hf;m;W  
bv;wtow“ rG´ wBo T;q]zæj>h,w“  
.&M;[i yj'w:  
tyBir]t'w“ &v,n< wToaime jQ'TiAla' 36 
*yh,løa>me t;arey:w“  
.&M;[i *yjia; yjew“  
35 If any of your kin fall into difficulty and become dependent on you, you shall support them; 
they shall live with you as though resident aliens.  
36 Do not take interest in advance or otherwise make a profit from them, but fear your God; let 
them live with you. 
The second subsection introduced by ykiw“ and the verbal root ^wm is not as long or 
diverse (in terms of content) as the previous section. These laws focus on when the 
poor brother “stretches out his hand” to you or as most translations would render it 
“becomes dependent on you.”35 This is not a chain of wc. + perfects. With both hf;m;W 
and T;q]zæj>h,w“ the stress is on the penultimate syllable meaning that it is the normal 
waw cop. + perfect. Still, it seems that we have actions building on each other as we 
would have had with a chain of wc. + perfects. A scenario is sketched where the poor 
brother ends up with the fellow Israelite who is to treat him as bv;wtow“ rG´36 and his 
brother is to live37 with him (&M;[i).  
Verse 36 continues that if the above-mentioned scenario occurs then one may not 
take tyBir]t'w“ &v,n< from the person in trouble. This prohibition is followed by a second 
                                                 
35 hf;m;W is regarded as a Qal perfect of fwm which can be translated with “schwanken, wanken” (in German) 
and “totter, shake, slip” (in English) (see Gesenius 1962: 400 or The Dictionary of Classsical Hebrew V. 5: 
171).  
36 One should acknowledge that the preposition K] is lacking before bv;wtow“ rGe above. Despite this, most 
translations follow the LXX which used  here and translates it with “as” or “like.” Grünwaldt (1999: 
101-102) discusses this problem rather extensively and offers other interpretation possibilities, but 
eventually has to agree with what Bertholet (1901: 92) said more than a hundred years ago namely that 
every proposal is “eine Ausflucht zur Konjektur.”  
37 The form of yj'w: is another debatable point. BDB (310) attests one similar example of the perfect of hyj 
from Gen 5:5. But why is a different form of the perfect used in the next verse? Another theoretical 
possibility would be to regard yj' as a noun (see BDB 312) meaning “kinsfolk.” See also the Dictionary of 
Classical Hebrew (V. 4: 204-205) for the same findings. This would mean that one could understand this 
clause as follows:  
wBo T;q]zæj>h,w“   
.&M;[i yj'w: bv;wtow“ rG´  
 If one were to regard it as two clauses of which the second is a nominal sentence one could translate it as: 
“And you will support him. An alien and a resident and a kinsfolk he is with you.” This means that 
although the third person masculine pronoun is not used, it is implied. It might also solve the problem of 
the missing K], but nevertheless the description of Bertholet in the previous footnote is also applicable to 
this suggestion.  
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(see v. 17) waw cop. + perfect of har, apparently to function as motivation for the 
previous directive. The last clause of this verse consists of a waw38 + perfect of 
hyj stating again that your brother will live with you. The next verse does not add 
anything in terms of content, but (in essence) repeats what has been said until now, 
be it a different format: 
Table 3.31 
&v,n<B] wlø @TetiAalø *P]s]K'Ata, 37 
*l,k]a; @TetiAalø tyBir]m'b]W  
!k,yheløa> hw:hy“ ynIa} 38 
!yIr;x]mi $r,a,me !k,t]a, ytiaxewhoArv,a} 
@['n"K] $r,a,Ata, !k,l; ttel;   
  s  .!yhiløale !k,l; twyúh]li 
37 You shall not lend them your money at interest taken in advance, or provide them food at a 
profit. 38 I am the LORD your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt, to give you the 
land of Canaan, to be your God. 
Verse 37 repeats content-wise what has already been prohibited in the first clause of 
v. 36. But here it is packaged in the parallelistic chiasm with which we have become 
familiar now.39 In both clauses we have aOl and @tn. But in the first line the direct 
object precedes the verb, while it follows the verb in the second. The order of the 
prepositional phrase also changes from taking the last position in the first line to the 
first position in the second line.  
Verse 38 is theologically the most “laden” up till now. We had a similar expression in 
v. 17 where YHWH identified himself by using the first person singular plural, but now 
this sentence is extended by an rv,a}-clause followed by two l] + inf. constructs 
expressing purpose.40 It starts with “I am YHWH” and as if somebody were asking 
“which YHWH?” the rv,a}-clause answers, “I am the one who brought you out of 
Egypt!” Two purposes are then expressed: 1) “In order to give you the land of 
Canaan” and 2) “In order to be your God.”  
3.8 Verses 39-46 
The next section starts with the same clause that we had in v. 35, but now &M;[i is 
added to what we had there and this preposition and suffix are quite prevalent in the 
first few verses of this section as the ovals below indicate.  
                                                 
38 Although the stress is on the last syllable, this is also the only syllable except, of course, for the waw. It is 
thus impossible to tell whether we have a waw cop. or a wc. BDB (310-311) does list this verb as a perfect 
of hyj.  
39 One should add here that the character of this parallelistic chiasm is different from the others, because the 
position of the verb does not really change, but rather the other elements in the sentence.  
40 Theoretical the two lines with the l] + inf. cs. is not a clause, but I still laid the lines out in this manner to 
express the two purposes separately.  
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Table 3.32 
&M;[i *yjia; &Wmy:Aykiw“¬  39 
&l;ArK'm]nIw“  
.db,[; td'bo[} wBo dbo[}t'Aalø 
&M;[i hy<h]yI bv;wtoK] rykic;K] 40 
&M;[i dbo[}y" lbeYúh' tn"v]Ad[' 
39 If any who are dependent on you become so impoverished that they sell themselves to you, 
you shall not make them serve as slaves. 40 They shall remain with you as hired or bound 
laborers. They shall serve with you until the year of the jubilee.  
The yKi-clause is followed by a wc. + perfect indicating the result of the poverty of the 
brother, namely being sold (Ni of rkm) “to you” or the addressee of these laws. A 
directive stating you “will not treat him as a slave” immediately follows this 
sentence.41  
Verse 40 starts with another nominal sentence (with the imperfect of hyh marking 
future time). The next clause states that a person will only serve until the next Jubilee 
(lbeYúh' tn"v]Ad['). This is followed by another short chain of wc. + perfect which is 
concluded with a further parallelistic chiasm: 
Table 3.33 
wMo[i wyn:b;W aWh &M;[ime ax;y:w“ 41 
wToj]P'v]miAla, bv;w “   
.bWvy: wyt;boa} tZæjua}Ala,w“ 
41 Then they and their children with them shall be free from your authority; they shall go back 
to their own family and return to their ancestral property. 
Verse 41 specifically states that the person along with his sons and wife will “go out” 
(wc. + perfect) in the Jubilee. The same parallelistic chiasm follows which we have 
had on many occasions before.42 Interestingly hZ:jua} is further qualified by “his fathers” 
(wyt;boa}). Thus the short wc. + perfect chain continues the directive in v. 39, while v. 40 
is only an extension of that directive.  
Table 3.34 
!he yd'b;[}AyKi ±  42 
!yIr;x]mi $r,a,me !t;ao ytiaxewhoArv,a}  
.db,[; tr,K,m]mi Wrk]M;yI alø 
&r,p;B] wbo hD,r]tiAalø 43 
.*yh,løa>me t;arey:w“ 
42 For they are my servants, whom I brought out of the land of Egypt; they shall not be sold as 
                                                 
41 BDB (713) translates this usage of db[ with the preposition B] as “use him as slave.” In the rest of the 
sentence the root db[ is also very salient. The last two words of the sentence form a construct relation 
between hd:bo[} (BDB, 715 “labour, service”) and db,[, (BDB, 713 “slave, servant”).  
42 See also Joüon & Muraoka (1993: 585) who identify a chiasm here. They prefer to call it an “attraction”, 
though.  
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slaves are sold. 43 You shall not rule over them with harshness, but shall fear your God.  
It seems that the yKi-clause (once again a nominal sentence) is used to support the 
directives in v. 39 and then the chain of wc. + perfects above. It is clearly stated why 
Israelites should not be regarded as slaves, the reason being that they are already 
the slaves of YHWH, which he brought from Egypt. More directives now follow 
prohibiting the addressees from selling fellow Israelites as “the sale of a slave”43 and 
they are not allowed to rule (hdr) over them in “harshness” (&r,P,). This second 
directive is followed by the third example of the clause *yh,løa>me t;arey:w“. Thus, no 
Israelites are allowed to become “real slaves” in the sense of owning people as 
possessions. But this is only with regards to fellow Israelites and they were actually 
allowed to own other people as possessions.  
To return to the problem of the waw cop. + perfect, Joüon & Muraoko (1993: 641-
642) understand this example of t;arey:w“ in v. 43 as an adversative waw. This is usually 
the case after a negative clause. Interestingly enough one could translate at least five 
of the waw cop. + perfects in this manner and it would make sense. The five 
examples are the three occurrences of t;arey:w“ (vv. 17, 36 and 43) along with ytiyWIxiw“  (in 
v. 21) and hg…yCihiw“ (in v. 26). All five these examples follow a negative clause. This 
explanation does however not account for hf;m;W and T;q]zæj>h,w“ in v. 35. It just shows that 
there are many things about Hebrew grammar that we do not really know.44  
Table 3.35 
&l;AWyh]yI rv,a} *t]m;a}w" *D]b]['w“ 44 
.hm;a;w“ db,[, Wnq]Ti !h,me !k,yteboybis] rv,a} !yIwGOh' taeme  
Wnq]Ti !h,me !k,M;[i !yriG:h' !ybiv;wToh' ynEB]mi !gæw“ 45 
!k,x]r]a'B] Wdyliwho rv,a} !k,M;[i rv,a} !T;j]P'v]MimiW 
.hZ…jua}l' !k,l; Wyh;w“ 
44 As for the male and female slaves whom you may have, it is from the nations around you 
that you may acquire male and female slaves. 45 You may also acquire them from among the 
aliens residing with you, and from their families that are with you, who have been born in 
your land; and they may be your property.  
Verse 44 seems to be one big pendens construction. In the first clause we find the 
constituent *t]m;a}w" *D]b]['w“, which is later taken up again in the following sentence as, 
                                                 
43 According to BDB (569), tr,K,m]mi is a feminine noun in the construct state and they translate it as “sale.” 
This is the only place where it occurs in the BHS. Joüon & Muraoko (1993: 450-451) call this construction 
an “internal object.” They define it as follows: 
The internal object is an abstract noun of action, identical with, or analogous to the action expressed 
by the verb.  
 In this instance the internal object (tr,K,m]mi) is qualified by a construct relation with db,[;. They (Joüon & 
Muraoka 1993: 452) translate this verse as “they shall not be sold as one sells a slave.”  
44 A further problem here would be the fact that Joüon & Muraoka (1993: 641-642) actually regard t;arey:w“ 
here as a wc. + perfect or what they call an “inversive” waw. See Joüon & Muraoka (1993: 134) for 
reasons why the stress is on the penultimate syllable. 
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hm;a;w“ db,[,. Van der Merwe, et al (1999: 339) does not regard a dislocated phrase “as 
part of the subsequent clause, but a construction occurring at the outer edge of a BH 
clause” which is usually followed by a complete sentence. The function of this type of 
construction usually is (as we already expressed above) to “(re-)activate an 
identifiable referent that is talked about.” In this case one could say that the referent 
is activated for the first time, being the nations surrounding them from whom 
Israelites may take slaves.  
It is not only from surrounding nations that this is allowed, but what is more, Israelites 
may take slaves from the residing aliens (!yriG:h' !ybiv;wToh' ynEB]mi). Verse 45 has a rather 
complicated structure with what seems like a further pendens construction. In terms 
of syntax one could say that Wnq]Ti !h,me is the first main sentence. This main sentence 
is extended by a clause preceding it introduced by !gæ in which we find the constituent 
!yriG:h' !ybiv;wToh' ynEB]mi. The latter is taken up in the following main sentence as a suffix 
(!h,me). The next clause starts with the phrase, !T;j]P'v]MimiW which is extended with two 
rv,a}-clauses and the question is whether one should regard this as a further 
extension of the previous main sentence? Another option would be to understand it 
as an extension to what follows namely, hZ…jua}l' !k,l; Wyh;w“. But it seems rather unlikely 
that a clause starting with a wc. + perfect could have a subordinate clause preceding 
it. Thus it seems that Wnq]Ti !h,me is extended by a clause preceding it and a clause 
following is. The next sentence (hZ…jua}l' !k,l; Wyh;w“) is more like a concluding or 
summarising sentence stating that all the above mentioned people can be possessed 
as slaves.45  
Table 3.36 
!l;[ol] hZ…jua} tv,r,l; !k,yrej}a' !k,ynEb]li !t;ao !T,l]j}n"t]hiw“ 46 
Wdbo[}T' !h,B; 
  s  .&r,p;B] wbo hD,r]tiAalø wyjia;B] vyai laer;c]yIAynEB] !k,yjea'b]W 
46 You may keep them as a possession for your children after you, for them to Inherit as 
property. These you may treat as slaves, but as for your fellow Israelites, no one shall rule 
over the other with harshness. 
The first clause of v. 46 starts with the usual wc. + perfect and is basically 
synonymous with the last phrase of v. 45. It can be regarded as another chain. This 
clause is completed with a l] + inf. cs. expressing something like result or 
consequence.46 The second line in the table above is much more unusual. It stands 
out because the object precedes the verb. Added to this the only way to make sense 
                                                 
45 Theoretically (i.e. following the theory of Joüon & Muraoka) this should also be regarded as a nominal 
clause.  
46 According to Van der Merwe et al (1999: 155) the inf. cs. can express the “outcome or consequence of the 
finite verb.”  
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of this clause is to regard it as the unusual usage of db[ which usually means 
something like “to serve” or “to be a slave”, but here apparently means “to treat as 
slave.” This is similar to what we had in v. 39 where db[ was used in the same sense 
and the preposition B] was also used to indicate the object. Thus following a chain of 
two wc. + perfects which refer (again) to the people that can be owned as slaves we 
find this short clause of marked word order reiterating again that these people (!h,B;) 
“and no one else”47 can be treated as slaves.  
The last phrase is a further directive preceded by another pendens construction, be it 
somewhat more complicated than usual. If we were to discuss it backwards, the main 
sentence would be: &r,p;B] wbo hD,r]tiAalø. Preceding this we have wyjia;B] vyai. This is 
clearly a pendens construction because it is later taken up again in the main 
sentence as wbo. But preceding this phrase we find: laer;c]yIAynEB] !k,yjea'b]W. It starts with 
an adversative waw which one should understand in the light of the previous marked 
clause. That reiterated that other people can be treated as slaves and now the 
spotlight moves to the Israelites, “your brothers.” In this last line the preposition B] 
occurs three times. One could understand all three cases as indicating the object of 
the verb hdr. The interesting thing is that there seems to be progression in this line 
or more accurately as if the author increases the focus. The first B] refers to “your 
brothers” then in apposition to that the “sons of Israel”, but then the second B] focuses 
more by changing to singular “a man towards his brother” and lastly we find the verb 
followed by B] and the personal pronominal suffix. It is as if the references becomes 
more precise and more intimate in order to express the utter foolishness of turning a 
fellow Israelite, a brother into a slave, or a mere possession.  
3.9 Verses 47-55 
Where the above section focused on Israelites becoming poor and becoming 
dependant on fellow Israelites the focus changes now to the scenario where an 
Israelite becomes dependant on a rG´ or a bv;/T.   
Table 3.37 
&M;[i bv;wtow“ rG´ dy" gyCit' ykiw“ ¬  47 
wMo[i *yjia; &m;W  
.rG´ tj'P'v]mi rq,[el] wao &M;[i bv;wTo rg´l] rK'm]nIw“ 
47 If resident aliens among you prosper, and if any of your kin fall into difficulty with one of 
them and sell themselves to an alien, or to a branch of the alien’s family,  
                                                 
47 Van der Merwe et al (1999: 347) would define this example as a case of an entity becoming the focus of an 
utterance and more specifically as “confirming the personal or exclusive role of a specific discourse active 
entity in an event.”  
  
 
88
The scenario is once again sketched with the use of a temporal yKi-clause and a wc. 
+ perfect series following. In this scenario a foreigner becomes a person of means 
and a brother becomes poor and end up being sold to a foreigner or to “a branch of 
the alien’s family.” So what should happen in this case? 
Table 3.38 
 rK'm]nI yrej}a' 48 
wLøAhy<h]Ti hL;auG“  
.WNl,a;g“yI wyj;a,me dj;a, 
WNl,a;g“yI wdoDoA@b, wao wdodoAwao 49 
WNl,a;g“y I wToj]P'v]Mimi wroc;B] raeV]miAwao   
wdoy: hg…yCihiAwao  
.la;g“nIw“  
48 after they have sold themselves they shall have the right of redemption; one of their 
brothers may redeem them, 49 or their uncle or their uncle’s son may redeem them, or anyone 
of their family who is of their own flesh may redeem them; or if they prosper they may 
redeem themselves.  
The next two verses are very adamant that in such a case only one result can be 
foreseen for this brother and that is hL;auG“! In the table above the six lines does not 
technically indicate clauses, because the last line has more than one verb, but laid 
out like this it is clear that there is a repetitive structure in these verses. In each line 
we have either a verb or a noun derived from the root lag. The first line functions as 
a heading and refers back to the previous part, “after he is sold”, and then the 
prescriptions follow. The next line just states that he will receive hL;auG“. And then as if 
to make sure that the readers understand the full implication of this prescription it is 
clearly stated who is responsible for this hL;auG“. These prescriptions start with the first 
person responsible and then with every next line48 the spotlight becomes larger 
including more and more people until the whole hj;P'v]mi is included. Yet every line 
concludes with the verb WNl,a;g“y. That is, with the exception of the last line, where the 
person is not redeemed by another, but recovers and “is redeemed.” This last phrase 
seems to leave a “loop-hole” in the prescription foreseeing the possibility that the 
people mentioned in the previous three lines do not accept their responsibility. Still, 
the last word of v. 49 anticipates “redemption” for this “poor brother.” So, now that it 
is clear who is responsible for the redemption, the question remains how this 
redemption should be executed? 
                                                 
48 According to Joüon & Muraoka (1993: 632) an !ai “can extend its force to a second supposition introduced 
by wao” and then they refer to this example.  
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Table 3.39  
lbeYúh' tn"v] d[' wlø wrok]M;hi tn"V]mi WhnEqoA![i bV'jiw“ 50 
!ynIv; rP's]miB] wroK;m]mi #s,K, hy:h;w“ 
.wMo[i hy<h]yI rykic; ymeyKi  
@h,ypil] !ynIV;B' twBor' dw[oA!ai 51 
wton:q]mi #s,K,mi wtoL;auG“ byviy:  
lbeYúh' tn"v]Ad[' !ynIV;B' ra'v]nI f['m]A!aiw“ 52 
wyn:v; ypiK] wløAbV'jiw“  
.wtoL;auG“Ata, byviy: 
50 They shall compute with the purchaser the total from the year when they sold themselves to 
the alien until the jubilee year; the price of the sale shall be applied to the number of years: 
the time they were with the owner shall be rated as the time of a hired laborer. 51 If many 
years remain, they shall pay for their redemption in proportion to the purchase price; 52 and if 
few years remain until the jubilee year, they shall compute thus: according to the years 
involved they shall make payment for their redemption. 
Verses 50-52 are about the “nitty-gritty” details of these transactions and are similar 
to what we had in vv. 14-17 and 26-27. Verse 50 starts with a wc. + perfect of bvj 
following the la;g“nIw“ above. It is stated that the person49 sold shall “calculate” with “his 
buyer” from the specific year (tn"V]mi) when the person was sold until the year (tn"v] d[') 
of the Jubilee. Following this we have two clauses both making statements with 
regards to these years. First something like the following is stated: “The money of his 
selling price will be like the number of years.” And then: “Like days of hired labour it 
shall be for him.”  
This is stated more clearly in vv. 51 and 52. Similar to v. 16 we have both options, “if 
the years are many” and “if the years are few.” Both clauses start with !ai which 
introduces the protasis of the conditional sentence. But the apodasis are introduced 
by different forms of the verb. In v. 51 it is the Hiphil imperfect of bwv and in v. 52 it is 
the wc. + perfect of bvj. This does not seem to make much difference. The end 
result is reiterated again in the last line of v. 52 with another Hiphil imperfect of bwv.  
Table 3.40  
wMo[i hy<h]yI hn:v;B] hn:v; rykic]Ki 53 
.*yn<y[el] &r,p,B] WND,r]yIAalø  
hL,aeB] laeG:yI aløA!aiw“ 54 
.wMo[i wyn:b;W aWh lbeYúh' tn"v]Bi ax;y:w“ 
53 As a laborer hired by the year they shall be under the alien’s authority, who shall not, 
however, rule with harshness over them in your sight. 54 And if they have not been redeemed 
in any of these ways, they and their children with them shall go free in the jubilee year.  
Verse 53 already seems to refer to the case where the “brother” is not redeemed, 
because the instruction now is that he will be like a rykic; with the alien as we had in 
                                                 
49 It is not clear why the NRSV above translates this with the plural.  
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v. 40. Furthermore Israelites are responsible (*yn<y[el]) to see to it that their brother is 
not treated in &r,P, by this alien similar to the instructions we had in v. 43. And then v. 
54 states the final option for this man if none of his brothers redeem him. He will go 
out (axy) in the Jubilee along with his sons.  
Table 3.41 
!ydib;[} laer;c]yIAynEb] yliAyKi ➔ 55 
!he yd'b;[}           
!yIr;x]mi $r,a,me !t;wao ytiaxewhoArv,a}  
.!k,yheløa> hw:hy“ ynIa} 
55 For to me the people of Israel are servants; they are my servants whom I brought out from 
the land of Egypt: I am the LORD your God. 
The final verse in this chapter is theologically very laden. It is introduced by a yKi 
followed by two nominal clauses. It is the same motivation as we had in v. 42, but it is 
amplified with further theological claims. In v. 42 we only had, !he yd'b;[}AyKi, but now 
we have !he yd'b;[} !ydib;[} laer;c]yIAynEb] yliAyKi. Basically the same thing is repeated using 
different words. Note that this can also be described as a parallelistic chiasm. Above 
I have underlined what I understood as the predicates and blocked the subjects. This 
makes the impact greater than what we had in v. 42. 
Like v. 42 (and 38) we also have an rv,a}-clause reminding the readers of the Exodus 
and YHWH’s special claim on the Israelites. The concluding statement is YHWH 
claiming his identity as their God (!k,yheløa>) again as he had done in vv. 17 and 38. 
3.10 Conclusion 
Above I chose to use the term “synchronic” as referring to a kind of study that is not 
interested in constructing the development of a text, but only attempts to describe the 
text in its current state. Thus synchronic became a synonym for other terms which 
biblical scholars use like “text-immanent” or what some would call a “literary reading.” 
In a strict sense this was not what Saussure meant when he coined the concept, but 
it was an attempt to be consistent. What I’ve done above was only to describe the 
grammatical features of the Masoretic text. I did not bother with possible diachronic 
ways of reading the text, neither with dating the text, although initially I did not 
exclude the latter possibility. The main objective was to get a “grip” on the text on 
which further engagements with the text could be based. I suppose that that is where 
all50 readings of a text start. 
                                                 
50 By this I mean that even traditional diachronic studies, even in the strict Literarkritik sense, had to start 
with the final form of the text. Yet, a scholar looking for layers asks different questions of a text. They 
would look for “inconsistencies” and “doublets” and other features that might betray the “seams” of the 
text and which would then be used to distinguish layers.  
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In this light I have tried to describe striking or salient grammatical features. These 
included features like, wc. + perfect series, marked word order, nominal sentences 
and the particle yKi. A question resulting from identifying these features would be why 
so many theologically rich parts are clothed in either yKi-clauses or nominal sentences 
or combinations of both? Is this a typical biblical Hebrew way of motivating directives 
or even of appealing to a reader? I do not need to say more about these now, but in 
the next chapter I will revisit these and specifically ask what possible role they play in 
persuasion. What I mean with this concept will become clearer in the next chapter. 
Yet, the fact that Van der Merwe et al (1999) often provided suggestions as to what 
they called the “semantic-pragmatic” functions of grammatical features, has already 
helped us on the way to that objective.  
There is one feature of the text that I definitely need to explore in the next chapter. 
That is a kind of stylistic preference of the authors to use what I have provisionally 
called “parallelistic chiasm.” With this term I meant that it is a chiastic structure that 
also shares certain (repetitive) characteristics with what has traditionally been called 
parallelism in Hebrew poetry. I found it surprising that apart from Jacob Milgrom 
(2001)51 so few biblical scholars have paid attention to these features.52 We will have 
to ask what these do, or how they function? These are further questions that will be 
addressed in the next chapter.  
Another question that then surfaces, is whether the texts surrounding chapter 25 
share some of these features? This question will have to be addressed in the chapter 
following the next one.  
 
                                                 
51 Milgrom (2001: 2158, 2163, 2170, 2180, 2200 and 2225) identifies most of these features, which he only 
calls “chiasm.” He seems to miss the one in v. 18, although I might have missed it in his text. He also 
constructs the example in v. 22 differently with the two d[" phrases (see table 4.14) forming a centre 
(Milgrom 2001: 2180).  
52 Joüon & Muraoka (1991: 585) mention the example in v. 41, but only calls it chiasmus, or their preferred 
term, “attraction.” Reventlow (1961: 130) has also identified the chiasm in v. 10 which he calls a “geprägte 
Form, mit Parallelismus membrorum und chiastischer Stellung.” He does not identify the similar example 
in v. 41.  
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CHAPTER 4  
PERSUASIVE FEATURES OF LEVITICUS 25 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter I identified many grammatical features that I thought were 
characteristic of Leviticus 25. The question that we concluded with there was what 
role these might have played in persuading a possible audience and whether it would 
be possible to identify some features as playing a more important role in persuasion 
than others. This is what I will attempt in this chapter and it will be done by means of 
criteria that Watts (1999) identified in a study on “the rhetorical shaping of the 
Pentateuch.” In the rest of the chapter a short summary will follow of his views and 
then I will attempt to apply them critically to this text. I should reiterate, though, that 
what is attempted in this chapter could at stages be understood as repetition of what 
I already did in the previous chapter. The “borders” between what I did there and 
what I am attempting now are not always that clearly drawn. Or, to state it the other 
way round, what I did in the previous chapter could be included under what some 
scholars understand under rhetorical criticism.1  
As I promised at the end of chapter 2 the term “ideology” will also return at the end of 
this chapter. As we will see, attempting to identify persuasive features in a text 
provides us with glimpses of how the people to whom this text was addressed 
understood themselves. Before we turn to Watts I do need to sum up my 
demarcation of this chapter which, is based on the grammatical observations in the 
previous chapter and specifically the use of yKi: 
Part 1, verses 1-2aa:  Introduction of divine speech 
Part 2, verses 2ab-13: Basic laws on the Sabbath and the Jubilee 
Part 3, verses 14-17[18-19]: Taking care of the tymi[; [with parenetic part] 
Part 4, verses 20-22[23-24]: What shall we eat? [with “hinge”] 
 
Part 5, verses 25-34:  First case: What to do with the hZ…jua}  
Part 6, verses 35-38:  Second case: Taking care of the ja; 
Part 7, verses 39-46:  Third case: The case of an db,[, 
Part 8, verses 47-55:  Fourth case: The problem of a rich rG´ 
My reasons for naming the sub-units as I did here should become apparent in the 
discussion that follows. 
                                                 
1 One example would be Vernon Robbins (1996). What he (1996: 7-39) calls the “inner texture” of a text 
sounds similar to some of the things that I tried to identify in the previous chapter.  
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4.1.1 Rhetorical criticism according to Watts 
In the rest of this chapter I will extensively make use of the proposals of Watts (1999 
and 2003) on rhetorical criticism. His studies are useful, because he focuses on 
biblical law and thus the Pentateuch.2 Another important aspect of his proposals is 
the fact that the kind of rhetorical criticism that he offers is not a-historical. We will 
see later that he also dates the “compilation” of the different layers of the Pentateuch 
in the Second Temple Period. It is also in this period that he imagines the audience 
that is addressed by the text. In this regard he is actually critical of “rhetoric” that is 
“a-historical” as the following quote from a recent essay by him shows (Watts 2003: 
80): 
Though rhetoric has come to be associated in biblical studies with purely literary 
analysis of structure and style, ancient and modern rhetoric have usually 
addressed such issues from the larger perspective of argumentation, asking how 
speakers and writers influence their listeners and readers. Literary study then 
becomes more than an analysis of the text itself; it aims to understand texts as 
transactions between authors and audiences. Rhetoric therefore calls attention 
to both the literary features of a text and the real writers and readers whose 
ideas motivated its formation. 
In terms of what we said in 3.1.1 above, his work could thus be described as 
synchronic, but still historical.  
In the first chapter of his book, Watts (1999: 15-31) argues that there existed a 
tradition of reading law aloud in Israel and that this played a role in the shaping of the 
Pentateuch. In support of his hypothesis Watts (1999: 29) argues that “the narrative 
context of Pentateuchal law confirms that the Torah is intended to be read as a 
whole.” It is exactly this combination of narrative and law (or story and list, as he 
tends to call it) that was intended to make the Pentateuch a persuasive document. 
His second argument in support of his hypothesis is that many features of the 
Pentateuch “make sense as rhetorical devices to aid aural reception of the law.”3 In 
his second chapter (1999: 32-60) he then argues that Greco-Roman theorists 
considered the combination of story and list as dangerous, a seemingly “unfair” way 
of attempting to convince people, appealing to people’s emotions and not to their 
                                                 
2 Other examples of rhetorical criticism have tended to focus on narrative and poetic texts. A good example 
would be the work of Trible (1978, 1984 and 1994). The first two focus on narrative texts, while the latter 
treated Jonah (a mixture of narrative and poetic texts). See also the comments by Watts (1999: 35). 
3 What Watts is arguing here should not be understood as an attempt to reconstruct the oral traditions that 
were used in the making of the Pentateuch. In a later essay Watts (2003: 81-83) is, for instance, very 
critical of scholars who have attempted to reconstruct what he calls “the forms of oral priestly teaching.” 
He is especially critical of form-critical attempts to construct the “genre of these ritual texts.” He is thus 
not interested in how these laws might have functioned in their original forms in a pre-literate context, but 
in how they might have persuaded audiences in a literate context when read aloud.  
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reason (see especially Watts 1999: 37-40).4 Yet biblical authors did not share these 
sensitivities and used this combination extensively and thus we have what we now 
know as the Pentateuch, which is an extensive combination of law and list. There 
also seems to have been examples of this combination in ancient literature, which 
leads him to the following conclusion (1999: 45):  
The combination of story and list appears too widely and too predictably to be 
regarded as a distinguished feature of a particular genre (though in Israel’s 
culture it did become a typical feature of Torah). It should rather be regarded as 
a strategy of persuasion employed by many cultures in a variety of literary 
genres for the purpose of convincing readers and hearers of document’s, and its 
author’s, authority. The combination of story and list can serve as evidence 
neither of literary dependence nor of a document’s date of composition. Instead, 
it indicates the rhetorical setting of the literature and the persuasive goals 
motivating its composition.  
One might now think what all of this could mean when reading Leviticus 25, because 
it might be a combination of different kinds of laws some apparently more apodictic 
and other more casuistic, but still it is only law and where is the narrative? In the next 
chapter (chapter 5) Leviticus 24 will be discussed, which is partly narrative and 
preceding chapter 25, but we will see in this chapter that some of the persuasive 
strategies used in chapter 25 are referring to the broader narrative of the Pentateuch. 
As we will see this is especially true when YHWH enters the fray.  
Speaking of which, a third element that Watts (1999: 45-49) adds to story and list is 
what he calls “divine sanction” (Watts 1999: 45): 
Ancient texts frequently invoke the power of religion to strengthen their 
persuasive appeal, a rhetorical device of which the classical theorists 
disapproved. 
This is often invoked through blessings and curses and we do not have to mention 
that Leviticus 26 is full of both, although we do have the short parenetic text in 
chapter 25 (vv. 18-19), but more of that below. The point is that these elements of 
story, list and divine sanction are, according to Watts, important building blocks in the 
persuasive make-up of the Pentateuch. 
                                                 
4 Watts (1999: 37-40) uses the work of O’Banion extensively who apparently blamed Aristotle “for the de-
emphasis on narration in Western thought in general and in rhetorical theory in particular.” The following 
quote from O’Banion explains why he blamed Aristotle (quoted from Watts 1999: 37): 
Since to him the essence of an argument was ‘to state a case and to prove it’, Aristotle accordingly 
considered narratio and all ‘introductory’ matters to be ‘superfluous’ or for ‘weak’ audiences (Rhetoric 
3.13-14). … Such concerns were unfortunate tasks preliminary to proceeding with what, at least to 
him, really mattered—the reasons and the evidence.  
 Watts (1999: 37-38) continues (following O’Banion) that it was the Roman orators, Cicero and Quintilian 
who much later re-established the importance of narrative. Yet, O’Banion demonstrated that the influence 
of Aristotle was quite pervasive in Western culture. The result of this was “that the narrative methods of 
argumentation were disassociated from the analytical methods of reason and proof, and usually isolated 
within the separate discipline of literary theory.”  
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In his third chapter, Watts (1999: 61-88) provides a specific description of some of 
the most important features of the persuasiveness of the Pentateuch as the following 
quote explains (1999: 62): 
Several stylistic traits of biblical law seem intended to further its aural reception. 
Previous studies in Pentateuchal law have devoted considerable attention to two 
such devices: hortatory addresses and motive clauses. Other prominent features 
of the legal collections, such as repetition and variation, also make rhetorical 
sense as didactic devices.  
I will therefore divide the following discussion into three parts namely “address”, 
“motivation” and I will discuss “repetition” and “variation” together, since I am strongly 
under the impression that the two are often intertwined, or at least two sides of the 
same coin.  
4.2 Address 
Under “address” Watts (1999: 62-65) discusses the fact that parts of the Pentateuch 
are in and addressed to the second person, while other parts are in the third person. 
Apodictic parts are usually directed to the second person, while casuistic laws, can 
be a mixture of the two (see especially 25:35-38 and 39-46). He provides a good 
summary of where we find what kind of law, and with regards to Leviticus his 
summary is worthwhile quoting (1999: 63): 
The sacrificial regulations of Leviticus 1-75 generally take the form of third-person 
casuistic law, but the rules for the grain offering take a second-person plural 
casuistic form that alternates between singular and plural (Lev. 2.4-16) and 
dietary prohibition on fat and blood appear in second-person plural apodictic 
form near the end of the collection (7.22-27). Second-person plural address 
shapes the dietary rules (ch. 11) but the following purity regulations (chs. 12-15) 
take third-person casuistic form. In the Holiness Code, sections dominated by 
laws in the second-person (Lev. 18-19; 23-24) and third-person (chs. 17; 20.1-
16; 27) are interspersed with sections that mix third-person casuistic formulations 
with second-person apodictic commands (20.17-22.33; 25).  
This is, for instance, in contrast to Deuteronomy which “maintains a second-person 
form of address throughout that is consistent with its setting as a speech, but it varies 
between singular and plural and between apodictic and casuistic formulas” (Watts 
1999: 63). But with regards to Leviticus, we thus see that chapter 25 is a combination 
of both texts addressed to the second person (both plural and singular) and texts in 
the third person. This feature of the text has been used by generations of (mostly 
German) historical-critical scholars to do “source criticism” or Literarkritik, which 
meant “looking-for-layers” by focusing on this change in person in the text. The best 
                                                 
5 See Watts (2003: 79-100) for a closer analysis of Leviticus 1-7.  
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two examples of scholars6 who based Literarkritik on the change of person were 
Elliger (1966a) and Cholewinski (1976). Both their efforts (and those of others) have 
been criticised by many7 of which the latest examples have been Grünwaldt (1999)8 
and Milgrom (2001).9  
The question that one could ask then would be whether there could be another 
synchronic way of explaining this change in person other than arguing that they 
represented phases in the development of the text? Watts (1999: 64) does provide 
some kind of an answer as the next quote illustrates: 
                                                 
6 Even somebody like Hartley attempts to do this and he describes the three “distinctive styles” in this text as 
follows (1992: 425): 
… impersonal laws (vv 26-34,[41], 42, 48-54 [less 53bb]), laws in the second person singular (vv 3-5, 
6-7, 8-9a, 14a, 15-16, 17ba, 25, 35-37, 39-40, [41], 43-44a, 46bb, 47, 53b) and material, both 
paraenetic and legal, cast in the second person plural (vv2ab+b, 9b-13, 14b, 17a, 17bb-24, 38, 44b, 45, 
46a+ba, 55b). Literary critics use these variations in style as one means of identifying a variety of 
sources. 
He also (see Hartley 1992: 425-426) discusses other attempts through the years to identify layers like 
Kilian, Elliger and Cholewinski. Hartley (1992: 426) himself identifies at least two editions. The first 
edition is identified by the second person singular “at the structural seems.” This editor probably 
incorporated the “impersonal law.” The second editor is characterised by the second person plural forms:  
Later, when this legislation became included as one of the speeches in the division on holy living, the 
speaker, who preferred the second person plural, included material to strengthen the rhetorical and 
ideological force of this speech. That person may have added the paraenetic material (vv 17, 18-19), 
the formulae of Yahweh’s self-identification (vv 38, 55), and the disputation (vv 20-22), tying this 
speech more tightly into the laws on holy living. 
This second redaction thus added the “more theologically laden” material. Sun (1990: 548-550) argues 
similarly.  
7 Gerstenberger (1993: 340) is, for instance, not that enthusiastic about using this change in person to divide 
into layers as the following quote explains:  
Das ausgedehnte und wortreiche Kap. ist mit erstaunlich konzentrierter, wörtlicher Anrede 
durchzogen. Man fühlt sich bei der Lektüre in einen Vortragssaal oder einen Gottesdienst versetzt. Die 
Redeformen bleiben aber nicht gleichmäßig in der 2. Pers. Plur. wie in Lev. 24, sie fallen immer 
wieder in den Sing. oder treten hinter einer unpersönlich neutralen 3. Pers. ganz zurück. Nun ist der 
Wechsel zwischen Plur. und Sing. in der direkten Anrede nicht immer gleichbedeutend mit einer 
Veränderung des Schauplatzes, an dem die Rede ergeht. Auch wir sind gewohnt, kollektive Anreden 
im Sing. zu hören: Liebe Gemeinde! Verehrte Festversammlung! Innerhalb einer Predigt oder 
Ansprache kann dann durchaus die plur.e Redeform, die jeden einzelnen in der Menge meint, mit der 
sing.en, welche die Einzelperson herausgreift, wechseln.  
 Although Gerstenberger never uses the term “rhetoric” he still understands the change in person as some 
kind of persuasive strategy that is typical of speeches and sermons, thus when a text is read aloud. In this 
regard his view is thus akin to that of Watts.   
8 The main problem with this option is that the exponents have difficulties to consistently fit their layers into 
their schemes. Grünwaldt (1999: 105-106), for instance, criticises both Elliger and Cholewinski for 
inconsistencies. Both find that the third person singular or “impersonal” parts are the oldest, with the 
second person plural layer as the latest. One example with regards to Cholewinski, whom Grünwaldt 
regards as the most consistent exponent of this trend (1999: 105), will suffice. He regards vv. 13-17a as 
part of the second person singular layer, but this part is actually full of parts formulated in the second 
person plural (e.g. vv. 13b, 14b, 17aab). Grünwaldt (1999: 106) then concludes: 
Gerade der Befund in V.13-17 zeigt, daß der Numeruswechsel als literarkritisches Kriterium in 
Rechtstexten nicht überall taugt. Hier sind Sätze in 2. Pers. Sing. mit Sätzen in 2. Pers. Plur. 
untrennbar verbunden, ebenso wie in der zweiten Hälfte des Kap.s Passagen in 2. Pers. Sing. oder 2. 
Pers. Plur. mit unpersönlich formulierten Sätzen eine Einheit bilden.  
9 Milgrom (2001: 2150) has the following to say with regards to scholars who identify literary strata: 
I shall follow the last position [i.e. scholars not attempting to distinguish layers - EEM], not because 
the identification of the literary strata is too difficult, but because the search for them–if they exist at 
all–is meaningless. The chapter, as is, flows logically and coherently. Even if the redactor had 
different sources before him, he welded them together in such an artistic and cogent sequence that it 
suffices to determine what he had in mind. This view is echoed in rabbinic literature: … 
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Second-person address gives commandments a sense of immediacy and 
urgency lacking in the hypothetical formulation of (usually) third-person casuistic 
laws. The ‘you’ addressed by YHWH and Moses is typified by but not limited to 
the Israelites in the wilderness. Hearers and readers are likely to feel directly 
addressed and therefore obliged to respond.  
A “logical” deduction from this would then be that the second person laws were more 
important for the author than the third person laws to get across. Watts does not 
argue this in the rest of his discussion, but if he says that second-person address has 
a “sense of urgency” that is lacking in third-person casuistic laws, then one could 
deduct that. Yet, I do not think that it would be possible to consistently argue that. 
Would it then mean that the biblical authors regarded apodictic law as more 
important than casuistic law? The former is usually directed at the second person, 
while the latter can be a mixture. This does not seem that maintainable and to 
complicate this issue further at least two of the four “cases” in the second half of 
Leviticus 25 are dominated by second person (both plural and singular) forms. In 
what follows I will explore this issue further along with another that Watts does not 
touch on. This is the fact that we have singular and plural forms in the second person 
in Leviticus 25 and it is a question whether some “persuasive” or “rhetorical” effect 
might have been meant by often changing between them.  
A scholar like Jan Joosten (1996: 47-54) does explore this issue in the Holiness 
Code and he identifies three modes of address in the Holiness Code (Joosten 1996: 
48): 
a. second person plural addressed to the community; in H this is the neutral 
mode, being used throughout; 
b. second person singular addressing each member of the collective individually; 
in H this mode is fairly frequent in Lev 18, 19 and 25 and sporadic elsewhere. 
c. second person singular addressed to the collective; in H this mode is found in 
three verses only (25:7-9), which I consider anomalous. 
He argues that examples of a. address the whole community and are usually 
concerned with issues that are relevant for the whole community. Examples of b. are 
thus aimed at the individual and targets issues in which the individual could make a 
difference. Joosten (1996: 49) thinks that certain concepts “are consistently 
associated with either singular or plural.” One interesting example that he refers to is 
the fact that it is usually “your (pl.) land” (!k,x]r]a'),10 but “your (sing.) field” (*d,c;).11 He 
continues (Joosten 1996: 49): 
                                                 
10 Instances of these include Leviticus 19:9, 33; 22:24; 23:22; 25:9, 45; 26:1, 5, 6, 19, 20 and 33. But there is 
one exception in 25:7 where we find “your (sing.) land.” 
11 See Leviticus 19:9, 19; 23:22; 25: 3 and 4. 
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Both of these words refer to the arable land on which the Israelites will live, but 
whereas the first has a global, “national” connotation, the second refers to the 
plot belonging to an individual. 
Along these lines he also identifies certain terms that usually accompany the plural 
and others that go with the singular.12 Yet, a word like ja; occurs with both the 
singular and the plural. Joosten (1996: 50) is nevertheless convinced “that we may 
read an individualizing nuance into verses employing the singular even when they 
give no other indication of it.” I will explore this issue below when I discuss vv. 2a-13, 
but the point is that there does not really seem to be clear-cut answers. The 
suggestions made by Joosten explain some of the features of the text, but not all. 
Even Joosten does not really know what to do with vv. 7-9, which according to his 
theory should be plural, but which are addressed to the singular (see Joosten 1996: 
52-53 or c. above).  
4.2.1 Verses 2ab-13, Basic laws on the Sabbath and the Jubilee 
Above we have discussed many grammatical and at stages stylistic features of this 
text like, for instance, the chiastic structures occurring in vv. 6-7, 9 and 10 (indicated 
here by the “brackets” to the left of the text). I also identified the marked word order in 
vv. 4 and 5, as well as the many nominal clauses in vv. 10, 11 and 12. These are 
grammatical and stylistic features that are probably important for understanding this 
text, but (as I said above) the focus will now be on whom are addressed in the text. In 
the text in the tables below all texts addressed to the second person plural are in 
italics and all addressed to the second person singular are in normal Hebrew font. 
The text is presented in two tables to make it more manageable.  
                                                 
12 Words that are associated with $r,a, and which thus “attract second person plural suffixes and verb forms” 
include (Joosten 1996: 49): “dwelling places” (!k,ytebov]/m), “generations (!k,yteroDo), “cities” (!k,yre[;i) and 
“sanctuaries” (!k,yveD]q]mi). Concepts referring to “the sphere of the individual” include (Joosten 1996: 49): 
“vineyard” (*m,r]K'), “cattle” (*T]m]h,B]), “slave” (*D]b][') and “neighbour” (*[,re and *t,ymi[};).  
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Table 4.1 
!k,l; @tenú ynIa} rv,a} $r,a;h;Ala, Wabot; yKi 2ab 
.hw:hyl' tB;v' $r,a;h; ht;b]v;w“ 
*d,c; [r'z“Ti !ynIv; vve 3 
*m,r]K' rmoz“Ti !ynIv; vvew“ 
.Ht;a;WbT]Ata, T;p]s'a;w“ 
hw:hyl' tB;v' $r,a;l; hy<h]yI @wtoB;v' tB'v' t[iybiV]h' hn:V;b'W 4 
[r;z“ti alø *d]c; 
.rmoz“ti alø *m]r]k'w“  
rwxoq]ti alø *r]yxiq] j'ypis] tae 5  
rxob]ti alø *r,yzIn“ ybeN“[iAta,w“  
.$r,a;l; hy<h]yI @wtoB;v' tn"v] 
.&M;[i !yriG:h' *b]v;wtol]W *r]ykic]liw“  *t,m;a}l'w“ *D]b]['l]W *l] hl;k]a;l] !k,l; $r,a;h; tB'v' ht;y“h;w“ 6 
 s  .lkoa>l, Ht;a;WbT]Alk; hy<h]Ti *x,r]a'B] rv,a} hY:j'l'w“ *T]m]h,b]liw“ 7
The introductory verses of this chapter (vv. 1-2aa) will not be discussed since they 
are not part of the laws and are not addressing anybody. We can thus start with vv. 
2ab-13 which are all direct speech, but where we find a change between singular and 
plural. The first clause of this text is directed at the plural 
(!k,l; @tenú ynIa} rv,a} $r,a;h;Ala, Wabot; yKi), but then from v.2b onwards it changes to 
singular until the end of v. 5. These are thus the laws about the Sabbath year and 
they are directed at the singular. We already discussed the fact that the regulations 
for the Sabbath year in vv. 4-5 are presented by means of marked word order. What I 
find fascinating here is that it seems as if this text is directed at the land-owning 
person, the person with the power. We find “your field” (*d,c;) and “your vineyard” 
(*m,r]K') twice in this passage as well as “your harvest” (*r]yxiq]) and “your untrimmed 
vine” (*r,yzIn“) once. Thus the person addressed by means of these verses is the 
person who owns these things and who then has the power to execute these laws or 
not.13 The text targets this person, not only by addressing him directly, but also by 
presenting these commands by means of marked word order.  
In vv. 6 and 7 we find a slight change in the sense that the second person plural is 
addressed shortly (!k,l; $r,a;h; tB'v' ht;y“h;w“), before the text changes to the singular 
again. The question is, of course, why suddenly the plural when it was singular all the 
time? One possibility is that the plural here is more of an inclusive (“umbrella”) term. 
In the clause that follows it is as if the plural “you” are divided into many different role 
players. These role players include the addressed “you” (*l]) and then the db,[,  the 
hm;a;, the rykic; and the bv;/T who is sojourning (rwg). Each one of these groups are 
portrayed as if they are in a specific relationship with the addressee, because it is 
always “your” db,[, and “your” hm;a; and even the people who are suppose to be free 
                                                 
13 In this regard I do agree with the observation by Joosten that these concepts belong to the “sphere of the 
individual” (Joosten 1996: 49).  
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like the bv;/T and the rykic; also share this relationship with the “you.” One should 
also keep in mind that vv. 6-7 are packaged in the chiastic parallelism that we have 
identified in the previous chapter. This adds to the impression that these two verses 
are rather important in the persuasive strategy of the text.  
Another important feature of the text and especially the first 13 verses is the way in 
which the preposition l] is used. Since the usage of l] is closely connected to how 
people are addressed in this text I will discuss that now shortly.  
Excursus 4.1, the preposition l].  
If one considers the way in which Van der Merwe et al (1999: 285-287) describe l], it is 
difficult to find an exact description for some of the l]s in this chapter. Under the broad 
heading of their first function, “indicates the goal of a process” (1999: 285) one would expect 
to accommodate the kind of l]s that we find in vv. 2ab-13, but I do not find an exact 
description for everything amongst their sub-headings. The closest is described in the 
following sub-heading, “indicates the goal of a process where something has been transferred 
to” (1999: 285). This is definitely a good description of what we just had in v. 2ag, but some of 
the other l]s in this chapter do not fit in that well. But first, let me start with those that are 
clearly definable.  
One kind of l] that can be clearly defined is one expressing “possession” (Van der Merwe et al 
1999: 286). The best two examples of these are $r,a;h; yliAyKi in v. 23 and !ydib;[} laer;c]yIAynEb] yliAyKi 
in v. 55. We will return to both these examples when we discuss “motivational strategies” in 
the next part of the chapter.   
Yet there are many l]s that do not seem to fit into any of the functions identified by Van der 
Merwe et al (1999). I refer to all the examples of l] in vv. 6 and 7 or the examples of !k,l; in the 
nominal clauses in vv. 8-13 (see Table 4.2). It is not as if “something is being transferred” or 
“possessed” as above, but still somebody appears to be receiving “something” and therefore I 
propose to describe the people addressed in this manner as “beneficiaries.” They are 
benefiting, or that is what the text looks like claiming. This is a rather vague term and the 
examples of “possession” and “of transferring something” are akin and could be included 
under this generic term. All of them have in common that they express benefit.  
The two examples of *l] in v. 8 appear to be examples of what Van der Merwe et al (1999: 
286) call “the reflexive element of an agent” or the so-called “ethical dative.” There are other 
examples that I will identify once we get to that part of the text. Yet, it should be clear that 
they are something else as my category of l] expressing benefit.  
I will thus consistently ask who is presented as beneficiaries in the rest of the chapter and I 
argue that l] is used to express this. I can imagine that this kind of strategy could play an 
important role when the objective of a text is to convince, or persuade people to act in a 
certain manner. It would always help if you could convince the addressee(s) that what they 
will be doing will be to their own benefit. 
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If the first beneficiaries of this text were the people addressed by !k,l; (because they 
receive the land in v. 2ag), then it is important to note that in the text that follows the 
addressee (for the rest of vv. 2b-7 mostly in the singular) is predominantly the person 
with the land (as we indicated above). Yet the land is the first “actor” in the sense that 
the land is the subject of the first verb, tbv. The “beneficiary” of this action is YHWH, 
because he is the person for “whom” (hw:hyl') the land will rest. This changes when we 
come to the first clause of v. 4 and now the land ($r,a;l; hy<h]yI @wtoB;v' tB'v') itself 
becomes a beneficiary along with YHWH (hw:hyl' tB;v'). We find the land again as 
beneficiary in the last clause of v. 5 ($r,a;l; hy<h]yI @wtoB;v'). Thus, up to v. 5 the 
“somebody” being addressed is asked to refrain (the marked word order clauses in 
vv. 4 and 5) from the actions that this person does every year (as described in v. 3). 
Yet the addressee does not benefit from his actions and the beneficiaries are either 
the land itself or YHWH or both.  
This then changes with vv. 6 and 7 where all the different groups are involved that we 
already mentioned above. By means of l] all these groups are now portrayed as 
people who will benefit including the owner of the land. Is this a further indication that 
vv. 6 and 7 are important in the persuasive force of the text? I think that the answer is 
definitely “yes.” We do find a chiastic structure here along with the fact that many 
groups are introduced here, which on the face of it will benefit from these laws along 
with the person primarily addressed up to now.  
Table 4.2 
 !ymi[;P] [b'v, !ynIv; [b'v, !ynIv; ttoB]v' [b'v, *l] T;r]p's;w“ 8 
.hn:v; !y[iB;r]a'w“ [v'Te !ynIV;h' ttoB]v' [b'v, ymey“ *l] Wyh;w“ 
vd,jol' rwco[;B, y[ibiV]h' vd,joB' h[;WrT] rp'wvo T;r]b'[}h'w“ 9 
.!k,x]r]a'Alk;B] rp;wvo Wrybi[}T' !yriPuKih' !wyúB] 
hn:v; !yVimij}h' tn"v] tae !T,v]D'qiw“ 10 
h;yb,v]yúAlk;l] $r,a;B; rwroD] !t,ar;q]W  
!k,l; hy<h]Ti awhi lbewyú 
wtoZ…jua}Ala, vyai !T,b]v'w“ 
.WbvuT; wToj]P'v]miAla, vyaiw“ 
!k,l; hy<h]Ti hn:v; !yVimij}h' tn"v] awhi lbewyú 11 
W[r;z“ti alø  
h;yj,ypis]Ata, Wrx]q]ti aløw“  
.h;yr,zIn“Ata, Wrx]b]ti aløw“ 
!k,l; hy<h]Ti vd,qo  awhi lbewyú yKi 12 
Ht;a;WbT]Ata, Wlk]aTo hd,C;h'A@mi  
.wtoZ…jua}Ala, vyai WbvuT; taZúh' lbewYúh' tn"v]Bi 13
Of vv. 8-13 the first three clauses (vv. 8-9a) are also still in the singular until it 
changes to the plural from v. 9b onwards to stay like that until v. 13. These verses 
then introduce the laws on the Jubilee. This change occurs exactly in the middle of 
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the chiastic structure identified in v. 9. We should also keep in mind that v. 2ab was 
directed to the second person plural and that this was changed to the singular when 
the laws on the Sabbath were introduced. It is actually being changed back to the 
plural now. We also saw that Joosten did not really know what to do with this and he 
regards it as anomalous (Joosten 1996: 48). The text is thus not addressed to a 
singular addressee, but to addressees. One could ask that if the singular forms 
above were addressed to those owning land, does it mean that the text now 
broadens its sight in order to address both those owning land and those who do not? 
Or, is the text simply addressing all those owning land as a collective unit now?  
In the light of these two possibilities, how do we understand “to all the inhabitants” 
(h;yb,v]yúAlk;l]) in v. 10 who apparently will be on the receiving end of the proclaimed 
rwroD] and who will benefit from it. Does this term refer to everybody, as in every 
human being, or just to everybody that has a claim to land? If you did not own any 
land previously, then rwroD] would be kind of useless, since whereto will you return?  
If one takes a look at the chiasm that we identified in v. 10 it is also interesting that 
although the verb is in the plural the subject is actually singular. One should thus 
expect the verb to be singular as well (and probably also third person as we find in v. 
41). According to Joüon & Muraoka (1991: 547) it is nothing out of the ordinary, but it 
is the normal way of expressing “each one/ every one.” The verb is usually in the 
plural (either third or second person) and vyai is the subject. We will find two more 
examples of this in the next part (see vv. 14 and 17) where it is in the negative and 
thus means “no-one” or “nobody.” The point is just that this grammatical feature 
leaves the impression that these laws on the Jubilee are not just addressing only the 
land-owners, but it seriously engages with everyone. Every single person will benefit 
form these laws, or that at least is one way of reading the text. Add to that the three 
nominal sentences where we find !k,l; in each, each time expressing that the Jubilee 
will be to the benefit of the addressees (see vv. 10-12), then one really has the 
impression that the Jubilee has much more of a communal identity than the Sabbath 
year had. Yet who is this community, everybody, or every person with a claim to 
land?  
If one were to regard this community as every person, on could argue that this is a 
strategy that aims the Sabbath laws at those who have the power to execute them, 
i.e. landowners. Yet the authors anticipated that, since the laws on the Jubilee were 
aimed at every person, who owned land and who did not, it would have been 
received with far more enthusiasm and that they needed to target the Sabbath laws 
specifically. For the former they thus used second person singular forms of address. 
It might have something to do with the fact that the beneficiaries of the Sabbath laws 
are primarily the land and YHWH and that the different groups of people introduced 
 103
by !k,l; in the chiastic structure of vv. 6 and 7 appear as an afterthought. This is 
despite the fact that it is persuasively packaged in a chiastic structure. It is as if the 
authors were acknowledging that they needed to express some kind of benefit for the 
addressee who had to refrain from doing what he did every year.  
Yet when rwroD] is at stake and when people will have the opportunity to return to their 
hZ…jua} or hj;P;v]mi then is it not better to address the text to the plural? Everybody has 
the power to do this. Everybody is in a position to execute these laws, since all they 
have to do is “to return” and everybody will apparently benefit from these laws. It 
seems also that this everyone will include all the inhabitants (h;yb,v]yúAlk;l]) of the land. 
The question is whether “all the inhabitants” include the groups that were mentioned 
in vv. 6 and 7 above? It might be, since we had the impression above that !k,l; 
functioned as some kind of double colon that included all the groups following. Does 
this mean that the text is also addressing the db,[, and the hm;a; along with the rykic; 
and bv;/T? That they are all included in the people who will “return” in the year of the 
Jubilee? One is tempted to believe that, after reading the first 13 verses of Leviticus 
25, but that is just one reading and I am not utterly convinced.  
The main problem with this interpretation is v. 2ab, the first clause of this sub-unit 
(!k,l; @tenú ynIa} rv,a} $r,a;h;Ala, Wabot; yKi). The text starts by addressing those that are 
about to receive the land. Does this not mean that the text addresses those that have 
the land or, those that in the eyes of the authors have a legal claim to the land? This 
would mean that every example of !k,l; and also the expression h;yb,v]yúAlk;l] are 
addressing the community of landowners, or the community that consists of men who 
have legal claims to the land, but not every human being. We should keep in mind 
that in v. 10 people return to their hZ…jua} and to their hj;P;v]mi. The former at least entails 
possession of land, or a claim to possess land. Even if the grammatical feature that I 
identified above (plural verb with singular subject) means “everybody” it could only 
mean every person that were regarded as important to the authors, which would 
mean every person with a legal claim to land. They are all addressed now, because 
they will benefit from the Jubilee and they will have the opportunity to return to what 
was legally theirs. Still it only addresses those that could make these claims in the 
first place. 
This would mean that even if we could understand the !k,l; in v. 6 as some kind of 
double colon, or a feature that expressed benefit to all the groups included, that all 
the other examples of !k,l; are probably only directed at the community of 
landowners. We should also not forget that all the groups named in vv. 6 and 7 were 
always portrayed as in relation to the individual landowner. It was always “your db,[,” 
 104
and “your hm;a;”, as well as “your bv;/T” etc. Still, all of them are defined by their 
relation to the individual landowner and it gives the impression that apart from being 
something possessed by the addressee, they were not really regarded as a 
“somebody.”  
Understanding the text in this manner that the second person singular was aimed at 
the individual landowner and the plural at the community of landowners also helps to 
account for understanding the change from singular to plural in v. 9. The same 
people are still being addressed, the previous singular was just the rhetorically more 
powerful strategy, because it is more individualising. It also helped to make the 
transition from singular to the plural forms of address smoother.  
4.2.2 Verses 14-17[18-19], Taking care of the tymi[; [with parenetic 
part] 
Just like the introductory laws on the Sabbath and Jubilee the following laws are also 
a mixture of singular and plural texts in the second person. Yet that is where the 
similarities end, because these laws are now much more casuistic or conditional. It is 
introduced by means of a conditional ykiw“, a feature often associated with casuistic or 
conditional law.14 Once again parts directed at the second person singular are in the 
normal font and second person plural text in italics. The bracket to the left of the text 
indicates a chiastic parallelism and those to the right three inclusios, of which two (in 
vv. 18-19) were previously identified (see table 3.17).15  
                                                 
14 See Sonsino (1980: 14) who prefers to use the term “conditional” law in stead of “casuistic” law. He does 
this because his own “conditional” category includes more than Alt’s original description of casuistic law. 
Conditional or casuistic laws “are built … on the sequence of the protasis and apodosis of a conditional 
sentence” Sonsino (1980: 12).  
15 Grünwaldt (1999: 99) also describes vv. 14 and 17 as an inclusio.  
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Table 4.3 
*t,ymi[}l' rK;m]mi WrK]m]tiAykiw“ 14   
*t,ymi[} dY"mi hnúq; wao    
.wyjia;Ata, vyai WnwToAla'   
*t,ymi[} taeme hn<q]Ti lbewYúh' rj'a' !ynIv; rP's]miB] 15   
.&l;ArK;m]yI taoWbt]AynEv] rP's]miB]   
wton:q]mi hB,r]T' !ynIV;h' bro ypil] 16   
wton:q]mi fy[im]T' !ynIV;h' f[om] ypil]W    
.&l; rkemo aWh taoWbT] rP's]mi yKi   
wtoymi[}Ata, vyai Wnwto aløw“ 17   
*yh,løa>me t;arey:w“    
.!k,yheløa> hw:hoy“ ynIa} yKi   
yt'QojuAta, !t,yci[}w" 18   
Wrm]v]Ti yf'P;v]miAta,w“   
!t;ao !t,yci[}w"    
.jf'b,l; $r,a;h;Al[' !T,b]v'ywI   
Hy:r]Pi $r,a;h; hn:t]n:w“ 19   
[b'col; !T,l]k'a}w"    
.h;yl,[; jf'b,l; !T,b]v'ywI  
There is another group of people who appears in the text now. They appear for the 
first time in vv. 14-17 and they are the tymi[; and the ja;. These are the terms used to 
describe the persons that the addressee(s) will trade with. The person addressed in 
vv. 14-17 is mostly in the second person singular. Yet vv. 14 and 17 are some kind of 
mixture. In v. 14 it is “your tymi[;” (twice), but “his ja;” and the verbs are mostly second 
person plural. This “his ja;” is similar to the “his hZ…jua}” and “his hj;P;v]mi” that we had in 
the chiasm in v. 10. We already referred to the fact that this grammatical feature is a 
means of expressing “everyone.” Verses 15 and 16 are clearly second person 
singular. Verses 14 and 17 address the person who has the ability to trade with his 
tymi[; or ja;. This person is asked not to cheat (Hi of hny) his ja; (v. 14) or his tymi[; (v. 
17).  
Verse 14 starts with “when you (sing.) buy from your tymi[;” (*t,ymi[} taeme hn<q]Ti) and 
“when he sells to you” (&l;ArK;m]yI) thus, both people selling and buying are at first 
addressed, but in vv. 15 and 16 the person who is buying becomes the only 
addressee. In v. 15 we only find the verb hnq and the Ni of rkm along with the noun 
hn:q]mi, which is usually translated as “purchase price” (see BDB). Therefore, the 
person that this text really zooms in on, is the person who is buying, which implies 
the person with the power. He is the only one that can decide whether he will cheat 
or not, simply because somebody selling is usually in a financially vulnerable and 
thus powerless position.16  
                                                 
16 See also Houston (2001: 38-39) with similar remarks.  
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The main principle reiterated here is that land (although not specifically called that) is 
not to be sold, but that the harvests left (thus the usufruct) to the next Jubilee is the 
actual item being sold. We could thus say that v. 14 is rather general, simply stating 
that when you buy and sell then you should not cheat. This verse in a sense hides 
the fact that the person selling is usually not in a position to decide whether he will 
cheat or not, because he is the vulnerable partner in the transaction. That is probably 
why vv. 15 and 16 target the person with power, namely the one buying. Following 
vv. 15 and 16 we find v. 17, which as we said is a mixture similar to v. 14. We find the 
second person plural form of the Hiphil of hny and “your tymi[;” and “his ja;” of v. 14 
now combine to form “his tymi[;.” Following this we find the phrase, *yh,løa>me t;arey:w“, 
which is still aimed at the “individual” and the next clause could be regarded as a 
salient feature of the Holiness Code, !k,yheløa> hw:hoy“ ynIa} yKi.17 The latter changes the 
text to the second person plural and it stays like that until v. 24.  
I will discuss this parenetic part along with the motivational clauses under the next 
subheading, but it will suffice for now to say that in these two verses obedience is 
strongly connected to living in the land securely (jf'b,l;) and eating enough 
([b'col; !T,l]k'a}w"). Once again the land is acting by providing (@tn) her fruit. So again 
we have the land acting and we have this concern with eating as we had in vv. 6 and 
7, but now the acting of the land and the resulting eating are clearly dependent on 
the addressees doing the instructions. 
Why then the change from singular to plural in v. 17? Probably for the same reasons 
as above with the laws on the Jubilee, where vv. 14-16 are directed at the individual 
who has the power to choose between cheating his tymi[; and ja;, or not. I would thus 
like to describe the text until now as very “power-conscious” in the sense that those 
people are targeted who have the power to make a difference. We saw this with the 
                                                 
17 According to Ruwe (1999: 71-72) we do not find this formula in either the Covenant Code, or 
Deuteronomy, but we do find many examples in other texts traditionally regarded as priestly. See also 
Zimmerli (1969: 11-40) for a discussion of most of the occurrences in the Hebrew Bible. He provides, 
amongst others, a discussion of the occurrences in Ezekiel 20 (1969: 17-24) and Second Isaiah (1969: 30-
33). The particular occurrences of the formula helps Elliger (1966b: 211) to speculate at the start of his 
essay about dating these texts: 
Es ist gewiß nicht von ungefähr, daß sich der Gebrauch der Formeln gerade bei H, P, Ezechiel und 
Deuterojesaja konzentriet, also anscheinend in der Zeit der Exils. 
Most scholars (i.e. Elliger 1966b: 211-231, Zimmerli 1969: 11-40 and Ruwe 1999: 71-74) distinguish 
between the shorter and the longer forms of what they usually call the “Selbstvorstellungsformeln.” Yet 
they understand this distinction differently. Elliger (1966b) attributes the difference to different layers. The 
shorter form then becomes the older form, which he usually calls the “Hoheitsformel” and the longer form, 
which he calls the “Huldformel”, is supposedly younger. He connects the former with the “jealous” side of 
YHWH, which he also calls a “religios-emotionalen Seite” (1966b: 215) and the latter with a later 
“Geschichtstheologie” referring to the Egypt experience (1966b: 214). Neither Zimmerli (1969: 14), nor 
Ruwe (1999: 72 n.73) shares this view and Ruwe (1999: 72-74) is mostly interested in the role that this 
phrase plays in the demarcation of the text. See also Bodendorfer (2003: 403-428) for a discussion on 
rabbinic interpretations of this phrase. 
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Sabbath laws in vv. 2-7 and now with these more case-like laws in vv. 14-16. There 
is thus a certain kind of “realism” or “pragmatism” involved here, mixed with some 
calculated persuasive strategies. By realism I mean that the text is not beating about 
the bush about who can make the difference and it focuses mostly on this person. 
Yet v. 17 and especially vv. 18 and 19 are once again calling on all the addressees to 
make this a group-effort.  
If one were to ask again: Which “group” is this, all the landowners, or every person? 
Then I would have to answer again that the former seems more likely. The text is still 
only directed at people with legal claims to land, those that can either sell, or buy 
land, but still only those with claims to land. Within this group the text focuses more 
on those who are buying than those who are selling, yet the focus of the text never 
moves beyond this land owning group. In this regard I think that vv. 14-19 are a much 
clearer example than vv. 2-13 were, but vv. 14-19 also offer further support for how I 
understood vv. 2-13.  
4.2.3 Verses 20-22[23-24], What shall we eat? [with “hinge”] 
The whole text in the following table is in italics because all of it is directed at the 
second person plural. Yet following v. 20aa we find three clauses (underlined with 
dotted lines) in the first person singular in the direct speech and thus imbedded within 
this text addressed to the second person plural. The bracket to the left of the text 
indicates the single chiastic parallelism here. 
Table 4.4  
Wrm]ato ykiw“ 20   
 t[iybiV]h' hn:V;B' lk'aNúAhm'  
[r;z“nI alø @he   
.Wntea;WbT]Ata, #soa>n< aløw“  
tyViVih' hn:V;B' !k,l; ytik;r]BiAta, ytiyWIxiw“ 21   
.!ynIV;h' vløv]li ha;WbT]h'Ata, tc;[;w“   
tnIymiV]h' hn:V;h' tae !T,[]r'z“W 22   
t[iyviT]h' hn:V;h' d[' @v;y: ha;WbT]h'A@mi !T,l]k'a}w"    
.@v;y: Wlk]aTo Ht;a;WbT] awBoAd['   
ttumix]li rkeM;ti alø $r,a;h;w“ 23   
$r,a;h; yliAyKi    
.ydiM;[i !T,a' !ybiv;wtow“ !yrig´AyKi   
  s  .$r,a;l; WnT]Ti hL;auG“ !k,t]Zæjua} $r,a, lkob]W 24  
The question in v. 20 (Wrm]ato ykiw“) expresses a fear that seems to be in tension with 
what we already had in vv. 6 and 7, namely “what will we eat in the seventh year?”18 
                                                 
18 Grünwaldt (1999: 107-109) treats this tension extensively and it becomes the main reason why he 
“removes” vv. 6-7. He starts by arguing that there is already a tension between vv. 5 and 6 (1999: 107). In 
v. 5 people are prohibited to collect the aftergrowth, but in v. 6 people are allowed to eat the harvest. 
Would not this harvest be the same as the aftergrowth prohibited in v. 5? This in itself is not enough for 
him to leave these two verses out, but his real reason is the role played by vv. 20-22. There is an even 
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There it was already stated that all the different groups in the society could eat the 
harvest in the Sabbath year. Now we find roots like [rz and #sa which we had in vv. 
3 and 4 along with this question with regards to eating in the seventh year. It would 
actually have made more sense to ask, “what will we eat in the eighth year”? If they 
did not sow in this year it would not have been a problem until the eighth. The answer 
also hints in this direction. In the first clause of v. 21 we find another example of !k,l;. 
Thus the addressees will be receiving the blessing of YHWH in the sixth year, or they 
will be benefiting. The promise then entails a good enough harvest for three years 
and in v. 22 it is further packaged in another chiastic parallelism with the root lka. 
These verses seem to be anticipating a fear that the addressees might have been 
harbouring, which the author(s) are anxious to address. Somehow the fear of not 
eating enough or of going hungry must have been very high on the agenda of the 
people writing this text, or it must have been regarded as very high on the list of 
needs of the intended audience. But in terms of logic this promise of a harvest for 
three years does not really address the fear. What would the use of a big harvest be, 
if you are not allowed to collect (#sa) it? It must indeed have been a “magic” harvest 
that could lie there for three years, being sowed upon in the second year and still 
provide food for the next.19  
In vv. 23 and 24 the topic changes back to what we had in vv. 14-17 namely the 
selling of land. Verse 23 will be discussed more thoroughly under the next sub-
heading (see 4.3 below), but for now it suffices to say that whereas the relationship 
between YHWH and the $r,a, is portrayed as stable, the relationship between YHWH 
and the addressees is different. They are called !yriG´ and !ybiv;wTo with him and it 
sounds rather negative, in the sense that the relationship is precarious. Succeeding 
v. 23 we have an occurrence of the word hZ…jua} in which the relationship between the 
land and the addressees is also clearly defined, be it somehow in tension with what 
was just said in v. 23. The land is now the hZ…jua} of the addressees, but is this not 
somehow contradicting the fact that YHWH seems to be the ultimate owner of the 
                                                                                                                                            
clearer tension between v. 6aa and v. 20a. What is the use of this question (what shall we eat?) in v. 20a, if 
it was already stated in v. 6 what people could eat? Thus, we find some obvious tensions here in the text 
and Grünwaldt (1999: 108-109) does not think that we should remove vv. 20-22, but proposes to remove 
vv. 6-7. 
19 This issue is closely related to the tension that Grünwaldt sees between vv. 5 and 6 (1999: 107): 
Während nämlich V.5 untersagt, den Nachwuchs (des Getreides) zu ernten und die freiwachsenden 
Trauben zu lesen, so dient nach V.6f gerade der Ertrag des Sabbatjahres zur Nahrung im Sabbatjahr. 
Und was sollte der anderes sein als eben dieser in V.5 genannte Nachwuchs? 
 Here, I suppose, one could argue that it is the aftergrowth that is left and not collected and that one should 
distinguish between the aftergrowth (*r]yxiq] j'ypis]) and the original harvest (Ht;a;WbT]). It is not specifically 
stated that the latter may not be collected in vv. 4-5, but I think that it is implied.  
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land in v. 23? This, I suppose, depends on how we understand the verb @tn (see 
discussion below in 4.3.1.2).  
In v. 24 we also have marked word order with hL;auG“ preceding the verb. Now the 
addressees have to give hL;auG“ to the land. Previously the land gave her fruit to the 
addressees and the land seems to be benefiting from this. The term hL;auG“ is, of 
course, one of the main features of some of the texts that are to come and in this 
light it seems that v. 24 is a kind of “hinge” verse between the two parts of chapter 
25. Verse 23 is also theologically a very rich verse portraying the relation between 
YHWH, $r,a, and addressees.  
Furthermore, the direct relation between vv. 20-22 and vv. 23-24 is not that clear, it is 
more as if vv. 23-24 should be read with the whole of the chapter in mind. It is 
referring backwards and pointing forwards, but it is also some kind of theological 
anchor for the whole chapter (as we will see below) and it clearly sets the agenda. 
The text is about the relation between YHWH, the land and the people addressed. Is 
this why we always find the plural “you” and not the singular “you”? Is it thus not 
about the relation between land and individuals, but between land and the whole land 
owning group? I think yes.  
4.2.4 Verses 25-34, First case: What to do with the hZ…jua}. 
We have already described the grammatical features of this text, which is the first of 
four cases to follow. The most important rhetorical feature of this text is the fact that 
only the first clause is still in the second person and that the rest is all third person 
(underlined). All seven occurrences of hZ…jua} are in “blocks” to indicate the kind of role 
that they play in this text. It also shows why I think that this text seems to be focusing 
on how one should deal with the hZ…jua} and thus the title. The occurrences of the root 
lag are all in italics.  
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Table 4.5 
*yjia; &Wmy:AyKi 25 
wtoZ…jua}me rk'm;W 
wyl;ae broQ;h' wløa}gO ab;W  
.wyjia; rK'm]mi tae la'g…w“ 
laeGO wLøAhy<h]yI alø yKi vyaiw“  26 
wdoy: hg…yCihiw“ 
.wtoL;aug“ ydeK] ax;m;W 
wroK;m]mi ynEv]Ata, bV'jiw“ 27 
wløArk'm; rv,a} vyail; #de[oh;Ata, byvihew“  
.wtoZ…jua}l' bv;w“ 
wlø byvih; yDe wdoy: ha;x]m;Aalø !aiw“ 28 
lbewYúh' tn"v] d[' wtoao hn<Qoh' dy"B] wroK;m]mi hy:h;w“  
lbeYúB' ax;y:w“ 
.wtoZ…jua}l' bv;w“ 
hm;wjo ry[i bv'wmoAtyBe rKom]yIAyKi vyaiw“  29 
wroK;m]mi tn"v] !ToAd[' wtoL;auG“ ht;y“h;w“  
.wtoL;aug“ hy<h]Ti !ymiy: 
hm;ymit] hn:v; wlø taløm]Ad[' laeG:yIAalø !aiw“ 30 
wyt;rodol] wtoao hn<Qol' ttuymiX]l' hm;jo wløArv,a} ry[iB;Arv,a} tyIB'h' !q;w“  
.lbeYúB' axeyE alø 
bybis; hm;jo !h,l;A@yae rv,a} !yrixej}h' yTeb;W 31 
bvej;yE $r,a;h; hdec]Al['  
wLøAhy<h]Ti hL;auG“ 
.axeyE lbeYúb'W 
!t;Z…jua} yre[; yTeB; !YIwIl]h' yre[;w“ 32 
.!YIwIl]l' hy<h]Ti !l;w[o tL'auG“ 
!YIwIl]h'A@mi la'g“yI rv,a}w" 33 
lbeYúB' wtoZ…jua} ry[iw“ tyIB'ArK'm]mi ax;y:w“  
laer;c]yI ynEB] &wtoB] !t;Z…jua} awhi !YIwIl]h' yre[; yTeb; yKi 
   rkeM;yI alø !h,yre[; vr'g“mi hdec]W 34 
s  .!h,l; aWh !l;w[o tZæjua}AyKi 
The first clause is still directed at the second person singular, or what I have tended 
to describe as the person with the power, but then we find some kind of “distancing” 
technique where people are not spoken to, but spoken of. It is as if the responsibility 
to help “your ja;“ is moved away to somebody else. This is already clear in the last 
clause of v. 25 where it is not “your” ja; anymore, but “his” ja;. We have already 
described the functioning of !ai and yKi in vv. 25-28 (previous chapter) and how the 
text has a fairly “neat” structure. Verse 25 is about an ja; selling land and then being 
redeemed and vv. 26-28 explore his options when no redeemer comes forward. 
Verses 26-27 present the possibility that he might acquire the means himself and the 
result is the beautiful clause at the end of v. 27 (wtoZ…jua}l' bv;w“). The man returns to his 
hZ…jua}. Verse 28 anticipates that this might not happen and he waits for the Jubilee, 
which results in the same thing (wtoZ…jua}l' bv;w“), the man returns to his hZ…jua}. There is 
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one striking feature of these verses which will most definitely have implications for 
the way in which we understand the hL;auG“ and that is that the end result of being 
redeemed by somebody else, is not to return to your hZ…jua} (see v. 26). The person 
only returns to his hZ…jua} when either he redeems himself (v. 27) or when he waits until 
the Jubilee (v. 28). If a relative redeems him then the land goes to that person, or that 
is the impression that the text makes.20  
In vv. 29-31 we do not find the term hZ…jua} again, but this text is concerned with 
houses in either a city or in villages. The end-result is here expressed in terms of 
either “not going out” (v. 30) or “going out in the Jubilee” (v. 31), and thus not 
returning to the hZ…jua}. Houses in a city are different from houses in a village. 
We have also discussed (previous chapter) how complicated vv. 32-34 are, 
especially v. 33. These verses are different from vv. 29-31 because the term hZ…jua} 
makes a comeback and occurs no less than four times. We also find two motivational 
yKis and another “actor” or “group of actors” now enters the text that has disappeared 
after v. 2. This group is the “sons of Israel” (laer;c]yI ynEB]).  
Still, except for these features towards the end of this text in the part referring to the 
Levites, this part is rhetorically rather dull. We find no beneficiaries and the strangest 
is that the person addressed becomes a spectator where other people redeem, or 
become poor, or buy and sell houses. He himself seems not to be too involved and 
this is despite v. 25 talking about “your ja;.” Yet, your ja; quickly fades into his ja;. 
Could we thus really argue that the authors did not regard these laws as that 
important? Maybe they thought that the addressee does not need to be targeted that 
extensively, because these laws would have had a greater likelihood of being 
executed? They could thus “save their rhetorical guns” for later? We do find stories in 
the Bible referring to this kind of transaction.21 This observation does in a sense 
                                                 
20 In this light I think that Kessler (1992: 40-53) argues quite convincingly that the only way to understand 
the hL;auG“ institution is within the “clan” context (German: “Sippe”). With regards to Leviticus 25 he 
specifically states (Kessler 1992: 48): 
Das Gesetz von Lev 25 ist primär nicht am zu lösenden Individuum und seinem Besitz, sondern an der 
Sippe und ihrem Besitz orientiert. 
 He therefore does not think that when a brother in trouble sold his land to a laeGO that the brother would 
have kept the piece of land. The person who redeemed receives the land and probably keeps it (contra Noth 
1966: 165). He also refers to the example of Jer 32 where Jeremiah acts as laeGO, but keeps the land. 
Otherwise “hätte er [i.e. Jeremiah - EEM] seinem Vetter die siebzehn Schekel Silber (Jer 32,9) für den 
Acker gleich schenken können” (Kessler 1992: 48). The objective is thus simply to keep the hZ…jua} within 
the hj;P;v]mi. Kessler (1992: 47) accentuates that this act is a legal act (“Rechtsakt”) not an act of grace, or 
charity (“Gnadenakt”). When reading vv. 25-28 above, I cannot help but agree with him. 
21 The best examples are Jer 32 and Ruth 4. Many scholars have discussed the possible connection with 
Leviticus 25. I already referred to Kessler (1992) above, but see also Grünwaldt (1999: 322-323), who 
discusses both, but who is, of course, more interested in finding the traditions behind Leviticus 25. He is 
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support the notion of Elliger22 and Cholewinski23 that these were older existing laws 
that were incorporated by the authors/editors of the Holiness Code. It at least 
provides the possibility to argue that the authors did not need to be so persuasive 
about them, because they might have been perceived as already part and parcel of 
the society for whom these laws were written. This issue will be taken up again under 
4.2.7 below.  
4.2.5 Verses 35-38, taking care of the ja;.  
Verses 35-38 are, in contrast to vv. 25-34, most definitely not rhetorically dull. Here 
the text engages with the addressee(s) again and the whole text is either second 
person singular or plural (v. 38, in italics). It starts with the “case-scenario” of your ja; 
becoming poor and then it continues to engage the reader. We find no “distancing” 
as in the previous text, no reader who becomes a spectator, but instead the 
reader/hearer is constantly addressed. Singular forms dominate the first three 
verses.  
Table 4.6 
*yjia; &Wmy:Aykiw“  35 
&M;[i wdoy: hf;m;W  
bv;wtow“ rG´ wBo T;q]zæj>h,w“  
.&M;[i yj'w:  
tyBir]t'w“ &v,n< wToaime jQ'TiAla' 36 
*yh,løa>me t;arey:w“  
.&M;[i *yjia; yjew“  
&v,n<B] wlø @TetiAalø *P]s]K'Ata, 37 
*l,k]a; @TetiAalø tyBir]m'b]W  
!k,yheløa> hw:hy“ ynIa} 38 
!yIr;x]mi $r,a,me !k,t]a, ytiaxewhoArv,a} 
@['n"K] $r,a,Ata, !k,l; ttel;   
                                                                                                                                            
happy that Jer 32 could be regarded as such and concludes (Grünwaldt 1999: 323) that “Lev 25,26f ist also 
eine alte Bestimmung in jungem Gewand.” Unfortunately Grünwaldt does not ask what happens to the 
land after it has been sold as Kessler (1992), for instance, did. For a somewhat different reading, see also 
Carroll (1991: 108-124). Carroll claims that this must be a field that originally belonged to Jeremiah. This 
is why Hanamel says that he has the “right of redemption” (v. 7), otherwise Carroll (1991: 112-113) 
argues, Hanamel would have received the land from his father Shallum. Yet, this does not really make 
sense, because the text is quite clear that Hanamel is the owner and not his father. He calls it “my land” 
twice (vv. 7-8). It seems more likely that Hanamel was in financial trouble and that Jeremiah was simply 
the closest relative.  
22 The oldest redactional layer of the Holiness Code, which Elliger (1966a: 16) calls “Ph1”, consists in 
chapter 25 of vv. 1-6aa.8-19.23-31.35-41a.43.44a.46bb.47abab.48.49b.50a.54f. Yet, this redactor did use 
sources (Quellen) of which Elliger (1966a: 347) regards vv. 25-31* as the oldest:  
Dann bleiben als älteste literarische Schicht nur die Bestimmungen 25-31† über Auslöse- und 
Rückfallrecht übrig, die schwerlich jemals ein selbständiges Gesetz gebildet haben, sondern aus einem 
größeren Korpus herübergenommen sein dürften.  
23 The “first layer” that Cholewinski (1976: 101) identifies consists of vv. 25b-31.48-53a.54. These are all 
mostly concerned with the hL;auG“ institution. The second layer that incorporated these verses was then 
characterised by the second person singular forms (Cholewinski 1976: 102).  
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  s  .!yhiløale !k,l; twyúh]li 
Verses 35 and 36 create the impression that a close relationship should exist 
between the addressee and his ja;. Three times we find &M;[i (underlined above) in 
these three verses. Van der Merwe et al (1999: 293) identify three different groups of 
functions. The first example above (v. 35) would probably fit their second, “indicates 
the direction of an action.” The ja; thus stretches his hand out to the person 
addressed. The other two examples could, however, fit into either of the other two 
functions that they identify. The first one is, for instance, about “the joining together of 
entities” with a sub-function “indicates accompaniment.” This could be the case here, 
that the ja; and the person addressed are joined together in the sense that the ja; will 
accompany the addressee. Yet the third function could also be applicable because 
this is about “spatial positioning” with a sub-function indicating “proximity to.” One 
could understand these two examples as something similar, the ja; will simply live in 
“your” proximity, but in both cases the lot of the ja; is clearly interwoven with the fate 
of the addressee and that actually seems to be the point that the text is trying to 
make.  
Furthermore, v. 35 stands out because we find the terms rG´ and bv;/T again. They 
have been absent since v. 23 where they were used in the plural. Now it seems that 
the addressee is asked to treat his ja; like24 he would treat a rG´ and a bv;/T living with 
him. It seems that this is meant to be a good thing, something recommendable 
treating your brother as you would treat a rG´ or a bv;/T and we are reminded of 
Leviticus 19 where you are to treat a rG´ like yourself (*/mK;). We are also reminded of 
v. 23 where YHWH said that the addressees are !yriG´ and !ybiv;wTo with him, although 
we probably have different uses of these concepts. Previously (v. 23), we thought 
that it expressed a negative relation focusing on how unpredictable the relationship 
between YHWH and the addressees is. Now, however, it appears much more 
positive.  
But the real message that this text seems to get across is one concerned with 
interest as we find in the first clause of v. 36 and the whole of v. 37. Three terms are 
used namely tyBir]T' and &v,n< in (v. 36) with &v,n< again in v. 37, but now along with 
tyBir]m' (v. 37). They all seem to be conveying the same thing, and the persuasive 
density of their presentation is striking. The first clause in v. 36 that prohibits the 
                                                 
24 There can be no doubt that this phrase (bv;wtow“ rG´ wBo T;q]zæj>h,w“) in v. 35 is highly problematic. A very good 
summary of the problem is provided by Grünwaldt (1999: 101-102) who summarises the views of many 
scholars like Baentsch, Bertholet and Elliger and then offers a view himself that is similar to the LXX 
where it is translated, “like a rG´ and a bv;/T.” But he still concludes with Bertholet (1901: 92) that however 
we argue, it will never be anything more than “eine Ausflucht zur Konjektur.”  
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charging of tyBir]T' and &v,n< is followed by the second occurrence of *yh,løa>me t;arey:w“ 
which we had in v. 17, also following a prohibition there. Then there is the chiastic 
structure in v. 37, which is different from similar ones that we had before (see Table 
3.31). Thus, vv. 35-37 really target the addressee and once again one could argue, 
the one with the power. In vv. 3-5 the land-owner was targeted and in vv. 15-16 it 
was the turn of the person who was buying land and now it is the person who helps 
his brother. What all of these addressees have in common is that they have the 
power to execute these laws or not.  
In v. 38 the text changes to second person plural and we have the most extensive 
presentation of YHWH until now. Verse 38 will be discussed under “motivation” 
below, but for the time being we could just say that the “collective of landowners” is 
addressed again. We also find two examples of !k,l; again where the addressees are 
presented as beneficiaries. Now, it is specifically YHWH that presents himself as 
doing something to the benefit of the addressees. One of the things that he will be 
doing is to give to them the “land of Canaan.” This reminds us of v. 2abg and it shows 
again that the addressees are those who in the eyes of the authors had legal claims 
to the land. 
4.2.6 Verses 39-46, the db,[, issue 
Most of the text below is addressed to the second person, either singular, or plural (in 
italics), but there are some clauses (see underlined) in vv. 41-42 where the third 
person is used.  
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Table 4.7 
&M;[i *yjia; &Wmy:Aykiw“ 39 
&l;ArK'm]nIw“  
.db,[; td'bo[} wBo dbo[}t'Aalø 
&M;[i hy<h]yI bv;wtoK] rykic;K] 40 
&M;[i dbo[}y" lbeYúh' tn"v]Ad['  
wMo[i wyn:b;W aWh &M;[ime ax;y:w“ 41 
wToj]P'v]miAla, bv;w“   
.bWvy: wyt;boa} tZæjua}Ala,w“ 
!he yd'b;[}AyKi 42 
!yIr;x]mi $r,a,me !t;ao ytiaxewhoArv,a}  
.db,[; tr,K,m]mi Wrk]M;yI alø 
&r,p;B] wbo hD,r]tiAalø 43 
.*yh,løa>me t;arey:w“ 
&l;AWyh]yI rv,a} *t]m;a}w" *D]b]['w“ 44 
.hm;a;w“ db,[, Wnq]Ti !h,me !k,yteboybis] rv,a} !yIwGOh' taeme  
 Wnq]Ti !h,me !k,M;[i !yriG:h' !ybiv;wToh' ynEB]mi !gæw“ 45 
!k,x]r]a'B] Wdyliwho rv,a} !k,M;[i rv,a} !T;j]P'v]MimiW 
.hZ…jua}l' !k,l; Wyh;w“ 
!k,yrej}a' !k,ynEb]li !t;ao !T,l]j}n"t]hiw“ 46 
!l;[ol] hZ…jua} tv,r,l;   
Wdbo[}T' !h,B; 
  s  .&r,p;B] wbo hD,r]tiAalø wyjia;B] vyai laer;c]yIAynEB] !k,yjea'b]W 
The first two and a half verses (vv. 39-41a) preceding the change to third person 
forms are reminiscent of the preceding text with four occurrences of &M;[i (underlined 
above), over against only three above. The ja; in trouble and the addressee are thus 
once again portrayed as having interdependent fates. The position of the ja; 
becomes more precarious though, because he is not only asking for help, but he is 
actually sold to the addressee. The point now seems to be that he should not be 
treated like an db,[,  but that he should be like a rykic; and a bv;/T with the addressee. 
This state of affairs is only to last until the next Jubilee, when he will go out (vv. 40b 
and 41a). Then in v. 41b we find that the text changes to the third person again, but 
the change seems more natural now. It is simply as if the paths of the addressee and 
the ja; will diverge and that he is to go his own way. The interdependence is thus 
gone now and that is why he is spoken of, because he is not present anymore. It 
does have a “distancing” effect similar to what we had in v. 25, but it is not that abrupt 
as above. 
This change to third person in v. 41 is also represented with another chiastic 
structure which involves the verb bwv and which is similar to the one we had in v. 10, 
although there the verbs were in the second person plural and now it is third person 
singular. In v. 42 we find another motivational clause where some more information 
on YHWH is offered (which will be discussed in the next section). In v. 42b the text 
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stays with the third person plural stating that “they” will not be sold as slaves, but in v. 
43 it moves back to the second person singular with a prohibition not to mistreat 
“him”, but rather to fear your God (again *yh,løa>me t;arey:w“).  
This brings us to vv. 44-46 which seem to be answering another question that the 
reader might have been thinking namely, from where will he then acquire an db,[, or 
an hm;a;? The text that follows is rather confusing and in the previous chapter I’ve 
described it as one seemingly “big pendens construction” with the db,[, and hm;a; often 
returning in different guises.25 The first clause is in the second person singular and 
then it changes to plural again. I understand this first clause as some kind of 
“heading” meaning something like, “with regards to your db,[, and your hm;a;…” The 
last time we had this formulation of “your db,[,” and “your hm;a;” was back in v. 6 and 
there it was followed by “your rykic;” and “your bv;/T who is sojourning.” Now it is not 
immediately followed by that (and rykic; never actually appears here), but instead 
many options are presented from whom the addressees are allowed to take an db,[, 
and an hm;a;. I would like to present this text as follows: 
Table 4.8 
&l;AWyh]yI rv,a} *t]m;a}w" *D]b]['w“ 44 
 
.hm;a;w“ db,[, Wnq]Ti !h,me !k,yteboybis] rv,a} !yIwGOh' taeme  
 Wnq]Ti !h,me !k,M;[i !yriG:h' !ybiv;wToh' ynEB]mi !gæw“ 45 
!k,x]r]a'B] Wdyliwho rv,a} !k,M;[i rv,a} !T;j]P'v]MimiW 
.hZ…jua}l' !k,l; Wyh;w“ 
!l;[ol] hZ…jua} tv,r,l; !k,yrej}a' !k,ynEb]li !t;ao !T,l]j}n"t]hiw“ 46 
Wdbo[}T' !h,B; 
  s  .&r,p;B] wbo hD,r]tiAalø wyjia;B] vyai laer;c]yIAynEB] !k,yjea'b]W 
This text does not appear to “belong” with the neat texts that we had up to now. The 
clauses are longer and it is really difficult to divide them into clauses in the first place. 
Most of the lines following my “heading” in the table above start with a waw, but not 
all of them. Some also start with a @mi, which should not come as a surprise, since it is 
concerned with groups of people from which the addressees are allowed to take an 
db,[, or an hm;a; (see Van der Merwe et al 1999: 288). But who are these groups? 
                                                 
25 Elliger (1966a: 341-342) has argued here that originally the text only consisted of the first and the last 
clause in Table 4.8 and thus: &l;AWyh]yI rv,a} *t]m;a}w" *D]b]['w“ and &r,p;B] wbo hD,r]tiAalø. We thus find no more 
reference to these verses that have caused so many ethical problems. My problem with this reconstruction 
is that it introduces other tensions. I thought that the point of vv. 39-43 was that you may not treat your ja; 
as a slave and that you may not treat him harshly. We thus do not have any real slaves in the preceding 
verses. This sudden reference to “your db,[,” and “your hm;a;” would thus not make sense since they have 
not been mentioned. It will only make sense if it is followed by reference to who they might be, or from 
where the addressee will be allowed to acquire them.   
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The first group mentioned is the “!yIwGO living around you.” This is the fourth occurrence 
of this term in the Holiness Code (and Leviticus). The previous examples were in 
Leviticus 18:24, 28 and 20:23 where they were always the “evil” predecessors in the 
land. These nations are never named, but they are just part of the “evil others” and 
have now become the “exploitable others.” It thus does not come as such a big 
surprise since the y/G did not exactly get “good press” until now in the Holiness Code.  
The second group comes as a surprise for they are the “sons of the !ybiv;wTo who are 
sojourning with you.” This second group is introduced by means of a !G" of which Van 
der Merwe et al (1999: 315) identify the following as their first “semantic-pragmatic” 
function:  
Speakers or writers give an explicit indication to their audience that a specific 
something or someone must be added to something or someone referred to in 
the preceding context: also, even, moreover, even more so. 
This thus shows that we have at least two different groups from whom slaves may be 
taken, namely the y/G and now the “sons of the !ybiv;wTo.” Note also that !k,M;[i is used 
which was previously used to express the close relationship and interdependence 
between addressee and ja;-in-trouble (vv. 35-36 and 39-40), although it is now 
addressed to the plural. There this portrayal of “closeness” seemed to motivate the 
addressee (sing.) not to mistreat his ja;-in-trouble, but now it is used in a context of 
exploitation. We should remind ourselves of the use of rG´ and bv;/T in v. 35 and the 
use of rykic; and bv;/T in v. 40. There the addressee was asked to treat his ja;-in-
trouble like these people and it seemed to be a good thing, but now it changes. How 
then is one supposed to treat the rG´, or the bv;/T, or the rykic;? Up there it seemed 
that the answer must have been something like, “decently” or “humanely”, but now 
the answer is, “use them as slaves.” This really introduces a “tension”26 into the text, 
                                                 
26 Grünwaldt (1999: 109-111) also identifies a tension in the text, but it is somewhat different from mine. He 
still thinks that the main problem is that vv. 44b-46a.ba digress from the main topic. Verses 39-41 are a 
prohibition of the oppression of a fellow Israelite who are in debt. This is theologically grounded in v. 42 
and is further reiterated by an admonition to fear God in v. 43. Until now everything is said that could be 
said about a poor brother in debt and it is nicely concluded with v. 43 (*yh,løa>me t;arey:w“ like for instance in 
v.17). But then “suddenly” in vv. 44-46 the topic changes to buying foreign slaves and therefore 
Grünwaldt calls this an excursus. He (1999: 111-112) also thinks that this text was added for pragmatical 
reasons to defend something that was part of the reality of Isrealite life. These are thus his grounds for 
regarding vv. 44-46 as a later addition. The biggest problem with this argumentation is whether these 
verses really digress from the “topic”? If the issue was that you cannot enslave your ja;, would it not have 
been expected that the text should also address whom one then could enslave? Could we not argue that this 
might have been a lingering concern in the minds of the addressees and that this would be an ideal place to 
treat this issue? We had a previous example in vv. 20-22 where the text did address possible concerns that 
the addressees might have had.  
 The point is just that Grünwaldt’s argument is not that “water-tight” (not that any argument ever is), but 
still we must acknowledge that these two verses do create further “tensions” or “inconsistencies” in the text 
as I have also pointed out above.  
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because above the lot of one of these groups did not seem bad. Yet now it seems 
like the worst that could happen, because the rG´ and the bv;/T (we do not know about 
the rykic;) can all at some stage become an db,[,  or for that matter an hm;a;.  
This status is also applied to the hj;P;v]mi of these groups and to children that were 
born in the land and again we find !k,M;[i. They are to be an hZ…jua} that can be inherited 
from generation to generation of the addressees. Up till now hZ…jua} has only been 
used with regards to land, but now it is applied to people. Once again we find !k,l; 
expressing benefit to the addressees.  
Referring to the “sons of Israel” for the third time in this text, v. 46 concludes by 
equating them with “your brothers.” This is followed by a clause that uses a second 
person singular verb and is an exact repetition of the first clause of v. 43, calling on 
the addressees not to treat their brothers harshly. This looks like another inclusio (as 
indicated in the table above).  
The one issue that I’ve not discussed with regards to vv. 44-46 is address. The larger 
part of the text is second person plural. The “heading” that I identified above in v. 44a 
was still addressed to the singular, but after that the text changed to the plural. The 
last clause of v. 46 is a mix of singular and plural forms, but it concludes with the 
singular. Thus in between these two singular texts, the community of landowners is 
addressed again and the authors once again need a “group-effort” from the 
addressees. But why this change now? Now, that the text turns to what for the 
modern reader sounds like terrible exploitation? Do we now acquire a better glimpse 
of how this community understood themselves over against other possible groups in 
that society? That the “collective psyche” of the group addressed enables them to 
draw boundaries between them and those regarded as not part of them?  
A striking feature of the text is that we suddenly find reference to “your land” (!k,x]r]a') 
in v. 45. This only occurs 12 times in the whole Holiness Code of which six are found 
in Leviticus 26.27 In chapter 25 we had this usage in v. 9 when the rp;wvo were to go 
through “your land” on the Day of Atonement. Now it leaves the impression that the 
addressees are reminded that these people, whom they may enslave, are born in the 
land of the addressees, implying that it is not their land, but yours. It reinforces what 
I’ve been arguing up to now, that the people addressed are those who in the view of 
the authors had legal claims to land. They are to protect each other, when they are in 
trouble and then they refer to each as either an tymi[; or an ja;, but all of them have 
claims to land. They are thus the only ones that can “return” to either hZ…jua} or hj;P;v]mi. 
All the other groups like a rG´, a bv;/T, a rykic; and obviously the db,[, and the hm;a; are 
                                                 
27 These include Leviticus 19:9, 33; 22:24; 23:22; 25:9, 45 and 26: 1, 5, 6, 19, 20 and 33. 
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not entitled to land. To these groups the !yIwGO are now added who are an even more 
distant group living in the surrounding areas of the addressees (!k,yteboybis]). These 
groups (excluding the y/G) may at times function as an example of how an addressee 
should treat an ja;-in-trouble, which then usually means “decently” or “humanely” as 
we saw above in vv. 35-37 and 39-41. Yet, apart from that and from sharing in the 
left-overs in the Sabbath year, they could be exploited, because they, after-all, had 
no legal claim to owning land. This state of affairs apparently did not stop the !yriG ´
from actually obtaining land and becoming rich at times as we see in the next case.  
4.2.7 Verses 47-55, The problem of a rich rG´ 
Table 4.9 
&M;[i bv;wtow“ rG´ dy" gyCit' ykiw“  47 
wMo[i *yjia; &m;W  
.rG´ tj'P'v]mi rq,[el] wao &M;[i bv;wTo rg´l] rK'm]nIw“ 
 rK'm]nI yrej}a' 48 
wLøAhy<h]Ti hL;auG“ 
.WNl,a;g“yI wyj;a,me dj;a, 
WNl,a;g“yI wdoDoA@b, wao wdodoAwao 49 
WNl,a;g“yI wToj]P'v]Mimi wroc;B] raeV]miAwao   
wdoy: hg…yCihiAwao 
.la;g“nIw“  
lbeYúh' tn"v] d[' wlø wrok]M;hi tn"V]mi WhnEqoA![i bV'jiw“ 50 
!ynIv; rP's]miB] wroK;m]mi #s,K, hy:h;w“ 
.wMo[i hy<h]yI rykic; ymeyKi  
wton:q]mi #s,K,mi wtoL;auG“ byviy: @h,ypil] !ynIV;B' twBor' dw[oA!ai 51 
lbeYúh' tn"v]Ad[' !ynIV;B' ra'v]nI f['m]A!aiw“ 52 
wyn:v; ypiK] wløAbV'jiw“  
.wtoL;auG“Ata, byviy: 
wMo[i hy<h]yI hn:v;B] hn:v; rykic]Ki 53 
.*yn<y[el] &r,p,B] WND,r]yIAalø  
hL,aeB] laeG:yI aløA!aiw“ 54 
.wMo[i wyn:b;W aWh lbeYúh' tn"v]Bi ax;y:w“ 
!ydib;[} laer;c]yIAynEb] yliAyKi 55 
!he yd'b;[} 
!yIr;x]mi $r,a,me !t;wao ytiaxewhoArv,a}  
.!k,yheløa> hw:hy“ ynIa}
This last case of the ja; getting in trouble and ending up with either a bv;/T or rG´ is 
especially reminiscent of the first case that we had (vv. 25-34) and this is mainly 
because of two characteristics that these cases have in common. The first is that the 
root lag dominates both cases. In the first case we had ten occurrences and now we 
have eight. The only other occurrence of the root is in v. 24. The other characteristic 
is that this case, like the first one, is mostly in the third person and once again it 
seems as if the ja;-in-trouble is distanced from the addressee. Verse 47 is still full of 
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pronominal suffixes addressing the second person singular, thus the rG´ and bv;/T 
become rich “with you” (&M;[i), but then “your ja;” becomes poor “with him” (wMo[i). This 
might have been the bothersome aspect here, that the ja; has ended up with the rG´ 
and the bv;/T, but luckily the latter was still “with you”, as it is once again expressed 
in the third clause of v. 47. That I suppose was the point that the addressee had 
some kind of “control” over the rG´ and the bv;/T, or the text at least attempts to claim 
this.  
Still the reality is accepted that the ja; will end up with the rG´ and the bv;/T and then 
vv. 48 and 49 spell out the contingency plan in this event. The ja; is distanced again 
and one is tempted to ask why the addressee is not encouraged to redeem his 
brother? But once again it is the redeemer who steals the show while the previous 
addressee becomes a spectator again. Yet now (as opposed to v. 25) we are 
provided with more detailed examples of who the redeemer might be; one of his 
brothers, an uncle or a cousin, or some other related person from his hj;P;v]mi, or he 
himself eventually.  
Verses 50-52 are concerned with calculating the redeeming price, and here as with 
the land in vv. 27-28, or vv. 15-16 the price is determined by calculating how many 
years are left until the Jubilee. In v. 53 it is reiterated that the person in trouble would 
be like a rykic; with the rG´ and the bv;/T. Thus in v. 35 your ja; will be like a rG´ and a 
bv;/T with you when he asks you for help and in v. 40 the brother that is sold to you 
will be like a rykic; or bv;/T with you. But when the same ja;-in-trouble is sold to the rG´ 
or the bv;/T, then he will be like a rykic; with them. Does this mean that he cannot be 
a rG´ or bv;/T with them (as he is with you), because they (i.e. the !yriG´ and !ybiv;wTo) 
are that already? Or, does it mean that rykic; is somewhat higher on the social order? 
Or did the text just run out of appropriate terms to describe all the different categories 
of people? At this stage I would guess that it is more about the rykic; being somewhat 
higher on the social ladder.  
In the second clause of v. 53 the attention of the addressee is demanded again when 
it is said that “they” (I presume the rG´ and bv;/T) will not treat him badly “in your eyes” 
(*yn<y[el]). This gives the impression that the text accepts the fact that the addressee 
will not really redeem his ja;, or should one say that the text does not really ask that 
from the addressee. The redeemer is always somebody else that is spoken of, not 
with, but the real (and only) claim that is made on the addressee is to “check up” on 
the ja; in the hands of the rG´ or the bv;/T and to make sure that he is not treated 
badly. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the following v. 54 concedes 
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that if there is no redeemer, that the ja; will go out in the year of the Jubilee. Verse 
55 provides the last yKi clause of chapter 25 and will be discussed below.  
So, why then the change to third person? Above in vv. 25-28 I argued that the 
change of person might have been because the authors did not regard these laws as 
that “urgent.” By that I meant that the laws might already have been part and parcel 
of the society and the authors could thus save their “rhetorical effects” for some more 
urgent issue. Therefore the laws were in the distanced third person. Then at least we 
had Jeremiah 32 to support the argument, but now it is different. The main problem 
now is that the verb lag is applied to human beings and not to land as in vv. 25-28. It 
seems that there are no other texts in the Bible where people are redeemed in this 
sense.28 There is as usual some diachronic ways out of the problem,29 but to argue 
the same here as I did with regards to vv. 25-28 would be real speculation. It might 
be that in the society which this text was targeting an ja; ending up with a rG´ might 
have been perceived as such a terrible breach of the values of that society that 
redemption would have followed immediately. It is possible, but we have no text to 
support this scenario.  
Another possibility is that I was wrong above with regards to vv. 25-28 that a change 
to third person does not signal “lesser urgency” and then Watts (1999) was wrong as 
well. If, for instance, this means “lesser urgency” why then is the redeemer so clearly 
defined in vv. 48-49? This does not sound like anything of lesser urgency, to the 
contrary. What other possible strategies could then be at work here?  
One possibility is that the concerns are more aesthetic here. We have four blocks of 
casuistic-like law of which the first and fourth are dominated by third person forms 
(apart from the root lag) and the second and third by second person forms. That 
forms another kind of chiastic structure (A B B’ A’). 
Another possibility is provided by the way in which I understood the two third person 
clauses in v. 41 which was also a chiastic parallelism (see 4.2.6 above). There I 
thought that the change was “more natural” in the sense that the paths of the 
addressee and the ja; that was living with him really separated. The ja; was not with 
the addressee anymore and therefore the distancing effect in the text. It might be 
possible to understand the first (vv. 25-34) and the fourth case (vv. 47-55) similarly. 
In the fourth case the ja; falls into the hands of a rG´ or bv;/T and thus somebody 
outside the community and therefore “distant.” In the first case the problem is not 
                                                 
28 Stamm (1971: 386) mentions that the verb lag is only used in the OT “beim Grundbesitz und bei der 
Blutrache.” See also Grünwaldt (1999: 343).  
29 For Cholewinski the fact that this text is in the third person meant that it must have been older similar to 
vv. 25-34 (1976: 101-102). Grünwaldt (1999: 331-333) argues that the text is the creation of the author 
from the previous parts of chapter 25. 
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really the ja; himself, but instead his hZ…jua}. It is thus not about people, but about 
things and therefore this “distancing style.” In the second (vv. 35-38) and the third 
(vv. 39-45) case the text is concerned with people, with the ja; ending up with the 
addressee(s) and therefore we have a more immediate second person style. Add to 
that the many examples of &M;[i and it seems like a viable explanation.  
To conclude, my description of “address” in this chapter I must admit that I cannot 
clearly describe the possible rhetorical effect that the change from second to third 
person might have had. Above I presented at least three possibilities. The first one 
was that the third person texts had “lesser urgency”, which was something suggested 
by Watts. I do not think that one can convincingly argue that, at least not with regards 
to the fourth case (i.e. vv. 47-55) in chapter 25. I then offered at least two more 
possibilities which do not necessarily exclude each other, but which seem more 
plausible. Yet all three of them are speculation, but it might very well be that all three 
have some element of truth in them.   
When it comes to the change from plural to singular within second person forms, I 
think that my explanations are more convincing. They all pointed to the fact that the 
text is power-conscious in the sense that it zooms in on those people who really have 
the power to make a difference. I also stand by my deductions that the addressees of 
this text are those that have legal claims to the land. “Legal” means valid in the eyes 
of the authors, but let us now turn to an issue that I think is slightly easier to describe.  
4.3 Motivation 
In his discussion of “motivation” Watts (1999: 65-67) accentuates that motivational 
clauses play an important role in connecting story and list with each other. He 
describes it as follows (Watts 1999: 67): 
Motive clauses thus contribute to the Pentateuch’s rhetoric of persuasion not 
only by explaining the laws, but also by tying story and list more closely together. 
They reinforce on a small scale the effect of the larger rhetorical structure that 
presents the torah of God in both narrative and law.  
It thus means that sometimes when we have a yKi-clause it is probably referring to the 
larger narrative. A very good example from the Holiness Code that has received 
plenty of attention is the so-called “I am YHWH” phrase that we find 45 times in 
Leviticus 17-26 (Watts 1999: 67). It occurs for the first time in 18:2 and from the 
outset it is connected with Egypt and thus the larger Exodus narrative and as we will 
shortly see that is often the case in chapter 25 as well. But first we need to agree on 
some kind of definition of what “motivation” entails. One question (that we partly 
addressed above) is whether “motivation” needs a “motivational yKi”?  
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In a study on “motive clauses in Hebrew law” Sonsino (1980: 70-76) provides a 
thorough discussion on the possible form of Hebrew motive clauses. Apart from the 
usage of grammatical particles (of which yKi is the foremost), he acknowledges that it 
can also be formulated asyndetically “simply juxtaposing the main clause and the 
causal clause” (Sonsino 1980: 74). This will help us to treat some clauses without the 
particle yKi as functioning similarly to those with the particle yKi or as he puts it (1980: 
74): 
The possibility of indicating logical subordination by means of unconnected 
grammatical coordination makes it possible to identify many circumstantial 
clauses which are formulated asyndetically as legal motive clauses.  
Eventually Sonsino (1980: 247-248) identifies nine motive clauses in Leviticus 25 of 
which eight (vv. 12, 16, 23 [x2], 33, 34, 42 and 55) are introduced by means of a yKi 
and one is not (v. 38). We will pay closer attention to these examples below. Yet, in 
one regard will I digress from what Sonsino did and that concerns parenetic 
statements. He does not treat parenetic texts along with motivation and he contrasts 
the two as follows in terms of purpose (1) and form (2) (Sonsino 1980: 68-69): 
(1) The primary object of a parenetic statement is to summon people to 
obedience. This is achieved by means of appeals formulated in broad terms 
such as those mentioned previously. The main purpose of a motive clause, 
however, is to provide a raison d’être for the law, to justify the appropriateness of 
the particular legal prescription, to show that the law is just because of the 
specific reason or purpose formulated therein. Here the element of exhortation is 
only secondary and implicit, inasmuch as a law that proves to be just may be 
expected to receive assent. Motive clauses do not embody direct appeals of 
general import, nor exhortations couched in broad indefinite terminology. Quite 
the contrary, they tend to be specific, pertaining closely to the law at hand.  
In terms of form Sonsino (1980: 69) argues that “a parenetic statement frequently 
appears as an independent unit even when it is connected with a given law.” This 
parenetic statement might even contain “its own motive clause.” A motive clause on 
the other hand “is never an independent entity; in fact, it always constitutes a 
subordinate clause or phrase.” In what follows I will discuss both the motivational 
clauses and the one parenetic text together, simply because I think that to “summon 
people to obey” and to provide a reason for a particular law could both be regarded 
as kinds of persuasion. I am not that convinced either that motive clauses are always 
that independent, neither that it is always connected to some or other clause.30 In any 
case, as we will see below the parenetic text in Leviticus 25 is closely connected to a 
motivational yKi-clause.  
                                                 
30 See my discussion in Meyer (2001: 39-42).  
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4.3.1 Motivation in Leviticus 25 
4.3.1.1 Motivation by means of repetition 
The first yKi-clause in Leviticus 25 is found in v. 12 which is (as discussed in the 
previous chapter) the third of three nominal clauses that we find in vv. 10-12. These 
three are thus unique to the laws on the Jubilee and only the third example is 
introduced by means of a yKi. One problem with the clause, 
!k,l; hy<h]Ti vd,qo awhi lbewyú yKi is that it is not that clear whether it is one or two nominal 
clauses. Thus, it is not that clear whether the “holy it shall be for you”-part is actually 
part of the motivational clause.31 We have already compared the three clauses with 
each other and it seemed as if they are building on each other, each “extending” the 
previous example by adding something new. What is important though is to realise 
that this clause; whether we regard it as two or one does not matter; does not really 
add “something new” to the text. It just says what has been said up to now. It is the 
third occurrence of awhi lbewy and the vd,qo is not that new either, since it was already 
stated in v. 10 that the addressees must “consecrate (Pi of vdq) the year of the 
fiftieth.” It thus uses elements that were there already, puts them together and uses 
that as motivation for the three directives preceding it. It is thus something like “do 
not do this, because we simply do not do things like that.” For a modern person it 
would not really answer the question of “why not”, by just answering with “this is how 
it is done.”  
The second yKi clause that we find in v. 16 is similar. It just repeats something that 
was already mentioned in the preceding text. This text (vv. 14-17) is about not 
“cheating” your tymi[; when buying and selling. We already said that the text then 
mainly focuses on the person buying who, after-all, probably has the most power and 
who is not in a vulnerable position. The first two clauses of v. 15 already state the 
basic principle that land is not sold but the amount of harvests left to the Jubilee. The 
yKi clause in v. 16 then just states this again and is nearly a word-for-word repetition 
of the second clause of v. 15 as the following table shows:  
Table 4.10 
&l;ArK;m]yI taoWbt]AynEv] rP's]miB]  15b 
 
&l; rkemo aWh taoWbT] rP's]mi yKi  16b 
Thus the situation is similar as above, nothing new is introduced, but we just find a 
repetition of former elements that has to serve as motivation. The two yKi clauses in 
                                                 
31 Sonsino (1980: 247), for instance, only regards awhi lbewyú yKi as a motivational clause and so does Bandstra 
(1982: 242).  
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vv. 33 and 34 referring to the Levitical houses in cities are further examples of this 
kind of motivation. Verse 32 already contains most of the elements that is only 
repeated again in the yKi clauses in vv. 33 and 34.  
This kind of motivation changes when we look at the other motivational clauses in 
this chapter. Now we have YHWH entering the discussion. 
4.3.1.2 Motivation by means of the divine 
The first example of this kind of motivation takes us to v. 17 which in itself is a real 
mixture of sorts. We mentioned above that the text changes here from second 
person singular to second person plural. Verse 17 is also a transition between the 
casuistic-like laws in vv. 14-16 and the parenetic text that follows (vv. 18-19). The 
first clause of v. 17 (wtoymi[}Ata, vyai Wnwto aløw“) forms an inclusio with the last phrase of 
v. 14 (wyjia;Ata, vyai WnwToAla') around the laws that focus on buying from an tymi[; (see 
table 4.3 above). It probably signals to the hearer that the text will move on to 
another “topic”, but not before the phrase *yh,løa>me t;arey:w“ is added. In the previous 
chapter we already mentioned that Joüon & Muraoka (1991: 641-642) understand 
this phrase (actually the example in v. 43) as “adversative.” One could thus translate 
it with something like “a man will not maltreat his neighbour, but rather fear your God” 
or “…, instead fear your God.” It thus provides alternative behaviour to maltreating an 
tymi[;, as if “fearing God” by definition simply excludes “maltreating” an tymi[;. This is 
also the first time that God is referred to in the text (excluding the introductory part).  
Following this introduction of God we find the next yKi introducing the most famous 
phrase in the Holiness Code. If somebody were thus to ask, “so why should I fear 
God”, then this phrase attempts to provide an answer, although rather sparingly, 
since there is no reference to Egypt or any deeds that YHWH might have done, just a 
claim to be “your God.” This claim is immediately followed by the parenetic part which 
also consists of two inclusios (see table 4.3 above). The first includes a text 
summoning people to do the laws (v. 18a) and the second promises a safe and 
prosperous stay in the land (vv. 18b-19). YHWH is thus not yet identified as the 
liberator from Egypt, but simply as a god who summons the addressees to do his 
bidding and who promises a good stay in the land when this happens. The 
relationship between the two inclusios is also that of command and motivation. The 
first summons or commands and the latter provides a reason why, in the sense of 
providing a positive outcome in the case of compliance. Or one could say offering 
something of the proverbial “carrot before the donkey’s nose.” This is another reason 
why Sonsino’s apparent clear distinction between motive clause and parenetic text is 
not always that clear-cut. 
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The second example of motivation involving YHWH is found in vv. 23-24 or what I 
previously called a “hinge.” Neither the word YHWH nor !yhiløa> occurs, but it is 
obviously YHWH speaking. Verse 23 is preceded by some verses (20-22) referring 
back to the Sabbath laws and now v. 23 itself deviates from that again and the topic 
of land being sold is suddenly on the agenda again. This is reminiscent of vv. 14-17 
where we had lots of buying and selling, although the thing that was sold and bought 
there was never actually called land. Verse 23 states that “the land will not be sold in 
perpetuity” and once again it compliments what was said in vv. 14-17 that only the 
harvests are sold. But now it adds a further motivation and that is that the land is “for 
YHWH” ($r,a;h; yliAyKi) and it thus motivates by referring to the character of the 
relationship between YHWH and land. This clause is then followed by another yKi 
clause now portraying the relation between YHWH and the addressees as !yriG´ and 
!ybiv;wTo. The first sounds like a reason, but the second could be understood as a 
warning addressed to the addressees implying something like “watch out, your 
relationship with the land is rather precarious and could be terminated at any 
moment!” Or, is it just stating a “fact” in the sense that YHWH is the land-owner and 
the addressees are living there under his supervision which implies that they do not 
own the land and they thus cannot sell the land? Now it is not a warning anymore, 
but just a factual statement, because a rG´ or a bv;/T living on somebody else’s land 
usually cannot sell that land. I do not think that we should exclude either possibility, 
the safest is probably to understand it as a combination of these two meanings. 
These two yKi clauses thus directly motivate the preceding law on not selling the land. 
But they also add to the persuasive strategy of the whole chapter, because these 
clauses focus on the relationship between addressees, land and YHWH and provide 
a theological foundation to the chapter that is explored further in the rest of chapter 
25. Verse 24, as I already indicated in the previous chapter, points forward to what 
follows in the second half of Leviticus 25. 
But to sum up, until now YHWH has been presented as a God making demands on 
the addressees to do his bidding and by offering some promises of safe living when 
the addressees were to comply (vv. 17-19). Now (in v. 23) we meet a god who owns 
the land and who does not allow people to sell it. It is not that clear yet on what 
grounds he makes all these claims, but this changes when we reach v. 38.  
Verse 38 is the example of the motivational clause without a yKi that Sonsino (1980: 
247) identified, who then regards the whole verse as one motivational clause. It is 
specifically stated that YHWH brought the addressees out of Egypt, of which this is 
the first reference in chapter 25, with two purposes in mind namely “to give the land 
of Canaan” and “to be your God.” Thus, once again we are back with the relationship 
between land, YHWH and addressees as in v. 23. Yet now the land is not “for 
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YHWH”, but instead we are reminded of v. 2ag where YHWH is about to give (@tn) 
the land to the addressees. The first l] here thus expresses something being 
transferred. The second l] expresses in a sense also something given or presented, 
or to use our previous concept, “presenting benefit” would be applicable again. The 
addressees are benefiting again, they acquire land, and they gain a god and they 
have already received liberation from Egypt. Thus, for the first time in this chapter the 
“Egypt-card” is used. It is as if it has been spared for this late moment in chapter 25, 
but now we will see that it is used in every remaining case.  
Furthermore, I do not think that v. 38 is specifically just motivating the preceding 
clause. We saw that v. 37 was also a parallelistic chiasm, which I understand as 
concluding the whole preceding text (vv. 35-36). Verse 37 is also a repetition of what 
was prohibited in the first clause of v. 36 which was followed by the “fear your God” 
clause. Verse 37, thus presents the “gist” of the preceding verses in this highly 
persuasive structure. I take this to mean that v. 38 should be seen as providing a 
motivation to the whole sub-section (vv. 35-38) and not just one specific clause. The 
next motivational clause also shares this feature.  
Verse 42 follows a chiastic parallelism that we find in v. 41. The difference is that 
both these verses (41 and 42) are not directed at the addressees anymore, but are 
both in the third person. Previously (v. 23) the addressees were called !ybiv;wTo and 
!yriG´ before YHWH, but now it seems as if they are demoted further because now 
they are called !ydib;[}. Yet, it is actually not the addressees that are called !ydib;[}, but 
instead the third person plural pronoun is used. The yKi clause is followed by another 
reference to the fact that YHWH brought them out of Egypt. This clause is in the third 
person plural whereas the previous example (v. 38) was second person plural: 
Table 4.11 
!k,yheløa> hw:hy“ ynIa} 38 
!yIr;x]mi $r,a,me !k,t]a, ytiaxewhoArv,a} 
!he yd'b;[}AyKi 42 
!yIr;x]mi $r,a,me !t;ao ytiaxewhoArv,a} 
In both cases we have rv,a}-clauses and the only difference between the two is that 
the second one has “them” as object and the first one “you.” The two rv,a}-clauses 
differ in one other sense and that is that the first one is telling us more about YHWH 
himself. It follows the famous phrase of the Holiness Code, !k,yheløa> hw:hy“ ynIa}. The 
second rv,a}-clause is not about YHWH, but instead about the !ydib;[}. The question is 
why it was not written “you are my !ydib;[}”, but instead “they are my !ydib;[}”? Did the 
author stick to the third person, because he was following the chiastic structure which 
was third person, or was it more a case of not trying to offend the addressees? 
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Would they have been offended if they were called !ydib;[} of YHWH? Or, to put it 
differently, who are the “they”? From this text it seems that it refers to the brother in 
trouble, not to the addressees. So, the brother in trouble is an db,[, of YHWH, but the 
addressees are only !yriG´ and !ybiv;wTo before him. Is this a “higher social class” or is 
something else going on here? The plot thickens when we turn to the next yKi clause 
in v. 55.  
Verse 55 is partly a repetition of v. 42 (!he yd'b;[}), but now we find another specific 
reference to the sons of Israel and as the land in v. 23 is “for YHWH” they now are 
“!ydib;[} for YHWH” (by means of l]). It is important to note that this theological 
motivation is once again referring to “them” not “you.” This is also only the third time 
that we have the “sons of Israel” in chapter 25. We had them in the introduction and 
then again in v. 33 where the issue of hZ…jua} amongst Levites was discussed. Are the 
“sons of Israel” thus those in trouble while the addressees are those with more power 
and money? When we only consider v. 55 it seems so, but when we consider vv. 1-
2aa where Moses is ordered to address all the “sons of Israel”, this impression 
changes since it means that all the addressees were included as “sons of Israel.” It 
appears more probable that the “sons of Israel” include the persons with power (the 
“you” singular) and the other addressees (addressed by the “you” plural) who seem 
to have less power, but also the ja; and tymi[; who are in definite financial trouble. 
Still, it only includes people with legal claims to land.  
To sum up, the motivational clauses involving YHWH introduce one of the 
fundamental issues in this text and that is the relationship between YHWH, the 
addressees, the ja; in trouble and the $r,a,. This relationship is based on YHWH’s 
claim that he brought the addressees and the “sons of Israel” from Egypt.  
4.4 Repetition and variation 
Watts (1999: 68-84) discusses repetition and variation under two different headings 
and he, of course, is more interested in these phenomena in the whole Pentateuch 
and focuses on a much “larger scale” than what I will attempt below. He does make 
some valuable remarks though, for instance that repetition “is a prominent feature of 
public speech, used to emphasize important points and make the contents 
memorable” (Watts 1999: 70). Or, that “repetition of individual commandments 
obviously enhances their mnemonic force, but it also serves to emphasize certain 
themes” (Watts 1999: 71). He also acknowledges that repetition and variety are often 
intertwined with each other (Watts 1999: 73-74): 
Variety preserves interest and attention in publicly read law, as it does in 
narrative. Israel’s tradition of public reading can be expected to have encouraged 
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variety for rhetorical effect even, perhaps especially, in the midst of didactic 
repetition.  
The repetition that he then focuses on has more to do with the relationship between 
the different law codes of the Pentateuch as a whole (see Watts 1999: 74-84).  
Many of the features of the text that I have identified in this chapter and the previous 
one can all be explained in the light of these two phenomena, repetition and 
variation. For instance, the three nominal clauses that we had in vv. 10-12 (see also 
table 3.12) are good examples:  
Table 4.12 
!k,l; hy<h]Ti awhi lbewyú 
!k,l; hy<h]Ti hn:v; !yVimij}h' tn"v] awhi lbewyú 
!k,l; hy<h]Ti vd,qo awhi lbewyú yKi  
I have indicated the added parts in italics every time, but it is clear that what we had 
in the first clause is always repeated in the following two, yet each time other words 
are added. We also discussed this above under the heading of “motivation by means 
of repetition” and these examples thus seems to be part of the persuasive strategy 
used in this text.  
The introductory clauses of the four cases in the second part of chapter 25 are also 
excellent examples of repetition and variation being combined (see also table 3.21): 
Table 4.13 
*yjia; &Wmy:AyKi 25 
 
*yjia; &Wmy:Aykiw“ 35 
 
&M;[i *yjia; &Wmy:Aykiw“ 39 
 
&M;[i bv;wtow“ rG´ dy" gyCit' ykiw“ 47 
wMo[i *yjia; &m;W 
In this example the function is probably more division than persuasion, but still we 
find the same elements being repeated every time and other elements added. 
Progression is also clearly visible. 
The combination of repetition and variation also played a role in many of the inclusios 
that I identified. Some good examples can be seen in table 4.3 (vv. 14-19) above 
where I identified three inclusios and each time it was by means of a verb (hny, hc[ 
and bvy) being repeated (and sometimes other elements as well), but on each 
occasion we found variation as well.  
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4.4.1 Chiastic parallelism 
Yet the best examples of this combination of repetition and variation were those 
features that I called parallelistic chiasm or at stages chiastic parallelism. Each one of 
these were an example of two clauses following each other, where the meaning was 
more or less repeated (usually by means of the same verbal root), but where the 
syntax was always the other way around, and thus combinations of repetition and 
variation, as the following examples show: 
Table 4.14 
vd,jol' rwco[;B, y[ibiV]h' vd,joB' h[;WrT] rp'wvo T;r]b'[}h'w“  
.!k,x]r]a'Alk;B] rp;wvo Wrybi[}T' !yriPuKih' !wyúB] 
Lev 25:9 
wtoZ…jua}Ala, vyai !T,b]v'w“ 
WbvuT; wToj]P'v]miAla, vyaiw“ 
Lev 25:10bbg 
t[iyviT]h' hn:V;h' d[' @v;y: ha;WbT]h'A@mi !T,l]k'a}w"  
.@v;y: Wlk]aTo Ht;a;WbT] awBoAd[' 
Lev 25:22*32 
wToj]P'v]miAla, bv;w“   
.bWvy: wyt;boa} tZæjua}Ala,w“ 
Lev 25:41b 
These are all examples of chiasms where the same verbal root is used every time, 
but we had one example where two different roots were used although they were 
doing the same thing in terms of meaning:  
Table 4.15 
yt'QojuAta, !t,yci[}w"   18 
Wrm]v]Ti yf'P;v]miAta,w“ 
Lev 25:18a* 
There were also two examples of chiastic parallelism involving the root hyh:  
Table 4.16 
.&M;[i !yriG:h' *b]v;wtol]W *r]ykic]liw“  *t,m;a}l'w“ *D]b]['l]W *l] hl;k]a;l] !k,l; $r,a;h; tB'v' ht;y“h;w“  
 s  .lkoa>l, Ht;a;WbT]Alk; hy<h]Ti *x,r]a'B] rv,a} hY:j'l'w“ *T]m]h,b]liw“  
Lev 25:6-7 
wroK;m]mi tn"v] !ToAd[' wtoL;auG“ ht;y“h;w“  
.wtoL;aug“ hy<h]Ti !ymiy:  
Lev 25:29abb 
These kinds of features make sense if these texts were written in order to be read 
aloud. The repetition of the verbal root along with the inverted order would probably 
have been detected by the hearers and must have added to the “aesthetics” of 
hearing the text as well as the persuasive effect. On two occasions (vv. 6-7 and 22) 
they occur at the end of sub-units and in v. 18 at the start of the parenetic part. On 
other occasions they are somewhere in the middle part of the unit (vv. 9, 10 and 41). 
At this stage it is thus not possible to determine a specific function for these features, 
apart from that they contribute to the aesthetics of a text. We should also keep in 
                                                 
32 In cases where my division of clauses does not concur with those of the Masoretes I will add a *. This is 
the case above, because the `atnah is already below the @v;y:.  
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mind that parallelism has always been associated with poetry and not necessarily 
with prose, or as in this case with legal texts.  
Ever since Robert Lowth identified parallelismus memborum two hundred and fifty 
years ago (1753) this term has been applied to Hebrew poetry. What I’ve identified 
above would not always have been classified as that, simply because the definition of 
what a line is, is much stricter in poetry, although that is also a debated issue (see 
Petersen & Richards 1992: 21-35). Recently Firth (2002: 647-656) has argued that 
we do find parallelism in prose and he identifies examples in 1 Sam 5-6. He (Firth 
2002: 648) also argues that “parallelismus memborum is a form of repetition.” Firth 
(2002: 648) continues “if parallelism is a standard literary feature and not a purely 
poetic one, then we should expect to find it within prose texts, and be able to 
describe its form and function.” We could thus say that we have reached his first 
objective of identifying examples of parallelism, be it not within prose texts, but in a 
legal text. Yet we are still some way off his second objective.  
With this latter objective in mind Firth (2002: 650) then argues that parallelism should 
be regarded as a kind of repetition: 
One feature that is immediately apparent in this text is its extensive use of 
repetition, both proximate and remote. It is the proximate repetitions that 
represent parallelism, though these need to be seen within the context of the 
wider use of repetition that is found throughout.  
This observation of him provides further support for treating these chiastic 
parallelisms under a heading concerned with repetition and variation. It is the 
proximity of the repetition that turns it into parallelism. The examples of parallelism or 
proximate repetitions that Firth eventually identifies usually involve a “degree of 
additional information” (2002: 650). Most of the examples are in essence “examples 
of seemingly synonymous parallelism between sentences, but in which the second 
line develops the first along the lines traditionally assigned to synthetic parallelism” 
(2002: 651). Firth (2002: 654) describes the possible functioning of parallelism in a 
narrative as follows:  
Moreover, the function of parallelism within narrative prose is specific to the story 
at hand, and in particular is used to heighten reader interest by introducing 
information that needs clarification through some form of specification.  
I do not really think that one could apply this definition to our examples above. For 
one, I do not think that the second line in our examples really develops the first line 
further and thus provides some form of specification. For instance, if we look at the 
example in v. 9 (see table 4.14), then I cannot see that calling it the “day of 
atonement” instead of “the tenth day of the seventh month” is really that different, or 
more specific. The reader or hearer knows form Leviticus 16:29 and 23:27 that the 
 132
tenth day of the seventh month is the Day of Atonement. Or is hj;P;v]mi more specific 
than hZ…jua} (vv. 10 and 41)? Should they not be read as some kind of pair? Or is it not 
the same to refer to the ninth year and the year when the next harvest will come (v. 
22), since both refer to the same event? Most of these examples look like “six of one 
and half a dozen of the other.” Thus even though I think that Firth’s identified function 
is applicable to the narrative texts that he studies, I do not think that it helps us much.  
For the time being we will thus have to settle to describe them as adding to the 
beauty and aesthetics of the text and in that sense providing some kind of rhetorical 
effect (see also Milgrom 2001: 2162). I will develop my argument further in the next 
chapter with regards to these stylistic devices as something that chapters 25 and 26 
have in common with each other. Yet there is one other feature with regard to these 
parallelisms that we should mention now.  
Two of the examples above (vv. 10 and 41) involve the verbal root bwv. In another 
two, vv. 6-7 and 22, the verbal root lka features. According to Warning (1999: 223) 
the root bwv occurs 11 times in this chapter (vv. 10[x2], 13, 27[x2], 28[x2], 41[x2], 51 
and 52). This is unique to chapter 25 when compared to only two other examples in 
the whole Holiness Code.33 lka occurs 8 times34 in vv. 6, 7, 12, 19, 20, 22[x2] and 
37, but it occurs also fairly frequently in the rest of Leviticus. On the face of it one 
could understand this as to mean that “returning” and “eating” are important concerns 
of the text and then probably of the people to whom it was addressed. Another word 
that is rather unique to chapter 25 (it only occurs five times in Lev 27 and twice in Lev 
14) is hZ…jua}. We find 13 examples in vv. 10, 13, 24, 25, 27, 28, 32, 33[x2], 34, 41, 45 
and 46 (Warning 1999: 182). In five of these cases (vv. 10, 13, 27, 28 and 41) it is, of 
course, used in conjunction with bwv, with two of them being chiasms. The same 
could be said about the term hj;P;v]mi which occurs five times in chapter 25 (vv. 10, 41, 
45, 47 and 49) and only once in the rest of Leviticus (Warning 1999: 208). Two of 
these are used in combination with bwv and are also chiasms.  
If thus repetition “serves to emphasize certain themes” as Watts (1999: 71) argues, 
then one could say that two important themes in this chapter is firstly, returning to 
your hZ…jua} and hj;P;v]mi and secondly to have enough to eat or not to go hungry. The 
former features all through the text and the latter is mainly limited to the first half of 
Leviticus 25 (vv. 1-24) (but is also a great concern in Lev 26).  
                                                 
33 These are, Leviticus 22:13 and 26:26 (Warning 1999: 223). 
34 Warning (1999: 183) misses verse 6.  
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4.5 Conclusion 
In the first and largest part of this chapter where I focused on “address” I attempted 
to argue that there are some aspects of the text that I found “power-conscious.” This 
had to do with the way in which the text often targeted people where it mattered. 
Thus, the law on the Sabbath year addressed the singular land-owning person, but 
the Jubilee was mostly addressed to the plural, making it much more of a group-
effort. Yet I thought that this power-consciousness was at its clearest in vv. 14-17, 
where the text zoomed in on the person who is buying and not the one selling, and 
thus the one with the power. In both vv. 14-17 and the Sabbath year it was the 
person with the power that was directly targeted. The first half of Leviticus 25 was 
characterised by this exchange between second person singular and second person 
plural.  
The text only changed in v. 26 to the third person and my lasting impression of vv. 
25-34 is that it was persuasively the “dullest” part of Leviticus 25. Except for v. 25 
nobody was really addressed and we had what I called a spectator effect. One 
should add to that that it is the only part of Leviticus 25 where YHWH does not 
feature and there is no motivation by means of YHWH. Does this mean that the 
authors did not regard these laws as that important or did not think that they had to 
do that much “persuasion” because it was already part and parcel of the society it 
was aimed at? That was what I thought initially, but I questioned that later on when I 
turned to vv. 47-55. The change from second person to third is still problematic. 
Verses 47-55 were slightly more interesting in the sense that we did find some clause 
aimed at the second person.  
I would think that the most powerful persuasive features of the text has to do with 
what Watts calls “divine sanction”, the way in which YHWH enters the text and 
features in the text. He is mostly presented in a relationship with the land, the 
addressees or the “Israelites.” When YHWH features it is also mostly in connection to 
the larger narrative of the Pentateuch, because he is the God that brought “them” 
and “you” out of Egypt to give them the land. The society from which this text came 
or to whom this text was addressed was really preoccupied with land and one should 
add “returning” to land and with “eating” from land. These concerns with “returning” 
and “eating” must also have been high on the agenda of the society, which produced 
this text.  
4.5.1 Ideological traces 
Having described the persuasive features of the text it should be clear that this in 
itself gave us a glimpse of how the authors and the addressees understood 
themselves. This exercise allowed us to peek into their world-view or ideology. The 
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people addressed in chapter 25 understood themselves in relation to the land, 
YHWH and other groups of people.  
The authors addressed this text to those whom they thought had a legal claim to 
land. This as I have said became clear from analysing “address” in this text. In v.2 it 
is clear that the people addressed are those that are about to receive land from 
YHWH, or then who have received land. The Sabbath year laws are addressed to 
each individual within this group and the Jubilee laws to the whole group. But as I 
said before, the only people that can “return” to their hZ…jua}, are those that had it in the 
first place. In most of the cases where we find a l] expressing benefit as for instance 
with !k,l; it is this group that is portrayed as the ultimate beneficiaries. It is also clear 
that within this group of legal land claimants, people do get in trouble and people do 
loose their land. These people that are in trouble are then referred to as either an ja; 
or an tymi[;. Yet I would think that they are also part of the addressed people even if 
they have lost their land, they still have legal claims to this land and are entitled to 
return to it.  
Apart from the addressees and the associated ja; and tymi[;, there are also other 
groups in this chapter. The text is not addressed to them, but they are often 
portrayed as being in a certain relationship to the addressee(s). The first time that 
they appear is in v. 6 where we find the db,[,  the hm;a;, the rykic; and the bv;/T who is 
“sojourning.” Each one of these are portrayed as “belonging to” or as “being 
connected to” the addressee. Thus apart from having this relationship with the land-
owning addressee, they are practically invisible. Or they are only visible when seen 
along with the addressee. That at least is the case in v. 6 where they seem to be 
sharing in the benefits of the Sabbath year.  
These people only appear again in the last two cases of Leviticus 25 and by that I 
mean as “real people.” Before that we do find examples where these concepts are 
used metaphorically either to describe the relationship between the addressee and 
the ja; in trouble or the relationship between the addressees and YHWH. When they 
appear again as “real people” then they are either portrayed as exploitable or as a 
threat. In vv. 44-46 the sojourning !ybiv;wTo may be taken as an db,[, and an hm;a;. Once 
again these latter two are portrayed as “your db,[,” and “your hm;a;” similar to v. 6. 
Thus the !ybiv;wTo along with the !yIwGO become a source of slaves and are thus 
exploitable. In the last case the rG´ and the bv;/T are presented as a threat in the 
sense that the ja; in trouble might actually end up there. The point is that all these 
other groups, when they are not used metaphorically, are only visible as either a 
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possessed other, or as an exploitable other, or as a threatening other. We thus have 
the classic in-group/out-group scenario.  
When they are used metaphorically to express the relationship between the 
addressee and the ja; in trouble they are used with an apparent positive connotation. 
In v. 35 the addressee is asked to treat his ja; in trouble like a rG´ and a bv;/T. This 
seems like a good thing and the same is true of the example in v. 40. Now it is like a 
rykic; and a bv;/T and once again it seems like expressing something positive.  
When the relationship between YHWH and the addressees is described the latter are 
called !yriG´ and !ybiv;wTo before YHWH in v. 23. In this verse the issue is the 
relationship between YHWH, the land and the addressees. I understand these terms 
as meaning that the relationship between the land and YHWH is much more “solid” 
than that between the addressees and YHWH. These terms are thus used in a 
negative sense functioning as a warning by reminding the addressees that YHWH is 
fonder of the land then of them.  
The term db,[, is also used in a metaphorical sense, also apparently expressing 
something good. In vv. 42 and 55 the Israelites (whom I would identify with the 
addressees despite the fact that it is in the third person) are called the !ydib;[} of 
YHWH, which he brought out of Egypt. In both these cases that is used in order to 
motivate that they cannot be either the slaves of the addressee, or the slaves of a rG´ 
or bv;/T.  
Thus the addressees understood themselves as having a special relationship with 
YHWH. The latter is presented as the liberator from Egypt and the provider of the 
land. The addressees expect to live in the land in safety (vv. 18-19) and to eat from 
the land. The land is also specifically called ‘the land of Canaan” (v. 38) and is given 
to the addressees by YHWH who also wants to be their God. This special 
relationship with YHWH is apparently only second to the special relationship between 
YHWH and the land. We must also deduct that the other groups featuring in this 
chapter do not share this relationship with either YHWH or the land. They were not 
delivered from Egypt and they are not his slaves and that is probably why they can 
end-up as the slaves of the addressees. This is thus the world-view or ideology of the 
people addressed by this text. Who and what they are is determined by their 
relationship to YHWH their deliverer from Egypt and their possession of the land of 
Canaan.  
What we need to do now is to ask what we can learn about these different role-
players from the texts surrounding Leviticus 25 and then we need to ask who they 
might have been and when the might have lived.  
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CHAPTER 5  
LEVITICUS 25 AND SURROUNDING TEXTS  
5.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to describe the kind of relationship that chapter 25 
has with its surrounding chapters. To put the objective differently would be to ask 
what chapter 25 has in common with surrounding texts and what not. In the previous 
two chapters we looked at chapter 25 at two different levels. The first attempted to be 
more of a simple description of grammatical features that are prevalent in this text. 
There I identified at least four important features of the text like, wc. + perfect verbal 
chains, the use of the particle yKi, marked word order and nominal clauses. I also 
described a certain preference for a stylistic feature, which I described as a chiastic 
parallelism. Now I would like to ask how many of these features are present in the 
surrounding chapters and how we could understand it? Or, how does it change the 
way in which we understand chapter 25?  
The second chapter attempted to specifically describe how these features could have 
been used to persuade possible ancient readers. Engaging with these rhetorical 
issues helped me to say something about the possible ideological traces that one 
could find in the text. As we saw in 4.5.1 above I could start to describe the world-
view of those that this text was addressing. I focused mostly on the way in which the 
addressees were portrayed in relation to YHWH, the land and other groups. In this 
chapter I will shortly try to do the same with regards to the surrounding chapters. 
How many of these characteristics are present in the other chapters and how does 
this help us to understand chapter 25? Are similar strategies of persuasion used or 
maybe not? 
I obviously cannot discuss all the other chapters of Leviticus or even of the Holiness 
Code in the same detailed fashion. One reason is that many scholars have already 
described these kinds of relationships and I do not need to repeat it, but can rather 
draw from their insights. In this regard I will especially make use of the study of 
Andreas Ruwe (1999), but only with regards to chapter 23 and the rest of the 
Holiness Code. With regards to chapters 26 and 24 my understanding of these differs 
considerably from his.  
The chapters that will receive the most attention will be the ones preceding and 
succeeding chapter 25 and would thus be chapters 26, 27, 24 and to a lesser extent 
chapter 23. With regards to these I will specifically focus on what I have called 
grammatical and rhetorical features, but when it comes to the other chapters my 
description will not be that thorough. Then I will only treat the rhetorical features and 
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will make much less detailed observations, building as I said, substantially on the 
work of Ruwe.  
5.2 Chapter 26 
Some scholars have recently argued that one should not read Leviticus 26 apart from 
25, of whom the best example would be the dissertation by Sun (1990). Sun (1990: 
439-559) discusses the two chapters under one heading, because the start of 25 and 
the end of 26 form a clear inclusio.1 An opposing view would be that of Ruwe (1999) 
who (except for vv. 1-2) does not treat Leviticus 26 at all in his study on the Holiness 
Code.2 In what follows I will offer some observations that would definitely support the 
views of Sun and I regard it is a loss that Ruwe never really explored the relationship 
between chapter 26 and chapter 25 and for that matter the rest of the Holiness Code. 
I will first offer some thoughts on the most important grammatical features of 
Leviticus 26, before I move to possible rhetorical features. Once again it will become 
clear that this is a very artificial distinction and not always that easy to maintain.  
The biggest difference between Leviticus 25 and 26 is that the latter is usually 
regarded as a parenetic text (excluding vv. 1-2), whereas the former is dominated by 
laws more reminiscent of either conditional or unconditional law, with only a small 
part that is also parenetic (vv. 18-19). This was also the main reason for Ruwe (1999: 
3) not to engage with Leviticus 26:3-46, because it was not “legal” enough for him. 
Ruwe (1999: 98-103) does discuss vv. 1-2 extensively because he understands v. 2 
as a “Unterschrift” of the whole Holiness Code.  
5.2.1 Grammatical features 
On the grounds of content one could divide the whole text into blessings (vv. 3-13) 
and curses (vv. 14-45). The largest part of the text (at least vv. 3-33) could on formal 
grounds be described as being part of either the protasis or the apodosis of a 
conditional sentence dominated by wc. + perfect chains. Verses 1-2 are different 
though, in the sense that they are apodictic or conditional. Another important feature 
of vv. 1-2 is that most of the clauses are actually cases of marked word order with the 
object often preceding the verb (see clauses in table below marked with ~).  
                                                 
1 Sun (1990: 496) goes so far as to say that “26:3-45 is subordinate to the main theme contained in Lev 25.” 
His main reason for this is the inclusio mentioned above and the fact that “Lev 26:3-45 looks back only to 
Lev 25 when it does allude to earlier chapters.” My own analyses below will support most of what Sun has 
argued.  
2 Ruwe (1999: 3) disregards 26:3-46 because his study is interested in the “übergreifenden 
Rechtssystematik” and he does not regard 26:3-46 as such but as “ausschließlich paränetische 
Formulierungen.” He also thinks that this should rather be seen as part of the whole Priestly Sinai 
Narrative. 
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Table 5.1 
ls,p,W !liylia> !k,l; Wc[}t'Aalø 1 26
!k,l; Wmyqit;Aalø hb;Xem'W ~
h;yl,[; t/j}T'v]hil] !k,x]r]a'B] WnT]ti alø tyKic]m' @b,a,w“ ~
.!k,yheløa> hw:hy“ ynIa} yKi 
Wrmov]Ti yt'toB]v'Ata, ~2 
War;yTi yviD;q]miW ~
.hw:hy“ ynIa} 
26 You shall make for yourselves no idols and erect no carved images or pillars, and you shall 
not place figured stones in your land, to worship at them; for I am the Lord your God. 2 You 
shall keep my sabbaths and reverence my sanctuary: I am the Lord. 
These clauses are grammatically reminiscent of the marked word order clauses we 
had in vv. 4-5 of Leviticus 25 (see table 3.4), but their content is somewhat different. 
The first two are negative commands and the next two positive commands. The 
marked word order makes the fronted entities the “focus of the utterance” (Van der 
Merwe et al 1999: 346-347). The objects that the addressees are not allowed to 
worship in v. 1 are contrasted with those that they should honour namely “my 
Sabbaths” and “my sanctuary” in v. 2. We also see that the “I YHWH” phrase occurs 
at the end of each verse in both the longer (v. 1) and the shorter (v. 2) form. This 
then brings us to the first conditional sentence of which v. 3 forms the protasis. It is 
introduced by means of an !ai and the first two clauses are also examples of marked 
word order.  
5.2.1.1 Blessings 
Table 5.2 
WkleTe yt'QojuB]A!ai~ 3 
Wrm]v]Ti yt'/x]miAta,w“~  
!t;ao !t,yci[}w" 
3 If you follow my statutes and keep my commandments and observe them faithfully,  
In all these cases of marked word order it seems that we also have examples of what 
Van der Merwe et al (1999: 346-347) describe as, making an entity “the focus of an 
utterance.” One could specify it further by saying that in v. 3 the marked word order 
confirms the “exclusive role” (Van der Merwe et al 1999: 347) that the t/Qju and t/x]mi 
are to play in the life of the addressees. The apodosis of this conditional sentence 
follows, introduced by a wc. + perfect,3 and consists of no less than nine verses 
stretching from v. 4 all the way to v. 12. The greater part of this apodosis consists of 
a chain of wc. + perfect verbs. The chain is at times interrupted, but then it is usually 
by means of a nominal sentence (v. 6, dyrij}m' @yaew“), a alø + imperfect (v. 11), or the 
                                                 
3 Van der Merwe et al (1999: 170) identify this as one of the four main functions that a wc. + perfect might 
have (see also excursus 3.1).  
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now familiar chiastic parallelism, to which we will turn now. The first two examples 
are found in vv. 4-5 indicated by the brackets on the left.4 
Table 5.3 
!T;[iB] !k,ymev]gI yTit'n:w“ 4 
Hl;Wby“ $r,a;h; hn:t]n:w“  
./yr]Pi @TeyI hd,C;h' $[ew“ 
ryxiB;Ata, vyID' !k,l; gyCihiw“ 5 
 [r'z…Ata, gyCiy" ryxib;W  
[b'col; !k,m]j]l' !T,l]k'a}w" 
.!k,x]r]a'B] jf'b,l; !T,b]v'ywI 
4 I will give you your rains in their season, and the land shall yield its produce, and the trees 
of the field shall yield their fruit. 5 Your threshing shall overtake the vintage, and the vintage 
shall overtake the sowing; you shall eat your bread to the full, and live securely in your land. 
In both these cases we find the same verbal root and as in chapter 25 the first 
occurrence is always a wc. + perfect. The next verb is an imperfect, which is not at 
the start of the sentence. Verse 4 starts with YHWH giving (@tn) rain in due time and 
this results in the land giving its produce and the trees giving their fruits. It then 
culminates in different agricultural seasons overtaking (Hi of gcn) each other due to 
sheer abundance. These verses, furthermore, remind strongly of vv. 18-19 of chapter 
25 where we also found the roots @tn, lka, bvy and the noun jf'b,.5 Both texts predict 
a lush bountifulness of agricultural produce if, of course, the addressees manage to 
keep these t/Qju and t/x]mi. 
The rest of the text (vv. 6-12) promises many more nice things to the addressees 
such as absence of war and victory over enemies (see vv. 6-8) and this is where we 
find the next chiastic parallelism.  
Table 5.4 
ha;me hV;mij} !K,mi Wpd]r;w“ 8 
WpDor]yI hb;b;r] !K,mi ha;meW   
.br,j;l, !k,ynEp]li !k,ybey“ao Wlp]n:w“ 
8 Five of you shall give chase to a hundred, and a hundred of you shall give chase to ten 
thousand; your enemies shall fall before you by the sword.  
In this example we have the verb #dr packaged in a chiasm. The blessings continue 
in the rest of the text promising the addressees that they themselves will also be 
made abundant by YHWH (v. 9). In v. 10 we find a further promise of agricultural 
prosperity and then YHWH promises to be personally present amongst them (vv. 11-
                                                 
4 See also Steymans (1999: 277) who calls these chiasms “parallelismus membrorum.” He also argues that 
this feature often interrupts the wc + chain (“w-qatal Kette”). He does identify some more examples in vv. 
6b, 10 and 11, but that is because his examples are not limited to those using the same verbal root. See also 
Korpel (1993: 131-136) who identifies countless examples of “internal parallelism” 
5 See also Sun (1990: 516-517).  
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12). It is then in these verses where we find the last parallelistic chiasm of the 
blessings part with the verb hyh. 
Table 5.5 
!k,k]/tB] ynIK;v]mi yTit'n:w“ 11 
.!k,t]a, yvip]n" l['g“tiAaløw“ 
!k,k]/tB] yTik]L'h't]hiw“ 12 
!yhiløale !k,l; ytiyyIh;w“  
.![;l] yliAWyh]Ti !T,a'w“ 
11 I will place my dwelling in your midst, and I shall not abhor you. 12 And I will walk 
among you, and will be your God, and you shall be my people. 
The chiasm thus concludes these verses about the presence of YHWH. Note that we 
find “in your midst” (!k,k]/tB]) twice6 and we should also take note of the root l[g that 
has vp,n< as subject. This combination will return in the curses part on three different 
occasions (see vv. 15, 30 and 43) and the verb by itself in v. 44.7 The part about the 
blessings is concluded by means of YHWH presenting himself as the liberator from 
Egypt in v. 13. In v. 45 we will find this claim by YHWH again and we already had it in 
the rest of the Holiness Code in 19:36; 22:33; 23:43; 25:38, 42 and 55. Yet 
grammatically there is something different in v. 13, a feature that we have not had in 
chapter 25 and that we do not find in the rest of chapter 26.  
Table 5.6 
!k,yheløa> hw:hy“ ynIa} 13 
!ydib;[} !h,l; tyúh]mi !yIr'x]mi $r,a,me !k,t]a, ytiaxe/h rv,a} 
  !k,L][u tfomo rBov]a,w: 
p  .tWYmim]/q !k,t]a, &le/aw: 
13 I am the LORD your God who brought you out of the land of Egypt, to be their slaves no 
more; I have broken the bars of your yoke and made you walk erect. 
The form of the two verbs in the last two clauses is actually wayyiqtol8 or wc. + 
imperfect. This also becomes a chain similar to a wc. + perfect chain. The first 
function that Van der Merwe et al (1999: 165) identify is a mirror-image of the first 
function that they identified with the wc. + perfect (see Excursus 3.1, above):  
1) Waw consecutive + imperfect bears reference to the same temporal spheres 
and aspects as a perfect form but it is also characterized by ‘progression.’ 
Thus the “temporal sphere” to which our example above will refer is the past. The 
kind of progression that we have here will probably be “logical sequence” (Van der 
                                                 
6 This is one of the phrases (!k,k]/tB] yTik]L'h't]hiw“) that makes Blum (1990: 325-326) argue that one should 
understand this text (especially Lev 26:9-13) as a “programmatischen ‘Schlüsseltext’” to the whole Priestly 
Sinai Narrative. God has made his “come-back” and is walking amongst his people again.  
7 See, for instance, the observations by Warning (1999: 100-101). 
8 Van der Merwe (1999: 369) use wayyiqtol as a synonym for wc. + imperfect and so will I, since it is a 
much shorter form of reference.  
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Merwe et al 1999: 166). The rest of Leviticus 26 is dominated by chains of wc. + 
perfect which refer to a hypothetical future. None of this should come as much of a 
surprise, because v. 13 introduces the claims made by YHWH that he delivered from 
Egypt, which lies in the past. One could note that the other examples of YHWH 
introducing himself that we had in Leviticus 25 were grammatically slightly different. 
In vv. 38, 42 and 55 we had rv,a} clauses, but they were never extended by means of 
a wayyiqtol. In v. 38 we also had two examples of a l] + infinitive being used to 
express the purpose for which YHWH delivered them from Egypt.  
The fact that a wayyiqtol chain is used makes v. 13 stand out slightly. Egypt is 
referred to as a place of slavery and YHWH claims that he broke this yoke and that 
he helped the addressees to “walk erect.” When YHWH returns again it is only at the 
end of the chapter after the curses have run their course.  
5.2.1.2 Curses 
The part, which presents the curses in the event of non-compliance by the 
addressees, is also mostly structured by means of extensive conditional sentences. 
The protasis is always introduced by means of an !ai and the apodosis by means of 
a wc. + perfect. The first conditional sentence (vv. 14-17) has grammatically by far 
the highest density, by which I mean that we find more particles and more examples 
of marked word order than in any of the other conditional sentences up to v. 33. From 
v. 34 onwards the grammatical character of the text changes again, but we will 
discuss that later. To return to vv. 14-17, in the protasis (vv. 14-15) we find three 
examples of !ai (in italics) of which two coincide with marked word order.  
Table 5.7 
yli W[m]v]ti aløA!aiw“  14 
hL,aeh; t/x]Mih'AlK; tae Wc[}t' aløw“  
Wsa;m]Ti yt'QojuB]A!aiw“ ~ 15 
!k,v]p]n" l['g“Ti yf'P;v]miAta, !aiw“ ~ 
yt'/x]miAlK;Ata, t/c[} yTil]bil] 
.ytiyriB]Ata, !k,r]p]h'l] 
14 But if you will not obey me, and do not observe all these commandments, 15 if you spurn 
my statutes, and abhor my ordinances, so that you will not observe all my commandments, 
and you break my covenant,. 
The apodosis is also introduced by means of a particle that we will only find again 
towards the end of the chapter (see v. 39), namely #a' in v. 16. According to Van der 
Merwe et al (1999: 312-313) this particle is mostly used in poetic9 texts where it 
                                                 
9 See Korpel (1993: 123-150) as an example of a scholar who argues that Leviticus 26 should be regarded as 
one big poem. Korpel (1993: 146) concludes that Leviticus 26 has “one canto of seven strophes of 
blessings, followed by two cantos of fourteen strophes of curses each.” I do not agree with her division 
between the last two cantos. She argues that her third canto starts with v. 32. In my own analysis below I 
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replaces !Gæ. One of the main functions that they identify is when #a' indicates that “an 
entity must be added to another.” They also add that “sometimes the entity that is 
added or need to be added is an extreme case. It is an entity that one would not have 
expected to be added to a particular group.” In v. 16 the #a' accompanies marked 
word order with the personal pronoun “I” preceding the verb. Is this combination thus 
used to express some surprising twist in the state of affairs? This might have 
theological implications for the way in which we understand the portrayal of YHWH in 
this text. Yet, in the rest of the text it does not seem that “surprising” would be a good 
description of what is to follow, it is more like a logical turn-around of the blessings of 
the first part. The “logic” lies in the fact that the addressees supposedly did need 
keep their part of the deal. The fact that the author used !ai three times to express 
the role of the addressees provided a build-up and made one actually expect 
something severe or extreme to follow and this reaction is then introduced by means 
of an #a'. Thus I do not think that #a' expresses surprise, but rather something like a 
very strong contrast or juxtaposition.  
The apodosis that follows consists of a wc. + perfect chain. The agricultural 
abundance described before is now turned on its head with the enemies eating the 
harvest (v. 16) and the enemies bringing all sorts of fear to the addressees, be it with 
a strange psychological twist in the last clause of v. 17. This nominal clause 
concludes v. 17, which leads us to the next !ai and thus the next apodosis. The 
pattern of a protasis describing the actions of the addressees followed by an 
apodosis describing YHWH’s response continues until the character of the text 
changes in v. 34. We find four examples of !ai up to v. 33.   
Table 5.8 
yli W[m]v]ti alø hL,aeAd['A!aiw“ 18
18 And if in spite of this you will not obey me, 
yriq, yMi[i Wkl]TeA!aiw“ 21 
yli ['mov]li Wbato aløw“  
21 If you continue hostile to me, and will not obey me, I will continue to plague you 
sevenfold for your sins 
yli Wrs]W:ti alø hL,aeB]A!aiw“ 23 
.yriq, yMi[i !T,k]l'h}w"  
23 If in spite of these punishments you have not turned back to me, but continue hostile to 
me,  
yli W[m]v]ti alø tazúB]A!aiw“ 27 
.yriq,B] yMi[i !T,k]l'h}w" 
27 But if, despite this, you disobey me, and continue hostile to me,  
                                                                                                                                            
argue that the text only changes from v. 34 onwards. Her presentation thus sounds somewhat like forcing 
the text into her very “neat system.”  
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In each of these examples we find l] with the first person singular pronominal suffix 
expressing that YHWH understands their actions as directed directly against him. 
The occurrence of the term yriq] in these texts further adds to that impression and we 
find the only six occurrences of this term in BHS here in chapter 26 (vv. 21, 23, 24, 
27, 28, 40 and 41), a term that Koehler & Baumgartner (1985: 855) translate with a 
“hostile encounter.” These apodoses are mostly expressed by means of verbal 
chains where the wc. + perfect is dominant. This is sometimes interrupted, but then 
often by means of the now familiar parallelistic chiasm which we find in v. 20. 
Table 5.9 
!k,j}Ko qyril; !t'w“ 20 
Hl;Wby“Ata, !k,x]r]a' @TetiAaløw“  
./yr]Pi @TeyI alø $r,a;h; $[ew“ 
20 Your strength shall be spent to no purpose: your land shall not yield Its produce, and the 
trees of the land shall not yield their fruit 
This chiasm is somewhat different from the usual in the sense that the first verb is 
actually a alø + imperfect. Yet it seems to be the only logical way of expressing a 
negative. Apart from that it is simply a negative version of the chiasm that we had in 
v. 4. In stead of hd,C;h' $[e we now have $r,a;h; $[e, but apart from this slight variation 
there is not much difference. This text obviously resonates with the parenetic text in 
chapter 25 (vv. 18-19). This adds to the “everything-turned-on-its-head-effect” that 
the curses seem to have on the former blessings. Another example hereof is the next 
chiasm in v. 29, which is especially reminiscent of the chiasm in 25:22, yet with a 
much crueller twist in the state of the affairs. 
Table 5.10 
!k,ynEB] rc'B] !T,l]k'a}w" 29 
.WlkeaTo !k,ytenúB] rc'b]W 
29 You shall eat the flesh of your sons, and you shall eat the flesh of your daughters.  
In 25:22 (and in 26:10, although not in the same neat chiasm) the addressees were 
still eating the old harvest when the new harvest was already available, but now they 
have to eat their own children, the flesh of their own sons and daughters. Whatever 
YHWH promised to do in vv. 3-13 is now utterly destroyed and devastated by the 
same YHWH who previously delivered them from Egypt. There are many examples 
left in this chapter of how blessings from vv. 3-13 are now turned upside-down into 
which we do not need to go, since most of them are quite clear.10  
                                                 
10 See, for instance, v. 26 where YHWH breaks (rbv) the “staff of bread” (!j,l,AhFem'), or v. 19 where he 
breaks (rbv) their “proud glory” whereas he previously broke (also rbv) the “staff of your yoke” 
(!k,L][u tfomo) in v. 13. Or in vv. 11-12 YHWH promises to be “in your midst” (!k,k]/tB]), but in v. 25 he 
sends the sword “in your midst.” The best example is probably just to compare what YHWH gives (@tn) in 
vv. 3-12 with what he gives in the latter part which is already closely related to what some of the examples 
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This whole about-turn is the result of the addressees not complying with what YHWH 
expected of them. At stages one also has the impression that there is a tit-for-tat 
element to the punishment as the next two examples from vv. 23-24 and vv. 27-28 
show. I have partially referred to both of them above already.  
Table 5.11 
yli Wrs]W:ti alø hL,aeB]A!aiw“ 23 
.yriq, yMi[i !T,k]l'h}w"  
yriq,B] !k,M;[i ynIa}A#a' yTik]l'h;w“ 24 
.!k,yteaFoj'Al[' [b'v, ynIa;A!Gæ !k,t]a, ytiyKehiw“  
23 If in spite of these punishments you have not turned back to me, but continue hostile to me, 
24 then I too will continue hostile to you: I myself will strike you sevenfold for your sins.  
yli W[m]v]ti alø tazúB]A!aiw“ 27 
.yriq,B] yMi[i !T,k]l'h}w" 
yriq,Atm'j}B' !k,M;[i yTik]l'h;w“ 28 
.!k,yteaFoj'Al[' [b'v, ynIa;A#a' !k,t]a, yTir]S'yIw“ 
27 But if, despite this, you disobey me, and continue hostile to me, 28 I will continue hostile 
to you in fury; I in turn will punish you myself sevenfold for your sins. 
If we look at the parts in italics it is clear that they are near repetitions of each other 
with, of course, the usual amount of variation. In the first example the addressees 
literally “walk hostile against YHWH” and he responds by doing the same and now 
we find another #a' (v. 24). The same is true of the second example although yriq,B] 
becomes yriq,Atm'j}B', which seems like an intensification. Whatever the addressees 
have to offer in terms of revulsion and hostility, YHWH can offer the same and much 
more! 
The whole text from v. 14 to v. 33 could thus be characterised by this 
protasis/apodosis pattern. The protasis (see vv. 14-15, 18a, 21a, 23, 27) always 
refers to what the addressees do or neglect to do and the apodosis to the response 
of YHWH to the actions of the addressees (see vv. 16-17, 18b-20, 21b-22, 24-26 and 
28-33). Yet, the response of YHWH is always much longer and for that matter far 
more severe.  
Until now I have just hinted at the fact that I regard v. 33 as some kind of ending and 
I have only discussed the text until v. 33 by means of my five times 
protasis/apodosis-scheme. The question is of course why I would regard v. 34 as 
some kind of new beginning? I could add that I think that v. 33 concludes with a 
                                                                                                                                            
that I already mentioned. In the former he gives rain (v. 4), peace (v. 6) and “his dwelling” (v. 11), but in 
the latter he gives, “his face against them” (v. 17), “a sky like copper and an earth like iron” (v.19), “your 
bodies on top of the bodies of your gods” (v. 30) and the sword in their cities (v. 31). Furthermore, we 
already referred to another example above with the root l[g that takes vp,n< as subject (see vv. 11, 15 and 
30). 
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further chiasm with the root hyh, just as v. 12 signalled that the end of the blessing 
part was near.  
Table 5.12 
!yI/Gb' hr,z…a> !k,t]a,w“~ 33 
br,j; !k,yrej}a' ytiqoyrih}w"  
hm;m;v] !k,x]r]a' ht;y“h;w“ 
.hB;r]j; Wyh]yI !k,yre[;w“ 
33 And you I will scatter among the nations, and I will unsheathe the sword against you; your 
land shall be a desolation, and your cities a waste. 
This in itself is not enough to argue that a unit ends here. Yes, the chiasm in v. 12 
was at the end of that text before YHWH reminded the addressees again that he is 
the liberator from Egypt (v. 13) which concluded that part. And, yes in v. 18 the 
chiasm was also at the end of the unit, before the next !ai, but in v. 29 we have the 
same stylistic feature in the middle of the text. This in itself is not enough to claim that 
we have the end of a unit here. What convinces me, though, is the fact that v. 34 
seems to be different on other grounds also.  
Table 5.13 
 hM;V'h? ymey“ lKo h;yt,toB]v'Ata, $r,a;h; hx,r]Ti za; 34 
!k,ybey“ao $r,a,B] !T,a'w“ 
$r,a;h; tB'v]Ti za; 
.h;yt,toB]v'Ata, tx;r]hiw“ 
34 Then the land shall enjoy its sabbath years as long as it lies desolate, while you are in the 
land of your enemies; then the land shall rest, and enjoy its sabbath years. 
The particle za;, of which we have two examples here, could be understood as 
introducing an apodosis of a conditional sentence (Van der Merwe et al 1999: 295). 
This, though, would not make sense here, because we already said that the whole of 
vv. 28-33 is an apodosis following the protasis in v. 27. That apodosis was already 
introduced by a wc. + perfect in v. 28. A more viable option seems to be to 
understand za; as functioning like a normal adverb which “indicates the time of the 
action to which the verb refers: afterwards, then” (Van der Merwe et al 1999: 307).11 
In both cases the verb is an imperfect which usually refers to the future. In that sense 
it is also a fairly substantial deviation from the previous text, since most of vv. 28-33 
was a wc. + perfect chain. The only exceptions are the chiasm in v. 29 (mentioned 
above), the alø + imperfect in v. 31, the marked word order in v. 33 and the chiasm in 
v. 33. The point is that every clause in vv. 28-33 starts with a waw and that chain is 
now interrupted by these two examples of za;.  
                                                 
11 See also Joüon & Muraoka (1993: 369-370). 
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I would argue that these examples of za; change the character of the text. It also 
introduces a “change” in the text that eventually leads to the curses being turned 
around again. Until v. 33 everything was rather hypothetical, “if this happens, then 
YHWH will do this” etc., but now we have a seemingly real “then”, a future with a 
much more realistic feel to it. The text also focuses on the land and its Sabbaths and 
especially the fact that the land will start to “repay” or “to make up” (hxr) for what she 
did not have before. This root, hxr, could entail some kind of restitution12 and it also 
signals the change in the text from curses to the eventual remembering of the 
covenant. We find the verb again in vv. 41 and 43, to which we will return later. Along 
with the first entrance of hxr in v. 34, we find another entrée and that is the so-called 
“land of your enemies” (!k,ybey“ao $r,a,). The latter occurs a further five times, twice in 
the plural (vv. 36 and 39) and three times in the singular (vv. 38, 41 and 44), towards 
the end of chapter 26.  
This focus on the land is nothing new and there were enough “signals” in vv. 31-33 to 
indicate that we are heading in this direction. The focus in vv. 31-33 is on the 
desolation in the land, the cities and even in the sanctuaries (v. 31). The verbal root 
!mv (Hi) occurs no less than three times (of which YHWH is the subject twice) and in 
v. 33 we find the noun, hm;m;v]. But in vv. 34-35 the connection is made between this 
desolation (twice, Ho inf. cs. of !mv) and the Sabbath and the opportunity that this 
opens up for the $r,a,. The land will have the opportunity to start anew without the 
previous inhabitants, lying completely empty and desolate. Thus, what is portrayed 
as a curse for the inhabitants, becomes an opportunity for the land itself.  
In v. 36 the “people left behind” (!yria;v]NIh')13 by this desolation enter and they are 
depicted as living in the land of their enemies (!h,ybey“ao txor]a'B]). The psyche of the 
“people left behind” is described as vulnerable, as people really traumatised by this 
event. It sounds as if they are “paranoid” and scared of everything, even the sound of 
a falling leaf (v. 36). We find two nominal clauses (vv. 36 and 37) each time stating 
that “there are no pursuers” (#dero @yaew“ and @yIa; #derow“), but still the survivors are 
terrified, similar to what we had in v.17. We find the by now very familiar root, lka, 
again, but now it is not the addressees who are eating, instead they are being eaten 
by the land of their enemies (!k,ybey“ao $r,a,). 
                                                 
12 According to Gerleman (1976: 811) the root hxr “wird in Lev 26 fast wortspielartig in seiner negativen 
und in seiner neutralen Bedeutung verwendet.” What he means by this negative meaning is the sense 
“paying”, or to “accept what is coming your way” which does not entail the “accept” of the neutral 
meaning or the “enjoy” of the more positive meaning (1976: 810). 
13 The way in which the “survivors” are introduced here is also an example of a pendens construction whose 
function is to “activate an identifiable referent that is talked about” (Van der Merwe et al 1999: 339). See 
also Steymans (1999: 278).  
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In the concluding v. 39 we find the survivors (!yria;v]NIh') again forming a nice inclusio 
with v. 36 and concluding this sub-unit with two marked word order clauses. 
Table 5.14 
!k,ybey“ao txor]a'B] !n:/[}B' WQM'yI !k,B; !yria;v]NIh'w“~ 39 
.WQM;yI !T;ai !t;boa} tnú/[}B' #a'w“~ 
39 And those of you who survive shall languish in the land of your enemies because of their 
iniquities; also they shall languish because of the iniquities of their ancestors. 
The survivors are now described as “rotting away” in the lands of their enemies 
(again $r,a,  but now in the plural) and they are doing it for the sake of their own 
iniquities. In the next clause the particle #a' is used again to introduce an additional 
ground for their suffering; the iniquities of their fathers which is the first reference to 
the term in this chapter.  
In the next verse (v. 40), which I understand as a new unit, the text changes to the 
third person never to address anybody directly again. It continues in v. 40 with the 
iniquities of the survivors, although we do not find the term “survivors” again and the 
iniquities of their fathers. Yet now it seems as if the tempo of the text picks up, as if 
we are heading for some kind of climax. The authors do not use their particles 
sparingly anymore, neither marked word order and instead the reader is bombarded 
with #a's (vv. 40, 41 and 42(x2)) and za;s (v. 41 (x2)) and with subjects and objects 
preceding the verb (6 times in vv. 42-43). Most of the terms that we find here are not 
new and are repetitions of what we already had in especially the curses part.  
In v. 41 following an za; we find “their uncircumcised heart” (lre[;h, !b;b;l]), which is 
something new in chapter 26 and in v. 42 we find reference to different covenants 
again. Previously it was only called “my covenant with them” (vv. 9), or “my covenant” 
(v. 15), or rather vaguely referred to as “revenge of the covenant” (v. 25), but now it is 
specified as the covenant with Jacob and Isaac and Abraham. These YHWH will now 
remember and he will also remember the $r,a,  which according to v. 43 has been 
deserted (Ni of bz[) from “them” (!h,me). Presumably this “them” still refers to the 
survivors of v. 39. Verse 43 continues with terms reminiscent of vv. 34-35 of the land 
“paying” for its Sabbaths and then again they are “paying” (both times hxr) for their 
iniquities and concludes with verbs like sam and l[g which remind strongly of v. 15 
and thus the start of the curses-part. This is followed by v. 44 where YHWH states 
that he will not do these things (again sam and l[g) to them. 
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Table 5.15 
!h,me bz´[;Te $r,a;h;w“~ 43 
!h,me hM;v'h]B; h;yt,toB]v'Ata, $r,tiw“  
@['y" !n:/[}Ata, Wxr]yI !hew“~ 
Wsa;m; yf'P;v]miB] @['y"b]W~ 
.!v;p]n" hl;[}G: yt'QojuAta,w“~ 
!yTis]a'm]Aalø !h,ybey“ao $r,a,B] !t;/yh]Bi tazúA!GæA#a'w“ 44 
!T;ai ytiyriB] rpeh;l] !t;Løk'l] !yTil]['g“Aaløw“ 
.!h,yheløa> hw:hy“ ynIa} yKi 
43 For the land shall be deserted by them, and enjoy its sabbath years by lying desolate 
without them, while they shall make amends for their iniquity, because they dared to spurn 
my ordinances, and they abhorred my statutes. 44 Yet for all that, when they are in the land of 
their enemies, I will not spurn them, or abhor them so as to destroy them utterly and break my 
covenant with them; for I am the Lord their God;  
In v. 42 YHWH has already said that he will remember his covenant, but now he 
goes even further, he breaks the cycle of tit-for-tat deeds. In v. 16 he responded to 
their deeds as described in v. 15 with the same deeds (!k,l; taZúAhc,[>a, ynIa}A#a'). There 
in v. 16 his response was introduced by means of an #a', but now one #a' is not 
enough and it is fortified with a further !Gæ. YHWH has turned from his revengeful path 
and he motivates this by a further !h,yheløa> hw:hy“ ynIa} yKi. This is followed by another 
reference to a covenant and the liberation from Egypt in v. 45. 
Table 5.16 
!ynIvoari tyriB] !h,l; yTir]k'z…w“ 45 
!yI/Gh' ynEy[el] !yIr'x]mi $r,a,me !t;aoAytiaxe/h rv,a}  
!yhiløale !h,l; tyúh]li 
.hw:hy“ ynIa} 
45 but I will remember in their favor the covenant with their ancestors whom I brought out of 
the land of Egypt in the sight of the nations, to be their God: I am the Lord. 
This use of l] reminds of the l]s expressing “benefit” that we had in the first half of 
chapter 25. The NRSV translated it with “in their favor”14 which seems to be a good 
translation in this case. What follows then is a repetition (with variation) of what we 
already had in v. 13 and before that in 19:36; 22:33; 23:43; 25:38, 42 and 55 as well 
as 11:45. In those cases the rv,a}-clauses always referred to either the addressees 
(19:36, 22:33 and 25:38) or the Israelites (23:43, 25:42 and 55), but now they are 
referred to as the “ancients” or “ancestors” (!ynIvoari).  
Chapter 26, thus indeed shares some grammatical features with chapter 25, despite 
the fact that it is mostly a parenetic text. The greatest part of the text is (as in 25) 
dominated by wc. + perfect chains. When this chain is interrupted it is mostly done by 
means of marked word order, nominal sentences, or chiastic parallelism. These are 
                                                 
14 See also Gerstenberger (1993: 367) who translated it with “ihnen zugute.”  
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all features that the text has in common with chapter 25 and if we add to that the fact 
that 25:1 and 26:46 form a very obvious inclusio the argument to read the two as one 
becomes even more convincing. 
Table 5.17 
.rmoale yn"ysi rh'B] hv,moAla, hw:hy“ rBed'y“w" 125
laer;c]yI ynEB]Ala, rBeD' 2 
!h,lea} T;r]m'a;w“ 
25:1 The Lord spoke to Moses on Mount Sinai, saying:  
tro/Th'w“ !yfiP;v]Mih'w“ !yQijuh' hL,ae 46 
p  .hv,moAdy"B] yn"ysi rh'B] laer;c]yI ynEB] @ybeW /nyBehw:hy“ @t'n: rv,a} 
26:46 These are the statutes and ordinances and laws that the Lord established between 
himself and the people of Israel on Mount Sinai through Moses. 
I will now shortly explore the persuasive features that can be identified in chapter 26.  
5.2.2 Persuasive features 
5.2.2.1 Address 
In chapter 4 by far the largest part of describing the persuasive features of Leviticus 
25 consisted of describing whom the text was addressing. The question was 
whether, second person plural or singular forms were used, or what I described as a 
distancing effect when the text changed to the third person and the addressee(s) 
became a spectator. The text of chapter 26 is in this regard much simpler and much 
more clear-cut than chapter 25. We do not find any second person singular verbal 
forms or suffixes. When the second person is used it is always plural. The same goes 
for when the text refers to people in the third person, then it is also always plural. The 
whole text until v. 33 is dominated by the second person plural and thus the text is 
directly aimed at the addressees. All six conditional sentences that I’ve identified 
between vv. 3 and 33 are directed at the addressees. There are very few clauses in 
which we do not find either the second person plural verb or, the second person 
singular pronominal suffix and these are always part of a wc. + perfect chain which 
as such addresses the second person plural. But what clues does the text supply as 
to who these addressees might be?  
In line with what I argued with regards to chapter 25, I would still argue that these 
addressees are the collective of land-owners, i.e. those who in the eyes of the 
authors had legal claims to the land. This is also supported by the fact that chapter 
26 is like chapter 25 really interested in the issue of land. Not only do we find the 
word $r,a, occurring 23 times over and against the 20 in chapter 25, but we also find 
the expression “your land” six times in chapter 26 (vv. 1, 5, 6, 19, 20 and 33). Until 
now the authors have used it rather sparingly on only six occasions in the rest of the 
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Holiness Code,15 but now at the end of the code prudence apparently is thrown 
overboard. Three of these are used in the curses part and then they often seem to be 
used ironically. Two of these occur in chiasms that I identified above in tables 5.8 and 
5.11 (vv. 20 and 33). Within the context of the curses I would translate these two 
verses with something like: “Your ‘so-called’ land will not give her harvest (v. 20)” and 
“Your ‘so-called’ land will be desolate” (v. 33). The irony lies in the fact that it is called 
“your land”, but it is obviously not anymore and the addressed “you” are actually not 
on the land anymore. All of this, furthermore, simply supports the notion that land-
possession, or maybe one could say “lack thereof”, is very high on the agenda of 
chapters 25 and 26. Until v. 33 these landowners or the “land-losers” are directly 
addressed. They still feature in vv. 34-39, but from v. 40 onwards they totally 
disappear. 
In vv. 40-46 the second person plural forms make way for third person plural forms. 
“You” becomes “they” or “them” and it stays like that until the end of the chapter. 
Once again we have some kind of distancing effect. Nobody is directly addressed 
and instead the addressees again become spectators, and whom are they watching? 
It seems like they are now watching the so-called !yria;v]nI who appeared in v. 36 for 
the first time. But how does the text describe these “survivors”?  
Above I’ve already explained why I thought that v. 34 was the start of a new unit. The 
two main reasons were the particle za;, which actually functions as an adverb and the 
sudden use of the imperfect which really seemed to change the sense of time we had 
in the text until then. Verses 34-35 (see table 5.13) focus on what will happen to the 
land then, or that is probably to put it wrongly, for it would be more accurate to say it 
is about what the land will do then. In vv. 34-35 $r,a, is the subject of the verb on 
three occasions (once with hxr and twice with tbv), as if the land suddenly has the 
freedom to act now that the addressees are in the land of their enemies (v. 34). Then 
in v. 36 we find the first mention of the “survivors” (!yria;v]NIh') who are or will be 
“amongst you” (!k,B;). Until this verse the text was always aimed at the second 
person plural (as I said above), but now in the rest of v. 36 and the most of v. 37 the 
text zooms in on the lot of the survivors. The second person plural only appears 
again in v. 37b when we find !k,l;. Verse 38 is again directly aimed at the addressees 
where it is stated that the land of your enemies will eat you. Then in v. 39 we find the 
survivors again who are amongst you and who will be rotting away in the land of your 
enemies, which changes again to the third person plural in v. 39b. What I’m trying to 
say is that vv. 36-39 are a mixture of second and third person forms and thus a 
mixture of addressing and distancing. I can only think that it forms some kind of 
                                                 
15 Other examples in the Holiness Code include: Leviticus 19:9, 33; 22:24; 23:22 and 25:9, 45. 
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bridge or transition between vv. 3-33 and 40-45, which are both either only second 
person plural, or third person plural.16  
The ultimate question still remains why this change to third person? Could we deduct 
a further rhetorical effect from this? Why are the survivors still referred to as 
“amongst you” in vv. 36 and 39, whereas they are distanced into the future from v. 40 
onwards? Why is YHWH remembering them in v. 45 and not you? Or why will he be 
a God for them and not for you anymore (v. 45)? The only answer that I would 
venture is that the authors are trying to stay within the fiction of the Sinai Priestly 
Narrative. Within that fiction the addressees are addressed on Sinai on their way to 
the $r,a,  which YHWH is about to give them. We should also note that chapter 25 
starts and chapter 26 concludes with a reference to Sinai. This could be read as an 
effort to project this event into the far distant future. The text thus pretends to keep to 
the fiction especially now at the end of what has often been regarded as a collection 
with an identity of its own (i.e. the Holiness Code).  
Another possibility would be to understand this distancing effect as trying to describe 
something of the “distancing” experience of people who are in a different land? 
These survivors will have to part with the land for a period of time, but there is some 
hope at the end of the text. Both answers are rather precarious and partially 
contradict each other.  
5.2.2.2 Motivation  
Motivation in chapter 26 is always done by “means of YHWH” as I have described it 
with regards to chapter 25. I already mentioned above that we find examples of “I am 
YHWH” at the end of vv. 1 and 2 in both the shorter and the longer forms. A yKi 
introduces it at the end of v. 1 and at the end of the blessing part in v. 13 we find the 
longer form again, but now without any yKi. And then at the end of the chapter in v. 44 
we find a yKi with the longer form and then the short form shortly thereafter at the end 
of v. 45. It is thus clear that these phrases act as structural markers that divide 
between the different parts of the text. Yet they also act as motivation or thus with 
persuasive intent in the sense that they say something about YHWH. In both vv. 13 
and 45 we find YHWH the liberator from Egypt. In v. 13 Egypt is portrayed as a land 
of slavery and YHWH claims that he broke that “yoke” and that he made the 
addressees walk “upright” (the wayyiqtol chain). The same is true of v. 45 where he 
claims that he brought them out of Egypt before “the eyes of the nations” (!yI/Gh' ynEy[el]) 
                                                 
16 See also Steymans (1999: 283) who argues that the change from second to third person is not clear-cut, 
“sondern ist verschachtelt.” He also understands vv. 36-39 as a kind of “Übergang” and specifically 
!k,B; !yria;v]NIh'w“. “Dieser Formulierung”, he continues, “drückt einerseits die Kontinuität zwischen den in 
der 2. Person Angesprochenen (!kb) und dessen Rest (!yravnhw) aus, andererseits leitet sie zu Abschnitten 
über, die nur noch vom Schicksal des Rests handeln.”  
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to be their God. This reminds of 25:38 although it was in the second person there 
and now is in the third person. The point is that the persuasive strategy exemplified 
here when YHWH is referred to, is the same as that of Leviticus 25. YHWH’s “claim 
to fame” is that he liberated them from Egypt. We will see later that other chapters in 
the Holiness Code also share this feature.   
5.2.2.3 Repetition and variation 
As in chapter 25 one could refer to all the examples of chiastic parallelism as cases 
where repetition and variation were combined to have a persuasive effect. One could 
also regard the fact that many of the curses in chapter 26 were “blessings-turned-on-
its-head” as another example of this persuasive strategy. I did mention many 
examples above where the curses were echoing the blessings, but often expressing 
the exact opposite and are thus examples of both repetition and variation.  
On another level I would now like to focus on the repeated use of the word $r,a,  
which, as we have already said, occurs 23 times in chapter 26 and 20 times in 
chapter 25. Compared to the rest of the Holiness Code and Leviticus this usage 
clearly stands out.17 I would shortly want to address the issue of how land is 
portrayed in both these chapters. Once again I would think that this gives us 
glimpses of the way in which the authors and addressees understood themselves 
and therefore one could once again refer to these features as “ideological traces.” 
5.2.3 Ideological traces 
Three names are given to land in chapters 25 and 26. The first two names are 
presented in 25:38 when YHWH presents himself for the first time in this chapter as 
the liberator from Egypt. That is the first name given to a land in chapter 25. The 
second name follows in v. 38 and that is Canaan. YHWH delivered from Egypt in 
order to give (@tn) Canaan to the addressees. In chapters 25 and 26 this is the only 
occurrence of the name Canaan, but it seems clear that this is the land that the larger 
part of chapters 25 and 26 refers to. We already had reference to this land in 25:2, 
the land that the addressees are about to receive. When YHWH says, “the land is for 
me” in 25:23 it is also the land of Canaan. Egypt features whenever YHWH presents 
himself, throughout chapters 25 and 26 (see 25:38, 42, 55; 26: 13 and 45). Egypt is 
never presented in a positive light and in 26:13 it is clearly portrayed as a place of 
slavery. It can only be imagined to be a place where the addressees do not want to 
be.   
                                                 
17 According to Warning’s (1999: 185) concordance of Leviticus the word $r,a, occurs 81 times in the whole 
book. Of these, 69 are in the “Holiness Code.” In the rest of Leviticus, chapter 11 is the chapter with the 
most occurrences namely eight. Apart from the multiple occurrences in chapters 25 and 26, chapters 18 
and 19 would share the third place with seven each and then chapters 20 and 23 with four each, while 
chapters 22 and 27 have only two. Chapters 17, 21 and 24 have nothing whatsoever to do with land. 
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Yet, Canaan the land where the addressees are going to is portrayed as a land 
where the addressees would want to be. This is clear from the blessing part of 
chapter 26 and especially from vv. 18-19 of chapter 25. The land (that they are going 
to) is presented as a sustaining land that will provide enough and in which they can 
live securely. But Canaan is also presented differently in the curses part of chapter 
26. Now the land is empty and desolate, a place where the addressees will not be 
anymore. We especially saw this in vv. 31-33 where the verbal root !mv dominated. 
The land ironically called “your land” in v. 33 is presented as empty and desolate. 
The reason being that the addressees, or the survivors amongst them, will be 
somewhere else and this is where the third “named” land enters.  
This land does not have a name like Egypt or Canaan, but it is referred to as the 
“land of your enemies” and it features from v. 34 onwards. We find reference to the 
“land of the enemies” on four occasions (26:34, 38, 41 and 44) and twice the text 
refers to the “lands of the enemies” (26:36 and 39). It is the land where the 
addressees will end up if they do not do what YHWH expects of them. The initial 
picture in this land is not exactly pretty, because the land will eat the addressees (v. 
38) and there they will waste away (v. 39). But towards the end of chapter 26 the 
description of the stay in this land becomes more hopeful when YHWH promises to 
remember them (i.e. the survivors) in the land of their enemies (v. 44). 
Thus the usage of the term land and the different portrayals of it presents the 
addressees as a people on their way somewhere (i.e. Sinai) between Egypt, the land 
of slavery, and Canaan, the promised land. Yet far away in the distant future looms 
the land of their enemies, a place where they will end up when they do not obey 
these laws. Thus both promise and threat in chapters 25 and 26 are closely linked to 
some land. It means that the people addressed by these laws share one big concern 
and that is the gain and the loss of land. Along with this expectation of land gain and 
land loss goes the expectation to live and to eat from the land and thus to be 
sustained by it. This is one concern that is salient in both chapters, the possession of 
land.  
In this light one should mention one difference between chapters 25 and 26. The 
former was also concerned with other groups in the society of the addressees like the 
rG´, bv;/T and rykic;. They have disappeared now in chapter 26 and the only other 
group that we find is the “enemies” that feature in both parts of chapter 26. They are, 
for instance, left behind in the land when the addressees are gone and they live on 
the land (v. 32). They slightly disturb the desolate picture presented of the land in vv. 
31-33, but maybe it is a case of not being of any importance to the authors, of one 
could say, being “invisible.” The land is empty because the true possessors of the 
land are not there anymore. They are somewhere else.  
 154
The people who were addressed by both chapters 25 and 26 understood themselves 
as closely connected to both YHWH and the land of Canaan. This is their identity, or 
their ideology, without land they loose this identity.  
5.3 Chapter 27 
Before we discuss chapter 24, we need to deal with chapter 27 first, which has 
recently caused some debate. The traditional diachronic or historical-critical view has 
generally been that chapter 27 is a later addition to the text18 and the main reason is 
the two concluding verses at the end of both chapters (vv. 26:46 and 27:34).19 
Recently two scholars, Douglas (1999) and Smith (1996) who both read the text 
synchronically20 have argued that we should read chapters 25-27 as one unit. For 
Douglas chapters 25 and 27 form another (like chapters 18 and 20 around 19)21 ring 
composition which elevates chapter 26. Her argument is mostly based on content.22 
Smith (1996: 25-26) understands these chapters similarly and shares Douglas’ view 
on how the narrative in chapter 24 functions as drawing a border between two 
different parts, an issue that will be addressed under the next sub-heading. Smith 
(1996: 29) adds some more “proof” by, for instance, referring to the fact that the root 
l[g is prevalent in both chapters. He counts 1723 examples in chapter 25 and 12 in 
chapter 27. One could also add that both chapters refer to the Jubilee, but the 
question is whether that is enough? Even if one were to read these chapters 
                                                 
18 Many scholars just accept this without much argument. Thus Otto (1999: 181) would simply state “Lev 27 
ist Zusatz, der durch die Wiederholung von Lev 26,46 in Lev 27,34 in seinen Kontext eingefügt wurde.” 
For him that is more than enough. Similarly Grünwaldt (1999: 128) states: 
Zweifellos bildet Lev 26 den Abschluß einer Gesetzessammlung, an welche Lev 27 sekundär angefügt 
wurde, und zwar nach Beigabe des Formelwerkes. Dies ergibt sich v. a. aus der verkürzten 
Wiederaufnahme von 26,46 in 27,34.  
 Both of them are thus convinced by v. 34 that Leviticus 27 is a later addition and do not bother to argue the 
case any further. Most German scholars would probably still agree with Bertholet (1901: 97) who said 
more than a hundred years ago that Leviticus 27 “will nach v. 34 auch noch zu den Befehlen am Sinai 
gehören, kommt aber freilich hinter 26:46 nach Thorenschluss.”  
19 Ruwe (1999: 44 n.21) does provide a short discussion on the problem of Leviticus 27. Apart from the 
problem with the two endings it also seems that chapter 27 has content-wise more in common with 
Numbers 1-10. As Ruwe puts it: 
In Num 1-10 gibt es u.a. schwerpunkmäßig um die Thematik ‚Abgeben, Weihegaben, Gelübde‘, wie 
die Levitenbestimmungen in Num 3:11ff, das Nasiräatsgesetz in Num 6 und der Bericht über die 
Weihegaben der Fürsten in Num 7 deutlich zeigen. Diese Thematik wird aber auch in Lev 27 
durchgängig behandelt, während sie in Lev 11-26 keine Rolle spielt. 
 There are also close parallels between Leviticus 27 and Numbers 6 and Ruwe suggests that these two 
chapters might have formed the frame around an earlier “Lagerordnung.”  
20 Smith (1996: 17) calls his study “literary-critical” which for him is concerned with “the characteristics of 
the book [i.e. Leviticus - EEM] as we know it today.” It thus is a final form reading or synchronic reading.  
21 See Douglas (1999: 218-240).  
22 Douglas (1999: 244) argues that chapter 27 “deals with the same topics form the point of view of debts to 
the Lord. God himself respects the jubilee law (Lev 27:24) and he himself allows redemption of persons 
(Lev 27:2-8), property (Lev 27:14-15), and animals (Lev 27:9-13). God himself, as a creditor, comes under 
the power of the jubilee laws.” See also the rest of her discussion (Douglas 1999: 241-244). 
23 In chapter 25 I actually count 19 namely, vv. 24, 25 (x2), 26 (x2), 29 (x2), 30, 31, 32, 33, 48 (x2), 49 (x3), 
51, 52 and 54. 
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synchronically without asking any diachronical questions, would it be enough to say 
that because the Hebrew root l[g is salient and because of the “same topic” (i.e. 
debts according to Douglas 1999: 244) we should regard these chapters as forming 
some or other sub-unit? I would like to argue that it is not and that it is indeed 
possible to argue synchronically that chapters 25 and 26 are to such an extent 
intertwined with each other that it still leaves chapter 27 as odd one out. The first 
question that we need to address is whether chapter 27 has anything to offer that 
could challenge the interconnectedness that I pointed out above?  
5.3.1 Grammatical features 
When we consider the grammatical features of Leviticus 27 it becomes clear that the 
arguments of Douglas and Smith are not totally without foundation. At first glance the 
text does remind of the conditional parts that we had in Leviticus 25, especially vv. 
25-34. The text also starts with a combination of a conditional yKi and vyai in v. 2, 
which is then followed by 20 examples of !ai scattered all through the text. Later in v. 
14, when dedicated houses are discussed, we find another combination of yKi and 
vyai. An interesting feature of the text that is different from chapters 25 and 2624 is the 
fact that we find 1125 occurrences of the discourse marker hy:h;w“. Van der Merwe et al 
describe the functioning of this marker as follows (1999: 331): 
Incorporates a state of affairs (described by means of nominal clauses) into the 
mainstream of the procedure being described or the future events envisaged. 
This is a way of preventing that state of affairs from being understood as mere 
background information. Semantically speaking hy:h;w“ has functions that 
correspond with the waw consecutive + perfect form. [their italics]  
I do think that this definition is spot on, because in most of the cases of hy:h;w“ it is used 
to express the price of a person or item, which could be considered as a “state of 
affairs” and is grammatically also a nominal sentence. In this regard hy:h;w“ is used with 
a very strange26 word on seven occasions (excluding vv. 10, 16, 21 and 33) namely 
*K]r][,.27 The noun is &r,[e and is usually translated with something like “assessment” 
or “estimate.” It thus always has to do with assessing or estimating the price of 
something that was dedicated to the Lord and is now to be redeemed (lag) by the 
person who dedicated it in the first place. Thus “state of affairs” seems to be an apt 
description and if we were to regard these examples as functioning similar to a wc. + 
perfect, we could at least say that Leviticus 27 shares this feature with both chapters 
                                                 
24 In chapter 25 there are only two examples in vv. 28 and 50. In chapter 26 we find none.  
25 See vv. 3 (x2), 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 15, 16, 21, 33.  
26 The “strangeness” of the concept is the use of the second person singular pronominal suffix and the 
question then is whom it addresses, but this is a “rhetorical” issue that will be addressed below.  
27 See vv. 2, 3 (x2), 4, 5, 6 (x2), 7, 8, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 23 (x2), 25 and 27 (x2), thus 21 times.  
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25 and 27 of being dominated by wc. + perfect chains. We also find enough 
examples of other verbal roots being used in short wc. + perfect chains.28 There are 
also some other things that remind us of chapters 25 and 26, of which we find some 
in v. 8.  
Table 5.18  
*K,r][,me aWh &m;A!aiw“ 8 
@heKoh' ynEp]li /dymi[>h,w“ 
@heKoh' /tao &yri[>h,w“ 
@heKoh' WNk,yri[}y" rdeNúh' dy" gyCiT' rv,a} yPiAl[' 
8 If any cannot afford the equivalent, they shall be brought before the priest and the priest 
shall assess them; the priest shall assess them according to what each one making a vow can 
afford. 
The first aspect that strikes one here is the verbal root &wm that we find in the first 
clause. This verb only occurs in chapter 25 and here in v. 8 of chapter 27. To this one 
should add the root gcn (Hi) which actually also occurs in chapters 25 and 26 (25:26, 
47, 49 and 26:5 (x2)). But then we also have something that is reminiscent of the 
parallelistic chiasms we had in chapters 25 and 26 in the last two clauses of v. 8. It is 
similar in the sense that we have the same verbal root (Hi of &r[), first as a wc. + 
perfect and then as an imperfect. It thus has the same chiastic effect. The difference 
is that it is not really as parallelistic as the previous examples. The second clause is 
much longer and we have this element “according to which the priest will measure” 
that was absent in the first clause. It might also be more accurate to present this 
feature as follows: 
Table 5.19  
@heKoh' /tao &yri[>h,w“ 
rdeNúh' dy" gyCiT' rv,a} yPiAl[' 
@heKoh' WNk,yri[}y" 
Now it looks more like some kind of “concentric” structure with something in the 
middle surrounded by two similar clauses. The term inclusio also comes to mind. 
This feature is thus similar, but still different to those that we had in chapters 25 and 
26. The same could be said of the next example found in v. 14. 
Table 5.20  
hw:hyl' vd,qo /tyBeAta, vDiq]y"AyKi vyaiw“ 14 
[r; @ybeW b/f @yBe @heKoh' /kyri[>h,w“  
@heKoh' /tao &yri[}y" rv,a}K' 
!Wqy: @Ke 
14 If a person consecrates a house to the LORD, the priest shall assess it: whether good or bad, 
as the priest assesses it, so it shall stand. 
                                                 
28 These include vv. 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 23 and 27.  
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We never had the relative pronoun rv,a}K' in any of the examples of parallelistic 
chiasms in chapters 25 and 26 and in that regard this example is different. Yet one 
could probably argue that the rv,a}K' is the equivalent of the phrase, [r; @ybeW b/f @yBe in 
the first part of the chiasm. These two phrases are thus parallel, but it is expressed 
differently from what we are used to. Once again this chiasm is reminiscent of the 
former examples, but still somewhat different. We find two further examples where 
the verbal root hyh is involved in vv. 10 and 21. 
Table 5.21  
WNp,ylij}y" alø 10 
b/fB] [r'A/a [r;B] b/f /tao rymiy:Aaløw“   
hm;heb]Bi hm;heB] rymiy: rmeh;A!aiw“  
aWhAhy:h;w“ 
.vd,QoAhy<h]yI /tr;Wmt]W 
10 Another shall not be exchanged or substituted for it, either good for bad or bad for good; 
and if one animal is substituted for another, both that one and its substitute shall be holy.  
!r,jeh' hdec]Ki hw:hyl' vd,qo lbeYúb' /taxeB] hd,C;h' hy:h;w“ 21 
./tZ…jua} hy<h]Ti @heKol'   
21 But when the field is released in the jubilee, it shall be holy to the LORD as a devoted field; 
it becomes the priest’s holding. 
The first example in the last two clauses of v. 10, is really different from previous 
examples, because the verb hyh actually refers to two different subjects. The first 
refers to the original dedicated animal and the latter to the one that it has been 
exchanged with. The second example is better, although the second line is much 
shorter than the first. We did have a similar example in Leviticus 25:29. Both these 
phrases refer to the field that will “go out” in the Jubilee and that will then be “for 
YHWH”, which in Leviticus 27 means “for the priest”, but now we are already 
approaching what is actually more part of the persuasive or rhetorical features of this 
text.  
To sum up, there are some grammatical features which Leviticus 27 shares with 25 
and 26, like the wc. + perfect chains and these parallelistic chiasms, but in both 
cases they are both similar and different. The former is dominated by hy:h;w“ which is 
very scarce in Leviticus 25 and the chiasms are often also somewhat different as I 
have pointed out above. The next question then is, whether Leviticus 27 shares any 
rhetorical or persuasive features with the other two chapters?  
5.3.2 Persuasive features (and ideological traces) 
With regards to the persuasive features identified above in chapters 25 and 26, 
chapter 27 has very little in common. For instance, it is totally different with regards to 
address, because it is always in the third person and the landowners are never 
directly addressed. There is the problem with the second person singular suffix in 
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*K]r][,  but most scholars do not know whom this is addressing. According to 
Bertholet (1901: 97) one can either regard it as referring to Moses or as a scribal 
error, because we do not find any of these in the LXX. Yet even if we do regard it as 
referring to Moses, then it still is something totally different from chapters 25 and 26.  
Motivation functions also differently in chapter 27. We do not find a single 
motivational yKi29 and none of the formulas with “I am YHWH.” In stead, in Leviticus 
27 the closest we find to a motivational clause is the multiple examples of “it shall be 
holy for YHWH” or different variations of it.30 The portrayal of YHWH is also different. 
He is never referred to as the liberator from Egypt, but we find many examples of 
hw:hyl' where it usually expresses benefit to YHWH.31 He is always on the receiving 
end of what has been consecrated and YHWH never gives anything in chapter 27. 
The addressees or the $r,a, are also never presented as benefiting. The only other 
person that benefits is found in v. 21 to which I already referred to above as a good 
example of parallelistic chiasm. If we regard that as some kind of parallelism then it 
means that in that case hw:hyl' actually means @heKol'. We should take note of the fact 
that when a field is consecrated to YHWH it ends up as the hZ…jua} of the priest. Once 
again I would argue that the persuasive features in the text allows us to peek into the 
ideology of the authors and readers. The fact that the hZ…jua} ends up with the priests 
probably gives us a further glimpse of the interests of the authors. In this regard I can 
imagine that chapters 25 and 26 (especially the blessing part) were much more 
persuasive since the addressees were often portrayed as benefiting, but here it is 
only YHWH and the priests who are benefiting. If there is something to the scholarly 
view that these texts originated in priestly circles then it means that the authors 
managed to “camouflage” their interests much better in chapters 25 and 26.  
The point is that even if I were to stick to reading these texts synchronically, paying 
no attention to any diachronic questions, even then it does not seem that chapters 27 
and 25 have that much in common. Chapters 25 and 26 do share many similar 
features on both grammatical and persuasive levels, even though the characters of 
the texts are different (25, being apodictic and casuistic law and 26 being mostly 
parenetic). Chapter 27 only shares some grammatical features and these are not all 
that convincing. On the persuasive level it seems to be different altogether and in this 
regard on could also add that the interests of the authors or not that hidden.  
                                                 
29 In the chapters from 16 onwards, we find motivational yKis in every chapter, see 16:2; 16:30, 17:11 (x2), 
17:14 (x2), 18:10, 18:13, 18:24, 18:27, 18:29, 19:2, 19:8, 19:20, 20:3, 20:7, 20:19, 20:23, 20:26, 21:7, 
21:8, 21:12, 21:15, 21:24, 22:7, 22:16, 22:25, 23:28, 23:43, 24:9, 24:15, 24:17 and 24:22. 
30 The root vdq occurs nothing less than 19 times in Leviticus 27. Of these 9 (verses 9, 10, 14, 21, 23, 28, 30, 
32, 33) seem to occur in nominal clauses that could be understood as “motivational.”  
31 These include vv. 2, 9, 11, 14, 16, 21, 22, 23, 26, 28 (x2), 30 (x2) and 32.  
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Yet one of the biggest characteristics of chapters 25 and 26 that is missing in chapter 
27 is a feeling of vulnerability when it comes to the possession of land. We do find 
the term $r,a, in Leviticus 27 on three occasions (vv. 24 and 30(x2)), but usually the 
text is more interested in “fields” (hd,c;) that were consecrated to YHWH. The term 
occurs 12 times especially towards the end of chapter 27 (vv. 16, 17, 18, 19, 20(x2), 
21(x2), 22(x2), 24 and 28). Still one do not get the impression that land-possession is 
under threat or that people will not have enough to eat as we had in chapters 25 and 
26. These things do not seem to be in jeopardy. The only issue is that YHWH should 
receive his due. If YHWH was a liberator and provider in chapters 25 and 26 
(excluding the curses part), he now turns into a tax collector.  
In short, I do not find the proposals by Douglas and Smith convincing. Chapter 27 
simply reads differently from 25 and 26 and is something else. Furthermore, I cannot 
help but feel chapter 27 does not even pretend to be about “liberation”, but seems to 
be more about a sanctuary that wants to make money. 
5.4 Chapter 24 
My treatment of chapter 24 will be considerably different from that of chapters 26 and 
27. Chapters 25 and 26 were woven together by the inclusio formed by 25:1 and 
26:46 and this made them into some kind of closed unit. The two chapters also 
shared many grammatical and persuasive features, not to mention the ideological 
traces that I identified in both. We also saw that, except for some grammatical 
features, Leviticus 27 was something different. The relation between chapter 24 and 
its surrounding texts is far more problematic and as we will shortly see, this has 
always been one of the main issues amongst scholars. The stumbling block then 
usually is the fact that chapter 24 is partly narrative. After taking a closer look at the 
grammatical and rhetorical features of chapter 24 and after finding very few 
similarities, we then will need to explore other avenues. One concern that chapter 24 
shares with chapter 25 is the rG´ and exploring this will provide us with more glimpses 
into the world-view or ideology of the authors and intended readers of these 
chapters.  
5.4.1 Grammatical and persuasive features  
I would divide the text into vv. 1-4, 5-9 and for the time being vv. 10-23. The first text 
is concerned with a lamp that Aaron is to arrange in the tent of meeting and the 
second with twelfth loaves of bread which Moses apparently is to bake and which 
Aaron must arrange every Sabbath. The latter text is a mixture of narrative and laws. 
If we take a closer look at vv. 1-4 then it is only v. 1 and the first clause of v. 2 
(laer;c]yI ynEB]Ata, wx') that are more or less familiar in the sense that it is about YHWH 
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telling Moses something. Yet then the rest of this text is grammatically totally different 
from what we had in chapters 25 and 26.  
Table 5.22  
laer;c]yI ynEB]Ata, wx' 2 
.dymiT; rnE tlø[}h'l] r/aM;l' tytiK; &z… tyIzæ @m,v, *yl,ae Wjq]yIw“  
@roh}a' /tao &ro[}y" d[e/m lh,aoB] tdu[eh; tk,rop;l] $Wjmi 3 
dymiT; hw:hy“ ynEp]li rq,BoAd[' br,[,me 
.!k,yterodol] !l;/[ tQ'ju 
dymiT; hw:hy“ ynEp]li t/rNEh'Ata, &ro[}y" hr;hoF]h' hr;núM]h' l[' 4
2 Command the people of Israel to bring you pure oil of beaten olives for the lamp, that a light 
may be kept burning regularly. 3 Aaron shall set it up in the tent of meeting, outside the 
curtain of the covenant, to burn from evening to morning before the LORD regularly; it shall 
be a statute forever throughout your generations. 4 He shall set up the lamps on the lampstand 
of pure gold before the LORD regularly. 
We find no wc. + perfect chain here, but instead the text starts with a wayyiqtol or wc. 
+ imperfect. Then we find four clauses of which the second and third might be 
nominal clauses and the other two seem to be cases of marked word order with an 
adjunct of place preceding the verb. It might also be possible to regard the two 
nominal clauses as further adjuncts of time and place to the third clause. That is not 
so important, but the point is that this text is grammatically different from what we had 
before.  
With regards to address it is also different. When the second person plural suffix is 
used in v. 2 (*yl,ae) it actually addresses Moses himself, not some land-owning 
Israelite. We do find some reference to the second person plural at the end of v. 3 
and then it is “your generations” (!k,yterodol]). Whenever the third person is referred to 
it actually refers to Aaron. Thus, now we can actually put names to most of those 
addressed or referred to, although the second person plural probably still refers to 
the collective of landowners. Before we move to vv. 5-9 we should also take note of 
the fact that dymiT; occurs three times in this very short text, a word often translated 
with “continuity” (e.g. see Brown, Driver & Briggs 1972: 556).  
Verses 5-9 have features that remind of what we had in chapters 25 and 26, because 
most of the text consists of a wc. + perfect chain. Most of these verbs are in the 
second person singular and once again it is Moses who is addressed, with Aaron 
apparently also playing a role in v. 8. The text is also unconditional and is concluded 
in v. 9 with a yKi clause motivating why Aaron and his sons are supposed to eat these 
loaves. The motivation is not really by means of repetition as we often had in chapter 
25, since it actually declares for the first time that these loaves are holy. The text is 
further characterised by the fact that the word YHWH features a lot. We have two 
occurrences of hw:hy“ ynEp]li (vv. 6 and 8) and one of hw:hyl' (v. 7) and then also a 
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reference to the “offering of fire of YHWH” (v. 9). We also have the word dymiT; again 
(v. 8) that we had three times in the previous text. To conclude, there are some 
grammatical features of this text that is reminiscent of chapters 25 and 26, but on a 
rhetorical level the text is totally different because Moses is addressed and we find 
no references to the second person plural.  
Verses 10-23 are also grammatically totally different from chapters 25 and 26. A 
wayyiqtol chain dominates the narrative parts (vv. 10-12 and 23), which is typical for 
a Biblical Hebrew narrative. We have a short wc. + perfect chain following an 
imperative in v. 14. The rest of the text, which includes the famous jus talionis or law 
of talion, is casuistic law and it reminds of laws throughout Leviticus where the 
protasis of the condition is often introduced by means of a combination of yKi and vyai. 
In Leviticus 25 we had two examples thereof in vv. 26 and 29. The first example in 
24:15 starts with a double vyai which can also be found in other parts of Leviticus 
(e.g. 15:2; 17:3, 8; 18:6; 20:2 and 22: 4, 18). In most of these examples it is used at 
the start of a group of laws. This is also the case here in chapter 24. Thus, apart from 
the two cases of combining vyai and yKi there is not that much in vv. 10-23 that 
reminds of chapter 25, not in terms of what I have described as grammatical 
features. In this regard one should also add that there are no examples of the 
chiastic parallelisms that were so salient in both chapters 25 and 26.  
In the whole text from v. 10 to v. 21 there is no reference to the second person either 
singular or plural, but then in v. 22 we have an example of !k,l;. The text states that 
there will be only one law (fP'v]mi) for both the rG´ and the jr;z“a, and then it is motivated 
by means of !k,yheløa> hw:hy“ ynIa} yKi. One could regard this !k,l; as similar to the ones in 
chapter 25 as expressing benefit. Thus v. 22 is the one verse within vv. 10-23 that 
has the most in common with some of the rhetorical features that we identified in 
chapter 25. We even find “motivation by means of YHWH”, but we find no reference 
to YHWH as the liberator from Egypt. Verses 10-23 share also one other feature with 
chapter 25, which we did not have in Leviticus 26 and that is the rG´. This term is 
always used alongside a further term that we do not find in either chapters 25 or 26 
namely the jr;z“a,.  
But to return to the issue of rhetoric, we should remember that the study of Watts 
(1999) was especially interested in the combination of law and narrative in the 
Pentateuch and in chapters 25 and 26 (and for that matter 27) we have not had any 
narratives. Yet now we have a narrative which precedes chapter 25 and the question 
now becomes, what effect this narrative might have on the understanding of chapter 
25? And one should add, a narrative, which is like chapter 25 interested in the fate of 
the rG´.  
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5.4.2 A strange combination of law and narrative 
This problem of the relation with the texts preceding and succeeding 24:10-23 is not 
the only problem. Another problem that scholars usually debate about is the relation 
between the narrative frame (24:10-15a and 23) and the laws imbedded into the 
narrative (24:15b-22). To illustrate this second problem we could use the following 
presentation by Hutton (1997: 152) of the legal part: 
For the resident alien as for the native (v. 15b-16) [cursing God’s name will result in 
the death penalty - EEM] 
Striking (to death) a human (v. 17) 
Striking (to death) an animal (v. 18) 
lex talio for bodily injury (vv. 19-20) 
Striking (to death) an animal (v. 21a) 
Striking (to death) a human (v. 21b) 
One law for the resident alien and for the native (v. 22a) 
It is clear that we have a concentric structure here with the lex talio forming the 
“centre” surrounded by laws on striking animals, then striking humans and then the 
laws referring to the legal status of a rG´. The first of this latter “circle” (vv. 15b-16) 
links these laws to the narrative by specifically referring to “cursing” (Pi of llq) or 
“swearing” (bqn) at God. One question would be the relation between verses 17-21b 
and the story. Some scholars32 do not see any logic connection between the two. 
They would argue that the story is about blasphemy, not about killing and hurting.33 
The other problem is that this narrative is one of only two narratives (see also Lev 8-
10) surrounded by a vast landscape of different laws in the rest of Leviticus. Chapter 
23 is, as we will see below, concerned with the many feasts of the sanctuary. The 
first nine verses of chapter 24 are, as we saw above, concerned with the lights in the 
tabernacle and the twelve breads that Moses has to bake every Sabbath. Still, both 
texts have a very obvious cultic focus34 and then suddenly we have the blaspheming 
                                                 
32 See the discussion by Hutton (1997: 152-153). Or see the following summary from Grünwaldt (1999).  
33 I’m not that convinced that this is so illogical. In some cases in the Hebrew Bible where the root hxn is 
used, one often finds that people get injured. One good example would be in Exodus 21:22 where two men 
fight and a pregnant woman gets injured. This is also followed by the jus talio. Fighting could thus not just 
lead to blaspheming, but also to injuries and death and in that sense these laws could be appropriate here.  
34 Ruwe actually treats the whole text from 23:1-24:9 as one unit on the following grounds (1999: 298):  
Thematisch paßt dieses Stück sehr gut zum Festkalender 23,1-43. Indem 24,1-9 die religiösen Rituale 
für die kleineren Zeithorizonte (jeden Sabbat und jeden Tag) thematisiert, fügt es sich inhaltlich 
stimmig an den Festkalender an, der die religiösen Feste und Anlässe im größeren Zeithorizont des 
Jahres behandelt.  
 I do think that Ruwe has a very strong case here. 
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half-Israelite in the rest of Leviticus 24. That is not to mention the succeeding chapter 
25, which is also quite different. But why is this story of the blaspheming half-Israelite 
placed here, between texts about religious acts and festivals and a text with 
seemingly more social implications? 
A diachronic way out of the problem would be to argue that it was added later and 
many scholars35 have argued this and many are still doing so. Grünwaldt (1999: 92-
93) states that research has been convinced up to now that the narrative is much 
younger than the laws. He summarises the three main reasons for this conclusion as 
follows: 
1) This narrative is similar to other narratives in the priestly text namely, Num 
9:6-14; 15:32-36; 27:1-11 and 36:1-12.36  
2) Only vv. 15b, 16 and 22 are in terms of content connected to the narrative. 
3) Vv. 15-22 have linguistic similarities to the Holiness Code.  
He himself does not rate the first and third criteria that highly and focuses more on 
the second. Eventually he agrees with these findings, be it with a slightly different 
argument.37 For him the story is indeed added as an illustration of the legal part.38 
Having done this he is satisfied and does not really bother further with either 
interpreting or dating the narrative part. One could still ask, whether it would not be a 
legitimate question to ask what the latter redactor might have wanted to achieve with 
this combination? That is, if we do accept that it was a later editor and that the two 
parts were not originally composed together.  
The most recent commentary of Milgrom (2001: 2105) insists that this narrative and 
the laws imbedded in it “were inextricably woven into each other not just in the 
present introverted structure of the text, but also from the beginning.” For Milgrom 
(2001: 2111) the legal question addressed by this text was: “Does the death penalty 
apply to a non-Israelite (or half-Israelite) blasphemer?” Hutton (1997: 145-163) 
                                                 
35 Thus Otto (1995: 391) thinks that “der spätpentateuchische Ergänzer” added this whole chapter (along with 
21:24 and 23:44) some time after completing the rest. 
36 See also Milgrom (2001: 2101) who does not mention Numbers 36. 
37 He (1999: 93-94) acknowledges that both the narrative and the legal part use verbs like bqn and llq (Pi) 
to express the offence of the half-Israelite. This might be seen as evidence that the two are interconnected, 
but in the narrative these verbs are much more compactly used. In vv. 15b-16 we find wyh;løa> lLeq'y“AyKi and 
hw:hy“A!ve bqenúw“. In both instances the verbs have clear objects. Yet in the story (v. 11) it is !Veh'Ata,….bQoYIw", 
thus only “the Name” now without YHWH and only lLeq'y“w" without any object whatsoever. The terseness 
of the version in the story, thus for Grünwaldt, presupposes that the story is a commentary on the laws and 
therefore later. The shorter version builds on the longer version and not the other way around.  
38 Similarly Ruwe (1999: 56-57) understands this text as a “nachkompositionelle Ergänzung” that is added to 
the composition “um die Gleichbehandlung des Fremden (rg) und des Einheimischen (jrza) in 
strafrechtlichen Fragen noch in der Sinaigesetzgebung zu verankern oder um ein bestimmtes Verfahren 
von Recthsfortschreibung auf der Grundlage von Gottesbefragung als am Sinai praktiziert zu legitimieren.” 
For him the obvious similarities with the narratives in texts like Numbers 9:6-14; 15:32-36; 27:1-11 and 
36:1-12 mean that it should be regarded as a text that was not originally part of the Holiness Code. He 
argues this in spite of the fact that he describes his study as mostly synchronic (see Ruwe 1999: 134). 
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argues that the narrative’s position is not random, but has a rhetorical aim when 
placed in the bigger structure of the book and also wants to read the two together.  
Other scholars also argue that the narrative plays an important role in the whole 
structure of Leviticus. In these views the role of the narrative in chapter 24 is usually 
compared and related to the other narrative in Leviticus namely chapters 8-10. Mary 
Douglas has provided at least two different but related proposals. Her first proposal 
(Douglas 1993a) was a kind of ring-composition where two halves (1-18 and 19-27) 
of Leviticus mirror each other. In these two halves chapter 24 is as Milgrom (2001: 
2106) puts it, “in Leviticus, the counterpart to chapter 10: the Name defiled balancing 
the Holy Place defiled.” In a latter work by her Douglas (1999: 223) proposes a new 
structure for the whole book, but now the two narratives also function together in the 
sense that they define “borders” to the three different parts of Leviticus. Douglas 
(1999: 195) understands both as being “about encroachment on the divine 
prerogative.” Similarly to Douglas, Smith (1996: 25-26) understands the narrative in 
chapter 24 as introducing the last part of Leviticus, which consists of chapters 25-27, 
as we saw above when discussing chapter 27. 
I will try to build on many of these observations, although I am not in total agreement 
with all of them. What they (i.e. Milgrom, Hutton, Douglas and Smith) all have in 
common is that they are not satisfied with separating either the narrative from the 
laws, or chapter 24 from the surrounding context, but insist that we should treat the 
whole. The question remains what the objective was of combining law and narrative 
in such a manner and why it was placed here in Leviticus?  
We have treated the contribution by Watts (1999) extensively in the previous chapter 
and especially the fact that he is interested in the combinations of law (or “list” as he 
calls it) and narrative in the Pentateuch. I have used his distinctions between 
address, motivation and repetition/variation extensively with regards to chapter 25 
and to a lesser extent when discussing chapters 26 and 27. The problem with 
chapter 24 is that he does not really engage with this chapter. Similarly to Milgrom he 
understands it as follows (Watts 1999: 87): 
The case of the half-Egyptian blasphemer (Lev 24:10-14) becomes an occasion 
to emphasize the universal application of not just the laws on blasphemy, but the 
criminal statutes as well (vv. 15-22). 
He compares chapter 24 to Num 32 and 36 and then concludes further (1999: 87):  
The reasons for placing the blasphemy case in Leviticus 24 are less apparent, 
but probably derive from a wish to restate in summary fashion at this point in the 
Holiness Code the universality of the most basic religious and criminal laws. All 
three stories [i.e. Lev 24 along with Num 32 and 36 - EEM] further the didactic 
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concerns and issues of the lists, rather than the plots and themes of the larger 
narrative.  
Yet we should remember that the kind of rhetorical criticism that Watts proposes is 
not a-historical and these questions will eventually have to be answered by 
constructing a historical context where this text was designed to have some kind of 
rhetorical effect on people living in that context. Ultimately most of the questions 
asked here can only be settled in the next chapter where the issue of historical 
context would be addressed. Then the ultimate question would be what kind of 
rhetorical effect might a story have had about a half-Israelite cursing God? Before we 
go there it might be helpful to ask how a rG´ is presented in the texts preceding 
chapter 24. We know what chapter 25 does with the rG´ and if this is some issue or 
feature that the two texts have in common we should ask how the rG´ is presented in 
the preceding texts. In chapter 25 the rG´ is usually referred to along with the bv;/T39 
and now the rG´ is mentioned along with the jr;z“a, and we need to ask how these 
groups of people are presented in the text preceding chapters 24 and 25. By doing 
this I am thus already discussing some of the preceding chapters and already asking 
what these have in common with chapters 24 and 25. Doing this runs the risk of 
repeating myself later on, but I will try to focus now specifically on the rG´ in these 
chapters and thus on a specific theme. Repetition is unfortunately inevitable. The 
interesting thing is that the rG´ often features where another familiar theme also 
presents itself namely the land. We are thus once again very much within the domain 
of ideology and group-identity.  
5.4.3 The rG´ in the Holiness Code 
The first time that the term rGe is mentioned, is in Leviticus 16:29,40 where it is stated 
that the rGe is, like the jr;z“a,  not allowed to work on the Day of Atonement. Then in 
17:8 the rG´ is also commanded to bring his offerings to the tent of meeting and in 
17:10, 12 and 13 they are not allowed to eat blood either. In these verses they are 
always contrasted with “a person from the house of Israel” (laer;c]yI tyBemi vyai vyaiw“). In 
both these cases (not bringing the offering and eating blood), the penalty is being cut 
off (trk) from his people (wyM;['me). In v. 15 the rG´ is juxtaposed with the jr;z“a, and any 
person of either group who eats torn meat or “what dies of itself” should wash himself 
and be unclean until evening. It thus seems that “a person from the house of Israel” 
                                                 
39 Rendtorff (1996: 79) points out that although the term rG´ is often used along with the bv;/T, it is never used 
along with rykic;, but the latter is often paired with a bv;/T.  
40 Chapter 16 is not usually regarded as part of the Holiness Code, but scholars like Ruwe (1999) and Smith 
(1996) would argue that it functions as some kind of “hinge” between the collections of 11-15 and 17-26. 
It could thus be read along with 17-26 as some kind of “introductory text.” These issues will be explored 
later.  
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and an jr;z“a, are the same. If these two groups are the same then by implication it 
means that the rG´ is not from the house of Israel. It is here that Rendtorff (1996: 82) 
points out that most of these texts are about what the rG´ and the jr;z“a, have in 
common although they apparently are groups who are contrasted with each other. 
The interesting issue would then be what these groups do not have in common. I 
shall return to this question later.  
In chapter 18 we find a long list of sexual taboos, which are followed by a warning not 
to defile the land (vv. 24-25) and both the rG´ and the jr;z“a, are once again 
encouraged to obey these laws. Otherwise, the land will spit them all out (vv. 26-27) 
as it did with the predecessors. Then in chapter 19 we have two further occurrences 
where in v. 10 the Israelites are commanded not to collect the whole harvest, but to 
leave something for the ynI[' and the rGe. Now the rG´ is thus juxtaposed with somebody 
else, namely the ynI['. In v. 33 we have a further sentence, which has many “echoes” 
with chapter 25. When a rG´ sojourns with you, you shall not oppress (hny, like in 25:14 
and 17) him. You shall treat him like an jr;z“a, and the motivation is that the Israelites 
were !yriG´ in Egypt. 
In 20:2 it is stated that neither an jr;z“a, nor a rGe shall sacrifice their children to 
Molech. YHWH himself promises to “cut these persons off.” In 22:18 it is prohibited 
for both an Israelite (again laer;c]yI tyBemi vyai vyai) and a rG´ to bring an animal with a 
blemish (!Wm). In 23:22 (similar to 19:10) the Israelites are asked to leave something 
for the ynI[; and the rG´ when they harvest. The next occurrence of the term is then 
chapter 24.  
I would like to categorise these laws into two broad groups namely laws laying 
obligations on the !yriG´ and laws that seem to be providing some privileges or 
protection.41 Most of the laws named above could be understood as laying 
obligations on the rG´. These include all the laws where the rG´ features along with 
either the jr;z“a, or the Israelite and where both parties are prohibited to do certain 
things. In 19:10 and 23:22 where the rG´ is presented along with the ynI[' the laws 
seem to be protecting the rG´ or providing the rG´ with some privileges. The same goes 
for 19:33 where the Israelites are not allowed to maltreat a rG´, but where they are 
                                                 
41 Milgrom (2000: 1496) argues as follows with regards to the legal status of the rG´: 
Whereas the civil law held the citizen and the rG´ to be of equal status (e.g., Lev 24:22; Num 35:15), 
the religious laws made distinctions according to the following underlying principle: the rG´ is bound 
by the prohibitive commandments, but not by the performative ones.  
 For him there is the common fear that the rG´ might also pollute the land. This is thus one reason for the 
“obligations” that I identified above.  
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commanded to treat him like an jr;z“a,. They are then reminded that they themselves 
were !yriG´ in Egypt.  
With regards to chapter 24 the question would thus be what kind of law is this, is it 
spelling out an obligation or providing protection? When one reads v. 22 alone it 
sounds protecting, but within the larger context it becomes more constraining. The 
laws are aimed against people cursing God and maiming each other.42 Thus both the 
rG´ and the jr;z“a, are prohibited doing these things and the consequences in this event 
are clearly spelled out.  
The rG´ is presented in the chapters preceding chapter 24 as somebody who either 
shares many obligations along with the Israelite, or who seems to be rather 
vulnerable and needs to be protected. I already mentioned above that when the rG´ is 
referred to along with the jr;z“a, and the Israelite it actually expresses what these two 
groups have in common, what they both are obliged to do. The question that I asked 
above, but which I did not answer was, with regards to what these two groups differ. 
If I were correct that the people that were addressed in chapters 25 and 26 were the 
land-owning males, or the people that in the eyes of the authors had a legal claim to 
land, then could we not argue that the !yriG´ were those that did not have legal claims 
to land? Rendtorff actually argues that by referring to Ezekiel 47:22 (1996: 85): 
According to this statement, the only thing that distinguishes a permanent rG´ 
from an Israelite is the participation in the possession of the land. If this situation 
changes, there will no longer be any difference at all.  
I would like to support his argument by referring to Leviticus 19:33 and some of the 
other mentioned occurrences of the rG´ again.  
Table 5.23 
!k,x]r]a'B] rG´ *T]ai rWgy:Aykiw“ 33 
./tao Wn/t alø 
!k,T]ai rG:h' rG´h' !k,l; hy<h]yI !K,mi jr;z“a,K] 34 
*/mK; /l T;b]h'a;w“  
!yIr;x]mi $r,a,B] !t,yyIh> !yrig´AyKi 
.!k,yheløa> hw:hy“ ynIa} 
33 When an alien resides with you in your land, you shall not oppress the alien. 34 The alien 
who resides with you shall be to you as the citizen among you; you shall love the alien as 
yourself, for you were aliens in the land of Egypt: I am the LORD your God. 
                                                 
42 I find the following quote by Milgrom (2000: 1496) quite useful and cannot help but agree with him:  
The injunction that “there shall be one law for you and for the resident stranger” (Num 15:15; cf. Exod 
12:48-49; Lev 7:7; 24:22; Num 9:14; 15:29-30) should not be misconstructed. It applies only to the 
case given in the context; it is not to be taken as a generalization (contra van Houten 1991:150, 156; 
cf. Ibn Ezra).  
 I am rather at a loss at what he means by Leviticus 7:7.  
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Most of this text is addressed at the second person plural, with only the second 
clause in v. 34 addressed at the singular and the *T]ai in v. 33. This mixture of second 
person singular and plural should in itself remind us of Leviticus 25. But add to that 
the root hny (Hi) in v. 33; which only occurs here and in vv. 15 and 17 of chapter 25; 
and the yKi clause referring to the addressees being !yriG´ in Egypt, then the picture is 
even clearer. The most interesting thing about this text is the expression “your land” 
(!k,x]r]a') in v. 33. We should keep in mind that the expression occurs only 12 times43 
in the whole Holiness Code. We already had six of them in chapter 26 and the 
authors thus used it rather sparingly. It is clearly stated that the land belongs to the 
addressees and the rG´ is actually sojourning in the land of the addressees (in “your” 
land), implying that the land does not belong to the rG´. Or, to rephrase it, implying 
that the rG´ has no legitimate claim to the land in the eyes of the authors. The rG´ is 
thus obliged to obey many laws along with the jr;z“a, or the Israelite, although he does 
not have any legitimate claim to land.  
A quick look at some of the other examples of !k,x]r]a' might also help to formulate my 
argument more clearly. If we exclude the examples in chapter 26 then we have six 
examples remaining. Of these we have just discussed one, but in chapter 19 we also 
find this expression in v. 9.  
Table 5:24 
rxoq]li *d]c; ta'P] hL,k't] alø !k,x]r]a' ryxiq]Ata, !k,r]x]qub]W 19.9 
.fQel't] alø *r]yxiq] fq,l,w“ 
lle/[t] alø *m]r]k'w“ 10 
fQel't] alø *m]r]K' fr,p,W 
!t;ao bzú[}T' rGel'w“ ynI[;l,
.!k,yheløa> hw:hy“ ynIa}
19:9 When you reap the harvest of your land, you shall not reap to the very edges of your field, 
or gather the gleanings of your harvest. 10 You shall not strip your vineyard bare, or gather the 
fallen grapes of your vineyard; you shall leave them for the poor and the alien: I am the LORD 
your God. 
Most of this text is addressed at the second person singular with the first part of the 
first clause in the plural. The text thus addresses the collective of land-owners first, 
before it zooms in on the individual and is thus like vv. 33-34 reminiscent of chapter 
25. Yet the most interesting fact here is that in the next verse we find reference to the 
rG´ and the same is true of Leviticus 23:22. 
                                                 
43 See Leviticus 19:9, 33; 22:24; 23:22; 25:9 and 45 and 26:1, 5, 6, 19, 20 and 33. 
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Table 5:25 
!k,x]r]a' ryxiq]Ata, !k,r]x]qub]W 23.22 
*r,x]quB] *d]c; ta'P] hL,k't]Aalø   
fQel't] alø *r]yxiq] fq,l,w“ 
!t;ao bzú[}T' rG´l'w“ ynI[;l,  
 s  .!k,yheløa> hw:hy“ ynIa} 
23:22 When you reap the harvest of your land, you shall not reap to the very edges of your field, 
or gather the gleanings of your harvest; you shall leave them for the poor and for the alien: I 
am the LORD your God. 
This verse is very similar to 19:9-10 and as in that example “your land” is later 
followed by a reference to the rG´. We should add 25:45, which we have discussed on 
more than one occasion, but where we also find the same combination. The only 
examples where these two entities are not used in each other’s vicinity are 25:9 and 
22:24, although the latter refers to the rk;nE. We could also add 25:6-7 where the 
singular suffixes are used, but where “your land” and “your rG´” are also used 
alongside each other.  
My question now is why the authors so often used the expression “your land” when a 
reference to the rG´ followed. Excluding the six examples in Leviticus 26 we thus have 
four occurrences out of six for the rest of the Holiness Code, plus the example with 
the singular forms in 25:6-7. Is this really a coincidence that the authors used “your 
land” when they wanted to say something about the rG´? I would venture that these 
examples provide us with a further glimpse into the world-view or ideology of the 
authors. It also suggests (to me at least) that the rG´ did indeed lay claim to the land, 
but that this claim was not acknowledged by the authors. Therefore they tended to 
express clearly that the land only belonged to the addressees whenever the words 
$r,a, and rG´ were used in the same vicinity. They intended to remind the addressees 
that it is their land and nobody else’s. Do these “slips of the tongue” betray an 
underlying struggle, a land dispute? That is what I would want to guess, but I will 
revisit this issue in the next chapter.  
To sum up, apart from the laws prohibiting the !yriG´ from doing certain things, we also 
find the laws that attempt to protect the rG´ and even provide him with some privileges 
as we saw above in especially the cases where the rG´ is juxtaposed with the ynI[;. Yet 
one never has the impression that the rG´ is treated unfairly, apart from the fact that 
he has no claim to land. This changes when we reach chapter 25 and some of the 
laws now seem rather exploitive when compared to the previous laws, especially the 
notorious vv. 44-46. But why this change after chapter 24? Does the narrative have 
anything to do with it?  
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In order to answer these questions we first need to address another question and 
that is how the other narrative functions in Leviticus? This narrative is not a part of 
what has traditionally been regarded as the Holiness Code, but the narrative might 
provide us with some clues as to the functioning of the current narrative.  
5.4.4 The first narrative 
Ruwe (1999: 45-52) understands this narrative as being both the climax of the 
Priestly Sinai Narrative and as a narrative that adds an ethical appeal to the 
understanding of the Priestly Sinai Narrative (Ex (19:1f*)24:15b - Num 10:10).44 But 
first we need to understand his description of the basic theme (“Leitthematik”) of the 
Sinai Priestly Narrative, which he bases on the work of Blum (1990). Blum 
understands (see Ruwe 1999: 40-45) the Priestly Sinai Narrative, to put it very short, 
as the story of God’s return or “come back.” Things went wrong between God and his 
people (as told in Gen 1-10), but God starts approaching his people and eventually in 
the Sinai Priestly Narrative God’s presence (dwbk) and glory is once again 
experienced amongst his people. The climax of the whole Sinai Priestly Narrative is 
in the narrative of Leviticus 8 and 9, where the tabernacle is consecrated and God’s 
presence (dwbk) is experienced once again amongst the people (Lev 9:23-24).  
Ruwe (1999: 45-52) agrees with Blum’s views, but wants to take it one step further 
by focusing stronger on the ethical part of this climax of the Priestly Sinai Narrative. 
In order to do this he explores chapter 10 of Leviticus, which he thinks should be 
read along with chapter 9. This story is for him about two different responses of 
YHWH to two different kinds of human acts and thus makes an ethical appeal. But he 
also regards the divine words in 10:8-11 as an intricate part of the story and 
especially vv. 10 and 11 where Aaron is instructed to distinguish between the holy 
and the profane and clean and unclean. The two collections following this narrative is 
exactly about these issues. Chapters 11-15 are concerned with clean and unclean 
(r/hF;h'/ameF;h') and chapters 17-26*45 with profane and holy (ljoh'/vd,Qoh') and this is 
similar to what Smith (1996) argues. The point is thus that both of them argue that 
part of that narrative’s purpose was to function as some kind of introduction for what 
is to follow. One could say to “pave the way” for what followed, to introduce the two 
collections following this speech and, of course, to persuade readers to take these 
two collections seriously.  
Both narratives share other features as well. Both “disturb” the “build-up” in the book 
towards a sanctuary where YHWH is present amongst his people and both are a 
                                                 
44 See similarly Watts (1999: 54). 
45 We have seen above when discussing chapter 26 that Ruwe unfortunately does not regard 26:3-46 as part 
of the Holiness Code. 
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strange mixture of law and narrative. The question would thus be whether both might 
also be functioning in the same way in the sense that they prepare the reader for the 
laws that follow? But then for what exactly do they then prepare the reader? Or, what 
possible rhetorical effect are they to have?  
Another interesting fact about the placement of the narrative in chapter 24 is the 
possible relation to the contents of chapter 23. It is as if chapter 23 and 24:1-9 
describe some kind of cultic “paradise” where the people of YHWH celebrate the 
different festivals in a yearly, monthly, weekly and even daily rhythmic cycle, but then 
this “tranquillity” is cruelly disturbed by this incident. It is as if things have nicely 
settled down after the previous disastrous incident in chapter 10. We have worked 
through the laws on clean and unclean (11-15) and now the laws focusing on holy 
and profane (17-24:9). Everything seems to have been returning to normality. Society 
was getting sorted out again, getting ordered into neat categories, where everything 
and everyone seemed to have had his/her place, and now this rather unfortunate 
disturbance. Verse 24:9 is nicely concluded with a phrase expressing the Holiness of 
the twelve pieces of bread that Moses were to bake and Aaron were to arrange on 
every Sabbath and now this peaceful bliss is scattered by a terrible profanity, 
somebody swearing at the Name. And who is the culprit? A half-caste who’s name is 
not even mentioned and who by implication should be regarded as a rG´.  
Then following the narrative, and after the culprit has been removed from society (v. 
23), chapter 25 is the chapter of the Holiness Code which introduces laws that really 
make a second class citizen of the rG´, who is extensively opened up to exploitation. 
They are the ones from whom (vv. 44-46) the Israelites are allowed to take slaves 
who will not be set free at the Jubilee, but who could be kept for perpetuity. They 
seem (vv. 47-55) to have the ability to gain land and some wealth, but if Israelites 
were to end up with them as slaves they should immediately be redeemed from 
them.  
What then was the intention of chapter 24? To disturb the blissful cultic situation 
spelled out by 23-24:8 by means of a story about a blaspheming “bastard”? Was this 
maybe to remind the hearers about the (perceived) threat that these mixed persons 
or !yriG´ posed to their society? It was after-all one of them who cursed the Name! 
Were the authors hoping that it would get the hearers/readers in the right mood for 
the exploitation that was to follow in chapter 25? They needed to forget laws like 
those in chapter 19 who asked them to treat the rG´ like themselves. Instead they 
needed to be reminded of the dangers entailed in the presence of the “mixed” people 
and rG´ in their midst. Maybe then the laws in chapter 25 would not have understood 
as being at such odds with those in chapter 19?  
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These questions can only be settled when we know more about the possible 
historical setting of these texts and can thus only be answered in the next chapter. 
For the time being I think that the most valuable insight that we gained from looking 
at how the rG´ featured in the preceding texts is the fact that the rG´ did not have legal 
claims to the land. Land does not really feature in chapter 24, but in the preceding 
texts it often features in the vicinity of the rG´. This also provides us with a glimpse into 
the worldview or ideology of the authors. I argued that it shows that some land-
dispute was taking place between those who called themselves the children of Israel, 
or an jr;z“a, and those that were called !yriG´. An interesting question would have been 
what the latter called themselves, but that is an impossible question to answer.  
5.5 Chapter 23 
Before we take a short look at the grammatical and especially rhetorical features of 
Leviticus 23 it might be useful to discuss Ruwe’s (1999) understanding of the second 
half of the Holiness Code. He attempts to find a basic theme (Basisthematik) for the 
Holiness Code and he (1999: 90-97) starts by dividing the Holiness Code into two 
parts and then discusses the second part first (23:1-25:55*). This part is then divided 
into two further sub-units namely Leviticus 23:1-24:9 and Leviticus 25:1-55. With 
regards to 23:1-24:9, Ruwe (1999: 91) argues that only some of the laws, like the 
festival of weeks (vv. 15-22), or the festival of booths (vv. 33-44) and maybe the 
festival of trumpets (vv. 23-25) have what he calls “festspezifischen Ritus.” With most 
of the other festivals these specific rites are lacking. This observation helps him to 
reach the following conclusion about the main intention of Leviticus 23 (Ruwe 1999: 
91): 
Seine Hauptintention scheint vielmehr darin zu liegen, für alle Feste 
gleichermaßen gültige Festtagsnormen zu formulieren und einen übergreifenden 
konzeptionellen Rahmen für den Jahresfestzyklus im ganzen zu schaffen.  
The “norm” that he then identifies is the Sabbath, which seems to be the basis of all 
of these festivals. This concept did not play such an extensive role in the other texts 
on Festival Calendars46 (Ruwe 1999: 91). Ruwe (1999: 92-93) provides many more 
                                                 
46 The texts that Ruwe (1999: 91-92) refers to include, Ex 23:14-17; 34:18-23; Dt 16:1-17 and Ez 45:18-25. 
He thus accepts that these texts were “literary ancestors” of Leviticus 23 and that the latter developed the 
contents of these texts further. This is an aspect of Ruwe’s work that might seem confusing; if he calls his 
study “synchronic”, why then does he bother with texts that he thinks are older then the Holiness Code? Is 
that not turning it into a diachronic study now? I think that this tendency is actually a strongpoint of Ruwe. 
Although he is mainly interested in studying the text as it is now, he also acknowledges that the text did 
develop and that other texts were reworked. The way in which he does this helps him to describe more 
accurately the features that are present in the text as we have it now. It is obvious from a normal 
synchronic reading of the text that the word Sabbath is rather important here. But when we compare it with 
(presumably) earlier texts and we discover that the concept was absent there, it helps us to understand the 
role that Sabbath now plays so much better. His study thus shows that the traditional distinction between 
what biblical scholars would call synchronic and diachronic studies is not that clear-cut.  
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detailed observations about the role played by the Sabbath and then concludes that 
all yearly festivals were “revamped” on the institution of the Sabbath (1999: 94):  
Insgesamt dürfte deutlich sein, daß der Kalendar 23,1-24,9 ganz wesentlich von 
der Sabbatthematik bestimmt wird. Absicht der priesterlichen Autoren, für die der 
tbv bekanntlich der Tag schlechthin ist (vgl. nur Gen 2,2-3 und Ex 16,23ff), 
scheint es zu sein, alle Jahresfeste (bzw. deren Anfangs- und Abschlußtage) mit 
dem Charakter des tbv zu versehen. Offenbar wollten sie den in ihren Abläufen 
und Inhalten durchaus unterschiedlichen Jahresfesten – zum Teil sind es Ernte-, 
zum Teil heilgeschichtliche Feste – einheitlich jene Dignität verleihen, die der 
siebte Tag für sie hat. Das übergreifende Thema von 23,1-43 sind also die 
Jahresfeste, sofern sie Formen des tbv sind.  
The same is more-or-less true of chapter 25 and Ruwe (1999: 94-97) argues that it is 
here especially important that the Sabbath year is something new. He argues (1999: 
95-98) that Leviticus probably used the seventh year concept found in Ex 23:10-11 
and “married” it to the Sabbath concept. Similarly the Jubilee year is build on the 
seven-year cycle. He concludes that like the “Festkalender” in chapter 23 the 
“Brachjahr- / Loslassungsjahr-komplex” in chapter 25 is build on the “Grundlage der 
Sabbatvorstellung.” The important point for our discussion is that this is something 
that chapters 23 and 25 have in common, that everything was revamped by using the 
Sabbath. The Sabbath became the foundation on which these two chapters were 
rebuild.  
On a critical note we could ask again why Ruwe then left out chapter 26? We saw 
that towards the end of that chapter when the land lay empty it had the opportunity to 
enjoy its Sabbaths (vv. 34, 35 and 43) and we actually found $r,a, being the subject of 
the verb tbv on three occasions (vv. 34 and 35(x2)). This is clearly a concern that 
chapter 26 shares with chapters 23 and 25. The character of chapter 26 is different in 
the sense that it is parenetic, but still it knows about the importance of the Sabbath, 
like chapters 23 and 25 also do. Apart form this oversight on behalf of Ruwe, I still 
think that his description is quite accurate of these two chapters. Both chapters are 
related and they are not only related in terms of their concern with the Sabbath, but 
also in terms of the features that I have described as grammatical and rhetorical. I 
will shortly argue this below in support of Ruwe.  
5.5.1 Grammatical and persuasive features 
Chapter 23 is especially reminiscent of 25:2-13 and thus the part that introduced the 
basic laws on the Sabbath and Jubilee years and the part that was also more 
unconditional or apodictic. As in that part we find many features like nominal clauses, 
 174
marked word order, the occasional wc. + perfect, the occasional motivational yKi47 and 
chiastic parallelism in chapter 23. Some of these are already present in v. 3 of 
chapter 23. 
Table 5.26 
hk;al;m] hc,[;Te !ymiy: tv,ve 3 
vd,qoAar;q]mi @/tB;v' tB'v' y[iybiV]h' !/Yb'W 
Wc[}t' alø hk;al;m]AlK; ~
  p  .!k,ytebov]/m lkoB] hw:hyl' awhi tB;v' 
3 Six days shall work be done; but the seventh day is a sabbath of complete rest, a holy 
convocation; you shall do no work: it is a sabbath to the LORD throughout your settlements. 
The first clause is a near replica of the first two clauses of 25:3 (see table 3.2). There 
the text was concerned with years and now it is about days. We also had the phrase 
@/tB;v' tB'v' in 25:4. The third clause is an example of marked word order where the 
object is fronted similarly to the marked word order clauses that we had in vv. 4, 5 
and 12. This specific clause occurs a further eight times in the rest of the chapter (vv. 
7, 8, 21, 25, 28, 31, 35 and 36) stating every time that no work is to be done on that 
specific festival. It is only left out with regards to two festivals, namely the festival of 
the first fruits and the festival of booths. In these two cases we have other examples 
of marked word order stating what extraordinary thing is to be done on this festival, or 
what is not allowed to happen.48 The last clause of v.3 is a nominal clause 
proclaiming that it is a Sabbath for YHWH. The following example is also reminiscent 
of the start of Leviticus 25: 
Table 5.27 
!k,l; @tenú ynIa} rv,a} $r,a;h;Ala, Wabot;AyKi 10ab 
Hr;yxiq]Ata, !T,r]x'q]W 
.@heKoh'Ala, !k,r]yxiq] tyviare rm,[oAta, !t,abeh}w" 
!k,n“xor]li hw:hy“ ynEp]li rm,[oh;Ata, #ynIhew“ 11 
.@heKoh' WNp,ynIy“ tB;V'h' tr'j?M;mi  
When you enter the land that I am giving you and you reap its harvest, you shall bring the 
sheaf of the first fruits of your harvest to the priest. 11 He shall raise the sheaf before the 
LORD, that you may find acceptance; on the day after the sabbath the priest shall raise it.  
The first clause is an exact replica of 25:2ab and we have the root rxq again (also 
25:5 and 11). The latter verb actually introduces a short wc. + perfect chain which is 
interrupted by a further familiar feature, a chiastic parallelism. In this case the verb is 
                                                 
47 There is actually only one example in v. 28: aWh !yriPuKi !/y yKi. It is concerned with the day of 
reconciliation and it reminds of “motivation by means repetition” that I identified in chapter 25.  
48 Thus in v. 14 we have the following clause stating what may not be eaten at that specific time: 
Wlk]ato alø lm,r]k'w“ yliq;w“ !j,l,w“. Note that the objects are also fronted. In v. 42 we have the following clause 
stating that the Israelites are to stay in huts: !ymiy: t['b]vi Wbv]Te tKoSuB]. In this case it is not the object that is 
fronted but the place where they are to stay.  
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#wn (Hi) and the first example is a wc. + perfect whereas the second is the normal 
imperfect. The kind of parallelism that we have here is slightly different in the sense 
that the first clause refers to the place (before YHWH), whereas the second refers to 
the time (at the evening) when it will happen. The following example is also slightly 
different from the examples that we saw in chapters 25 and 26.  
Table 5.28 
hn:V;B' !ymiy: t['b]vi hw:hyl' gj' /tao !t,GOj'w“ 41 
!k,yterodol] !l;/[ tQ'ju  
./tao WGjoT; y[iybiV]h' vd,joB'  
!ymiy: t['b]vi Wbv]Te tKoSuB'~ 42 
.tKoSuB' Wbv]yE laer;c]yIB] jr;z“a,h;AlK;~ 
41 You shall keep it as a festival to the LORD seven days in the year; you shall keep it In the 
seventh month as a statute forever throughout your generations. 42 You shall live in booths for 
seven days; all that are citizens in Israel shall live in booths, 
In v. 41 we have a similar case where the verb ggj is used, but the chiasm is 
somewhat spoiled with the phrase !k,yterodol] !l;/[ tQ'ju added between the two 
repetitive clauses. Both clauses refer to time, but the first clause refers to a period of 
time and the last to a specific point in time. Still I do think that this repetition adds to 
the aesthetics of the text and also to the persuasiveness of the text, but the next 
verse is even more interesting for our purposes. We find a repetition of the verb bvy 
and although it is not a chiasm, there is something else rather fascinating about the 
two verbs. The first example is in the second person plural and thus is directly 
addressing our addressees, but the second example is in the third person. In the first 
clause the addressees will live in booths and in the second every jr;z“a, of Israel will 
live there. It thus means, or that is how I read it, that the addressees and the jr;z“a, 
are the same people. This adds further support to my argument that the addressees 
are those who in the eyes of the authors have a legal claim to land.  
That brings us to the issue of address in Leviticus 23. Most of the text is addressed at 
the second person plural as should be clear from the few texts that I quoted above. 
There are occasions where the text slips into the third person as, for instance, in v. 
20 where the actions of the priest is described with the elevation offering, but still it is 
the addressees who bring the offering in v. 19. In vv. 29 and 30 we also find a text 
that seems to be more conditional. It is introduced with vp,N<h'Alk; yKi and refers to 
anybody who does not comply with the prescriptions for the day of Reconciliation. 
Yet these two verses seem to act as further motivation for the prescriptions 
preceding and succeeding these verses stating that the addressees are not allowed 
to work. It is thus imbedded within a second person plural text.  
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The text as a whole is thus directed at the second person plural, but there is one 
exception where the text targets the individual landowner in v. 22. We did discuss 
this verse above (see table 5.25) because it was one of those few examples of "your 
land" used in the vicinity of the concept rG´. 
Table 5.29 
!k,x]r]a' ryxiq]Ata, !k,r]x]qub]W 22 
*r,x]quB] *d]c; ta'P] hL,k't]Aalø   
fQel't] alø *r]yxiq] fq,l,w“ ~
!t;ao bzú[}T' rG´l'w“ ynI[;l, ~
  s  .!k,yheløa> hw:hy“ ynIa}  
22 When you reap the harvest of your land, you shall not reap to the very edges of your field, 
or gather the gleanings of your harvest; you shall leave them for the poor and for the alien: I 
am the LORD your God. 
This is the last verse on the festival of weeks and seems to be a general stipulation 
not necessarily applicable to that festival only. But one should keep in mind that the 
festival of weeks builds further on the festival of first fruits, which starts in v. 9 with 
“when you shall enter the land.” The first clause is directed at the plural and as I said 
above we find another example of “your land” (out of only 12 in Leviticus). But then 
the texts zooms in again on an individual and as before it is the individual who owns 
a field (*d]c;) and thus also a harvest (*r]yxiq]). This individual is asked to leave the 
edges of his field and the gleanings for the rG´ and the ynI[;. The first is concluded with 
the longer version of “I am YHWH.” It thus seems that we have the same kind of 
power-consciousness that I described in especially the first half of chapter 25.  
The point is that Leviticus 23 and 25 do not only share the fact that both chapters 
were built on the Sabbath concept as Ruwe argued. There are other similarities also 
in terms of both the grammatical and persuasive features that I have identified. 
These similarities are especially clear with regards to vv. 1-13 of Leviticus 25.  
With regards to ideological traces I would think that the most important remark above 
was the fact that I identified the addressees with the jr;z“a,. The text thus shares this 
ideological presupposition with chapter 25-26 that the addressees are those with a 
legal claim to land. The rG´ only features here as a vulnerable person that needs to be 
taken care of.  
5.6 Chapters 17-22 
My treatment of the second half of the “Holiness Code” will be much briefer and 
totally different from my discussion of those texts that were either immediately 
preceding or succeeding chapter 25. These chapters are mostly concerned with 
other issues and in terms of the grammatical and persuasive features that I have 
discussed above they are usually somewhat different. Ruwe (1999: 98-120) argues 
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that the basic theme of the first part (17:1-22:33) is the “Furcht des Heiligtums” which 
we can translate with the “fear of the sanctuary”, or “respect for my sanctuary.”49 It is 
a much longer and more complicated argument than the one in which he argued that 
the Sabbath is the basic theme for chapters 23-25. The argument partly entails 
regarding 26:1-2 as a conclusion50 to the whole Holiness Code where we find the 
following clause: War;yTi yviD;q]miW Wrmov]Ti yt'toB]v'Ata,. Ruwe (1999: 99-100) then argues 
that yt'toB]v' refers to the second part (23:1-25:55*) and that yviD;q]mi refers to the first 
part. He (Ruwe 1999: 103-115) also discusses the fact that yviD;q]mi has some kind of 
“schöpfungsrestitutive Funktion” in the Priestly texts.51 Ruwe (1999: 115-120) then 
focuses on the “schöpfungsrestitutive Funktion” of vdqm in the first part of the HC.52 
He concludes his findings as follows (1999: 120): 
Der erste Hauptteil (17,1-22,33) hat in der „Furcht des Heiligtums“ sein 
systematisches Prinzip und ist auf die schöpfungsrestitutive Funktion des 
Heiligtums zentriert. Der zweite Hauptteil (23,1-25,55) zielt dagegen auf die 
Sabbatinstitution ab.  
I do think that Ruwe has a good argument here although it tends to be too compact a 
theme to sum up everything that is written in chapters 17-22. The word “sanctuary” 
only appears here in the first half of the Holiness Code (19:30, 20:3, 21:12(x2) and 
                                                 
49 Ruwe (1999: 115) sometimes opts to translate it with “mit Respekt zu beachten.”  
50 Ruwe (1999: 98-99) first argues that chapter 25 is concluded with v. 55 and that 26:1 is a new start. But 
then he argues that since vv. 1 and 2 are a legal text and from v. 3 onwards is actually a parenetic text that 
we should regard 26:1-2 and 26:3-45 as two different texts. So if 26:1-2 is not part of the preceding text, 
nor part of the succeeding text, then it means that they are isolated and he then concludes (Ruwe 1999: 99): 
Weil die Passage 26,1f am Ende aller materialen Rechtssatsabschnitte des Heiligkeitsgesetzes steht, 
unmittelbar vor der auf das Ganze bezogenen Schlußparänese, liegt die Vermutung sehr nahe, daß 
auch 26,1f auf das Ganze des Heiligkeitsgesetzes bezogen ist und also eine Art Unterschrift zu 17,1-
25,55 darstellt. 
 This argument is totally different from what I argued with regards to chapter 26. In my presentation 
chapters 25 and 26 are intertwined, but I must acknowledge that vv. 1-2 are indeed “standing out”. One 
does have the impression that they sort of “come from nowhere.” I would thus ask whether we could not 
regard them as some kind of “summary” of the code, even if I do not think that they stand at the end of the 
code. We do find a similar clause in 19:30 and there it is also in the “middle of nowhere.” 
51 Ruwe (1999: 105-106) argues that there are many echoes between creation texts and sanctuary texts (e.g. 
Gen 1:31a and Ex 39:43a) and that the focus of these “Schöpfung-Heiligtum-Bezüge” is to present 
“Schöpfungswerk” and Heiligtumsbau” as parallel activities. He (1999: 106-112) focuses especially on 
Genesis 1 and argues that the building of the sanctuary functions as a partly restitution of the original 
creation. Genesis 1 presented a well-ordered universe (three layers), but then things were “mixed up” and 
destroyed by the entrance of “violence” (smj) as portrayed in Genesis 6:1-4 (see Ruwe 1999: 113). The 
sanctuary partly restores this previous “orderliness” (Ruwe 1999: 113): 
Wenn also die Errichtung des Heiligtums mit der ursprünglichen Schöpfung parallelisiert und als eine 
analog segmentierte und durch Zuordnungen bestimmte Welt herausgestellt wird, dann ist angesichts 
der Akzentsetzung in der Flutgeschichte (Gen 6-9, P) klar, daß das nur im Sinne einer Art 
Wiederherstellung der ursprünglichen Schöpfung gemeint ist.  
52 One of the important principles that he (along with many other scholars of course) identifies in Genesis 1 is 
the principle of “Trennung/ Scheidung.” This principle is now executed again in the establishment of the 
sanctuary and Ruwe (1999: 115) describes the functioning of the first part of the HC as follows: 
Der erste Hauptteil des Heiligkeitsgesetzes zielt u.E. insofern darauf ab, die schöpfungsrestitutive 
Funktion des Heiligtums im Bereich der Ethik gleichsam forzusetzen.  
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21:23) and twice in chapter 26 (vv. 2 and 31). As we will see chapters 17 and 21-22 
are partially addressed at the priests and these are thus issues that concern the 
sanctuary. It is also in these chapters that we are introduced to YHWH as a god who 
“sanctifies” and if we were wondering why this Code is called the Holiness Code, it 
should become clear in the short discussion below. I will specifically try to focus more 
on those texts that share some similarity with the ones that we have discussed 
already. As we will see the kind of features that I identified in the chapters above 
often appear when similar issues are touched upon like the relationship between 
land, YHWH and addressees.  
5.6.1 Chapters 21-22 
These chapters are mostly directly concerned with the priests. Thus chapter 21 starts 
with YHWH telling Moses to say something to Aaron and his sons 
(@roh}a' ynEB] !ynIh}Koh'Ala,). Later in chapter 21 in v. 16 we find Aaron specifically being 
addressed (@roh}a'Ala,). Likewise we have wyn:B;Ala,w“ @roh}a'Ala, at the start of chapter 22. 
Thus it is either the priests as a group, Aaron or both that are addressed. It would 
therefore not be possible to argue here that the addressees are those with legal 
claims to land. The addressees here are simply the priests and it cannot be anyone 
else. Yet the larger part of the text is not directly addressed to this group, but is 
mostly in the third person, both plural53 and singular. This changes radically from 
22:17 onwards, but apart from that we have only one verse in chapter 21 where the 
second person is addressed.  
Table 5:30 
/Tv]D'qiw“ 8 
byriq]m' aWh *yh,løa> !j,l,Ata,AyKi  
&L;Ahy<h]yI vdoq;  
.!k,v]Diq'm] hw:hy“ ynIa} v/dq; yKi 
8 and you shall treat them as holy, since they offer the food of your God; they shall be holy to 
you, for I the LORD, I who sanctify you, am holy. 
I do not want to get bogged down in how we are to translate this verse or who the 
addressed singular might be. This verse also reminds somewhat of vv. 10-12 of 
chapter 25 with the wc. + perfect in the first clause, the nominal sentence in the 
second and the two yKis. What interests me most is the second yKi clause and the way 
in which YHWH introduces himself. In chapters 23-26 we became accustomed to a 
YHWH who only introduced himself as “your (pl.) God” or sometimes as “their God” 
(e.g. 26:44). Now YHWH presents himself as a God who sanctifies, who makes holy 
and it seems that this sanctifying process is specifically directed at the priests. In 
chapters 21-22 I find five examples of this, namely 22: 8, 15, 24 and 23: 9 and 16. In 
                                                 
53 See 21:5-7; 22:2, 9 and 15-16. The rest of the text is mostly dominated by the third person singular.  
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each case it refers to YHWH who sanctifies some or other priest or priests. Thus 
although I think that we will find grammatical features that are similar to what we had 
in chapter 25, on all other possible levels these two chapters are different. It is not a 
land-owning class that is addressed, but a class of priests and YHWH is presented 
as sanctifying this class or group. The text is thus concerned with the relationship 
between YHWH and the priests and not with YHWH, the land and the land-owning 
class. The rG´ does not even feature, but we do find one short reference to the rykic; 
and the bv;/T in 22:10 where they are not allowed to eat from the offerings. Taking 
22:11 into consideration it makes it very clear that the rykic; and bv;/T were not 
bought by the priests, but this is something that we already suspected, that they were 
a class above the db,[,  who could be bought. 
The text does become more familiar from 22:17 onwards. Now YHWH instructs 
Moses to talk to Aaron, his sons and all the Israelites 
(laer;c]yI ynEB]AlK; la,w“ wyn:B;Ala,w“ @roh}a'Ala,) and we thus have a combination of the priests 
and the sons of Israel. Ruwe (1999: 278) argues that 22:17-33 is the conclusion to 
his first part of the Holiness Code (17:1-22:33). He also thinks that it forms a frame 
with chapter 17 that surrounds this first part of H.54 Both are concerned with basic 
laws with regards to offerings. Here in 22:17-33 the larger part of the text is 
specifically concerned with unblemished animals. It makes sense that both Israelites 
and priests are being addressed, because the former will be bringing the animals and 
the latter will be slaughtering them. The text is a mixture of third person singular and 
second person plural forms with only v. 23 using a second person singular verb. At 
the end of this text YHWH introduces himself by means of both this sanctifying role 
and the one who delivered from Egypt.  
Table 5.31 
yt'/x]mi !T,r]m'v]W 31 
!t;ao !t,yci[}w" 
.hw:hy“ ynIa} 
yvid]q; !veAta, WlL]j't] aløw“ 32 
laer;c]yI ynEB] &/tB] yTiv]D'q]nIw“  
.!k,v]Diq'm] hw:hy“ ynIa} 
!yIr'x]mi $r,a,me !k,t]a, ayxi/Mh' 33 
!yhiløale !k,l; t/yh]li  
  p  .hw:hy“ ynIa} 
31 Thus you shall keep my commandments and observe them: I am the LORD. 32 You shall not 
profane my holy name, that I may be sanctified among the people of Israel: I am the LORD; I 
sanctify you, 33 I who brought you out of the land of Egypt to be your God: I am the LORD. 
                                                 
54 Chapter 17 seems to be the only other chapter that is introduced by addressing both the priests and the sons 
of Israel within the Holiness Code: laer;c]yI ynEB]AlK; la,w“ wyn:B;Ala,w“ @roh}a'Ala,.  
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Verse 31 is a near carbon copy of many other examples of this kind of parenetic text 
in the Holiness Code. In v. 32 we find YHWH again sanctifying the addressees, after 
he has apparently been sanctified. I take it that the addressees now include both 
priests and Israelites (i.e. land-owners). Verse 33 is a further example of YHWH 
stating that he wants to be the God of the addressees (see 25:38 and 26:45). We 
also find that the rG´ features in v. 18 and it is similar to chapter 17 where the rG´ is 
also included in some of the basic laws on bringing sacrifices, although the issue 
there was more bringing the sacrifices to the right place and not to drink the blood.  
I do not think that there is much more to say about chapters 21-22. Most of it is 
directed at the priests, whom YHWH sanctifies. The text is not really concerned with 
the relationship between YHWH, land and addressees, but more with the relation 
between YHWH and priests. YHWH is also presented slightly different and this only 
changes towards the end of chapter 22. This is also where the rG´ enters in a similar 
fashion as in chapter 17. 
5.6.2 Chapters 18-20 
Chapters 18-20 are somewhat more interesting, because although the relationship 
between land and addressees is not presented at the centre of the discussion, it still 
is present and plays a big part in the persuasive strategy of the text. Chapters 18 and 
20 are both concerned with sexual taboos, but they are different in terms of form. 
Chapter 18 is mostly apodictic and addressed at the second person singular, 
whereas chapter 20 is casuistic and dominated by third person forms (mostly 
singular). We do not need to treat these sexual taboos in any detail, but we need to 
take a look at the parenetic texts that precede and follow these sexual taboos. In 
these parenetic texts the issue of YHWH, $r,a, and addressees are once again part 
and parcel of the persuasive force of these chapters.  
Table 5.32 
.!k,yheløa> hw:hy“ ynIa} 2b
Wc[}t' alø HB;A!T,b]v'y“ rv,a} !yIr'x]miA$r,a, hce[}m'K] 3 
Wc[}t' alø hM;v; !k,t]a, aybime ynIa} rv,a} @['n"K]A$r,a, hce[}m'k]W  
.Wklete alø !h,yteQojub]W 
!h,B; tk,l,l; Wrm]v]Ti yt'QojuAta,w“ Wc[}T' yf'P;v]miAta, 4 
.!k,yheløa> hw:hy“ ynIa} 
I am the LORD your God. 3 You shall not do as they do in the land of Egypt, where you lived, 
and you shall not do as they do in the land of Canaan, to which I am bringing you. You shall 
not follow their statutes. 4 My ordinances you shall observe and my statutes you shall keep, 
following them: I am the LORD your God.  
I would want to argue that these verses set the stage for the whole text that is to 
follow. It is the first time that YHWH is introduced like this in the Holiness Code and 
the introduction of YHWH is immediately connected with land. The addressees are 
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presented as on their way between Canaan and Egypt and both of these are 
presented as bad examples that the addressees should not follow. YHWH presents 
himself as the one that has orchestrated this journey and by the power of who he is 
and what he has done his request of the addressees is not to act as either Egypt or 
Canaan did. At the end of chapter 18 it becomes clear why they should not follow the 
lead of Canaan. This text follows after the sexual taboos of vv. 7-24 and it is also 
parenetic. 
Table 5.33 
hL,aeAlk;B] WaM]F'TiAla' 24 
.!k,ynEP]mi j'Lev'm] ynIa}Arv,a} !yI/Gh' Wam]f]nI hL,aeAlk;b] yKi  
$r,a;h; am;f]Tiw" 25 
h;yl,[; Hn:/[} dqop]a,w:   
.h;yb,v]yúAta, $r,a;h; aqiT;w"  
yf'P;v]miAta,w“ yt'QojuAta, !T,a' !T,r]m'v]W 26 
!k,k]/tB] rG:h' rG´h'w“ jr;z“a,h; hL,aeh; tbo[e/Th' lKomi Wc[}t' aløw“  
!k,ynEp]li rv,a} $r,a;h;Ayven“a' Wc[; laeh; tbo[e/Th'AlK;Ata, yKi 27 
.$r,a;h; am;f]Tiw"  
Ht;ao !k,a}M'f'B] !k,t]a, $r,a;h; ayqit;Aaløw“ 28 
.!k,ynEp]li rv,a} y/Gh'Ata, ha;q; rv,a}K'  
24 Do not defile yourselves in any of these ways, for by all these practices the nations I am 
casting out before you have defiled themselves. 25 Thus the land became defiled; and I 
punished it for its iniquity, and the land vomited out its inhabitants. 26 But you shall keep my 
statutes and my ordinances and commit none of these abominations, either the citizen or the 
alien who resides among you 27 (for the inhabitants of the land, who were before you, 
committed all of these abominations, and the land became defiled); 28 otherwise the land will 
vomit you out for defiling it, as it vomited out the nation that was before you.  
In v. 24 the text changes from addressing the singular to addressing the plural and 
now it becomes clear why the addressees should not follow the example of their 
predecessors in the land of Canaan. They are asked not to defile themselves in any 
of these named ways and then we find two yKi clauses (vv. 24 and 27) which both 
spell out more or less the same scenario. The first yKi clause is followed by a 
wayyiqtol chain that describes how the events followed each other. The land became 
defiled, YHWH visited her (i.e. punished), and she spitted out. The spitting or 
vomiting land returns again in v. 28. The fact that the land is the subject of the verb 
ayq (Hi) is reminiscent of chapters 25 and 26 where the land was the subject of the 
verb tbv and hxr. In chapter 26 we also had the land of the enemies being the 
subject of the verb lka, in which case the addressees were the rather unfortunate 
objects (i.e. food). In v. 26 we also find the rG´ who is sojourning and he is also 
prohibited from doing these things along with the jr;z“a,. These texts are important 
because it already hints at the fact that the relationship between YHWH and the land 
is much closer than that between YHWH and the addressees. He had a relationship 
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with the land long before he apparently had a relationship with the addressees. 
YHWH and the $r,a, “go way back” when compared to YHWH and the addressees.  
This same scenario is presented at the end of chapter 20 when this parenetic text 
follows the casuistic sexual taboos.  
Table 5.34 
yf'P;v]miAlK;Ata,w“ yt'QojuAlK;Ata, !T,r]m'v]W 22  
!t;ao !t,yci[}w"    
.HB; tb,v,l; hM;v; !k,t]a, aybime ynIa} rv,a} $r,a;h; !k,t]a, ayqit;Aaløw“  
!k,ynEP]mi j'Lev'm] ynIa}Arv,a} y/Gh' tQojuB] Wkl]te aløw“ 23 
Wc[; hL,aeAlK;Ata, yKi  
.!B; $qua;w:  
!k,l; rm'aow: 24 
!t;m;d]a'Ata, Wvr]yTi !T,a'  
vb;d]W bl;j; tb'z… $r,a, Ht;ao tv,r,l; !k,l; hN:n<T]a, ynIa}w"   
!k,yheløa> hw:hy“ ynIa}  
.!yMi['h;A@mi !k,t]a, yTil]D'b]hiArv,a}  
22 You shall keep all my statutes and all my ordinances, and observe them, so that the land to 
which I bring you to settle in may not vomit you out. 23 You shall not follow the practices of 
the nation that I am driving out before you. Because they did all these things, I abhorred them. 
24 But I have said to you: You shall inherit their land, and I will give it to you to possess, a 
land flowing with milk and honey. I am the LORD your God; I have separated you from the 
peoples.  
Once again the addressees are encouraged to do these “statutes” and “ordinances”, 
or “threatened” would probably be more accurate. If they do not do these laws they 
will end up where their predecessors did, somewhere without land. In v. 24 there is 
reference to a promise that YHWH made to the addressees, to provide them with a 
land of milk and honey (vb;d]W bl;j;). YHWH is also presented differently as the one 
who has “separated them from the peoples.” In the following v. 25 the addressees 
are also asked to separate between pure and impure and this verse is reminiscent of 
the kind of topic that we find in Leviticus 11. Verse 26 includes the famous “be holy, 
for I am holy.” We also find this clause in v. 7 which is also a parenetic text, but 
where there is no reference to land. It is fitting to find this phrase here before 
chapters 21-22 where YHWH presents himself as the sanctifying God. This quest for 
“holiness” was also absent from chapter 18, where the main motivation was simply 
the possibility of land loss.  
The important issue with regards to these parenetic texts in chapters 18 and 20 is 
that both share a certain interest in land with especially chapters 25 and 26. Here it 
seems that the possession of land is also under threat. The text only presents a 
promise of land, but this promise is steeped in threats that the land might be lost. The 
text also provides some kind of moral justification for the fact that the addressees 
received the land. The predecessors are portrayed as people who brought the loss of 
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their land upon themselves. These texts thus share the same ideology of land that 
we find in chapters 25 and 26. All of these texts quoted above are also directed at the 
second person plural. Once again I would thus conclude that the addressees are 
those who in the eyes of the authors have a legal claim to the land.  
Chapter 19 is imbedded within these two surrounding chapters concerned with 
sexual taboos and land possession. This chapter is a strange mixture of different 
kinds of laws, some addressing issues that we would regard as “social” and others 
that we would regard as “cultic”. It is the chapter in Leviticus where we find the most 
occurrences of “I am YHWH”. We find seven of the longer forms and eight of the 
shorter ones (see Ruwe 1999: 194). I have referred to some verses from chapter 19 
when I discussed the rG´ above (see 5.4.3) and these were vv. 9-10 and 33-34 (see 
tables 5.24 and 5.23). These verses were important because they often referred to 
the land (i.e. “your” land) and the rG´ in the same vicinity. On the face of it these laws 
protect the rG´, but as I argued above they do keep them landless. Leviticus 19 thus 
does share a concern for the $r,a,  but it is not as clearly formulated as in the 
parenetic parts of chapters 18 and 20. We also find one example where the $r,a, is 
the subject of a verb and that is in verse 29. 
Table 5.35 
Ht;/nz“h'l] *T]BiAta, lLej'T]Ala' 29 
$r,a;h; hn<z“tiAaløw“   
.hM;zI $r,a;h; ha;l]m;W  
29 Do not profane your daughter by making her a prostitute, that the land not become 
prostituted and full of depravity.  
This text is addressed at the second person singular and probably targets the 
individual father who has a daughter and thus once again the person who can make 
the difference. In the second clause we find that the land is the subject of the root hnz. 
The NRSV has not translated it as such, but presents the land in a more passive role. 
Yet I do think that chapter 19 shares this tendency with chapters 18 and 20 as well 
as chapters 25 and 26 to portray the $r,a, as an acting entity. This action is often in 
response to what others have done to her, but still the land plays an active role. 
Thus, although chapter 19 has other more cultic and social concerns, these concerns 
are part of a bigger world-view where the land also plays an important role. As in 
chapters 18 and 20 the relationship between land, addressees and YHWH and other 
contenders like the rG´, forms part of the larger canvass on which these texts paint 
their ethical demands. As we already saw the rG´ appears for the first time in the 
chapter preceding the Holiness Code.  
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5.7 Chapter 1655 
Seidl (1999: 219) starts his essay by stating that recent research has made the 
following clear with regards to Leviticus 16:  
Im Pentateuch bildet Lev 16 die Mitte von Geschictserzählung wie 
Gesetzesverkündigung (Ex 20 - Num 10: “Die Sinaiperikope”), in der 
Priesterschrift, speziell in ihrem Kernstück, dem Buch Levitikus, steht das Kapitel 
nach Opfertora (1-7) und Priesterordination (8-10) in der Mitte zwischen 
Reinheitstora (11-15) und Heiligkeitsgesetz (17-26); es enthält mit seinen 
vielfältigen Reinigungs- und Entsündigungsriten die Bedingung der Möglichkeit, 
“Reinheit und Heiligkeit” der laer;c]yI lh'q] zu erlangen, und zwar begleitet von 
Opfern (1-7) und vermittelt durch Priester (8-10).  
Chapter 16 thus forms some kind of “hinge” between the two collections in 11-15 and 
17-26. It also precedes all the texts that we have discussed up to now. I did mention 
Leviticus 16 above when I discussed the rG´ in the Holiness Code (see 5.4.3) and we 
saw that the first time that the rG´ is mentioned is in Leviticus 16:29. This is an 
important verse, because it is here that the “address” changes in the text. Until v. 28 
the text is in the third person singular and it changes in v. 29 to the second person 
plural. This feature is one of the main reasons why many historical-critical scholars 
regarded this text as a later edition.56 In the larger part of Seidl’s (1999: 225-243) 
essay he does not engage with these verses and it is only at the end (1999: 243-244) 
when he compares it to Leviticus 23:26-32 that this text features again. In 16:29 the 
day on which this ritual will happen is clearly indicated: vd,jol' r/c[;B, y[iybiV]h' vd,joB'. 
This phrase is repeated again in 23:27 and in 25:9, where it was part of that chiastic 
parallelism. In chapters 23 (v. 28) and 25 (v. 9) this day is also specifically called the 
“Day of Atonement” (!yriPuKih' !wyú), whereas we do not find this term in chapter 16. In 
16:31 the Day of Atonement is also called a @wtoB;v' tB'v', something that we also find 
in 23:3 (with reference to the Sabbath), 23:32 (with reference to the Day of 
Atonement) and 25:4 and 5 (with reference to the Sabbath year).  
The point is just that Leviticus 16 does not only share an interest in the rG´, with 
chapters 23 and 25, but also in the festival calendar and especially with the Sabbath. 
The Day of Atonement is thus also portrayed as some kind of Sabbath. In this regard 
                                                 
55 We do not need to discuss chapter 17 in any detail. I have discussed the most important features above 
when I referred to the way in which the rG´ is also prohibited from drinking blood and also commanded to 
bring his offering to the tent of meeting (see 5.4.3). It is also a text that is like 22:17-33 addressed at both 
the priest and the Israelites.  
56 Seidl sums up this “Konsens” as follows (1999: 222): 
Die Vv. 29-34 repräsentieren eine andere literarische Hand als der vorausgehende Text: Er ist ein im 
paränetischen Stil der 2. Pl. angehängter Kolophon, der anders als der vorausgehende Ritualtext den 
Akzent ausschließlich auf die Entsündigung des Volkes legt, Fasten und Arbeitsruhe hervorhebt, den 
Sündenbock nicht erwähnt und die offene Zeitbestimmung von 2c auf den Feiertag am 10.07. festlegt 
und damit alle vorausgehenden Riten zu agendarischen Vollzügen dieses einen Tages, des 
“Versöhnungstages” macht.  
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Ruwe (1999: 360) understands the relation between the three institutions, Day of 
Atonement, Sabbath year and Jubilee year as follows:  
Versöhnungstag, Sabbatjahr und Jobeljahr sind somit drei Institutionen im 
Heiligkeitsgesetz, die, obzwar in unterschiedlicher Weise und bezogen auf 
unterschiedliche Lebensdimensionen, gemeinsam dazu dienen, in Israel 
periodisch immer wieder eine ursprüngliche Nähe zu Gott und zu ursprünglichen 
Lebensverhältnissen herzustellen. Offenbar aufgrund dieser konzeptionellen 
Analogie wird der Versöhnungstag als Proklamationstag des Jobeljahres gefaßt. 
He argues this in response the question as to why the Jubilee is proclaimed on the 
Day of Atonement. These three institutions are thus part of the same theological 
system in which a constant return to some or other original state is the objective. The 
point is just that it is not only chapter 25 that is “obsessed” with returning to an 
original state, but some of the other chapters also share this interest and they are 
chapters 16 and 23. I would thus think that it is fitting for chapter 16 to precede the 
Holiness Code, since it already exposes the reader to some of the fundamental 
principles of the kind of world-view that is also visible in the following texts.  
5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter was an attempt to describe the kind of “affinities” that one can find 
between chapter 25 and surrounding chapters. The questions that were asked 
included: What did these chapters have in common with 25? Which chapters 
manifested the same grammatical and persuasive features than chapter 25? And in 
which chapters could we detect the same kind of concerns and interests? By far the 
largest part of this chapter was concerned with Leviticus 26. The reasons for this 
were fairly clear. I identified similar grammatical and persuasive features and I 
identified a common concern with land and living off land. It seems to me that the 
loss of land is dreaded in chapters 25 and 26. It is as if there is a fair amount of 
concern and even trepidation in these texts with regards to land. I also referred to the 
three presentations of land in chapters 25 and 26. There was the land of Egypt from 
where the addressees came. Egypt is portrayed as the house of slavery, but the 
addressees were on their way to Canaan the land of promise. In the distant future 
then loomed the land of the enemies, another place where they did not want to be. 
Along with this fear of losing the land, my argument was that both texts were 
addressed at those who had legal claims to the land, at least in the eyes of the 
authors. 
My treatment of Leviticus 27 was much shorter and it was mostly an attempt to 
counter the arguments of Douglas (1999) and Smith (1996) that one should read 
chapter 27 along with chapter 25 as some kind of frame around chapter 26. My 
argument was simply that chapter 27 read differently and despite the fact that there 
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were some grammatical similarities the text was vastly different with regards to the 
persuasive strategies used. My synchronic analysis thus agrees with previous 
diachronic explanations. I would say that it is a text with a different character, while 
they would call it a later edition.  
I discussed Leviticus 24 also very differently. The narrative in that text just makes it 
so different and therefore I had to resort to the scholarly debate about this strange 
combination and had to treat issues like the presentation of the rG´ in the whole 
Holiness Code (including chapter 16). I also had to ask how the first narrative in 
Leviticus 9-10 functions. Eventually I ended that discussion with some open 
questions to which I will return in the next chapter. For the time being it will suffice to 
say that chapters 24 and 25 share a certain interest in the rG´. 
With regards to Leviticus 23 I used the work of Ruwe who pointed out that both 
shared a kind of cultic interest in the Sabbath and both chapters build their 
institutions on the institution of the Sabbath. But I also identified other grammatical 
and persuasive similarities between chapters 23 and 25, and at stages the same 
interest in land. In verse 22 I found the same kind of “zooming in” technique that we 
so often had in chapter 25, which I called “power-conscious.”  
The most interesting feature that I identified in chapters 17-22 was the “ideology of 
land” that is especially present in chapters 18 and 20 and to a lesser extent 19. 
Chapters 21-22 are totally different and are interested in the priests and even YHWH 
is presented differently. But in chapters 18, 20 and 19 we find the same sense of 
trepidation with regards to the possession of land. The loss of land seems to be a 
constant threat. These texts are also interested in the relationship between YHWH, 
the $r,a, and the addressees. The parenetic texts in chapters 18-20 also provide 
reasons for why the addressees possessed the land in the first place. We also find 
the land acting, functioning as the subject of a verb and I would thus argue that we 
have the same concerns that were so clear in chapters 25 and 26. This “ideology of 
land” thus justifies why the addressees are the legal claimants of the land and the 
!yriG´ and other groups not. The next question would then be to ask when these texts 
were composed in order to find a rhetorical context where the identified persuasive 
strategies would have been most effective. That is what I will attempt in chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 6 
POSSIBLE SOCIO-HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
6.1 Introduction 
The issue addressed in this chapter is the possible socio-historical context of not only 
Leviticus 25, but also the rest of the Holiness Code. This does not mean that I think 
that there is no older material in the text. I acknowledge that parts of the text might be 
much older, but I am rather sceptic when it comes to determining the exact nature of 
these. What I am arguing instead is that I want to envisage the text as we have it now 
in a specific historical context, or it would probably be better to say a specific 
rhetorical context. I want to imagine that the rhetorical or persuasive strategies that I 
identified were aimed at addressees living in a specific context, or as Watts (1999: 
131) puts it (already quoted in chapter 4): 
Rhetoric has therefore always drawn attention to the motives and ideologies of 
speakers or writers and to the social situation and commitments of their 
audiences. Not only rhetorical theory but also the legal contents of the 
Pentateuch point to the historical and social world outside the text, for legislation 
aims to have real consequences on human behavior and even idealized laws 
propose critical standards for legal conduct. So both legal material and rhetorical 
method draw our attention to the historical conditions and process that gave rise 
to the Pentateuch.  
I am in some doubt as to whether his “always” is really applicable of how rhetoric has 
been used in biblical studies, but as to the rest I am in agreement with him. He also 
uses the term “ideology” and he uses it along with “motives” which adds to how I 
concluded chapter 4, namely that the persuasive strategies that I identified gave us 
glimpses of the ideology of the authors. It helped us to construct what they wanted to 
achieve or what their objectives were and it helped us to understand how they 
thought about themselves and how they understood each other.  
Now I will attempt to look for a context where these rhetorical strategies might have 
been effective, or where these motives and interests and traces of ideology that I 
identified might have been “at home”. In the first part of what follows, I will critically 
engage with the issue of dating Leviticus 25 and the Holiness Code and will mostly 
offer the opinions of scholars who date these texts in the post-exilic or second-temple 
period. The second part will focus more on studies, which have described the kind of 
society that we found in the Persian period in Palestine and studies that have 
focused on the kinds of conflict that arose there.  
In the third part I will focus on the debate about the “myth of the empty land” that the 
late Robert Carroll started. This discussion will be thoroughly ideological-critical and 
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will not only describe the ideology of the authors, but will claim that a fair amount of 
distortion was taking place. Following this discussion I will revisit the debate about 
the rG´. In the previous chapter (see 5.4.3) we did treat this issue when we discussed 
Leviticus 24, but there I attempted to stay within the literary confines of the text and 
now I will go further and speculate about a historical context. I will also then attempt 
to answer the question with regards to Leviticus 24 that I have left unanswered until 
now.  
6.2 A post-exilic dating 
What are the main arguments for dating the Holiness Code in the post-exilic 
community? Of the four monographs that appeared in 1999 on either Leviticus or the 
Holiness Code, two of them (Ruwe 1999 and Warning 1999) do not bother with this 
question, while the other two (Douglas 1999 and Grünwaldt 1999), argue for a post-
exilic dating. Douglas (1999: 7) does not really offer any arguments for this dating, 
but accepts what she calls “the largest scholarly consensus”, which “points to the 
post-exilic period, the Second Temple community in the fifth century.” This dating 
then refers to the final form of Leviticus and she has no interest whatsoever to 
construct different layers in the text, nor in the difference between the Holiness Code 
and the rest of Leviticus. Her study is thus synchronic, be it historical.  
Grünwaldt (1999) has a much more complicated view and his study focuses only on 
the Holiness Code and not on the whole of Leviticus. It is also important that 
Grünwaldt’s study is a genuine diachronic study, which attempts to do Literarkritik 
and to identify the “original H.”1 The text that he thus dates in the second temple 
period is not the whole Holiness Code, but what he has identified as the “oldest” or 
“original” H.  
By identifying the traditions that were used in H, Grünwaldt (1999: 375-381) can then 
argue that H is later then these traditions. These traditions include PG, Ezekiel, as 
well as influences from Deuteronomic theology and maybe even Deutero-Isaiah. This 
then means at least late exile. If one further argues that P, Deutero-Isaiah and 
Ezekiel originate from the Diaspora and that the Deuteronomic laws as well as 
Deuteronomic literature originate in Palestine, then it must have been at a later date 
when these traditions had the opportunity to interact with each other. Or, when all of 
them were at least available. Along broadly similar lines Otto (1999: 125-196) argues 
                                                 
1 See especially his (Grünwaldt 1999: 23-130) third chapter, named “Literarkritik”, where he attempts to 
identify the “Ursprüngliche Gestalt” of H. It is important to note that his attempt is much more modest than 
some of his German academic ancestors (i.e. Elliger 1966a and Cholewinski 1976). He (1999: 23) is 
adamant that the only criteria that he will use are “Widersprüche, unvereinbare Spannungen” and “störende 
Doppelungen.” For a summary of all the “additions” (German: “Zusätze”) that he identifies in the whole 
Holiness Code, see Grünwaldt (1999: 130). With regards to Leviticus 25 he removes vv. 1, 2aa, 6-7 and 
44-46.  
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similarly. This essay by Otto focuses more on the relation between the Holiness 
Code and other texts in the Pentateuch. For him the relation is clearly that of the 
Covenant Code, Deuteronomy and the Priestly text (both what he calls PG and PS) 
preceding the Holiness Code. The latter is then often integrating and even 
“correcting” the former as the following quote explains (Otto 1999: 134): 
Wichtig ist die Einsicht, daß in Lev 17-26 mit priesterlicher Terminologie gegen 
die Priesterschrift polemisiert wird im Dienste einer Integration des 
Deuteronomiums in die Priesterschrift, um andererseits aber auch Korrekturen 
am deuteronomischen Reformprogramm, insbesonder in Lev 17 und 25, 
vorzunehmen: 
He argues this by accepting the views of Cholewinski as well as disagreeing (mostly) 
with the views of Knohl and Milgrom (see 6.2.1 below). Thus based on this (rather 
complicated) argument of him, which he describes as “inner biblical exegesis”,2 he 
excludes a pre-exilic dating of Leviticus 17-26 (contra Knohl and Milgrom) and wants 
to look for the “literarische und historische Ort” in the post-exilic period.3 At the end of 
his essay Otto (1999: 182) concludes that this redaction of the Pentateuch (i.e. the 
“Redaktor” who wrote H) “ist damit nicht nur antiköniglich, sondern vor allem auch 
antiprophetisch bis auf die Knochen” which for Otto once again means belonging to 
the “nachexilisch-persischen Zeit.” Otto’s dating of this text is thus solely based on 
his construction of the development of the different texts in the Pentateuch. If H uses 
the other collections then the dating of H is thus later then those. Otto’s basic 
argument is thus similar to Grünwaldt’s, but the latter adds six more specific 
motivations for his dating (Grünwaldt 1999: 380-381):  
a) Leviticus 26:13 addresses the Israelites as delivered people, thus after the 
exile. 
b) The same goes for the rest of chapter 26, which addresses different 
generations of people, left behind. In v. 39 we find the people addressed with 
whom JHWH wants to make a new start, which Grünwaldt understands as a 
new beginning in the land.  
                                                 
2 What he understands with “innerbiblische Exegese” is best explained by means of what he does with 
individual texts. With regards to Leviticus 25 (see Otto 1999: 161-172) he assumes that the author (which 
he calls “der Redaktor”) builds further on texts like Exodus 23:10-11 and Deuteronomy 15. Otto not only 
explores what is changed, but also what is left out as the following quote illustrates (Otto 1999: 168): 
Nur wenn nicht nur erkannt wird, was der Redaktor aus den Vorlagen übernommen oder reformuliert 
hat, wird seine Intention begreiflich, sondern vor allem auch dann, wenn aus das geschaut wird, was er 
nicht übernommen hat.  
3 I must emphasise that Otto and Grünwaldt only agree “in broad terms.” Otto (2001: 418-422) actually 
criticises Grünwaldt extensively on many grounds including the way Grünwaldt goes about doing 
Literarkritik (focusing especially on Lev 17). He is also critical of Grünwaldt’s view that the “introductory 
formulas” of the Priestly Sinai Narrative (for Otto seemingly part of PS) are later than H. Yet Otto does not 
criticise Grünwaldt’s dating of H since he mostly agrees with that.  
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c) Based on the detail of the prescriptions found in Leviticus 17; 21-23 (be it not 
as detailed as Ex 28-29 and Lev 1-7) and the fact that these texts are 
concerned with the “theologische Bedeutsamkeit”, Grünwaldt further thinks that 
the re-opening of the temple should not be too far away. He thinks this might 
be in the vicinity of 520-515. 
d) One has the impression from the Holiness Code of a society in a time when life 
was characterised by a “integrative Tendenz gegenüber den Fremden.” The 
foreigners were often rich and as we saw in Leviticus 25 Israelites often ended 
up in their debt (see discussion below).  
e) Then there is also the 50-year period in chapter 25, which also points to a post-
exilic date. He thinks that the 50 years of the Jubilee “sind nicht nur eine 
Potenzierung des Sabbatjahres, sondern entsprechen auch ziemlich genau der 
Zeit zwischen der zweiten Exilierungswelle und der Machtübernahme Kyros II. 
in Babylon.” Grünwaldt does not understand this as a “problem”,4 that these 
laws might have been written to justify the return of land to the “original” owners 
returning from exile. 
f) From chapters 17 and 23 Grünwaldt also deduces that we have here a rather 
“eng begrenztes Wohngebiet” which fits nicely into post-exilic Palestine. The 
six festivals of chapter 23, for instance, would only have been possible if 
people were not living too far from the temple and according to Grünwaldt 
these conditions “sind am ehesten im nachexilischen Juda gegeben, wo kein 
Ort mehr als 30-40 km vom Heiligtum ernfernt ist.” 
We have to return to especially b), d) and e) above. Grünwaldt’s discussion in 
Leviticus 26 in b) is important, because my own explanation for the change of person 
(see 5.2.2.1 above), from second to third, in especially v. 36 onwards was rather 
precarious. As I said then it was as if the lot of the “survivors” were projected “into the 
future”, especially from v. 40 onwards, where we find no reference to the second 
person plural anymore. I ventured then that it might be an attempt to stay within the 
narrative frame of the Sinai Priestly Narrative, in the sense that the addressees are 
portrayed as being at Sinai, whereas the survivors will only feature somewhere in the 
distant future. Yet Grünwaldt does not have any problem with identifying these 
survivors as the returnees in the post-exilic period. For Grünwaldt the people reading 
this text in the post-exilic period would thus identify with these survivors, because 
they have already returned (and “survived” for that matter). The text thus projects into 
the future, but the possible hearers of the text recall the past. This is how I would 
eventually read this text, if I were to read it in this historical context. 
                                                 
4 By “problem” I mean the theological-ethical problem of using this text in modern-day debates on ethical 
issues like “land-restitution.” This means that Leviticus 25 becomes the text of the returning elite who 
wanted their land back. See discussion below and in next chapter.  
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With regards to d) one might be surprised that Grünwaldt characterises the view of 
foreigners as “integrating.” Here one should however keep in mind that he has 
removed vv. 44-46 of chapter 25 by means of Literarkritik. How and why he did this is 
not that important now,5 but the point is that if that text is removed then the view 
towards !yriG´ is quite positive.6 It also seems that Grünwaldt would think that the !yriG´ 
were really “foreigners” in the sense of being a “Nichtisraeliten” (Grünwaldt 1999: 
167). My own understanding of these texts differ considerably from what Grünwaldt 
argues here under d). My reasons for this will become clear in the rest of this 
chapter. 
To turn to e), Grünwaldt is not the first to argue that the 50 years period has to do 
with the return after the exile. The first person to have argued this appears to have 
been Willis (1969: 337-345) who was puzzled by the fact that the seven year period 
(in Ex 23 and Dt 15) is changed to a fifty year period, or as he puts it (1969: 341): 
Alle Passagen von Lev. 25 sollen persönliche Freiheit und Grundbesitz 
gewährleisten und nicht schmälern. Warum sollte man Formen, die sich 
ursprünglich doch wohl mit dem Zyklus von sieben Jahren verbanden, jetzt auf 
ein halbes Jahrhundert umgestellt haben?  
His (Willis 1969: 342-343) answer to this question is that one should understand it as 
related to the period of exile and that the Judeans in exile were thinking about how to 
get the land back if they ever had the chance of going back. Their main question was 
whether their rights to land had not become superannuated. The fifty years of the 
Jubilee were thus their attempt to counter the loss of land and to receive their land 
back when they returned to Palestine. But Willis does not think that this ever 
                                                 
5 Grünwaldt’s (1999: 109-112) main argument for removing vv. 44-46 is that he thinks that the author 
deviates from his discussion and that it does not really fit into the text. Verses 39-41 are about prohibiting 
the oppression of the fellow Israelite who is in debt. This is theologically grounded in v. 42 and is further 
reiterated by an admonition to fear God in v. 43. Until here everything is said that could be said about a 
poor brother in debt and it is nicely concluded with v. 43 (*yh,løa>me t;arey:w“ like for instance in v. 17). But 
then “suddenly” in vv. 44-46 the topic changes to buying foreign slaves and therefore Grünwaldt calls this 
an excursus. 
6 I do not find this argument of Grünwaldt (1999: 109-112) convincing, especially not the notion that vv. 44-
46 are a change of topic. Is it not a logical place to address this question? If the laws are stating that you 
are not allowed to treat a fellow Israelite as a slave, could it not be anticipated that the reader or hearer 
might be wondering, “so from where could I buy slaves then?” It seems that vv. 44-46 are addressing a 
question that is really closely connected to this case, something that I did argue above in chapter 4. This is 
not the first time that this chapter addressed questions that might be “lingering” in the mind of the hearer or 
reader. Another good example was vv. 20-22, which Grünwaldt does not want to “remove.” There it 
seemed that the author was anticipating a question that the hearer or reader might be asking namely, “what 
shall we eat in the seventh year?” There it is definitely at odds with the surrounding texts, simply because 
it refers back to the Sabbath year whereas the preceding and following texts are concerned with the Jubilee 
already.  
The point is just that Grünwaldt is not consistent in his argumentation and his claim that vv. 44-46 change 
the topic/subject is not enough to remove these verses, because then he should have removed other texts 
also. Another question that he does not answer properly is when this text was added then. We will see later 
that this text does not feature again in Grünwaldt’s book, not when he dates the whole code and especially 
not when he discusses the theological and ethical implications of the whole text (see chapter 7). 
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happened because the initial return to the land after the decree by Cyrus was very 
meagre and thus the deadline of 50 years expired.  
A scholar like Cholewinski (1976: 248-249) supports the conclusion of Willis and 
adds that he thinks that Leviticus 25 was probably written in the hope “ein dauerndes 
Gut in der israelitischen Gesetzgebung zu bleiben.” This did not happen because of 
many possible reasons:  
Vielleicht ist im Bewusstsein der Späteren die Erinnerung daran geblieben, dass 
die Jobeljahrgesetzgebung hauptsächlich für die einmalige Situation der 
Rückkehr aus dem Exil verfasst wurde, oder … 
Cholewinski is not willing to speculate any further, but it is thus this tradition started 
by Willis and continued by Cholewinski that Grünwaldt uses as part of his argument 
for the dating of H in the post-exilic period. Other German scholars7 have also argued 
along similar lines, especially in articles concerned with the relevance of biblical texts 
in modern society.8 Dietrich (1997: 350-376), for instance, does well to describe the 
possible “tug-of-war” between the returnees and the people that stayed behind with 
regards to the land. He uses the study of Smith (see 6.3 below) in support of his 
argument that the well-off returning exiles wanted their land back and also the article 
by Willis (1969). With regards to the oft-occurring root bwv he argues (Dietrich 1997: 
369), “dann könnte sich hinter dieser Formulierung eine konkrete Hoffnung und ein 
handfester Anspruch der Exilierten verbergen: daß sie nach fünfzig Jahren Exil in die 
Heimat und auf den eigenen Grund und Boden ‘zurückkehren‘ könnten.” Yet, 
Dietrich’s (1997: 376) most interesting idea is the notion that Leviticus 25:23 was an 
effort not to side with one specific party in this struggle for land, but to relativise the 
claims of both groups. In essence land belongs to God and the only people that can 
use it are those in the right relationship with him. But then the question becomes, 
which party presents their relationship to God as the “right” one.  
One should also place this dating of both Grünwaldt and Otto and the scholars 
relating the 50 year Jubilee to the 50 year in exile within a broader debate of scholars 
who have argued that the Persian period is the most probable time for the dating of 
the “formation” of the final form of the Pentateuch. Some have argued that it was 
actually under Imperial pressure that the Pentateuch came into being and that this 
forced the Priestly and Deuteronomic schools/groups/political parties (or whatever we 
want to call them) to reach a “compromise.”9  
                                                 
7 See for instance, Crüsemann (1992: 330-331).  
8 Two very good examples of this would be Kessler (1999) and Crüsemann & Crüsemann (2000). See 
discussion in next chapter. One other example is Robinson (1991) who imagines a similar post-exilic 
scenario (see especially 1991: 476-480), but does not see any injustice in that.  
9 See, for instance, Blum (1990: 333-360), or Watts (1999: 131-161) who actually disagrees with Blum by 
arguing that the impetus came from inside the Jewish community and not from outside as Blum argues. 
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Until now I have thus offered arguments that pointed towards an exilic or post-exilic 
dating. That in itself should warn us that it is extremely precarious to attempt to 
pinpoint a specific historical context. The fact that some have argued that the 50-year 
period of Leviticus 25 could be traced back to specifically the exilic period (i.e. Willis 
and Dietrich), while most of the other scholars seemed to favour the post-exilic period 
once again shows that the text did develop. We thus have a notion possibly 
originating in the exilic period, but then used later in a post-exilic context. Still I would 
want to think that all of this was part of the heritage, or identity, or then ideology of 
the group that returned from Babylon. It was part of the way in which they understood 
themselves.  
We need to state one last question with regards to Grünwaldt’s a) above. He dates 
the code in the post-exilic period because the Israelites are being addressed as free 
people, meaning they have been delivered from exile. If “delivered from Egypt” thus 
actually means “returned from Babylonian exile”, does it then mean that the borders 
in the post-exilic community were drawn between those who experienced the exile 
and those that did not? Might it then not be that those who did not experience the 
exile were called a rG´ or a bv;/T or a rykic;? I will continuously explore these questions 
in the following discussion, but first we need to consider the opposite view and then 
we need to tap into the latest discussion on what the post-exilic community looked 
like.  
6.2.1 A pre-exilic dating 
There are some scholars who do argue for a pre-exilic dating of the Holiness Code of 
which I think the best examples would be Knohl (1995) and Milgrom (e.g. 1991 and 
1999). These are thus Jewish scholars who are often critical of Wellhausen’s original 
theories with regards to the post-exilic origins of the priestly source. These scholars 
also follow in the footsteps of the famous Israeli scholar Yehezkel Kaufmann who 
argued for a pre-exilic dating of the priestly source.10 Both Knohl (1995) and Milgrom 
(e.g. 1999 and 2003) share the view that H follows P, which is thus broadly speaking 
similar to the views of Grünwaldt and Otto above, but they differ with regards to the 
extent of H. Their H (i.e. Knohl11 and Milgrom12) is much more extensive than that of 
                                                                                                                                            
Berquist (1995: 131-146) also argues similarly to Blum that the Persians provided the impetus to the 
creation of law. He (Berquist 1995: 138-139) specifically attributes this to the time of Darius. He describes 
the Pentateuch as internally representing “the old Israelite traditions”, but also externally “its final form 
represents Persia’s imposition of a text upon Yehud.” Or, see Otto (1995) who thinks that “compromise” is 
not appropriate since P won the battle and that the final redaction of the Pentateuch favours P over against 
D. Still all four of them understand the final redaction of the Pentateuch as taking place in the Persian 
period.  
10 See Blenkinsopp (1996: 495-518) for a critical discussion of Kaufmann’s work, but see also Milgrom 
(1999: 10-22) for a critical response. For a Jewish post-exilic dating, see Levine (2003: 11-23). 
11 See the summary of Knohl (1995: 104-106) of his two layers, P and H, which both run all the way through 
Genesis to Numbers. H does include most of the traditional Holiness Code.  
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Grünwaldt and Otto who focus mostly on the traditional Holiness Code (i.e. Lev 17-
26*).  
Knohl (1995: 199-224) is very specific about when he dates what he calls HS (i.e. 
Holiness School) which for him is the time-period of Ahaz and Hezekiah. We do not 
need to go into the details of his argument,13 but I will shortly focus on how he treats 
the curses in chapter 26 which “warn of the destruction of the land and the exile of its 
inhabitants to the land of the enemy” (Knohl 1995: 205). In the rest of his discussion 
the last part of Leviticus 26 that presumably refers to the exile is not really addressed 
thoroughly. Knohl (1995: 213) does mention that the “theme of the return of the 
remnant of Israel to God is common to both Isaiah and HS (Is 10:20-22; Lev 26:39-
45).” He also states that the exile referred to in Leviticus 26 is that “of Israel to 
Assyria” and he then describes this migration of people as follows (Knohl 1995: 223): 
After the destruction of the northern kingdom, many of its inhabitants migrated to 
Jerusalem, bringing their spiritual heritage with them. The immigration of the 
northern peoples to Jerusalem is confirmed by the rapid expansion of the city 
under Hezekiah. The influence of the traditions of the refugees was felt in the 
amazing development of spiritual life in Judea.  
Could one then deduce that the “survivors” or “remnant” referred to in Leviticus 26 
were these “refugees” that came from the North? But that would mean that they 
actually thought of Judah as the “land of their enemies” (26:34-39) where they were 
rotting away and where they were eaten by this land! This does not make sense and 
would be a rather unthankful way of referring to the land that took the refugees in and 
the land whose “spiritual life” benefited from this influx of refugees (according to 
Knohl). Or, does this mean that there did exist an expectation that those taken into 
captivity would return after paying for their sins in Assyria? Then does it mean that 
the land that is enjoying its Sabbaths is the land of Samaria? This is very hard to 
“proof” or “disproof” especially in the light of the fact that nobody apparently ever 
returned from the Assyrian exile. The dating of Knohl just complicates everything 
considerably and the simplest solution is to regard Leviticus 26 as a reference to the 
                                                                                                                                            
12 With regards to Leviticus Milgrom (1999: 12 and 2003: 24) distinguishes between P (chapters 1-16) and H 
(chapters 17-27). For other texts, which belong to H (or actually HR) outside Leviticus, see Milgrom (2003: 
29-40). 
13 After providing a summary (Knohl 1995: 204-205) of the main issues that the Holiness Code addresses (as 
a sub-unit of HS), he then concludes (Knohl 1995: 205): 
Based on this survey, we may propose that the origin of HS and the composition of the Holiness Code 
were a response to the following developments: the incursion of idolatrous practices into Israel, 
especially the worship of Molech and soothsaying and conjuring of familiar spirits; the development of 
social polarization leading to the uprooting of farmers from their lands and their enslavement to the 
rich; and the detachment of morality from the cult. We may notice that the formation of HS is linked to 
the centralization and purification of the cult; however, the traditions of popular worship are not 
invalidated. Finally, the curses at the conclusion of the Holiness Code reflect the impact of forced 
mass exile on the people.  
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exile of Judah. Then at least we know of survivors who did eventually return. I will 
thus join the ranks of those scholars that date these texts to the post-exilic period.14  
6.3 The post-exilic society  
A scholar who has attempted to describe the Judaic community of the exilic and post-
exilic period extensively, is Daniel Smith(-Christopher) (see Smith 1989, 1991 and 
Smith-Christopher 1994, 1996, 1997). In his first study, Smith (1989) attempts to 
develop a sociological model to describe what happened when communities 
experience exile. He arrives at this analysis by studying four case studies of 
situations and societies where people were forcibly removed from their homelands 
(see Smith 1989: 69-90). He is especially interested in how people survive such a 
traumatic event.15 Based on this analysis he identifies four “survival mechanisms” 
that such groups develop which he then applies to selected texts from the Hebrew 
Bible. These mechanisms are: 
1. They adapt structurally, combining traditional structures with innovation 
(Smith 1989: 93-126). 
2. They develop new leadership that can be for or against radical change (Smith 
1989: 127-138). 
3. They acquire ritual behaviour (Smith 1989: 139-151). 
4. They develop hero stories (Smith 1989: 153-178). 
All these result in the evolution of different communities. Such differences usually 
become apparent when these communities return to the place of origin and this is 
where Smith’s study becomes very relevant for ours. As a result of these differences 
conflict arises. In a latter essay by Smith (1991: 73-97) he argues this point further by 
providing a sociological and anthropological analysis of the book of Ezra. The conflict 
arises around the survival mechanisms of those who returned. In order to survive the 
exile the community had to maintain their boundaries and view themselves as an 
exclusive group (Smith 1991: 82-84). Those who returned formed a survivor group, 
the so-called children of the Diaspora. They survived because they could resist the 
destructive effects of deportation by building solidarity, by maintaining boundaries 
against others and by adapting groupings imposed on them. The pressures of 
deportation can be understood in the light of Neo-Assyrian practice as well as Neo-
Babylonian deportations. One should remember that deportation meant that people 
were cut off from the things that gave them their identity. Such things might be the 
                                                 
14 Another rather unconvincing attempt to date the Holiness Code somewhere in the pre-exilic period is that 
of Joosten (1996). When Joosten (1996: 203-207) presents his final argument for this dating he ignores the 
issue of Leviticus 26 referring to the exile altogether. The reader is only in a footnote (1996: 207 n.23) 
referred to an earlier footnote (1996: 9 n. 30) where he argued that the prediction in chapter 26 “might be 
genuine.”  
15 See especially Smith-Christopher (1997: 7-36) for an attempt to describe the trauma caused by the exile.  
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land on which they lived (therefore the title of Smith 1989), the community which they 
knew, the symbols of their society, their religion and leaders. Thus, deportation puts 
people under pressure to lose identity. The only way of surviving such an ordeal is to 
find new ways to preserve identity. It is then in this light that Smith (1991: 85-86) 
understands the preoccupation of P with the root ldb as especially manifested in 
Leviticus 11 (see also Smith 1989: 146-149).  
In the last part of this essay, Smith (1991: 86-96) examines the social conditions at 
the return of the exiles to the land. By means of analysing Hag 2:10-14 Smith (1991: 
90) concludes that “Haggai is referring to pollution from some group outside the 
community he is addressing”, but the question is then who this group is and Smith 
still thinks that this group is part of the larger Jewish community. After considering 
different options Smith (1991: 90-96) concludes that conflict arose between the 
returnees and those who were already there, who were now in possession of the 
land. Those who stayed behind had developed on their own, while those who went 
into exile were shaped by that event. When the exiles returned from Babylon it 
became clear that there were big religious differences between those who had 
remained in the land and those who were coming back. The returnees formed a 
community whose bonds were forged in exile. But even within the group of returnees 
conflict was possible, such as conflicts based on historical differences or class 
differences. Smith (1991: 96) concludes:  
I would argue that the separate religious, social and structural development of 
the exiles, apart from those that stayed behind, was antagonized by the 
arguments over property and finances, but that such conflicts had many other 
causes as well. In any case, all the evidence, as we have seen, does not lead to 
an exclusively religious explanation, either.  
Those who returned from exile had undergone a separate religious, social and 
structural development. These differences from those in the land were sharpened by 
arguments over property and money. Smith is not so clear about what these “other 
causes” might have entailed. Berquist (1995: 133) adds another source of tension in 
this society when he refers to the immigrants that came from Persia: 
These immigrants were distinct ethnically and culturally; certainly there were 
differences of birth location and language. In general, these immigrants probably 
considered themselves to be the true inheritors of the Davidic monarchy and 
Jerusalem’s past; they often termed themselves “Jews” in distinction to the 
inhabitants of the land whose families had not experienced the dislocation of 
exile at the beginning of the sixth century. Immigration became Persia’s chief 
means for exerting state influence upon Yehud.  
Many of the things that he mentions above concur with what Smith argues that the 
experience of the exile changed the people that went away and that eventually came 
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back (although I am not so sure as to what Berquist means with “ethnically” above). 
Yet what Berquist adds, is the possible political objective of the greater Persian 
Empire. For Berquist these immigrants became tools of the empire to exert its power. 
They understood themselves as being the true claimants to the land of Judah, but the 
larger empire might have exploited this understanding. This obviously added more to 
the pressure in the post-Exilic society.  
To this discussion we could also add the scholarly debate about the mixed marriages 
issue in texts like Ezra 9-10 and Nehemiah 13. Smith-Christopher (1996: 123) argues 
“that some of these ‘mixed’ marriages—particularly in Ezra16—were probably not 
‘mixed’ at all in truly racial/ethnic sense of the term, and may well have represented 
marriages between Jews who were not a part of the exilic formed ‘Sons of the 
Golah’, with those who were.” For Smith-Christopher (1996: 124) Ezra’s “group” is 
“consisting only of former exiles (Ezra 9:4).” Smith-Christopher (1996: 125-126) is 
also interested in the fact that the Priests and the Levites are portrayed as being part 
of those guilty of mixed marriages (Ezra 9:1). This leads him to conclude (Smith-
Christopher 1996: 126): 
…we appear to have grounds for seeing Ezra 9-10 as a disagreement between 
Jews, and specifically priests, as to the acceptability of these people that Ezra is 
calling “foreigners.”  
But it is also quite possible that the only basis for Ezra’s objection is that those 
he called “foreigners” were simply Jews who were not in exile.17 [italics his - 
EEM]  
All these remarks point further to the possibility that the exile became some kind of 
dividing line in the post-exilic community which caused a fair amount of friction and 
stress. The group that came back was changed by this experience and they 
distanced themselves from those that never went away. They were thus culturally 
different and they could also be understood as a group closely associated with the 
Persian Empire (as Berquist argued). This is the context in which I think we should 
read Leviticus 25 and the other chapters of the Holiness Code. This is also the 
                                                 
16 Smith-Christopher (1994: 258-261 and 1996: 126-127) argues that Nehemiah 13 is more concerned with 
political interests and might be referring to marriages with “real” foreigners.  
17 See also the essay by Eskenazi & Judd (1994: 266-285). They offer interesting arguments from modern 
Israel on how more conservative groups would not regard other groups as Jews, although the latter would 
regard themselves as Jews. They conclude their essay as follows (Eskenazi & Judd 1994: 284-285): 
Like the illustrious haredi European rabbis in the 1930s, Ezra arrived from diaspora late, after certain 
patterns had been established. He offered a more stringent definition of who is a Jew, which gained 
popular support among some segments of the population, leading to further legal reformulation of the 
issues and to communal tension. In this process, previously sanctioned relations had to be re-
evaluated.  
Given this interpretation, the women of Ezra 9-10 could have been Judahites or Israelites who had not 
been in exile and who, in the eyes of the early returnees, were appropriate marriage partners.  
 They thus offer the same conclusion as Smith-Christopher, but they offer insights from the situation in 
modern Israel in support of their argument.  
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context in which the addressees of Leviticus 25 and surrounding texts were being 
addressed.  
Yet, lately some scholars have been questioning the traditional view that the exile 
had a great impact on the “Judaic” society, or one should say that some scholars 
have been questioning the way that this exile was portrayed. To use terms that I 
have used before, these scholars argue that the way in which the exile is presented 
smacks a bit of distortion. To a certain extent these argument might question some of 
the findings of Smith. We now need to pay some attention to this debate.  
6.4 The myth of the empty land 
In a recent volume on historical methodology and the “exile”, Grabbe (1998: 149) 
summed up some of the main issues that were debated in that volume as follows: 
If most of the original community was left in the land and not deported, and if 
most of the descendents of those deported did not return to the original 
homeland, how accurate is it to speak of ‘the return’? Particularly, how accurate 
is it to speak of a ‘restoration’?  
We are in a sense starting at the end now, but the point is that some biblical scholars 
question whether the exile was such a big event as many (from the days of 
Wellhausen onwards) would argue and of whom Smith-Christopher is also a good 
example. Two questions are thus asked in the above quote namely, whether the first 
deportation was really as “big” as often thought? And, whether that many people did 
return from “exile” at all? Along with these questions another question would thus be 
whether it is accurate to speak of “exile”, since exile entails going away and then 
returning. But if we are not sure anymore that that many went away in the first place, 
nor that that many returned, then “exile” is not such an appropriate term.18  
A landmark article in the debate has been the article by Carroll (1992) with the title 
“the myth of the empty land”, which introduced both questions, but which focused 
slightly more on the first question as to whether that many people did go into exile? 
Or one should probably say, whether so few people were left behind as some biblical 
texts claim? Carroll then specifically analyses certain texts like 2 Chr 36: 17-21 and 
Leviticus 26: 27-39 where it seems that the land was left desolate in order to enjoy 
the Sabbath that it never had (1992: 80-81). Yet, other texts (2 Kgs 24:14, 25:12, Jer 
39:10, 52:15) describe a slightly different picture with only “the poorest people of the 
                                                 
18 Davies complicates the use of the term even more by stirring the problem of land-ownership into the 
“stew” (1998: 133): 
‘Exile’ is already an interpretation. It interprets those ‘exiled’ as belonging to a piece of land, and 
indeed constructs that piece of land as belonging to them (and implicitly to no one else, including 
present inhabitants); it also interprets the land as definitive of identity, for an assimilated exile ceases 
to be an exile, though without necessarily losing all ethnic affiliation.  
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land” being left behind (1992: 81). Carroll connects this myth “of the empty land” with 
another, namely the “land polluted by its Canaanite inhabitants” (1992: 79).  
In both cases he offers an ideological-critical reading of these texts which uncovers 
that the “texts substitute for political action where serious political power is absent” 
(1992: 79). Carroll (1992: 80) describes the language in Kings and Jeremiah as 
“brutal realism” and the language in the Chronicler’s account as “that of ritual values.” 
This “emptiness” in the land portrayed in Chronicles and Leviticus only ends when 
Cyrus gains power and provide the opportunity for the people of JHWH to return to 
the land of Judah (Carroll 1992: 80): 
This `a=liyyâ to the homeland is the beginning of the second temple period and it 
is based on the idea of a land purified from pollution and empty of people.  
For the Chronicler the poor people who remained in the land and who received the 
vineyards and fields (Jer 19:10; cf. 2 Kgs 15:12) are invisible (1992: 80). Carroll also 
refers to the depiction of the return in the book of Ezra (1992: 81): 
Great wealth also endowed the returning deportees, so that their appearance in 
the ravaged land accompanied by such enormously conspicuous wealth must 
have set them apart from the local inhabitants and have given rise to 
considerable opportunities for social oppression. Much of the story which follows 
the account of the deportees’ return to the ancestral homeland in Ezra 1 is an 
account, imaginary or otherwise, of the establishment of the hegemony of the 
deportees over the people of the land.  
In the rest of the essay Carroll argues in his typical “ideological-critical-expecting-the-
worst” fashion (which we saw in chapter 2) that these particular texts are very good 
at silencing the voices of the people left behind by the first two deportations (Carroll 
1992: 83):  
The image of the land paying for its sabbaths (Lev 26: 34-35, 43) echoes the 
notion of a land cleared of all its occupants. For the root metaphor of sabbath is 
a cessation of activity, and only a land evacuated of people could be said to be 
keeping (rsh, “pay off”) sabbath by having nobody working it in the normal 
agriculturalist senses. An empty land is therefore also an image of possibility for 
the future. Even though the devastated land and the deported people represent 
territory available for occupation by invading forces (cf. Lev 26: 32), such 
occupants do not appear to count against the notion of sabbath-keeping. That is 
because such foreigners are invisible in terms of divine plans.  
Texts like Leviticus 26 thus present a picture where the people left behind are simply 
invisible and it is interesting that Carroll uses the term “foreigners” here. In the rest of 
the article he also focuses on the group of people that came back from “deportation” 
and whose “ideologies” determined what was written in the Hebrew Bible (Carroll 
1992: 85): 
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Much—in some sense perhaps all—of the literature of the Hebrew Bible must be 
regarded as the documentation of their claims to the land and as a reflection of 
their ideology. The representation of the people(s) of the land must also be seen 
as the depiction of the losers in that particular ideological struggle.  
We do not need to go into further detail of Carroll’s argument, but the importance of 
this article by him is that it provides us with further arguments for engaging with what 
we have found in Leviticus 25. It is also useful that he treats Leviticus 26, which we 
saw is closely connected to Leviticus 25 and they most definitely share the same 
traces of ideology. It provides us with a further argument to associate these texts 
(Lev 25 and 26) with the post-exilic community. They do share some of the 
ideological features that can be found in the Chronicler for instance. Carroll does not 
really argue this dating, he just accepts it and it is part of his accepted foundation on 
which he builds his argument. The other important issue is that Carroll prefers not to 
use the term “exile”, because that would mean buying into the ideology of the group 
that seized the Hebrew Bible to further their own political causes.19 When we use this 
term we then partake in the silencing of the majority that was never deported and the 
silencing of the majority that never returned.  
Thus, Carroll and Smith have many things in common, in the sense that they both 
understand the time after the deportation and the time of the return as important and 
that it did have an impact on the Judean society. Yet, Smith tries to describe by 
means of sociological tools what happened to the group that was deported and what 
this experience might have done to them. Smith sounds also rather sympathetic 
towards this group who were deported and who returned. Carroll also engages with 
this scenario, but for him it is important to pay attention to the silenced voices. His 
“sympathies” lies more with those that were left behind when the others were 
deported (and even those who stayed behind when the others returned). He 
questions whether both the deportation and the return were really that “big.” And he 
argues that what was really “big” about these returnees was their power and their 
ability to let large parts of the Hebrew Bible speak for their political interests, while 
silencing the interests and the voices of those left behind on both occasions.  
Other scholars have continued to build further on what he suggested in this article, 
like Barstad (1996) who wrote a book with the same title as Carroll’s article. Apart 
form analysing the biblical texts (Barstad 1996: 25-45), he also added some 
archaeological arguments (Barstad 1996: 47-55)20 to support the argument by 
                                                 
19 See also Carroll (1998c: 66-67):  
My sense of disquiet with such titles [i.e. titles using the term “exile” - EEM] arises from my point of 
view that to use the term ‘exile’ in a book title is to connive at, conspire or collaborate with the biblical 
text in furthering the myth represented by the ideological shaping of biblical history.  
20 His main argument is that although some cities were indeed destroyed, large parts of the country were left 
more or less intact as the following quote shows (Barstad 1996: 47-48): 
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Carroll, which was only based on “textual evidence.”21 An important part of his 
argument that Judah was no tabula rasa and not that utterly destroyed is the fact that 
this would not have been such an economically favourable decision by the 
Babylonian rulers (Barstad 1996: 61-76). Nebuchadnezzar mostly needed Judah “for 
economic reasons” (Barstad 1996: 67). Judah was simply such an important 
producer of especially agricultural commodities needed in Babylon that to have 
utterly destroyed the whole country would have meant to have “killed the goose who 
lays the golden eggs” (Barstad 1996: 70-76).  
In a recent article by Blenkinsopp (2002: 169-187), he also uses archaeology to 
come to a similar conclusion as Carroll did (Blenkinsopp 2002: 187): 
I have tried to show that what has become known as the ‘the myth of the empty 
land’ originated with the dominant Judaeo-Babylonian elite in Judah under 
Persian rule, and is inscribed most clearly in the book of Chronicles … 
Another scholar who has provided archaeological evidence, which is relevant for the 
question of how many people were deported in the first place, is Willi (1995). Willi 
(1995: 18-39) argues that there was not really a break in the “material culture” of 
Palestine until much later in the Persian period. He characterises this first phase as a 
phase of “continuity” with the culture of the late monarchic period. Like Carroll, Willi 
(1995: 21-25) offers a critique of texts like 2 Chronicles 36 and Leviticus 2622 which 
depicts a kind of tabula rasa and then he contrasts it with threefold evidence to the 
contrary (Willi 1995: 22):  
…die alttestamentliche Quellen, vor allem Hag, Sach, Teile der Bücher Jer (Kap. 
37-44.52), Ez, Klgl und nicht zuletzt Deuterojesaja sowie das wohl im Lande 
zusammengestellte deuteronomistische Geschichtswerk; sodann der 
                                                                                                                                            
Whereas the archaeological evidence from such sites as Jerusalem, Tell Beit Mirsim, Beth-Shemesh, 
Lachish, and Ramat Rachel shows clear traces of the destruction brought about by Nebuchadnezzar’s 
campaigns in the west, settlements in the northern part of Judah and Benjamin were not affected by the 
event. Several cities lying north of Jerusalem, in the traditional area of Benjamin, were not destroyed 
at all. In contrast to sites excavated south of Jerusalem, these places in fact prospered in the later sixth 
century. Thus, it was mainly the hill country of Judah that suffered deportations and destructions under 
Nebuchadnezzar. The rest of the country was left more or less intact.  
 See also the discussion by Albertz (2001: 66-67) 
21 It seems that Carroll (1998c: 72-73) was often reluctant to make too specific connections between the 
world of the biblical text and the world outside the text:  
It is much more the case that there is not really anything to be done here because the connections 
between the biblical text and the world outside of the text are far too few to be of any consequence and 
far too problematic to warrant the over-confidence of traditional biblical scholarship’s reading of the 
text. We have no grid on which we can map the details of the biblical narrative alongside the external 
date available in order to create a reliable historical picture which would satisfy normal historians (if 
such things as ‘normal historians’ can be said to exist).  
 This statement comes in response to criticism by Willie McKane who accuses Carroll “of laziness here, of 
conveniently not having to do the historical research entailed.” I do find this statement slightly puzzling, 
because Carroll usually does no hesitate to read texts within the second temple period. See especially 
Carroll (1991 and 1994). Or would that count as a not “too specific connection”?  
22 See also Albertz (2001: 20-22).  
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archäologische und historische Befund und schließlich eine sorgfältige 
Interpretation der eingangs angeführten Stelle 2 Chr 36,20f.  
With regards to archaeological evidence, Willi (1995: 24-26) refers to the evidence 
that suggests that although many cities were destroyed it seemed as if life in 
especially rural areas went on as normal and in some instances even flourished. With 
regards to life in these rural areas he suggests (Willi 1995: 25): 
Verhältnismäßig unangetastet mag das Leben in den Dörfern und Landschaften 
Judas weiter seinen Gang genommen haben. Es ist gut denkbar, daß hier nun 
die alten religiösen und politischen Grundlagen und Strukturen Judas ihre 
bewahrende Kraft erwiesen und so eine kontinuierliche Fortführung des Lebens 
ermöglichten.  
So, life in a sense went on as normal for many people, the majority of people who 
continued to live in the land and older systems of government (which for Willi 
especially meant the so-called “people of the land”) that were part of the traditional 
tribal organisation regained power.23 Eventually Willi (1995: 26) concludes: 
Die Archäologie ergänzt und bestätigt diese Sicht der Dinge. Immer deutlicher 
ergibt sich das Bild einer weitgehend unveränderten Übernahme und 
Fortführung vorexilischer Zustände. So gesehen bedeuten das Exil und die erste 
nachexilische Periode keinen Einschnitt. Das tägliche Leben der materiellen 
Kultur verrät Kontinuität und ungebroche Fortdauer der Gewohnheiten.  
In the rest of his book he argues that things only changed later, more-or-less in the 
middle of the Persian period when he thinks that the Jewish community started to 
develop a new identity. This had to do with the formation of the Persian province of 
Jehud (see Willi 1995: 82-90). The most fascinating (or maybe puzzling) aspect of his 
study is the fact that although he presents the initial deportation as not that 
substantial, he does not describe a picture of such conflict between the returnees 
and the people who stayed behind (as we had from Smith-Christopher and Carroll). 
He (Willi 1995:59-60), for instance, criticises the notion of a “Jerusalemer 
Kultgemeinde” of scholars like Noth as being a “Fiktion” or as he puts it (1995: 60): 
Für Esr-Neh ist nicht eine mehr oder minder fiktive “Jerusalemer Kultgemeinde” 
Erbin und Nachfolgerin des alten Israel, sondern das Volk als ganzes,24 die in 
                                                 
23 Albertz argues similarly when he refers to life in Judah after the assassination of Gedaliah in 582 (2001: 
84): 
Die einfache Landbevölkerung war von der Deportation und den Abwanderungen im Jahr 582 weit 
weniger betroffen. Auch wenn die babylonische Provinzverwaltung den Druck erhöhte, so leistete man 
nun die Steuern, Fron- und Spanndienste kaum anders als ehedem für die eigenen Könige. Darum ist 
zu vermuten, daß sich die Versorgungslage auch jetzt bald wieder stabilisierte. Es gibt sogar Hinweise, 
daß es möglich war, unter der babylonischen Provinzverwaltung eine beschränkte Selbstverwaltung 
auf der Basis von Ältesten aufzubauen (Thr 5,14). Weitere Konfrontationen blieben offerbar aus.  
 See also Berquist (1995: 17) who argues that “effects on the rural people would have been only minor.”  
24 For the opposite view, see the essay by Dyck (1996: 89-116) that contrasts the kind of “ethnicity” that we 
find in Ezra-Nehemiah with that of Chronicles. In Ezra-Nehemiah Dyck (1996: 99-104) describes it as 
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der Diaspora lebenden Nachkommen des Zwölfstämmevolks und besonders des 
ehemaligen Königreichs Juda so gut wie die in der Heimat lebenden Bewohner 
der jungen Provinz Jehud, die “Juden” in der alten wie in der neuen Bedeutung 
des Wortes also, die sich religiös und ethnisch ebenfalls primär als Glieder des 
alten Israel der zwölf Stämme verstanden. [italics mine - EEM] 
Thus, for Willi those that never went into exile and those who stayed behind became 
one “Volk” later without experiencing that much conflict.25 Willi (1995: 61) thinks that 
to use a term like “Gemeinde” to describe this society would be rather anachronistic. 
But then the question would be whether his use of “Volk” in the quotation above 
could not be regarded as another example of an argument that is “anachronistisch 
und unzulässig”? Could one thus ask (along with Carroll maybe) whether Willi does 
not fall for the ideology of these authors?  
A further important feature of Willi’s book (that we already mentioned above) is his 
insistence that the “Wende” in post-exilic Palestine only came much later when the 
exiles returned. Smith-Christopher (1997: 8 n.3) regards the book by Willi as “another 
attempt to depreciate the crucial significance of the exile”, which he, of course, 
contrasts with his own (Smith 1989) as an attempt to take this event seriously. Smith-
Christopher thus thinks that because of this Willi’s study is mostly at odds with his.  
                                                                                                                                            
“vertical ethnicity” where the focus is on those that experienced exile. It is thus a very exclusive kind of 
ethnicity where membership is clearly defined (Dyck 1996: 100-101):  
Membership in one of these communities, which were organised along kinship lines, determined 
access to the cult and established one’s right to land. In this way the “exilic” concept of ethnic identity, 
determined in the first instance by kinship, figured in every aspect of community life, helping to 
concentrate and focus social interactions within the community and functioning as a redemption myth 
that legitimated the community’s claim to land. All this points in the direction of an ethnic group 
which emphasises vertical depth and territorial compactness.  
 Dyck (1996: 104-108) describes the ideology of identity that we find in Chronicles as lateral. Their 
perspective is more inclusive, it refers to “all Israel” (as Willi also points out) and it does not establish “an 
inside/outside distinction” (Dyck 1996: 106). Yet, Dyck (1996: 108-114) makes it clear that this inclusion 
creates a “hierarchy within” where the returning Elite is still the ones with power. The way in which he 
describes it makes one want to change “inclusion” into “annexation.” Dyck (1996: 116) has no illusion that 
this “inclusion” was also mostly about power:  
In my view the Chronicler’s ideology of identity, aimed at generating an integrating belief in greater 
Israel, was simultaneously an ideology of legitimacy and power that functioned in the interests of 
Jerusalem, its institutions and its ruling classes. 
 I think the views of Willi and Dyck on Ezra-Nehemiah are largely divergent, while there will be more 
similarities when it comes to Chronicles. Willi, though, does not share the “power-conscious” or one could 
say “ideological-critical” perspective of Dyck. See also Willi (1994: 146-162). 
25 With regards to Ezra 9-10, Willi (1995: 80-81) is not willing to regard these chapters as “discriminating” 
or “exclusive”: 
Es wäre abwegig, diesen Kapiteln wie Esr-Neh überhaupt diskriminierende, exklusive Gesichtpunkte 
zu unterstellen. Wie könnten solche einem Werk zugrundenliegen, das alles daransetzt, nachzuwiesen, 
daß der heidnische Oberherr die Initiative zum Bau des Tempels ergriffen habe und daß er dabei von 
Gott inspiriert gewesen sei! Das Heiligtum, wie es nun steht, wirkt als Saat und Keim; es verlangt eine 
heilige Umgebung. Seine universal ausgerichtete sühnende und bewahrende Funktion ruft danach. Das 
ist alles.  
 It thus seems as if Willi constructs a kind of theology here where the temple has to be kept “pure” in order 
that all the “impure” peoples could be saved by it. One finds no mention from Willi that these “foreign 
wives” might have been some of the people who actually stayed behind.  
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Yet, I do not think that it is and I do not think that Willi is actually not taking the “exile” 
seriously. Willi does not question that a deportation happened, nor a return for that 
matter. It is more a case of “from whose point-of-view” they approach their studies. 
Willi approaches it from the land of Palestine and what happens there to the people 
living there. In this light his argument is then that the biggest impact was not when 
deportation took place, but when the “return” happened, when Jews living in Babylon 
immigrated to Palestine. The “return” is very much a part of the “exile” and therefore 
Willi most definitely does not “depreciate the crucial significance of the exile.” Smith-
Christopher on the other hand mostly attempts to describe the impact that the 
deportation had on the (small?) group that experienced it. For this group it was a 
“Wende” from the start all the way through to their partial return to reclaim the land. 
Yet it was this return that impacted on Palestine and in this sense I think that Smith-
Christopher and Willi would agree, although they obviously disagree on the kind of 
conflict that this community experienced.  
We have until now started with some of the recent theories for dating Leviticus 25 
and more specifically the Holiness Code as such which all boiled down to the Second 
Temple Period. Then I moved to the work by especially Smith(-Christopher) who 
used sociological analyses to describe what might have happened to the people who 
were deported and who returned. This helped us to acquire some possible insight 
into the kinds of conflict that might have been prevalent in that society. We also paid 
attention to the recent debates on the exile, which often tended to ask more 
ideological-critical questions, or more exactly argued that the view that we have of 
the exile is fairly distorted.  
The question addressed at Grünwaldt after summing up his argument for the dating 
of the Holiness Code was, if he used the “brought out of Egypt” refrain for dating the 
text in the post-exilic period, could we then argue that we should read “Babylon” 
instead of “Egypt”? This would then entail that the post-exilic community was divided 
between those who were in exile and those who never went away and that the 
returning community understood themselves as the “true standard bearers” of old 
Israel. Rainer Albertz expresses it well when he describes the way in which the exile 
is portrayed in Second Chronicles (2001: 21): 
Erstens: Diese Exilzeit sind Tage der Verwüstung, d.h. das Land lag während 
dieser Zeit vollständig menschenleer und brach da (vgl. Lev 26,43). Zweitens: Es 
wurde – noch totaler als in den Königsbüchern – die gesamte noch lebende 
Bevölkerung Judas (und Benjamins) exiliert (2.Chr 36,20); von im Land 
Zurückgelassenen ist nicht mehr die Rede. Und drittens: Eine Kontinuität 
zwischen dem vorexilischen und dem nachexilischen Israel gab es nur noch über 
die babylonische Gola. Nur die Heimkehrer aus dem babylonischen Exil, die das 
radikale Gericht Gottes voll durchlitten hatten, konnten für sich beanspruchen, 
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das “wahre Israel” zu sein (Esr 2,1ff.; 3,1; 5,16), und waren berechtigt, dessen 
Geschichte, die JHWH mit der Erweckung des Kyros hatte anheben lassen 
(2.Chr 36,22; Esr 1,1), fortzuführen (Esr 4,3f.; 5,16,19f.).  
His first and second remarks fit well into what scholars like Carroll, Barstad and 
Blenkinsopp have argued. The land is empty and those that stayed behind are not 
mentioned anymore, or as Carroll puts it, have become invisible. Yet his third remark, 
which concurs with the work of Smith(-Christopher), is even more important for it 
states that the true Israel are those who went into exile, those that were in Babylon. I 
would add that whenever the Holiness Code refers to those brought out of Egypt, it is 
actually aiming at those who came from Babylon. This is the ideology of the authors 
and addressees of Leviticus 25 and surrounding texts. This is how they understood 
their past and their present. They were the true Israel and they were the true 
claimants to the land of Israel and they were the true people of YHWH. They were in 
the “right” relationship to him, because he claimed them when he delivered them 
from Babylon.   
A related question that we should shortly address now, before we return to a 
previous issue that we have not concluded, is whether the authors of these texts 
were priests or not. This has more-or-less been the consensus view of the Priestly 
texts and even if we understand the Holiness Code as later than most of the rest of 
P, many scholars would still regard this as a Priestly text.26 Until now the group of 
people that would have profited most from Leviticus 25 and other surrounding texts 
were not priests, but “normal” land-owners who wanted to have access to land and 
live from it. The only text that is blatantly favouring the priests is Leviticus 27, which I 
argued was somewhat different from the rest of the Holiness Code. With this text I 
am tempted to just call it a later edition, maybe at a time when the sanctuary was in 
need of some money. My question is simply that if the priests were not the only ones 
profiting, but also a class of returning land-claiming Elite, is it really viable to regard 
the priests as the only possible authors of these texts?  
Grünwaldt (1999: 384) has also recently questioned this. He understands chapter 21-
22 as an attempt by lay people to control the priests. These two chapters lay 
obligations on the priest and it thus limits their power. He also thinks that the ethical 
side of the Holiness Code does not fit into a priestly world-view. I am not sure 
whether I want to go that far. Yes, chapters 21-22 do lay obligations on the priests, 
but it still leaves them out of power. To be sanctified by YHWH as the priests are, 
would still provide one with a position of power in that society. I would rather venture 
that the people who wrote the Holiness Code were the returning Elite, which included 
a land-claiming class, but also a priestly class. The laws that are propagated here 
                                                 
26 See, for instance, Crüsemann (1992: 331) or even Knohl (1995: 216).  
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would be in the interest of both these groups, if they were two groups in the first 
place.  
There is one issue that I would like to revisit now which is closely related to the 
problem of who had legal claims to the land. When discussing Leviticus 24 in the 
previous chapter (see 5.4.3 above) I argued that the basic meaning of the word rG´ is 
that of somebody who does not have any legal claims to the land, at least not in the 
eyes of the authors. I have done this mainly by analysing the particular texts in the 
Holiness Code where the term occurs and my argument was thus mainly based on 
an immanent reading of the text. Yet I have not really engaged with the larger 
scholarly debate, nor have I considered socio-historical issues. The time is now ripe 
to revisit these groups in the Holiness Code that often featured along with the 
addressees. I do not only refer to the rG´, but also to the bv;/T and the rykic; who often 
featured with the former, especially in chapter 25. 
6.5 The rG´ in the Holiness Code, revisited 
Two monographs, Van Houten (1991) and Bultmann (1992), that appeared on the rG´ 
in the nineties have two almost opposite views of these people in the Holiness Code. 
Both of them attempt to determine the different diachronic layers in the text and both 
of them date them to certain time-periods. I will start with Bultmann and then move 
on to Van Houten.  
For Bultmann the rG´ in the Deuteronomic Code, which he mostly dates to the seventh 
century BCE, signifies a “lower layer” in the class society of the day (Bultmann 1992: 
213): 
Der rG´ is fremd an dem Ort seines Aufenhalts, und es läßt sich für keinen Beleg 
in dem genannten Quellenbestand nachweisen, daß die Fremdheit in dieser 
Relation von der Fremdheit in einer möglichen zweiten Relation überlagert 
würde, nach der der rG´ eine Gestalt nicht-israelitischer Herkunft wäre, d.h. aus 
den benachbarten oder sogar entfernten Völkern im Umkreis der Monarchie 
Juda stammte. 
For him (Bultmann 1992: 214) they occupy a niche between the land-owning upper 
class and slaves and they depend on getting employment from the land-owning 
farmers. The fact that they have no land means that they are not so connected to a 
certain place and that they moved around and therefore they were often depicted as 
rG´ (“stranger” or “sojourner” etc.). The meaning of the term does not change much in 
the sixth century when the deuteronomic laws develop further (Bultmann 1992: 216), 
but a real shift in meaning takes place when we turn to the fifth century and the time 
of the exile and the Return.  
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In Bultmann’s (1992: 175-196) discussion of the use of this term in the Holiness 
Code27 he scrutinizes texts like Leviticus 19 (vv. 9-10 and 33-34), 25 (vv. 47-55) and 
17 (vv. 1-14). In all three he identifies three slightly different uses of the term. 
Bultmann (1992: 176-179) regards parts28 of vv. 9-10 in chapter 19 as dating from 
the end of the sixth century when the Judaic Monarchy ended. The meaning of rG´ 
here is thus similar to that of deuteronomic law, a social term describing somebody of 
a lower class. This changes already when we turn to vv. 33-34, in which we once 
again find layers, only this time three.29 It is in these layers where Bultmann spots the 
change of meaning of the term rG´ from a social term referring to a kind of person 
within Israel who needs to be protected to somebody who seems to have the same 
social status as the jr;z“a, and who is “sakralrechtlich” equal to the jr;z“a,. When he 
then turns to Leviticus 25 Bultmann (1992: 179-190) starts with the following quote 
(1992: 179): 
In Lev 25 ist ein erstaunlicher Gebrauch der Bezeichnung ger belegt, der sich 
von dem in Lev 19,9f. deutlich unterscheidet. Die Gestalt des ger ist hier nicht 
eine persona misera, auf die aus religiösen Gründen besondere Rücksicht zu 
nehmen wäre, sondern sie ist ökonomisch selbständige und gelegentlich 
überlegene Gestalt, die außerhalb der durch die Jahweverehrung gebundenen 
Gemeinschaft steht.  
The problem with his presentation is that he mainly focuses on vv. 47-55 where we 
do have (what I have called) “the problem of the rich rG´.” His argument is that the rG´ 
is not a persona misera (as in chapter 19), but has economic power and engages 
                                                 
27 The name of this chapter (Bultmann 1992: 175-212) is actually “Heiligkeitsgesetz und Sakralrecht” 
whereby he acknowledges that although the exact character of the Holiness Code is not clear, it is evident 
enough that “die Gesetzestexte im engeren oder weiteren literarischen Anschluß an die priesterschriftliche 
Erzählung der Vorgeschichte Israels und der Einsetzung seiner religiösen Ordnungen umfaßt” (1992: 176).  
28 In true German “Literarkritik”-fashion Bultmann (1992: 176) distinguishes between different layers in the 
text, by means of the difference between plural and singular forms of the second person. The plural parts 
are from the hand of the redactor and dated in the middle of the sixth century, while the singular parts are 
from after the fall of the Monarchy. Why this is so, is not clear, but he uses the works of Cholewinski and 
Elliger extensively to champion his cause.  
29 The three layers that Bultmann (1992: 177) identifies are presented as follows:  
wta wnyt al !kxrab rg [ ^ta II] rwgy ykw 
[ !kta rgh rgh !kl hyhy !km jrzak 
 [ ^wmk  wl tbhaw 
!yrxm $rab !tyyh !yrg yk 
!kyhla hwhy yna 
I v. 33a.b 
III] v. 34aa 
II] v. 34ab 
I v. 34ag 
I v. 34b 
 The first layer (I) still refers to the land as a concrete reality where people work on the fields and where 
there is the need to leave parts of the harvest for the destitute and the rG´ (as in verses 9f. and 23ff.). But the 
second and third layers (II and III) use prepositions like ta not to express a social problem anymore, but 
instead a “sakralrechtliche im Vergleich zum jr;z“a,.” In these verses Bultmann thus already sees a move 
from a social problem within the Judaic society to a religious problem more concerned with giving these 
people access to the sanctuary (Bultmann 1992: 179): 
Im jetzigen Gebotstext Lev 19,33f. überschneiden sich die beiden Stränge des biblischen 
Wortgebrauchs von ger. Das Gebot gerät damit in die Spannung von sozialer Orientierung und 
religiöser Ordnung. 
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with Israelites in trade. The fact that the hL;auG“ institution has to be used to rescue the 
ja;, implies for Bultmann that the rG´ is somebody from “outside.” He dates this text in 
the latter half of the fifth century in a similar historical context to Nehemiah 5:1-13 
(Bultmann 1992: 189): 
Da sich von dtn Gesetz und seinen Nachklängen her für Lev 25 eine Datierung 
in das 5. Jahrhundert nahelegt und da noch kein Einfluß von Lev 25 auf Neh 
5,1ff feststellbar ist, kann als hinreichend wahrscheinlich gelten, daß die 
Jobeljahr-Konzeption eine Nachwirkung des Impulses der Seisachthie Nehemias 
ist.  
Thus (see Bultmann 1992: 190) here the rG´ is somebody from “outside” the 
community who has economical power and who poses a threat to the society and 
therefore the society needs to draw boundaries here. These people did not want to 
become part of the religious community either. According to Bultmann (1992: 190) 
this is the only use of rG´ in this manner in the whole OT. Van Houten, though, has the 
opposite view.  
Van Houten’s (1991) study with regards to the rG´ produces more-or-less the opposite 
result from that of Bultmann. For Van Houten (1991: 110-117) most of the laws 
pertaining to the rG´ in the priestly texts are from the historical context of the 
restoration after the exile. Or, as she puts it (Van Houten 1991: 117):  
The laws pertaining to the alien as well as the bulk of the Priestly legislation are 
illuminated when they are understood as a creative response to the crisis 
brought about by the exile, and the subsequent reuniting of the returnees with 
those who had remained in Judah.  
She (1991: 117) uses the analyses of Smith (1989) extensively in order to describe 
the kind of society that we found after the exile and the fact that they were obsessed 
with their “borders”: 
When they returned, they had to become integrated with a group who claimed 
the same religious heritage, but had not undergone the profound ideological and 
sociological transformation as the group that had survived the Babylonian exile.  
She then discusses the references in the Priestly Laws under four groups namely 
(1991: 120): 
a. laws which juxtapose the alien and the poor; 
b. laws in which the alien is considered along with the temporary resident; 
c. laws which set the alien alongside the native of the land; and 
d. laws which treat the alien as equal with the native or the Israelite.  
Of these categories only b. is specifically referring to examples in Leviticus 25, while 
a. refers to examples like those in Leviticus 19 and 23. Examples of d. are also plenty 
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in Leviticus, or one should actually say in the Holiness Code, because apart from 
chapter 16 the word rG´ does not feature in the part of Leviticus that precedes the 
Holiness Code. C. refers to examples that we do not find in Leviticus and therefore I 
will only treat the other three (b., a. and d.).  
Examples of a. include those in Leviticus 19:10 and 23:22. She concludes that the 
!yriG´, which we meet here are similar to those that were found in Deuteronomic law, 
in the sense that the !yriG´ “are defined in socioeconomic terms” (Van Houten 1991: 
124). But she continues that “the manner in which the Israelite is approached, and 
the motivation30 for obedience are quite distinct.”31  
With regards to b., Van Houten (1991: 125) maintains that the combination of rG´ and 
bv;/T is not to be found in either the Covenant Code or the Deuteronomic laws and in 
terms of legal texts are thus unique to the Priestly legislation.32 In most of the other 
cases (like 1 Chr 29:15, Ps 39:13 and Gen 23:4) it is clear (to Van Houten at least) 
that these terms mean the same thing, but she does not necessarily want to accept 
that they have the same meaning in the Priestly Code. The first obstacle in the way 
of understanding the two as similar is the fact that we find three cases (according to 
her Ex 12: 43-47; Lev 22: 10-13 and 25:6) where the rykic; and the bv;/T are 
mentioned together with regards to eating holy food. In these cases there does not 
seem to be much of a difference between them.33 She continues (1991: 126-127) to 
make the interesting point that these laws arose because all these people were 
members of the household and that it would not have been a problem if the rykic; and 
bv;/T would have eaten apart from the land-owners. When she then (Van Houten 
                                                 
30 What she means by “motivation” is the “I am the Lord your God” phrase that we find 16 times in Leviticus 
19 and two times in Leviticus 23. Van Houten (1991: 124) argues that the “Israelites are motivated to obey 
the laws in Leviticus not because they understand the reason for the law, nor out of gratitude, but because 
the law derives from the Lord, their God. This phrase is an appeal to authority.” She continues to describe 
the kind of society in which she thinks this kind of motivation might have been successful (1991: 124): 
This type of motivation is more at home in an authoritarian, hierarchical community than in an 
egalitarian, democratic one. It is such a community, and such a world, that we meet in these laws. 
People as well as animals are hierarchically ordered. The order is based on purity and holiness as 
defined by these laws. The priest is the most holy, and can come the closest to God, while the infirm, 
the foreign and the female are furthest from God.  
31 She rejects the idea though that Leviticus was written as a response to Deuteronomy (Van Houten 1991: 
122).  
32 According to Van Houten (1991: 125) we do find fourteen examples of this word in the Hebrew Bible. 
These include, Genesis 23:4; Exodus 12:24; Leviticus 22:10; 25:6, 23, 35, 40, 45, 47; Numbers 35:15; 1 
Kings 17:1; 1 Chronicles 29:15; Psalms 39:13.  
33 Van Houten (1991: 125-126) then makes a strange comment stating that “in none of these laws is the alien 
mentioned along with other dependent people, i.e. slaves, maidservants, manservants, daughters.” I can 
understand that this is applicable to the first two examples where the rG´ is not mentioned, but in Leviticus 
25:6 (as in v. 44) we find reference to !yriG:h' *b]v;wto, thus the bv;/T who is “sojourning” (participle of rwg). 
Van Houten does not mention this and I do not think that 25:6 belongs with the other examples, it is in any 
case not about “holy eating”, but about sharing the whole harvest amongst everyone.  
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1991: 127-131) focuses on the Jubilee laws she dates this text to the post-exilic 
period (Van Houten 1991: 128): 
These laws are best explained as justifying the re-appropriation of the land of 
Judah by the returning exile in the early years of the restoration.  
She continues (Van Houten 1991: 128-129) to argue that the terms rG´, bv;/T and 
rykic; are used “interchangeable” in texts like vv. 35, 40, 44 and how the Israelites are 
contrasted with these groups as having special status based on the deliverance from 
Egypt. She makes it clear that these texts were written from the vantage point of the 
“Israelites”, which does not want to acknowledge that the rG´ is on par with them, 
although it is obvious that they were permanent residents. Then she continues (1991: 
129-130):  
The law envisions the alien as economically secure, even wealthy, and in the 
land for several generations. If the Jubilee laws are set in the historical context of 
the restoration community, then it is possible that the aliens are the Judeans who 
remained in the land, and were not considered true Israelites by the returnees.  
Eventually Van Houten (1991: 130) does conclude that the term bv;/T, rG´ and rykic; 
are used “more or less synonymous.” But let us turn now to the relation between the 
rG´ and the jr;z“a,.34 
The examples of d., where the rG´ and the jr;z“a, occur together, are plenty,35 
especially in Leviticus, although none in chapter 25. Despite this fact her discussion 
on the jr;z“a, is important because it provides further support for her dating of P. Of 
the 17 occurrences in the OT only three (Ez 47:22, Josh 8:33 and Ps 37:35) are not 
in P. For van Houten (1991: 139) the term jr;z“a, in P should be linked to “P’s notion of 
the sanctity of the land”, or as she puts it: 
It is the belief in the land as a holy place, a land set apart for God, which would 
lead to the designation of the Israelites as natives, i.e. drawing attention to their 
relationship to the land.  
Van Houten (1991: 139) also argues that the land is personalised, for instance, it 
“vomits out” (Lev 18) and that this “metaphor is part of a warning which makes it clear 
that all in the land are responsible for keeping the land pure.” This theology of the 
land plays a further important role in the blessing and curses of Leviticus 26 where it 
is specifically the land (along with the covenant) that is remembered. She concludes 
her discussion of jr;z“a, and the $r,a, as follows (Van Houten 1991: 140): 
                                                 
34 We do not need to discuss “the Alien and the Native of the Land” (Van Houten 1991: 131-138) since all 
the examples are limited to Exodus and Numbers.  
35 According to Van Houten (1991: 138) these include, Leviticus 16:29; 17:8, 10, 12, 13, 15; 18:26; 19:33, 
34; 20:2; 22:18; 24:16, 22; Num 15:14, 15, 16, 26, 29, 30; 19:10.  
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These two things—hope for the future based on God’s remembering the land, 
and the nature of these laws as a charter for the returning exiles in order to 
prevent them from repeating history—explain the prominence of the land 
theology, and the concomitant designation of God’s people as natives. 
The returnees thus stake their claim to the land by presenting themselves as the real 
owners and the real “locals” although they actually come from the outside! 
We do not have to pay attention to her discussion of the individual occurrences of 
jr;z“a, in the rest of Leviticus (16:29; 18:26; 19:33, 34; 20:2; 22:18; 24: 16, 22 and 
17:8, 10, 12, 13, 15), but could settle for her summary on the identity of the Alien in 
the Post-Exilic Community (Van Houten 1991: 151-155). She argues (1999: 152) 
further that the Israelites who went into exile remained Israelites and considered 
themselves to be the true Israelites. They called themselves the jr;z“a, and they 
disregarded “the people who would have been living in Palestine during the time of 
the exile.” In this sense Van Houten already anticipated a debate that would shortly 
follow in the academic guild about the “emptiness of the land” during exile (which we 
already discussed above) and the fact that the remaining inhabitants were “invisible.” 
In her reconstruction we thus have the jr;z“a, or Israelites who came back from exile 
and who came into conflict with those that had stayed behind. These people who 
stayed behind probably also regarded themselves as Israelites and they also wanted 
to worship and therefore the many laws that also regulate how the !yriG´ are to 
worship. Yet the returnees always regarded the ones that stayed behind as the 
“others” and therefore they were called !yriG´ and in chapter 25 also !ybiv;wTo and rykic;. 
Van Houten thus reaches the opposite conclusion as Bultmann who thinks that the 
!yriG´ were non-Israelites.  
I would think that the biggest difference between these two is that Bultmann sticks to 
more traditional historical criticism (especially source-criticism) whereas Van Houten 
uses the sociological insights generated by the study of Smith (1989). The end-result 
is a different kind of criticism that they direct at the text. Bultmann channels his 
criticism into Literarkritik looking for different layers and making different semantic 
constructions of this word in each layer, but still he takes the text fairly seriously. If 
the text says “Israelites” then he accepts that the authors viewed themselves as such 
and the !yriG´ as not. This is where the “sociological-sensitivities” that Van Houten has 
gained help her to state a further question and that is whether it might not have been 
possible that the !yriG´ actually viewed themselves as Israelites as well? The text thus 
portrays them as non-Israelite, but she is suspicious of what the text claims and 
directs her criticism against the text. In Carrollian terms, Bultmann partakes in the 
silencing of the “invisible” people who stayed behind, while Van Houten succeeds in 
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giving them some kind of voice. Bultmann “falls” for the ideology of these authors, 
while Van Houten does not and uncovers some distortion.  
I would like to return to the question that I left unanswered when I discussed chapter 
24. The main question was what kind of rhetorical effect would a story about a 
blaspheming half-Israelite have who by implication is a rG´? If Smith(-Christopher) and 
Van Houten are correct that the main source of the conflict in the post-exilic society 
was between those that returned and those that never went away what might the 
objective of such a story have been? I would venture that if this story were told in a 
context where there was a struggle for land and power between the returned Elite 
and those that stayed behind (i.e. the rG´), then the effect of the story would have 
been to present the rG´ as a danger in society. It creates an image of a rG´ as a person 
who is inclined to curse YHWH, as a person who is inclined to threaten the “cultic 
bliss” of the post-exilic society. Above (see 5.4.4) I described the kind of “stability” or 
“orderliness” that returned to Leviticus after the previous disastrous event in chapter 
10. But why is this “bliss” disturbed by a half-Israelite? If the story simply wanted to 
say that neither jr;z“a,  nor rG´ should curse YHWH, why could the blasphemer not 
have been an jr;z“a,? Why did the culprit have to be a rG´? Could the story not have 
been told with an jr;z“a, doing the cursing? The authors could still have added 
afterwards that this penalty against cursing will be applicable to the rG´ as well. 
In Leviticus 25 some of the !yriG´ (excluding the rich rG´) end up as a slaves of the 
addressees. In chapter 24 the rG´ in the story ends up dead. I would thus argue that 
the objective of this story was to remind the returned Elite that those that were not 
regarded as belonging to their group were a threat to them. This opened the way for 
exploitation and that did follow in the next chapter.  
6.6 Conclusion 
It should be clear by now why I regard the Second Temple Period as the most 
propebable rhetorical context of Leviticus 25 and the rest of the Holiness Code. I 
started by summing up the main arguments of scholars who date Leviticus 25 to this 
period. It seems that the majority of OT scholars would share this view and my own 
analyses of these texts did not offer anything against these arguments, to the 
contrary. Apart form the 50 years issue,36 I think that the strongest indication of a 
                                                 
36 A further example of a scholar who uses the 50 year period as an indication of a post-exilic dating is 
Gottwald (1999: 36-37) who imagines the following circumstances in which the Jubilee might have been 
proposed: 
The extension of the seven-year sabbatical to 49/50 years by a priestly party vying for leadership in 
restored Judah could have offered an attractive fresh start. It proposes a “clean slate” to sweep away 
past economic and political encumbrances on land. It would be attractive for returning exiles whose 
land had fallen into other hands in their absence. It would also promise to honour the just claims of 
those remaining in the land who had fallen prey to Samaritan, Babylonian or other non-Yedahite 
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post-exilic dating is the interest of chapters 25 and 26 with land, gaining land, 
returning to land and loosing land. I can only deduct that this text was born amongst 
people who lost that land, who returned to it and who were scared of loosing it again. 
This also made me reject any attempts to date this text in the pre-exilic period.  
My depiction of the society of the Second Temple Period drew immensely from the 
work of Smith-Christopher and the ultimate aim of that part was to point out that the 
main source of conflict in the Second Temple Period was the fact that some 
experienced exile and others did not. When the former then came back they were 
different from the others. This lead us to the “myth of the empty land”, because it was 
in the interest of this returning or returned Elite to present the land in their absence 
as empty. It was in their interest to make the people that were probably leading a 
normal life in the land in their absence invisible. That at least might have made their 
attempt to repossess the land easier to accomplish. This failure to present the others 
or to acknowledge their presence, is ideology, distorting ideology.  
I then revisited the issue of the rG´ in the Holiness Code and I fortified my previous 
definition of the rG´ being those that do not have any legal claim to the land, not at 
least in the eyes of the authors. Now I would argue along with Van Houten that the rG´ 
were those that were left behind in the land and that is of course why they were not 
regarded as legitimate claimants to the land. They were not in exile and they did not 
share the special (or “right” as Dietrich argued) relationship with YHWH. Therefore 
they were not the legal possessors of the land. I thus identified the “invisible people” 
of Leviticus 26 with the landless rG´ (and bv;/T and rykic;) of Leviticus 25. I also 
contrasted the way in which Bultmann read the text with that of Van Houten. Both of 
them addressed criticism at the text, or were suspicious of some aspect of the text. 
Yet Van Houten’s suspicion was different in the sense that it attempted to speak on 
behalf of those voices that were silent and it did not fall for the ideology of the 
authors.  
The addressees identified throughout Leviticus 25 and surrounding texts were thus 
the returned Elite in the post-Exilic period. They apparently came with money and 
political support from the Persian authorities and they came to repossess the land. 
They were the true Israel, in their own eyes at least, whom YHWH has delivered from 
Egypt (i.e. Babylon). Whether they actually did acquire the land is another story, but 
                                                                                                                                            
creditors or expropriators. … The 50 years between the fall of Jerusalem in 587 and the edict of Cyrus 
in 538 could have been the historical impetus to begin the jubilee programme with all possible speed 
following the restoration of Judah.  
 Gottwald includes a possibility here that I have actually excluded in this chapter. For him the Jubilee might 
also have been beneficial to those who were left in the land and not only to the returnees. My argument in 
this chapter actually steered away from that possibility, because I constructed one of the most important 
dividing lines in the post-exilic world as running between the exiles and those that stayed behind.  
 214
they wanted to and they understood themselves as having a legal claim to the land. 
The fact that some of the !yriG´ were rich (25:47-55) and were possessors of land and 
the fact that some of the addressees apparently became poor and lost their land 
suggest that everything did not happen as the returnees hoped it would. This I think 
was what Carroll meant when he said that “texts substitute for political action where 
serious political power is absent” (1992: 79).  
Reading Leviticus 25 (and surrounds) in this rhetorical context radically changes the 
image of the text. Suddenly the text becomes a political tool in the hands of a 
returning elite who wanted their “original” land back. They regarded themselves as 
the legal owners of the land, but still when I describe it like this, then most modern 
readers would probably experience some discomfort. The text claims that the original 
state of affairs should be restored, but is this justice? Was the original distribution of 
land just? This I think is where some of our discomfort originates. We then realise 
that any claim that the original was better should compel us to ask a counter question 
namely, whose “original” is that? We should remind ourselves that the old saying of 
the “victors writing history” is not that far off the mark. For the returning Elite who 
apparently had the blessings of the Persian Empire, their “original” was an original 
where only they previously possessed the land. This is one issue that I will engage 
with in the text chapter.  
But there is another related issue at which I already hinted above when I said that 
Smith-Christopher’s work tended to be sympathetic towards those who went into 
exile, in other words, the elite that lost everything. He is very successful at describing 
the suffering that this groups might have experienced and he is very clear that the 
strategies they develop to survive is a result of this terrible experience. They are thus 
portrayed as victims and he argues that we should not “judge” them when he 
discusses the issue of mixed marriages in Ezra 9-10,37 because they were still 
                                                 
37 See especially the following quote by him where he refers to the way that commentators have treated the 
incidents in Ezra 9-10 and Nehemiah 13 (Smith-Christopher 1996: 122-123): 
In dealing with this episode in the Persian period, contemporary commentators are frequently unsettled 
from typical “scholarly reserves” when they approach these events—note Williamson’s view that “The 
treatment described in these two chapters of how Ezra tackled the problem of mixed marriages is 
among the least attractive parts of Ezra-Nehemiah, if not the whole Old Testament,” and David Clines’ 
view that he is “appalled by the personal misery brought into so many families by the compulsory 
divorce of foreign wives [and ] outraged at Ezra’s insistence on racial purity, so uncongenial to 
modern liberal thoughts.” 
 In favour of Williamson and Clines I would at least say that they did not make the “ethical fault” that 
Clines (1995) warned against in a later publication. They are honest in the sense that they evaluate the 
biblical text in terms of modern values. Smith-Christopher’s response to them then shows why he remains 
sympathetic to this group (Smith-Christopher 1996: 123): 
I have previously [i.e. Smith-Christopher 1994 - EEM] suggested that approaching these events from a 
sociology of a threatened minority may shed considerably different light on these actions—by 
considering such actions as attempts to preserve identity and culture, etc. 
 Smith-Christopher thus helps us to understand at least where these strategies came from, but still he 
continues to view them as victims, while I do not think that they were that anymore.  
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applying the strategies that they developed when they were victims. I would argue 
that it is because he understands this group as victims that he consistently stays 
sympathetic to them, even when the returnees start doing things that modern readers 
find offensive. His sympathies stay with this group, because from the start he has 
portrayed them as victims who needed to survive. 
The sympathies of Carroll and other scholars like Barstad, Blenkinsopp, and even 
Van Houten seemed to lie more with the people that stayed in the land. They were 
the victims in these portrayals and the exiles and returnees were the culprits who 
wanted to force their ideologies unto those that stayed behind. Were the exiles thus 
initial victims who turned into eventual culprits? Did their struggle for survival change 
into a struggle to occupy or conquer? We have thus returned to the issue of being 
both a culprit and a victim and this will also be explored in the next chapter.  
The point is just that reading Leviticus 25 in this socio-historical context radically 
changes the liberating image that this text has. The strangest thing about the way in 
which Leviticus 25 was portrayed in the Jubilee 2000 movement, is the fact that by 
presenting the text as liberating it actually bought the ideology of the authors. By 
presenting the text as a liberating text that spoke on behalf of the voiceless in our 
modern world it participated in the ideology of the authors and it participated in 
silencing the ancient voices. Along with the authors of this text, it deemed the people 
who stayed behind in the land as invisible and it participated in their oppression.  
Would it be ethically responsible to attempt to give a voice to the voiceless today, 
while at the same time silencing many ancient voices? Would it be a price worth 
paying to support the legitimate claims of many modern suffering people and at the 
same time ignore the legitimate claims of many ancient suffering people? We are 
thus in a situation where the first two objectives that I identified in chapter 2 (see 2.6) 
are competing with each other.  
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CHAPTER 7 
THEOLOGICAL-ETHICAL OBSERVATIONS 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we attempted to construct a possible historical context in 
which the Jubilee laws could make sense. Or, it would be better to regard it as an 
attempt to construct a rhetorical context in which the rhetorical strategies identified in 
previous chapters would have been at its most persuasive. These persuasive 
strategies could also be called “traces of ideology” in the sense that it gave us 
glimpses of how the authors understood themselves and how they understood their 
possible target audience. It gave us glimpses into their world-view, of who they 
thought they were, of where they came from and of how they understood their 
relation towards YHWH, the land and “others.” These “others” were mostly those that 
did not in their eyes have this relation with YHWH and with the land.  
I have already described these relations between the addressees and YHWH, but I 
need to treat that in more detail now and I need to ask what this might mean for us? 
What implications does this have for us today in (South) Africa and are these 
implications “good” and “liberating”? Or, could they be a threat to the very liberation 
that we strive for in our society? This we said was part of the critical task of a biblical 
critic, to make a value-judgement, or to put it more plainly, to say whether we like it or 
not.  
Towards the end of the previous chapter I attempted to clarify the issues a bit more. 
These are the issues that I think we need to address before we attempt to ask how 
the God of Leviticus 25 and surrounding texts is portrayed and what implications this 
might have for us. As I said above, we are actually confronted with some kind of 
paradox, since if we use this text to provide a voice for the poor and the vulnerable in 
our modern-day, then we partake in the silencing of many ancient voices. We thus 
experience a tension between the modern voiceless and the ancient voiceless. This 
is just one problem. Another problem that I identified was the way in which we view 
the different groups in the biblical texts and how we decide on where our sympathies 
should be. I argued that this is closely related to whether we portray a particular 
group as victims or as culprits.  
Under the next sub-heading I will explore these issues further, before I specifically 
engage with the way in which “God” is portrayed in Leviticus 25 and surrounding 
texts. The first (and larger) part of this chapter will thus have a much more “negative” 
feel to it, in the sense that I continue to problematise these different aspects. Even 
the portrayals of JHWH are problematised as having exploitive potential. This is in a 
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sense where an ideological-critical approach brings one. Yet above (see 2.6 above) I 
said that eventually I would want to go beyond this ideological-critical reading and 
look for the “unlocked potential” in the biblical text. I will eventually reach that point at 
the end of this chapter under the last heading, but it is a slow process and it does not 
come easy, especially not after exposing so many dark sides to the text.  
7.2 Important issues 
What follows are three important issues that I think we need to clarify before we can 
say anything about the relevance and meaning of Leviticus 25 in our current context.  
7.2.1 Whose original?  
Walter Houston (2001: 42-45) identifies five “key values” that guide the “whole 
system” on which Leviticus 25 is based. His first key value has to do with idealising 
the past as “perfect” (Houston 2001: 42-43): 
The proper ordering of society is to be found in the past. In this belief Leviticus is 
at one with the ancient Near East generally; but it expresses the idea in a way 
distinctive of the Old Testament. When the Israelites entered Canaan, they 
received just allocations of land; but the misfortunes of some and the advantage 
taken of them by other have led inevitably to the loss of this original just ordering. 
The task of the lawgiver is to ensure that this original justice is restored. … It is 
not necessary to this belief that the old just order should really have existed, 
needless to say. [italics mine - EEM] 
I think that he is correct that this chapter expresses some kind of desire to return to 
the past when everything was apparently far better and when society was regarded 
as just. The predominance of the root bwv supports that assessment. In order to 
return there has to be something in the past, some previous more desirable state of 
affairs to which one can return. Yet it is especially Houston’s last sentence that is 
interesting where he acknowledges that it is not necessarily so that this old order 
ever really existed. Apart from that problem, I think that one could add a further 
ethical problem and that is that this original order might not have been that just in the 
first place. The portrayal of this past as just thus means that the portrayal is in the 
interest of some part of society. Once again the words ideology and also distortion 
come to mind. The previous just order to which the returning exiles want to return is 
to a state-of-affairs where they owned the land. It is thus their original and not 
necessarily an original that ever really existed. It is an original that they would want to 
create in the light of their views of their own claims to the land.  
Two very good examples of scholars who have mentioned this issue are Kessler 
(1999) and Crüsemann & Crüsemann (2000). Both articles are attempts to support 
the ideas of the Jubilee 2000 movement and the writing off of debt in the Third World 
by means of referring to biblical traditions like Leviticus 25. Yet, despite the fact that 
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both mostly portray the text as liberating and thus as supporting the writing off of debt 
and supporting the poorest of this world, they both mention the possibility that the 
text might not have been so liberating and might have had other objectives. Both 
(Kessler 1999: 26 and Crüsemann & Crüsemann 2000: 22) argue that the text is 
about returning the possession of the land to a previous state of affairs, but warn that 
this can only be just if this previous state of affairs was just. Kessler (1999: 26) also 
points out that the time period of the exile was close enough to 50 years:  
Es spricht einiges dafür, daß diese Grundbesitzer nach der Möglichkeit der 
Rückkehr aus dem babylonischen Exil von 538 v.Chr. an – das sind ziemlich 
genau fünfzig Jahre nach besagter Landreform! – gerade unter Berufung auf das 
Jobeljahrgesetz ihren alten Besitz zurückverlangen.  
Eine restitution in integrum kann dazu führen, daß geschehenes Unrecht wieder 
gutgemacht wird. Sie kann aber auch zu neuem Unrecht führen, wenn die 
Verhältnisse, die wiederhergestellt werden sollen, selbst nicht gerecht waren. 
Die Geschichte des Grund- und Hausbesitzes in der ehemaligen DDR nach 
deren Eingliederung in die Bundesrepublik Deutschland liefert dafür Beispiele in 
Fülle.  
Crüsemann & Crüsemann (2000: 22) argue similarly that this kind of restitution can 
only be just if a “just” original did indeed exist: 
Und wenn nach 50 Jahren alle auf ihren ehemaligen Grundbesitz zurückkehren 
dürfen, ist das nur gerecht, wenn die Landverteilung und mit ihr die gesamte 
Gesellschaft vorher gerecht war, und alle z.B. gleichen Anteil am Land besaßen.  
As with Kessler it seems that their experience of the incorporation of the DDR has 
sensitised them to ask the question of whether “that ever was the case” (Crüsemann 
& Crüsemann 2000: 22): 
Aber wann war das jemals der Fall? Wir haben ja etwas durchaus 
Vergleichbares real erlebt, als nach dem Zusammenbruch der DDR alte 
Besitzverhältnisse wiederhergestellt wurde, – ohne zu fragen, ob denn diese 
ihrerseits gerecht und rechtmäßig zustande gekommen waren.  
They then also argue (as I did in the previous chapter) that the fifty-year period points 
to the possible situation at the end of the exile (Crüsemann & Crüsemann 2000: 22): 
Vieles spricht dafür, dass diese Vorstellung einer Wiederherstellung nach einem 
halben Jahrhundert speziel für die Probleme konzipiert wurde, die sich mit dem 
Exilsende und der Rückkehr von Teilen der ehemaligen Oberschicht stellten, 
zumal es keine Hinweise auf ältere Traditionen gibt. Hier war ja zu entscheiden, 
wem denn nun welches Land gehört (vgl. Dietrich).1 Die alte prophetische Kritik 
an den Großgrundbesitzern und dem Zustandekommen ihres Besitzes wäre 
dabei in Rechnung zu ziehen.  
                                                 
1 The essay that they refer to is that of Dietrich 1997, to which I referred to towards the end of 6.2 above. 
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Both of them thus draw from their experience and evaluation of the 
Wiedervereinigung in Germany. What apparently2 happened was that after 
reunification West Germans who previously owned land and houses in the East 
claimed back that property. They previously were the legal owners of that land, but 
the East German people who inhabited the land in the mean time actually bought it 
from the government of the DDR. They thus also claimed that they legally bought it 
and had a legal claim to it. To complicate matters further was the fact that the West 
Germans were usually well off and the East German fairly poor. Yet the West 
Germans often took back their previous land and houses renovated it (to increase the 
value) and then rented it again to the East Germans at rates that the latter could not 
afford. This “restitution” was thus a classic example of making the rich richer and the 
poor poorer and that probably made many Germans wonder whether this was really 
justice. It is this discrepancy that both Kessler and the Crüsemanns refer to. The 
basic question that this leads to is whether the original was just in the first place. Was 
it really fair for these original land-owners to have owned so much land in the first 
place?  
That is the ultimate question that we need to address when it comes to Leviticus 25. 
If we are correct that this is a text of the returning Elite who wanted back what they 
previously owned, then are we really convinced that that was a just state-of-affairs in 
the first place? The Crüsemanns argue that we should take the prophetic critique into 
account that that was most definitely not the case and one could add a text like 1 
Kings 21, to name just one. It then means that the “original” that this text wants to 
return to is the “original” of the Exiles, who understood themselves as the only legal 
claimants of the land. All the other people who were in the land when they were 
absent were, after all, invisible to them. If I put it like this then it sounds again like the 
rich getting richer and poor being returned to a previous state of poverty.  
It is thus the old question of who had what land first? This is a question that South 
Africans are also quite familiar with. Beinart (2001: 65) described (quoted above in 
2.5.1) the kinds of moral issues that were debated after the South African war as 
issues like “who got there first; who invaded whose land; who ignored whose rights; 
to whom did the wealth and resources of the country belong?” In the South African 
context the answer could be answered quite clearly, depending, of course, on how 
far back you are willing to go. It would be simple to say that 350 years ago there were 
no white people in this country and that land obviously did not belong to them (or us 
then). But nobody is willing yet to redistribute land on such a scale, although it is 
happening in Zimbabwe with disastrous consequences for that country. The point 
                                                 
2 My description of this situation is based on a discussion that I had with Prof. Rainer Kessler himself in 
October 2002. 
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that I am trying to make is how problematic a straight-forward application of this text 
in our context will be. To which “original” do we need to return? Even if we literally 
wanted to return to how land was distributed 50 years ago, then it would not help 
much, because then most of the land was already in the hands of white people.  
The text does remind us that in a situation like this different parties with different 
interests will have different views of what the “original” might have been and also of 
what “just” might mean. This kind of discussion will eventually have to be resolved by 
means of criteria that simply cannot be deducted from this ancient text.  
7.2.2 Siding with victims and exposing culprits  
Previously (see 2.5.1) I constructed my own Afrikaner identity as oscillating between 
being either a victim or a culprit. The culprit part has, of course, only emerged 
recently from the 1990s onwards after Apartheid collapsed,3 but the victim part was 
very much part-and-parcel of the identity with which I grew up. This victim-ideology 
did entail some distortion in the sense that it camouflaged the fact that the ultimate 
victims in South Africa were not the Boers or the British, but the original Khoisan and 
black people. Part of Afrikaner identity has always been this quest for survival and 
the portrayal of the group as an entity that has suffered, but which has survived and 
will continue to struggle for survival, or that at least is how I understand “us.” It is in 
this light that Giliomee (2003: 447-486) names his chapter in which he describes the 
birth of Apartheid as “the making of a radical survival plan.” The perceived threat was 
not from the English anymore, but it now came from the black majority. The 
Afrikaners understood themselves as having survived and outlasted the English and 
now they were preparing themselves for the next struggle against the black majority. 
Giliomee (2003: 470) puts it as follows:  
Afrikaner nationalists argued that their survival as a volk was inseparable from 
maintaining racial exclusivity, and that apartheid was the only policy that 
systematically pursued that end. But apartheid with its racist outcomes was not a 
goal in itself; political survival was.  
The point is that Afrikaners were still convinced that survival was the ultimate 
objective. Yet from the outside things started to look different now, especially from an 
ethical perspective. Outsiders were not convinced that it was about survival anymore, 
in stead from the outside it looked like massive exploitation, although from the inside 
it was still perceived as a quest for survival.4 Here the distinction between an emic 
                                                 
3  By this I mean that Afrikaners were only confronted with this image after the country itself has changed. 
Before 1994 most were probably quite successful at ignoring it.  
4  In this chapter of Giliomee (2003) he often mentions the role that “fear” played. When he discusses the 
role that the DRC played in legitimating Apartheid, he argues that despite many dissenting voices in the 
late 1940s, which were warning against this policy the church did not listen mainly to appease its members 
with their survival fears (Giliomee 2003: 464): 
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and an etic perspective (see discussion of Brett 1996 below) is valuable. Afrikaners, 
and thus from the emic perspective, did not understand what they were doing as 
exploitation, but rather as survival. Yet from an outside etic perspective it was not 
convincing anymore, because the quest for survival was happening at the cost of 
others and it thus turned into exploitation. But why this change, at least, when looking 
from the outside? 
In an essay named “Interpreting ethnicity: method, hermeneutics, ethics”, Mark Brett 
(1996: 3-22) starts by describing the tension between a homogenising global culture 
and the attempts of, for instance, the Australian Aborigines to retain their identity. 
Brett (1996: 5) then states that he “would argue biblical critics have an ethical 
responsibility to address this complex web of issues. There can be no denying that 
the Bible has had, and continues to have, an influence on many cultures, and a 
specialist knowledge of this ancient library is something which carries moral and 
political implications—whether scholars possess particular faith commitments or not.” 
Like West (see 2.6 above), he acknowledges that the Bible still has powerful 
influence in modern day society and that we as biblical critics have an ethical 
responsibility to engage with these issues.  
Apart from referring to the useful distinction between “emics” (the native insider point 
of view) and “etics” (the critical outsider point of view), Brett consistently points out 
that the concept of ethnicity can be viewed as both positive and negative. This is for 
instance clear when Brett (1996: 8) argues that “ethnic categories have been used to 
manipulate and to rule, but they have also been used as modes of resistance.” The 
former, I would think, is usually looked upon in a negative light while the latter could 
be understood as more positive. What I mean by that is that the former is usually 
seen as being “hegemonic”, of forcing a dominant culture unto people who do not 
have the means to resist, but the latter is usually seen as “liberation” from a dominant 
culture. As Brett (1996: 17) further states “ethnocentrism is only malign when it is 
combined with homogenizing political power.” Or, an approach of holding unto 
cultural identity “might be perceived as ‘racism’ in the hands of a dominating group, it 
is ‘resistance in the hands of a subaltern collective.’” Yet I think his most important 
insight is the following (Brett 1996: 20): 
It is ethically important to take asymmetries of power into account. But even if we 
agree that ethnocentrism is only pernicious when imposed by force, and it is a 
different matter when it is adopted as a strategy for subaltern resistance, there 
                                                                                                                                            
But it was these survival fears that made it difficult for the church to listen to the warnings of 
Oglethorpe, Keet and Marais, and for white South Africans in general to heed their conscience. Alan 
Paton, a devout Christian, leading liberal and author of the internationally acclaimed Cry, the Beloved 
Country, told the New York Times in 1949: ‘We in South Africa also have a conscience. But our fears 
are so great that our conscience is not so clearly apparent.’ Although Paton did not share these fears, 
he knew his white countrymen, of whom he was indubitably one.  
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are nevertheless some ethical issues remaining for subaltern collectives. … 
Dominated communities are not entirely free of ethical constraints.  
Brett is not really that clear about these “ethical constraints”, but I think that he is 
spot-on when he says that we should take the “asymmetries of power” into account. 
To return to the Afrikaners, it is fairly easy to look sympathetically at them (or “us”), 
when they did not have the power under British rule. When they were the victims of a 
bigger hegemonic culture and when we, for the time being, forget that they were not 
the ultimate victims. Yet when they do acquire the power and when they start to 
exploit the black majority, then the sympathies towards them change. Now that they 
have gained the power, people tend to judge by a different set of rules. It is as if we 
have some kind image of an ideal situation where power is distributed evenly. We 
become uncomfortable when a specific group acquires all the power. This is probably 
the legacy of western democratic culture that attempts to distribute power evenly 
between different contenders for power.  
The same, I would argue, is true of the debate with regards to the exile of Judah. We 
are sympathetic towards the Exiles when we understand their struggle in exile as one 
for survival, as Smith-Christopher’s work has showed. But when this Elite returns and 
when they (in my construction at least) start to force these strategies of theirs unto 
the majority that stayed behind, then they forfeit our ethical sympathies. If that 
construction were true then we will tend to side with the people that stayed behind in 
the land, the people that we perceive had the lessor power, the people who were the 
proverbial underdogs and the people who then lost their land. Why do we change 
sides here? Is it some kind of built-in human tendency to side with those that are 
regarded as underdogs? I think that the answer to this question is yes, but as to why 
that is so, I do not think that I could venture an answer. 
What are the ethical constraints that Brett refers to? Is it not a case of “everything 
goes” for a powerless group that struggles against an overwhelmingly powerful 
regime? The problem is that the same strategies that are used to resist can later be 
used to oppress! For the oppressing group, from the inside at least, it all looks the 
same, it is still about survival. Nothing has really changed for them, yet from the 
outside it has become clear that powerless people are once again getting hurt.  
Is it maybe because we as outsiders see more than the insiders? We at least have a 
view of those that suffer under this “survival strategy.” We can see that there are 
other people involved that are actually invisible to the in-group, since they only tend 
to see themselves. They only experience their own suffering, while we tend to see 
the suffering of the opponents. I have not really answered all the questions that I 
stated above, but I think that this discussion has showed again why biblical critics 
should play this outsider role, why we should make visible those people that the text 
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regards as invisible. This is our ethical responsibility and if we do not do this we 
might partake in the abuse and the exploitation of these invisible peoples.  
7.2.3 Making the invisible visible 
I would argue that it is when people who are visible to us, but invisible to the culprits, 
suffer that we cry “injustice” and that our “ethical sensitivities” are aroused. Could it 
be possible that the experience of exile or the loss of power create strategies in a 
group which make it difficult for them to see beyond themselves? That they cannot 
fathom that the others, whom they are at once exploiting and ignoring could have the 
same needs as they themselves have? That the others could be human just as they 
are human?  
In one of the most disturbing chapters in Antjie Krog’s (1998: 177-190) book named 
“truth is a woman”, she describes the kind of violence that was aimed at women in 
Apartheid South Africa. She concludes this chapter by referring to a conversation she 
had when she was a little girl, the kind of conversation that most Afrikaners would 
probably be able to recall (Krog 1998: 190): 
I’m visiting a friend in town, someone I have known since Sub A.5 In their 
backyard lives a maid. ‘Doesn’t she miss her children?’ I ask, thinking of the 
large families on the farm. 
‘Maids don’t feel like other people about their children. They like to be rid of 
them. Anyway, Alina likes me now.’ 
On a previous visit. ‘Why doesn’t she have a heater?’ 
‘Maids don’t get cold like white people.’ 
The reason she stinks I already know from the farm, where water is rolled along 
to the houses in big drums – they don’t like washing. 
Black people do not like their children and black people do not get cold, or that at 
least is what the little friend believes. The woman living in the backyard reminds me 
of the invisible people of Leviticus 26. She is not really human for the little girl, or she 
does not have the same needs, as the little girl would expect from “white people.” In 
terms of this world-view “white people” are the only “real people.” She is not visible 
on a “human level” and therefore she does not have the needs of other “humans.” 
There is a kind of blindness here that is the most normal thing for the little girl, but 
that we find appalling and evil. Krog (1998: 190) then continues to define how she 
understands a “myth”:  
A myth is a unit of imagination which makes it possible for a human being to 
accommodate two worlds. It reconciles the contradictions of these two worlds in 
a workable fashion and holds open the way between them. The two worlds are 
the inner and the outer world. 
                                                 
5 “Sub A” refers to the first year of school now called “Grade 1.” 
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Myth makes it possible to live with what you cannot endure. 
And if the myth has been learnt well it becomes a word – a single word that 
switches on the whole system of comforting delusions.  
... 
The function of a myth is to provide a logical model capable of overcoming a 
contradiction. The myth proves that things have always been like this, that things 
will never change.  
I would understand “myth” here as a story that is part of a greater “world-view” or 
“ideology.” It thus functions within this greater scheme of things. I also think that she 
specifically chooses the word “myth” to point out that it is “not true”, in the sense that 
there is distortion here. This is similar to Carroll’s use of the word myth in his “myth of 
the empty land.”6 There is a discrepancy here between a little girl that wants to know 
why the maid does not have the needs of other human beings and another little girl 
who believes that she is not really “human” and therefore does not have these needs. 
Just as there is a discrepancy between a text that portrays a land as empty, while 
other texts point to a land where people were continuing their lives as before.  
Could we not argue that the myth that “YHWH delivered us from Egypt” could have 
functioned similarly, drawing a line between “us” and “them”? It was used to remove 
the discrepancy between the fact that the returnees claimed the land as their own, 
but that other people that were there already claimed the same. Or, the discrepancy 
between the returnees believing that they had a special relationship with YHWH, 
while others in the land claimed the same. It might to useful now to ask who this 
YHWH was, or how he was portrayed in this text?  
7.3 The God of Leviticus 25 and surrounding texts 
I have consistently argued above that Leviticus 25 and surrounding texts are 
especially interested in the relationship between YHWH, the land and the 
addressees. I need to summarise the remarks that I have made above in order to 
understand how YHWH is portrayed and I would ultimately argue, “used” in this text. I 
will start by focusing on these two relationships separately. From these two 
discussions two different portrayals of God emerge. He is presented as both the 
ultimate “land-possessor” and the ultimate “slave-owner.” I use these two images 
specifically to make the modern reader uncomfortable with these representations. 
This discomfort becomes especially clear when people start to argue that we should 
use a model like the “imitation of God” as a modern ethical model.  
                                                 
6 See especially Dyck’s (2000: 110) fifth definition of ideology: 
… ideas and beliefs which help to legitimate the interests of a ruling group or class specifically by 
distortion and dissimulation;  
 This “myth” or story is thus part of a greater system of beliefs that distorts reality in order to justify why 
the ruling group has all the power.  
 225
7.3.1 YHWH, the great land-possessor 
As I pointed out above (see 6.2), when YHWH is introduced for the first time in the 
Holiness Code (Lev 18:2-5), it is clear that he has a close relationship with the land. 
Leviticus 18:3 immediately introduces a contrast between the land of Egypt and the 
land of Canaan. Both lands are used as an example of what the addressees should 
not do. They are portrayed as having lived in Egypt and as being brought to Canaan 
by YHWH (v 3). Later in the chapter (vv. 24-29) it is clear that YHWH has a very 
close and intimate relationship with Canaan. In v. 24 YHWH is the one who was 
actually “casting out“ the !yIwGO before the addressees. Verse 25 provides a further 
explanation of why this happened. The land became defiled, then YHWH “visited” or 
“judged” the land and it spitted out the inhabitants. YHWH is thus portrayed as having 
power over the land (i.e. Canaan) that allows him to decide who will live there and 
who will not. He is presented in this fashion in the parenetic frame of Leviticus 18 that 
surrounds the sexual taboos in that chapter. The same can be said of the parenetic 
text at the end of chapter 20 (vv. 22-27). Once again YHWH is closely associated 
with the “vomiting” or “spitting” land. In v. 24 we find the first example of YHWH 
openly stating that he will give (@tn) the land to the addressees 
(vb;d]W bl;j; tb'z… $r,a, Ht;ao tv,r,l; !k,l; hN:n<T]a, ynIa}w"). The land is also called the land of 
“milk and honey”, but the most important thing about this portrayal is that the land is 
YHWH’s to give.  
As we said before, the issue of land disappears in chapters 21-22, but then in 23:10 
we have the clause, !k,l; @tenú ynIa} rv,a} $r,a;h;Ala, Wabot; yKi which later returns in 25:2. 
Once again the land is YHWH’s to give. This is ultimately claimed in 25:23 when it is 
motivated why land should not be sold permanently, $r,a;h; yliAyKi. YHWH is thus 
presented as the one who has the power to give the land and ultimately to take it 
away.7 In chapters 18 and 20 it is quite clear that he was the chief instigator behind 
the land vomiting out its previous inhabitants. It thus seems as if part of YHWH’s “job 
description” entails to find suitable inhabitants for the land. He is the ultimate landlord 
and if the tenants do not shape up, then he simply gets rid of them. This was how we 
                                                 
7 I do not altogether agree with the argument by Kessler (1996: 214-232) that 25:23 does not really refer to 
YHWH possessing the land, but rather to YHWH’s responsibility for the fertility of the land. I agree that 
YHWH’s relationship to the land includes this maintenance of its fertility. Texts like 25:18-19 and 
especially 26:2-13 support that notion and Kessler (1996: 217-220) does well to describe this. Kessler 
(1996: 217) also argues that YHWH gave (@tn) the land to the Israelites without any property reservation 
(“Eigentumsvorbehalt”). In this regard I differ from him and I would argue that in the light of how the 
relationship between YHWH, land and addressees is portrayed in Leviticus 25 and surrounds, that it is 
clear that the relationship between YHWH and the land is much more permanent than that of the 
addressees with the land. Yet I do agree with him that this is probably a post-exilic development (see 
Kessler 1996: 220). It is the response of people who have already lost the land and we should keep in mind 
that Kessler’s main argument is an attempt to counter claims that YHWH was perceived as the ultimate 
land-owner in pre-exilic Judah.  
 226
read 25:23 and the point was that the relationship between YHWH and the land was 
much more intimate and certain than that of YHWH and the addressees.  
Leviticus 26 is also very clear about how quickly things can change for the 
inhabitants of the land. It is clear that the land can rapidly change from a sustaining 
place to a rejecting place. Once again YHWH is the chief instigator in both, he has 
the power to make the land into a sustaining place and he has the power to make the 
land turn on its inhabitants. He also has the power to make the land “desolate”, 
although we saw that that was a rather distorted picture (see 6.4). When he 
remembers the land in 26:42 we are reminded of this landlord image again, of YHWH 
playing the role of somebody whose responsibility includes finding suitable tenants 
for the land. As if he remembers that the land has been lying empty and that the land 
should actually have inhabitants, for its own sake, it seems.  
If I present YHWH as the ultimate land-possessor then there does not seem to be 
anything offensive about it. Our world could do with this kind of respect for the land, 
of being reminded that the land does not really belong to human beings. This kind of 
respect is needed today, especially in the light of our threatening ecological crisis. 
Above I referred to Dietrich (1997: 376) who argued that this claim might actually 
have functioned in order to solve the tension in the post-exilic community with 
regards to land-ownership. He thought that it helped to relativise the competing 
claims of the different landowners (Dietrich 1997: 376): 
Die Größe der Maxime von Lev 25,23 liegt darin, daß in ihr solche Besitztitel 
nicht der anderen Seite ab- und der eigenen zugesprochen, daß sie vielmehr 
insgesamt relativiert und der Beziehung zu Gott untergeordnet werden.  
This might have helped in the sense that it reminded everybody that the land was not 
theirs to give, but YHWH’s. This also sounds rather liberating, but then Dietrich adds, 
“it is subordinated to the relationship to God.” Thus only those people who are in the 
proper relationship to God will have any claims. So, they could not “give” the land 
away, but they could receive the land. Yet now the question becomes what this 
“proper relationship” might have entailed and who decides who has this relationship 
with YHWH? Who decides who actually is a rG´ or a bv;/T or even an db,[, of YHWH? 
If I were to understand myself as being either an db,[, or a rG´ of YHWH, then it would 
entail that I were to have access to the accompanying “perks.” The main benefit here 
will then be access to land.  
7.3.2 YHWH, the great slave-owner 
YHWH is also from 18:2 onwards presented as the liberator from Egypt. Whereas he 
owns Canaan, he apparently does not own Egypt, but he brought the addressees 
from there and therefore he owns the addressees. In 18:2 it is implied that YHWH 
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brought the addressees from Egypt, but the first time that it is clearly stated is in 
19:36, where we find the following phrase, 
!yIr;x]mi $r,a,me !k,t]a, ytiaxe/hArv,a} !k,yheløa> hw:hy“ ynIa}, which is thereafter often repeated 
(22:33; 23:43; 25:38, 42, 55; 26: 13 and 45). Most of these are similarly constructed 
with an rv,a} as here, but the two examples in 22:33 and 23:43 are somewhat 
different. The former uses a participle to refer to YHWH and the latter an infinitive to 
refer to the time when YHWH brought the Israelites from Egypt and let them stay in 
huts. These references to deliverance from Egypt then reaches some kind of climax 
towards the end of the Holiness Code in chapters 25 and 26. In chapter 25 the latter 
two examples (vv. 42 and 55) both refer to the Israelites in the third person and call 
them the slaves of YHWH.  
This is thus an image for YHWH that one finds in Leviticus 25. He is the big slave-
owner, but the slaves are only those that he brought from Egypt. These are then the 
Israelites, but the interesting thing here is that liberation is expressed by means of 
slavery. To be liberated means to be a slave of YHWH. Leviticus 25 cannot imagine 
existence without having a “master.” In a religious sense a state where somebody 
has no “master”, no “owner”, or no “god” is not imaginable. There is no liberation 
without a master, but instead liberation entails changing a bad master for a good 
master. “We” will thus always be slaves and it is just a question of who will be our 
“master.” The text then presents YHWH’s mastery as being better than that of any 
other master. This kind of liberation is probably strange to most modern people, since 
westerners often imagine themselves as being free. This might be an illusion, but still 
we should not too easily forget that to talk of YHWH as a “slave-master” in a world 
that despises slavery might not be the best of marketing strategies for the Bible and 
Christianity in our modern world.  
Some biblical scholars have also described this image similarly, although they do not 
necessarily anticipate the same problem that I just did. Thus Milgrom (2001: 2226) 
also argues that freedom “means solely a change of masters; henceforth, the 
Israelites are slaves of God.” Joosten (1996: 97-98) also describes this similarly:  
Through the Exodus, the Israelites were subjected to a change of master: no 
longer would they be slaves of the Egyptians (cf. 26:13 “I am the Lord your God, 
who brought you forth out of the land of Egypt, that you could not be their 
slaves”), but slaves of YHWH. Thus, the relationship between YHWH and the 
Israelites was defined in legal terms. … Of course, the point of the whole motif is 
not the utter and irredeemable wretchedness of the Israelites, but their supreme 
and perennial dignity.  
Joosten (1996: 98) continues that we should not forget that this is essentially a 
metaphorical expression. He also reminds us that it is stated in many places in H (i.e. 
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22:33, 25:38 and 26:45) that the explicit aim of YHWH’s bringing them out of Egypt, 
was to be the God of the Israelites. He then continues (Joosten 1996: 98): 
Thus we observe that the juridical aspect of the Exodus expressed by the 
master-slave analogy is not naive. What YHWH did to the Israelites when he led 
them out of Egypt may be described in legal terms on the analogy of a mighty 
kinsman who redeems slaves or prisoners from a foreign power. The relevance 
of this analogy, however, is limited to contexts where the subject matter is the 
social status of the Israelites. 
Joosten thus warns that although we have an image of a slave-owner here, we 
should not get too carried away with it. This portrayal of Jahweh attempts to limit 
abuse amongst human beings. If your brother is the slave of YHWH, then you cannot 
enslave him. But would it not be possible to argue that this kind of image might be 
open for abuse? Especially if people start using arguments like “it is asked of the 
Israelite to act towards his fellow Israelite, in the same way as God acted towards 
him.” We are thus venturing into the debate about imitating God, or the so-called 
imitatio Dei.  
7.3.3 Imitating God  
Many scholars have argued with regards to Leviticus 25 that the addressees are in a 
sense asked to imitate God, thus to act towards their fellows as he did towards them. 
Milgrom (2001: 2234) argues that it is specifically applicable with regards to the first 
and fourth stages of poverty (i.e. vv. 25-34 and 47-55), but first he describes what he 
calls the “underlying theology”:  
The underlying theology needs to be underscored. YHWH redeems on both a 
national and an individual scale. YHWH is the redeemer of the people of Israel 
whenever it is subjected to (i.e. enslaved by) a foreign nation. This was the case 
in the Egyptian bondage (Exod 6:6; 15:13; cf. Isa 63:9; Ps 106:10). And 
according to Second Isaiah, such will be the case in the Babylonian Exile (Isa 
35:4, 9; 43:1; 44:22, 23; 48:20; 51:10; 52:3; 63:9; cf. Mic 4:10). Thus the 
example of divine intervention whenever any part of his land is lost (i.e., the 
jubilee) is to be duplicated whenever any of his people is lost (i.e., enslaved). 
Just as the nearest relative is obligated to redeem the land of his kinsperson sold 
(or forfeited) to another, so is he obligated to redeem the person of his 
kinsperson sold to (i.e. enslaved by) a non-Israelite.  
The Israelite is thus supposed to act like YHWH has acted, by bringing either the 
land or the kinsperson back to where it or he belongs. YHWH has done this on two 
occasions, i.e. Egypt and Babylon. But as we said this “principle of imitatio dei” is 
only applicable to the first and the fourth case and thus only in those parts where the 
root lag dominates. Although Grünwaldt (1999: 343) does not specifically use the 
term imitatio dei he has a similar understanding of the fourth case, when he argues 
that the verb lag is taken from Exodus terminology: 
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… so handelt der den Verwandten loskaufende Israelit in Entsprechung zum 
Handeln YHWHs an den in Ägypten versklavten Israeliten. Aus dem hier 
herrschenden Geist einer Ethik der Nachahmung YHWHs erklärt es sich auch, 
daß für die beim Schutzbürger arbeitenden Israeliten Auslösung erlaubt, ja 
geboten ist, für die beim „Bruder“ in Schuld geratenen aber nicht: Die 
Knechtschaft, aus der YHWH befreit hat, war ja die Knechtschaft bei einem 
fremden Volk.  
Just as YHWH has delivered the whole “Volk” from strangers, so the fellow Israelites 
should do the same and in that sense it is an imitation (“Nachahmung”) of YHWH. If 
the ja; then ends up with a fellow Israelite, then the concerns of the authors have 
been addressed. The ja; in trouble still has a master, but he at least is not a stranger 
anymore and thus a better master. Liberation or redemption is still portrayed as a 
change of master, a foreign master is exchanged for a kinsperson master. In 
Apartheid South African terminology it would have meant for a white person to have 
a white master instead of a black or brown one.  
Another word used to express this “master-subordinate” relationship is the word 
“patronage.” Houston (2001: 40) is adamant that we are dealing here with patronage 
and he adds, “patronage is not to be despised. It is a relationship which can give 
great security to the client, and which unlike the tax-funded welfare state supplies a 
motive to the patron to act generously.” The motive that Houston identifies is that of 
acquiring honour in an honour-shame culture. The patron thus acts generously to 
acquire honour in the eyes of other members of the group. Later Houston (2001: 44-
45) identifies the following metaphor which echoes what has been said above: 
One can distinguish here a metaphor derived from the subject matter of the 
chapter, and a rhetorical aim. The metaphor is God as patron, who stands in the 
same relation to the people of Israel as they, or their better-off representatives, 
may from time to time stand towards their own impoverished brethren, except 
that this relationship is permanent. … As YHWH has graciously delivered his 
people from slavery in Egypt and enabled them to live before him, so they are 
required to deliver their own kin from slavery to live with them.  
All three scholars that I have mentioned have argued similarly, just as YHWH has 
acted towards the Israelites so they should act towards each other when they are in 
trouble. Just as YHWH is the ultimate land- and slave owner, or master, or patron, or 
whatever we want to call it, so they are to act similarly towards their fellows.  
There is definitely an attractive side to this presentation, the fact that we have a 
responsibility to act towards our fellow human beings. We have to perpetuate the 
grace that God has shown towards us. But will this image of a master or patron still 
work in our modern world and will it not be possible to be abused by some? In what 
follows I will attempt to shortly explore the abusive potential of imitating God in this 
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sense in our modern world by once again referring to the South African context and 
history.  
Another fascinating chapter in the Afrikaner history by Giliomee (2003: 88-129) has a 
title that might just as well have been the title of a chapter in a book on Leviticus 25. 
It is named “Masters, Slaves and Servants: The Fear of Gelykstelling.” The first half 
of the title speaks for itself, but it is difficult to find an English word for Gelykstelling. 
Giliomee tends to translate it with “social equality”. This chapter describes mostly the 
time at the beginning of the 19th century before slaves were set free in 1838, but it 
also attempts to describe the kind of relationships that existed between different 
racial groups in this century. The term “masters” obviously refers to the white Dutch 
settlers or burghers, whereas servants refer to the Khoisan people that were often 
living in a virtual state of slavery on white farms. The slaves were imported from other 
colonies, often of Malay descent. Giliomee (2003: 90-91) describes the situation as 
follows: 
Slave-ownership was remarkably widespread among the burghers themselves, 
and even the status of non-owners depended on their membership of a slave-
holding community. Most slaves passed from one generation in a family to the 
next at the owner’s death. Selling slaves out of the family occurred mostly as a 
result of bankruptcy. The ideology of paternalism remained intact despite the 
transfer of power to the British. As a Graaff-Reinet slave-owner remarked in 
1826: ‘[Do] not deprive me of my paternal authority, under which both my 
children and slaves are happy, and which is necessary for their and my peace.’ 
Slave-owners could not conceive of peace in or outside the house were the 
paternalistic relationship to be disturbed.  
I am specifically interested in this “ideology of paternalism”, which as described here 
presents the master as occupying a benevolent position of taking responsibility for 
either the Khoisan servants, or the slaves. The master thus believes that he (it 
always is a “he”) is doing a good thing, or as Giliomee (2003: 49) explained in an 
earlier chapter the “real purpose of paternalism was to justify slavery not to the slave 
but to the master and to boost the master’s own self-respect.” It also helped this 
farmer from Graaff-Reinet to boost his “self-respect” and to justify the kind of 
relationship that he had with his slaves. This reminds of how Krog defined a “myth” 
above (see 7.2.3), that it “reconciles” contradictions. It soothes the conscience of the 
master who eventually understands himself as doing a good thing. It is also very 
clear from the following quote (Giliomee 2003: 49): 
The concept of a bonded extended ‘family’8 was emphasized by the common 
worship of the Lord by both masters and slaves. By the end of the eighteenth 
                                                 
8 On the previous page Giliomee (2003: 48) described the “ideology of paternalism” as follows: 
The ideology of paternalism had to bear the brunt of the burden in reconciling slaves to their fate. 
Owners propagated the myth that slaves were members of the household and even part of the extended 
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century it became common practice for masters to admit their most trusted 
slaves and servants, usually squatting or standing against a wall, to the family 
prayers held every day. In the master’s mind the action of inviting the slave 
briefly into the inner sanctum of his family demonstrated his benign and moral 
intent. The ‘benevolence’ was a counterpoint to the violence inflicted on erring 
servants, and it boosted the burghers’ belief in themselves as Christian 
colonizers of the land.  
It should be apparent that this “ideology of paternalism” can be very dangerous and 
has a fair measure of distortion to it. It camouflages the exploitation that is taking 
place by presenting this exploitation as something good, something Christian, even 
as some act of worship to God. This “ideology of paternalism” that later became 
“trusteeship”9 paved the way for Apartheid that came some centuries later.  
This would be my main problem with the “imitating God” model especially if the role-
model (i.e. YHWH) is presented by means of the image of a master or a slave-owner. 
It could lapse into a camouflaging strategy that dresses up an exploitive relationship 
with “pretty language.” That did happen in South Africa and it became a myth that 
reconciled obvious contradictions in the society. I can imagine that it has happened in 
many places on this world and that it still can happen. I am thus rather suspicious 
when it comes to “imitating God”, especially the God of Leviticus 25 and surrounding 
texts. This could be a very exploitive model.  
Yet there is some difference between the way in which “patronage” is portrayed in 
Leviticus 25 over against the way in which it was understood in South Africa. In 
Leviticus 25 the addressees only have this responsibility towards fellow land-owners 
and not towards the different “non-Israelite” groups. In the South African context 
                                                                                                                                            
family, consisting of the patriarch’s immediate family, some brothers or sisters and their families, one 
or more bywoner families, Khoikhoi servants and slaves. The master called the slaves and servants his 
‘volk’ (people). Paternalism was supposed to represent a bargain. At the most elemental level, slaves 
were expected to display loyalty and respect towards the master or mistress. The master class acted as 
if they were fathers, rewarding faithful slaves and disciplining those who had erred, as they did in the 
case of their children. They also cared for them, fed them properly, and nursed them when sick. 
 I am tempted to compare this little scenario with vv. 6-7 of Leviticus 25. Similar to these verses we do 
have a household or extended family here. We also have different categories of landless people namely the 
“slaves”, the “servants” and the “bywoners.” The latter is an Afrikaans word that refers to white people 
that became landless and also ended up under the supervision of a land-owning burgher. This word is 
usually used to translate the Hebrew bv;/T, which is similarly translated into German as “Beisasse.” 
9 Giliomee (2003: 286) describes the different ways with which Afrikaans- and English speaking whites 
justified white supremacy by the late 1880s as follows:  
English South African politicians and journalists drew particularly on the concept of biological 
hierarchy of races and on the (social) Darwinian theory of the survival of the fittest. By contrast, 
Afrikaans and Dutch publications seldom considered the biological concept of race. They focused on 
an idealized picture of paternalism, depicting the white master as caring for faithful servants, and 
punishing them when erred. The more modern among them sketched a world of competing organic 
nations, each with its own distinctive cultural heritage and needs, co-existing under aegis of white 
supremacy. Later both English and Dutch/Afrikaans publications fostered the idea of white 
‘trusteeship’, under which blacks could gradually progress upwards to the levels Europeans had 
already reached.  
 This is a good example of that “ethnocentrism” that is “pernicious” as Brett (1996:20) argued above “when 
imposed by force”.  
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paternalism was addressed towards the so-called “out-group”, whereas in Leviticus 
25 it was aimed at the “in-group”, the ja; in trouble and thus the fellow addressees 
who had legal claims to land, but who lost it (i.e. the returned Elite in my historical 
construction). Their objective was to keep the group to which they belonged intact. 
That was their struggle for survival, a remnant of the experience of exile. It might thus 
be that we have two different kinds of paternalism here. In the South African context 
it was a “world-view” or “ideology” of which the aim was to disguise the fact that 
exploitation of outsiders was taking place. In Leviticus 25 exploitation of outsiders is 
not disguised (i.e. vv. 44-46), but this kind of paternalism seems to have the 
protection of the “in-group” as objective. Yet I would still want to ask whether even 
this patronage towards the “in-group” could not have been a case of “prettying up” an 
exploitive reality. We should also add that from a modern perspective the idea of 
having an “in-group” and an “out-group” is as such ethically problematic.  
I have described these portrayals of YHWH above by means of the word “image” and 
I have consciously attempted to avoid the word “metaphor.” That word did eventually 
slip in above, because Houston used it. I would like to take a short look at this 
concept, which has become very technical and the danger is that one could get 
bogged down in a larger academic discussion. In this light Perdue (1994: 201) 
remarks “the effort to understand how metaphor works as an important element of 
language is often a slippery and elusive task.” Fortunately he does continue to 
describe some of the important features of a metaphor (Perdue 1994: 201-202):  
Rather, a metaphor says that one thing is something else. In describing its 
grammatical and linguistic character, metaphor in essence interfaces two 
distinctly different things (tenor and vehicle) within a sentence. The tenor is the 
principal subject that is conveyed by a vehicle, or secondary subject. Quite often 
the tenor, being somewhat enigmatic, is described by a vehicle that is better 
known. The vehicle serves as a lens through which to observe and then to 
attempt to described and define the tenor. A new insight or a point of similarity 
between the two is seen as being true. And in the relationship between tenor and 
vehicle, meaning for the sentence is constructed.  
If I thus were to say that “YHWH is a slave-owner” or that “YHWH is a patron” then 
YHWH is the tenor and “slave-owner” or “patron” the vehicle. By means of the latter I 
thus attempt to describe YHWH who is the “enigmatic” party in this interface. Perdue 
(1994: 202) continues that intrinsic in this relationship is a tension between the “is” 
and the “is not.” Thus YHWH is a slave-master or patron, but at the same time he is 
not. Perdue (1994: 202) adds that “[w]hen this tension between the two collapses, 
then the metaphor dies or is transformed into something else, either absurd or 
sterile.” I would think that it is more-or-less here in this tension that modern people 
experience discomfort when I say “YHWH is slave-master.” We associate the latter 
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with modern images of slavery and abuse and our “is not”-part of the metaphor 
bothers us, probably to such an extent that we miss the “is” part. In Leviticus 25 this 
image actually has a liberating intent as Joosten (1996: 98) also pointed out above. 
The “is” part of the metaphor lies in the fact that YHWH owns the addressees, but the 
objective of this claim is that no other human being can own these people. The 
Israelites are thus portrayed as having this divine, benevolent owner, with the result 
that it excludes any other kind of ownership. That is the “is” part of metaphor, one 
small protecting act by a patron or slave-owner and it excludes a fairly large amount 
of “is not” characteristics.  
Perdue (1994: 203) also discusses three stages in which a metaphor works. The first 
he calls “destabilization” which results in an experience of surprise or shock on the 
side of the hearer, because it is “blatantly false.” It is as if the “is not” parts of the 
metaphor strike the hearer and this also happens when modern people hear that 
YHWH is a slave-owner, as I said above. The second stage is then called “mimesis” 
which means that “[t]hrough new and even contradictory associations brought to the 
tenor by its vehicle, the insight is gained that something in this relationship is true.” 
This then opens up the possibility of the third stage in which the audience experience 
“transformation” and “restabilization”. The third stage also opens up liberating 
possibilities for the audience. Perdue (1994: 204) continues, “[a] new world has been 
created, all by means of the linguistic construction of reality.” Yet this is not the only 
possibility, but metaphors can apparently “get out of hand” and the seed of the 
problem lies in the very tensions that make metaphors so powerful in the first place 
(Perdue 1994: 204): 
While it may seem ironic, these very tensions provide metaphors and the world 
they build with life-giving and life-sustaining energy. When tensions are removed, 
especially by those who wish to misshape metaphor into literal and factual 
definitions, metaphors either die or become distorted, inflexible, and unyielding. 
Thus tenor merges with vehicle, not for moments of imagination and creative 
reflection, but as permanent and concrete distortions. This all too frequent 
occurrence of linguistic dogmatism is destructive to the reality systems in which 
root metaphors play an important role.  
I would think that this is what happens when we take the metaphor of God as slave-
owner and we make this into a model of human behaviour. The danger is that all the 
tensions collapse and that no differences exist anymore between the “is” and the “is 
not” part of the metaphor. Human beings could then use everything that the vehicle 
has to offer as a model to imitate and it then becomes a “distorted, inflexible and 
unyielding” image that leads to abuse.  
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Thus to use two metaphors like a “land-owner” or “slave-owner” is not by itself an 
exploitive act. Exploitation only becomes possible when people forget that these are 
metaphors and turn them into models that should be imitated.  
Should we thus imitate the God of Leviticus 25 and surrounding texts? We could 
imitate some of his actions like “liberating” people, although we will have to define 
what that means. But we cannot imitate him if our “factual definition” of him is a “land-
owner” or “slave-owner”. That would mean to abuse the metaphoric language that is 
used to describe his liberating acts. And that would sound too much like using God 
for our own exploitive interests.  
7.3.4 Whose YHWH is it anyway?  
Above when I discussed the presentation of YHWH as a big landowner I referred to 
the argument by Dietrich that the clause $r,a;h; yliAyKi, could have been used to 
relativise the claims of different groups to land. Dietrich added that the claim to land 
is “subordinated under the relationship to God.” I then hinted at the fact that this 
would mean that those who understood themselves as having the proper relationship 
to God would have had access to the land. In v. 23 this clause is followed by another, 
ydiM;[i !T,a' !ybiv;wtow“ !yrig´AyKi, which portrays the addressees as having a relationship 
with YHWH. If the land belongs to YHWH and if he is the great land-possessor then it 
might not be such a bad thing to be a rG´ or bv;/T in his household. The rG´ and the 
bv;/T would thus have access to the land, because they are usually portrayed as 
working for other landowners on the land. If YHWH is thus the ultimate landowner 
and the addressees are his !yriG´ and !ybiv;wTo, then they have the land! 
I am interpreting v. 23 much more positively than I did before (see especially 4.2.3 
above). I would still argue that the relationship between the land and YHWH is 
portrayed as much more stable than the relationship between YHWH and the 
addressees. Yet if the addressees were !yriG´ and !ybiv;wTo with YHWH, then they were 
still far better off than people who had no relation with YHWH. The land is in a better 
position than the addressees, but the addressees are still in a far better position than 
anyone else, who might want to use the land. Even if the text later refers to the 
Israelites as the !ydib;[} of YHWH, it does not change anything. The addressees and 
the Israelites are all part of the little household of YHWH, whether they understand 
themselves as his rG´ or, bv;/T or, db,[,  they all have a relationship with YHWH and 
they are thus allowed to use his land.  
Thus the fact that YHWH is the ultimate land-possessor does not really relativise all 
the different claims to land, to the contrary, it supports the position of those who can 
claim that they have a special relationship with him and those that have the power to 
enforce this view. In chapter 6 I argued (along with many other scholars) that the 
 235
most probable group, which would have had both the power and the experience (i.e. 
exile) to claim this, was probably the returning or returned Elite.  
This means, to put it rather crudely, that instead of describing how “YHWH is 
portrayed” in Leviticus 25 and surrounding texts, we should probably rather describe 
it as how “YHWH is used” in these texts. If the returning Elite portrayed themselves 
as having this special relationship with YHWH, then it would have beenhelpful to 
achieve what they wanted to achieve, which probably included getting back the land 
that they claimed they previously had. The question that I asked in chapter 6 was 
whether the rG´ of Leviticus 25 and surrounds did not understand themselves as also 
worshipping and also having a relationship with YHWH? We cannot really know that, 
since we do not have their side of the story, but I argued that this might have been 
the case. The fact that so many of the laws referring to them from Leviticus 16 
onwards regulate their participation in the cult, I would argue, does point in this 
direction. It might have been a strategy of the returned Exiles to satisfy some of the 
claims of the !yriG´ that they were also part of Israel, but it still kept them apart and it 
did not acknowledge their claims to the land. It satisfied their cultic needs and kept 
them in that sense content, but still landless and dispossessed.  
So whose YHWH was it then? If the addressees were the returned Exiles, then the 
text claims that YHWH “belonged” to them.  
7.4 So what about “relevance”? 
So, what do we do with this rather “dark” interpretation where people abused God to 
get back what they thought belonged to them?  
In chapter 2 we touched on the issue that one of the biggest reproaches used against 
historical-critical methods was the fact that they were too interested in the asking of 
genetic questions. This often leads to the fact that they did not really bother with what 
implications the text might have in contemporary contexts (see Barton 1998b: 10-11). 
I also referred to Heikki Räisänen who summed up this complaint by referring to the 
work of Sugirtharajah (Räisänen 2000: 10): 
… the “original sin of the historical-critical method” is the notion of a division of 
labor “between biblical scholarship and theological enterprise”; the 
“hermeneutical gap” between the biblical milieu and the present day is thus a 
problem created by this method. 
Thus the problem identified seemed to be that scholars tended to spend too much 
time on the “biblical past” and not much on the “present day.”10 These studies were 
                                                 
10 Knut Holter (1998: 248-249) also thinks that Western OT scholarship runs the risk of becoming irrelevant 
and he argues that African OT scholarship can challenge Western OT scholarship in this regard: 
I believe African OT scholars, in their emphasing of the question of relevance, challenge their Western 
colleagues on a crucial point, the basic definitions of OT scholarship's what and why. And without 
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too “historical” and not “ethical” enough, or too antiquated and not contemporary 
enough. We saw that Barton (1998b: 15) thought that this was not true. Yet if one 
were to look at most studies done in the previous century in the German speaking 
world on either Leviticus11 as a book or the Holiness Code12 we find very few 
examples of scholars actually constructing something “theological” or engaging with 
the ethical implications of these texts. Most scholars were indeed content with just 
presenting their historical-critical results which in most cases meant simply identifying 
different layers and trying to date them to hypothetical historical contexts.  
The only exceptions were Baentsch (1893), Bertholet (1901), Feucht (1964),13 
Gerstenberger (1993) and now Grünwaldt (1999). There were other scholars who 
from time to time did venture into asking questions about “relevance”, but this was 
usually done in different articles or essays and not presented as the “results” of a 
critical monograph and most of these appeared in the nineties.14 Yet I think that this 
is changing now and I think that Grünwaldt (1999) is a very good example of this 
change, which I think is a very good thing. I will shortly use Grünwaldt as some kind 
of “sparring partner”, before this chapter is concluded. The main reason being the 
fact that he presents the relevance of the Holiness Code in a “positive light.” He does 
not identify the “dark sides” and “ulterior motives” that I did and it is useful to see 
where that leads him in order to compare it with where I ended up above, which 
some might say is “nowhere”.  
The last part of the study by Grünwaldt (1999: 375-414) is named “Ergebnis”, where 
he draws his arguments together. He also dates the code and presents the theology 
of the code. The last subheading in this final part is named “Von der Relevanz des 
Gesetzes” (Grünwaldt 1999: 402-414).15 It is also here that Grünwaldt (1999: 403-
404) identifies three criteria that could be used to “filter out” the out-dated laws and 
leave us with laws relevant for our context. These are, 1) whether they still fit into our 
scientific world-view (“Weltbild”) and thus an acknowledgement that these laws were 
                                                                                                                                            
listening to these concerns, I fear that the guild of Western OT scholarship might ultimately face the 
danger of being of interest to nobody but itself. 
11 The literature on Leviticus as a whole that I looked at was the following: Baentsch (1900), Bertholet 
(1901), Eerdmans (1912), Heinisch (1935), Elliger (1966a), Noth (1966), Kornfeld (1983), and 
Gerstenberger (1993).  
12 With regards to the Holiness Code I consulted the following literature: Kornfeld (1952), Reventlow (1961), 
Kilian (1963), Feucht (1964), Cholewinski (1976), and Grünwaldt (1999). One should also add the two 
essays of Otto (1994a and 1999). Another example would be Baentsch (1893), a book that Grünwaldt 
(1999) refers to, but a book to which I did not have access.  
13 Of these first three, Feucht (1964: 181-197) offered most by concluding with a chapter on the “Theologie 
des Heiligkeitsgesetzes.” He does not engage with the issue of “relevance” but discusses different aspects 
of his constructed theology like “anthropology” and “cosmology.”  
14 Some good examples would include the contributions of Kessler (1999), Crüsemann & Crüsemann (2000), 
Otto (1994b) and Albertz (1990 and 1995).  
15 It is thus noteworthy that Grünwaldt presents this theological and ethical discussion at the end of his 
monograph as his “results” and this makes him different from most of his German ancestors. 
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historically confined to a different world. Many laws like the prohibition of sowing a 
field with two kinds of seeds (19:19), or the mourning rituals, or the blood taboos, or 
the death penalty simply does not make sense any more. 2) A second criterion is that 
these laws were meant for a specific time (“Zeitbedingtheit”) when the world was 
different and one example would be the laws on sacrifices. They are simply 
impossible to execute, because the temple is not here anymore. 3) A third criterion is 
the New Testament view of these laws. Here Grünwaldt pays some attention to how 
these laws were re-interpreted in the Sermon on the Mount. His point is that the 
Sermon on the Mount does not want to replace these laws, but attempt to recover 
their “original sense” (Grünwaldt 1999: 405). 
I would like to return to his first two criteria and I actually find it rather difficult to 
clearly distinguish between the two.16 They both remind us of that old distinction that 
Stendahl made in the 1960s (see 2.2.1 above). If we say that one of the “filtering out 
devices” is to ask whether the world view and understanding of humanity imbedded 
in the text is still compatible with ours, would there not be much more to talk about 
than just the death penalty, or the eating of blood (and the one or two other things 
that he mentions)? Grünwaldt (1999: 404) does mention the issue of human rights, 
but leaves it at that and one should also add that Grünwaldt (1999: 109-112) 
previously “solved” the slavery issue by means of Literarkritik.17  
Grünwaldt’s idea of a “Weltbild” is, of course, far more innocent than our definition of 
“world-view” or “ideology” is. He apparently does not account for what Carroll called 
“allowance for distorting or deforming possibilities” (1996: 18). Yet I would think that 
most of the things that I mentioned in the previous part of this chapter should also be 
discussed here, along with the things that he mentions. For instance, what about the 
portrayal of JHWH as “slave-master”? Or the fact that liberation might mean 
changing a “bad” master for a “good” master? For the modern person these concepts 
are very foreign and we usually imagine ourselves as our own masters (as I said 
                                                 
16 Grünwaldt (1999: 404) partially admits that when he introduces the second criterion with, “Hiermit hängt 
das Kriterium der Zeitbedingtheit der Gebote zusammen.” It acknowledges that the second and first criteria 
are closely related.  
17 This is indeed a very unconvincing part of Grünwaldt’s argument, the way in which he simply “removes” 
vv. 44-46 by means of Literarkritik and never mentions it again. Above, (see 6.2) I did offer some 
inconsistencies in his argument. Yet I think that what makes me very suspicious is the fact that he never 
engages with these verses again, not even in this “relevance” chapter of his. If his third criterion above is 
what the NT does with these laws then it entails some kind of approach where the whole Christian canon is 
taken into account. If Grünwaldt thus can use the traditions about Jesus and the writings of Paul to further 
his theological argument, how does he then manage to ignore all the texts that he “chopped away” by 
means of Literarkritik? Are they not in the canon also? Simply put, sometime before Jesus and Paul 
entered the Christian canon vv. 44-46 of chapter 25 also entered and even if they were added later than the 
largest part of the Holiness Code, they still cannot be ignored. In the light of the fact that his source-critical 
arguments were not convincing in the first place I would suspect that it is for “convenience” sake that he 
removes vv. 44-46 so that he does not have to engage with the theological-ethical implications thereof 
later.  
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above). This might be an illusion, but still the idea of “liberation” as presented in the 
Holiness Code in a sense becomes totally irrelevant for people living in modern 
Western and democratic societies. It might have a different ring to it in a society 
where people are suffering under a dictator or in the Third World where people are 
suffering under the burden of the First World. The images of God are all from another 
world and modern readers might find some of them offensive.  
One of the biggest clashes in terms of world-view that I see between ancient and 
modern western society is the relation of the individual to the group. In an individual-
driven society much of what is said in chapter 25 just does not make sense, or is too 
easily wrongly understood. Most modern readers understand Leviticus 25 as 
addressing every person in that ancient society, because for us most people are 
“visible”, including, women, children and poor people. For the authors of Leviticus 25 
they were not really important and they were mostly invisible. We find no mention of 
children and the women are only referred to as female slaves. “Everybody” in that 
context probably meant as I argued “every male with a claim to land.” I further 
restricted the addressees to those that returned from exile, because they thought of 
themselves as having a special relationship with YHWH. The objective of the text 
was to protect this small elite of land-owning people, not “everyone” in the modern 
sense.  
Later Grünwaldt (1999: 412) sums up the “main idea” of the Jubilee as follows: 
Will man die theologische Grundidee des am Versöhnungstag beginnenden 
Jobeljahres zusammenfassen, so lautet sie: Jeder soll – alle 50 Jahre – die 
Gelegenheit zu einem völligen Neuanfang vor Gott und den Menschen erhalten.  
This is a good summary, despite the fact that “everyone” in that context is not the 
same as “everyone” in ours. This does not stop us from arguing that all people today 
need opportunities like this to rectify past mistakes, or past injustices, but we need to 
consciously make those groups visible in our society that were invisible in the society 
of Leviticus 25 and surrounding texts.  
But what does a “new start” mean in any case? Where do people start anew? Where 
is this “start”? My problem is how we should apply these questions to the problems 
facing (South) Africa. If the root of our problems lies in our colonial past, how can we 
possibly rectify that? Africa cannot go back to that past when there were no white 
people in Africa. Most poor people in Africa had a bad start in the first place, they 
started poor and there is no better past that they can return to. For the poor in Africa 
the “future” is probably the only “better place” that they can hope for, since the past is 
mostly an exploitive past.  
Grünwaldt (1999: 412) does acknowledge that Leviticus 25 connects the ability to 
sustain oneself and one’s family with access to land and this in itself is totally 
 239
different in Germany (from where he writes). But he then continues (Grünwaldt 1999: 
412): 
Was weiterhin von Relevanz sein kann, ist der sich in Lev 25 ausdrückende 
Wille, Verarmung nicht nur zu bekämpfen, sondern von vornherein zu 
vermeiden. 
It is nearly impossible to reconcile this statement with my interpretation above. Once 
again it operates from a premise that there is some kind of “better” state before 
poverty, how else can one prevent poverty? There is some truth in this statement in 
the sense that the Jubilee laws attempted to protect the landowning class from 
loosing that property and it provided them with opportunities to regain it once they 
have lost it. But still this protection was only available to those who had legal claims 
to the land in the first place. The text is indifferent to the poverty of the rykic;, bv;/T, rG´ 
and db,[,.  
Or if we were to understand the text in the way that I interpreted it in chapter 6 then it 
was an attempt to reclaim land for the returnees with the result that many people 
might have been left landless. Instead of preventing poverty, it thus reinstated 
poverty.  
We are thus in a sense “nowhere”, because it seems that there is very little in the text 
that we can honestly use in our modern society. Yet I do think that there are three 
things that we can consciously take from this text, if we make some adjustments, or if 
we take two criteria into consideration to which I have hinted above at stages. The 
first has to do with the groups-ethos that we find in this text and the second with the 
way in which YHWH acts.  
As I have stated many times the text is only interested in protecting the rights of a 
small land owning (or land claiming) Elite. These protective strategies are good 
because they do offer some protection against poverty, but they are only in favour of 
the in-group and they actually discriminate against the out-group. One should also 
add that the “in-group” is much smaller in my construction than many other scholars 
would argue. The text might have had a slightly better image if I had included the 
people who stayed in the land, but I did not. The only way in which we could use this 
is when we were to consciously enlarge the borders of our modern-day “in-group.” If 
“everyone” could really become “everyone” as in every human being on this planet, 
then we could use these in-group values of Leviticus 25 to the benefit of all. If a 
person in the First World could have the same rights and opportunities and value as 
a person in the Third, then and only then can we take something liberating from this 
text. This is what the Jubilee 2000 movement did, but they unfortunately 
presupposed that the text claimed that in the first place, while it is actually foreign to 
the text. To open up these borders we could also use other texts from the Old and 
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New Testament and thus from the Christian canon. In the Old Testament we have 
texts like Jonah and Ruth that do challenge the ancient reader to think wider than the 
own in-group. These are texts that make the Moabites, the foreign sailors and the 
inhabitants of Nineveh visible, that present them as human beings and that challenge 
the in-group mentality of Leviticus 25. It also portrays them as people who could have 
a relationship with YHWH. The New Testament and especially the Jesus traditions 
also offer many possibilities that could help us to broaden the horizons of Leviticus 
25. In that sense the third criterion of Grünwaldt is spot on.  
I do also think that the way in which YHWH acts has some liberating potential if we 
consciously broaden the horizons and if we guard against using YHWH for political 
purposes. But then YHWH must not be the possession of those that regard 
themselves as delivered from Egypt. Above when I presented YHWH as a landowner 
and slave master, I argued that one could not use these as role models. That would 
make the metaphor sterile and would actually go against the grain of what a 
metaphor is supposed to be. It would do away with the very tensions on which a 
metaphor thrives and by means of which it creates new possibilities. It would merge 
the “is” and the “is not” parts of the metaphor. The liberating “is”-part of this metaphor 
lay in the owning act of YHWH, which meant that the addressees belonged to him 
and could not belong to any other human being. But that can only be liberating if all 
human beings were !ybiv;wTo and !yriG´ of YHWH and it would mean that no human 
being could own another. That is, of course, also foreign to Leviticus 25 where only 
the Israelites, or the addressees had this relation with YHWH, which had to do with 
their understanding of themselves as delivered from Egypt and as having a special 
relationship with YHWH. David Clines (1995: 201) describes this (problematic) part of 
God’s character in the Pentateuch as follows:  
The grain of the text, in short, assumes the centrality of the Jewish people and 
portrays a God whose intention is concentrated upon that nation. So long as we 
stay within the ideology of the text, we experience no discomfort with the 
portraiture. But the moment we position ourselves outside the text and become 
conscious of our own identities as non-Hebrew (which we might do even if we 
are Jews today), it becomes difficult not to take a more quizzical view of the 
character. If we do not actually approve of a universal deity having one favourite 
race, we are bound to take a different view of that deity’s character from a reader 
who happily embraces the ideology of the text.  
If, in our case we were to take the view of the rG´, or the bv;/T, or rykic;, or especially 
of the db,[, and hm;a; then the special relationship between the addressees and YHWH 
sounds again like abusing him to maintain power. We could also use the broader 
Christian canon and other traditions to say that all of us are the slaves of YHWH and 
that it means that none of us can be the slave of another, not to mention the priestly 
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tradition in Genesis 1 that presents both male and female as created in the image of 
God. In that sense this image can be liberating (unless, of course, it develops into a 
system where “all slaves are equal, but some are more equal than others”).  
There is a further very attractive side to the text that I do not think that I have 
explored enough and that has to do with the sense of “returning” that we have in the 
Jubilee year. I have pointed out above that the Hebrew root bwv is salient in this 
chapter. I can imagine that this is a feature of the text in which many dispossessed 
people on this world may find some hope. In Africa there are many examples of 
people groups who have been dislocated by catastrophies like war and famine. 
People who are now far away in another country, away from that land to which they 
are connected and away from their families and larger kin groups. The people in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo will be a good example of such groups. Similar to 
the people of Judah, their experience of being torn away from everything that they 
hold dear, must have been extremely disrupting. Smith-Christopher’s work also 
provides us with some insight into what these people might be experiencing. For 
them at least this text will be full of promise, just as I think that the idea of going back 
was for the exiles. These displaced people will also hope to return one day and in the 
light of historical construction I would wonder what would await them when they go 
back? Will somebody else be using their land that they have been connected to for 
centuries; will somebody else be living in their houses? What will happen then? How 
will this conflict be resolved?  
There are thus many aspects of Leviticus 25 that are irrelevant and there are others 
that are indeed dangerous and could be used to exploit as I have pointed out in the 
chapter above. But apart from these dark sides there are indeed liberating sides to 
this text that we can use in a critical way. We do find measures protecting 
landowners from permanently loosing their land. We meet a God who claims that he 
liberated from Egypt and that he provides a sustaining land. This God also disallows 
his people to become the slaves of other human beings by claiming them as his 
property. These are things that could be liberating in our world if they could be 
applied to all people and if all people could be equal. Then this text provides the 
opportunity for everybody to start again every 50 years. That is no small thing.  
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
I formulated my problem above as a sense of “discomfort” with the way in which 
Leviticus 25 was used in the Jubilee 2000 debate. This problem was intensified by 
the fact that I supported the objectives of this movement and that I thus found myself 
in a position where I was drawn in two directions, i.e. my sympathies towards the 
movement and my reading of the text itself. My way of addressing the problem was 
actually to intensify it, in the sense that I argued that biblical scholars should not shy 
away from this, but should continue to play a critical role and should especially 
continue to engage critically with the biblical text. The kind of criticism that I argued 
for was “ideological criticism” especially as it was theorised and practised by Carroll. 
As I said above, this approach entails a suspicious reading of the text that attempts 
to identify political interests and ulterior motives in the text. These motives and 
interests are part of a bigger worldview in which the authors and readers of the text 
understand themselves as in a particular relationship with YHWH, the land and with 
“others.” Yet this kind of suspicion should also be addressed at the reader or 
interpreter and here Carroll used the concept of our “ideological holdings”, which play 
a role in how somebody reads a text. I argued that a large part of my ideological 
holdings would be Apartheid and the role that the Bible played in this ideology. This I 
argued has predisposed me to read in a certain manner. One could also say that this 
explained why I found an ideological-critical reading so attractive. The fact that I 
came from a tradition that used the Bible to legitimate Apartheid sensitised me to 
acknowledge the oppressive potential in the Biblical text.  
With these objectives in mind I read the text mostly synchronically which for me 
meant not to “look for layers”, but to engage with the final composition of the text. It 
also meant that I did not exclude the possibility of dating the text. I started off by 
describing the grammatical features that were salient in Leviticus 25 and I used these 
observations to attempt a further rhetorical reading of the text. After describing the 
grammatical features the objective then became to specifically ask what strategies 
were used in the text to persuade. This I did by means of the kind of rhetorical 
criticism that Watts has applied to the Pentateuch. Most of that chapter was spend on 
“address”, but this engagement helped me to describe who I thought the addressees 
were and it helped me to portray their close-knit relationship to the land. The way in 
which YHWH was portrayed in the motivational parts of the text also helped us to 
express the kind of relationship that existed between the addressees and YHWH. 
Having done this we already had glimpses of the ideology of the people who wrote 
this text and the people for whom it was intended. They understood themselves as 
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having a very close relation to YHWH and the land, but they also understood 
themselves as being different from other groups, like the !yriG´ and the !ybiv;wTo.  
In my discussion on the surrounding texts I specifically focused on the texts that 
immediately preceded and succeeded chapter 25. In this regard it was clear that 
chapter 26 had much in common with 25, on all the different levels that I identified, 
grammatical and persuasive and it also shared this concern with the land. My 
treatment of Leviticus 24 was totally different, because the text was so different, but 
eventually (see 6.5) I argued that Leviticus 24 shared a certain prejudice towards the 
rG´ with chapter 25. I also argued that that explained why this narrative was inserted 
in front of chapter 25. Leviticus 23 shared a certain preoccupation with the Sabbath 
and festivals and with regards to the texts preceding these chapters I specifically 
focused on a shared ideology of land. This ideology motivated why the addressees 
were the only legal claimants of the land.  
In chapter 6 I then eventually attempted to date the text and along with many other 
Old Testament scholars I argued that this text was composed in the post-exilic 
society. That is the rhetorical context in which I thought that the persuasive strategies 
that I have identified would have been at their most persuasive. In this regard my 
argument was not original and I mostly relied on what others have already said. Still I 
would think that my main contribution here lies in the fact that I added some very 
thorough analyses of these texts to support these arguments. It was in this chapter 
that the liberating image of Leviticus 25 was somewhat spoiled. In my interpretation 
the text is that of a returning Elite who wants their land back. I am not so convinced 
that this ever happened, but I would think that that was what they intended. It is thus 
not a text that wanted to prevent poverty, but a text that (if implemented) would have 
reinstated poverty. Jacob Milgrom (2001: 2243) refers to the following “personal 
communication” that he had with Norman Gottwald in which the latter argued: 
The holdings of Israelites at the fall of Jerusalem in 586 B.C.E. were very 
unevenly distributed. Restoration of land to their previous owners would 
incorporate gross inequities and ensure the vulnerability of small landowners to 
indebtedness. 
This is similar to what I argued in chapter 7, a return to this “original” would not have 
been justice. It is also similar to what Kessler and the Crüsemanns argued. But 
Milgrom refers to Gottwald in support of his argument that these texts should be 
regarded as pre-exilic. For him this could not have happened and therefore the text 
cannot be dated in the post-exilic period. Milgrom simply cannot imagine that a 
biblical text could have had such an oppressive objective. This is where an 
ideological-critical reading is different, because in a sense it actually expects that 
from a biblical text. That was also why I initially mentioned that I had the impression 
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that Robert Carroll read a biblical text with a kind of “expecting-the-worst” attitude 
and I still think that that is a fair description. I have explained how my Apartheid 
background has “predisposed” me to read similarly. One could of course use other 
words like, “biased” or even “prejudiced”, but at least I did not “smuggle in my 
commitments under cover of dark” as Barton previously said. The question then is 
whether this has “biased” me too much, to such an extent that I read into the text, 
and that I did not respect the integrity of the text; that I made it say what I wanted it to 
say? I do not think that it is really possible to answer this question, but I would want 
to ask whether it might have been different when I for instance came from a tradition 
that struggled against Apartheid, that read the Bible as a liberating book?  
In my title I stated specifically that I would be interpreting this text from “a” South 
African perspective. This was an effort to acknowledge that there are many different 
contexts in South Africa. I thus only attempted to describe my own, namely an 
Afrikaner context. Previously I also remarked that I often thought that this name was 
used ironically, because “Afrika” is in the word, but in Apartheid ideology it functioned 
more like a synonym for European or non-African. In Dutch and German the word 
actually only means “African”,1 but in South Africa it eventually acquired a different 
meaning. That is still an interesting debate that will continue for some time, the 
identity of Afrikaners, are we European or African, or something in-between? This 
debate has, of course, also implications for the way in which we approach the 
academy. With regards to my own study, I do not think that there is anything 
particularly “African” about this dissertation. The way in which I read this text was by 
means of “methods” that were developed in Western academic circles. Furthermore I 
often compared the values in the biblical text with “modern western values.” Most of 
these values are now part of the society in which I live (as expressed in our 
constitution), but I am not sure that they are typically African. I thus do not think that I 
have contributed much if any to that debate. I read the text in this manner because I 
am part of the small white minority in South Africa who for some time oppressed the 
majority. I cannot pretend that I am black or coloured, or female because I am not.  
Thus in the light of the fact that I came from this Apartheid tradition, I attempted an 
ideological-critical reading. I wanted to learn from this experience and to make a 
contribution to this debate, or maybe to start a debate, since very few people talk 
about it in South Africa. It might have been different if I came from a black community 
where the Bible was used to struggle against Apartheid, where the Bible has a very 
liberating image. Where, one might argue (contra Carroll), that the Bible developed 
more than just a “rhetoric of liberation”, but indeed an “ideology of liberation.” But this 
is why I insisted on reading it from “a South African perspective”, because I am a 
                                                 
1 See the way in which Gerstenberger uses the word in the second footnote of chapter 1.  
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white Afrikaner male and I cannot pretend to be anything else. I can read with 
“justice” in mind and I can argue that “justice” should be for all the other groups in my 
society, but that is still only my viewpoint of justice and I cannot really talk on behalf 
of those groups in my country that suffered under Apartheid. That would just be a 
further patronising act. I can be critical of who I am, but I cannot change it. But to 
return to the question that I stated above, what if I came from another tradition that 
did not use the Bible to oppress, but that used the Bible to liberate? Would that have 
changed the way in which I read? 
There are some black scholars who have made similar critical remarks about the use 
of the Bible in Black and African Theology. The best example would be Itumeleng 
Mosala (1989) who did extensively criticise the use of the Bible by such Black 
theologians as Alan Boesak and Bishop Tutu. The Bible is no innocent text for 
Mosala and in that I do agree with him. Another recent example is Farisani (2002: 
628-646) who is critical of some African theologians who use the text of Ezra-
Nehemiah to construct an African theology. His problem with these efforts is that 
these African theologians “fall” for the ideology of these authors. He also argues that 
by uncritically using these texts they then participate in the silencing of ancient 
marginalized voices. Similar to my understanding of Leviticus 25 he argues that there 
is a prevalent ideology in the Ezra-Nehemiah text, “which is biased in favour of the 
returned exiles, but biased against the am haaretz” (2002: 643). He (Farisani 2002: 
646) proposes what he calls a “sociological reading” which attempts the read “against 
the grain” of a text and “[i]t tries to retrieve the voices of the marginalised am haaretz, 
and also attempts to read the Ezra-Nehemiah text from the perspective of the am 
haaretz.” This does not seem that different from what I did with the text, although I 
called it Ideologiekritik as Carroll did. The result was also to give some voice or 
representation to the voiceless, like the !yriGE2 in especially chapters 24 and 25, or like 
the invisible people of Leviticus 26.  
These two (i.e. Mosala and Farisani) have both been part of the struggle against 
Apartheid, but they have read the Bible with a similar suspicion as I have and came 
up with similar interpretations. One should also add that the theologians that they 
criticise are mostly systematic theologians. The suspicious readings that we share 
are thus probably more related to the fact that we are biblical critics and not that we 
come from different sides of the struggle. It is thus not a racial thing (which comes as 
a relief). Yet we are once again reminded of that old essay by Stendahl (see 2.2.1) 
where the main challenge to biblical criticism came from systematic theology. So, in 
                                                 
2 We do find two references to the $r,a;h; ![' in Leviticus 20:2 and 4. They are to stone those to death who 
sacrificed their children to Molech, whether the culprit is Israelite or rG´. I have not discussed this issue 
since it plays a marginal role in the Holiness Code. An interesting study would be to compare the way in 
which the !yriG´ are portrayed in the Holiness Code with the $r,a;h; ![' in Ezra-Nehemiah.  
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order to answer the question stated above, even if I did come from a tradition that 
used the Bible to liberate, even then I probably still would have read the Bible 
suspiciously as Mosala and Farisani did.  
But where did the discussion lead us?  
I have changed Leviticus 25 from a liberating text to something that is fairly close to 
Trible’s (1984) “texts of terror.” It is much more subtle and hidden than the texts that 
she discusses, but still it becomes one of those texts where groups are silenced and 
exploited. Although we do not find the explicit stories of violence against women that 
we find in the stories that she reads, women only feature in this text as female slaves 
(hm;a;). The end result of my reading is that I have also given a voice to groups who 
are silenced by the texts. I have read Leviticus 25 and 24 from the viewpoint of the 
rG´, or Leviticus 26 from the viewpoint of those invisible people left in the land. By 
constructing their stories I have thus discovered distortion in the presentation of the 
Biblical text.  
This I think should always be one of the vocations of biblical critics to talk on behalf of 
those ancient voices that were silenced and to give them some kind of 
representation. This is partly what criticism should entail, to be critical of the way in 
which the text presents the views of certain groups while it neglects and undermines 
the interests and view of others. Criticism should always include to be suspicious of 
the dominant view in a text and to ask which views were neglected.  
In this sense I think that my concepts of “culprit” and “victim” were quite useful. It did 
not only help me to understand my own identity as an Afrikaner better, but it opened 
up avenues of engagement with ethical issues. It reminds us of how our 
presentations are influenced from where we look, from whose side we evaluate or 
simply put from which point of view we engage with something. In the academic work 
of Smith(-Christopher) he apparently always sides with the people that went into 
exile. His studies were immensely helpful and it really gave us insight into what that 
group might have experienced. It also helped us to understand the extent to which 
they suffered. They developed strategies to survive in the context of the Babylonian 
Empire and they did survive, but I have argued that these same strategies might 
have changed from means of survival to means of oppression when they re-entered 
the land with the blessings of the new Persian Empire. Then this group changed from 
being victims to becoming culprits, or that is how I represented them.  
If ideology is the world-view of a particular group, the way in which they understand 
themselves, the story about who they are and where they came from. And if their 
ideology, their understanding of themselves, if this serves their interests, if this 
justifies the things they do to survive, to overcome the perceived threats to their 
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society, then how do we determine distortion? I would argue that we listen to the 
stories of their enemies in which they are no victims but culprits and in which they are 
a threat. Then we hear another distorted story, we hear another interest-ridden 
presentation of reality, but in this other presentation the former victims become 
culprits and the roles are changed. Whether it is the Nuer and the Dinka in Sudan, 
Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda, Boer and Briton, or black and white in South Africa, in 
each of these ideologies or world-views the other is the threat and the culprit and the 
self is the victim. Thus no view of reality is without distortion and the only ethical 
responsible way of coping with this reality is to listen to as many different 
presentations of this world as possible. That is what I did when I attempted to give 
the rG´, the bv;/T, the rykic;, the hm;a; and the other invisible people a chance to present 
their views. We cannot really hear their voices, but we can somehow imagine who 
they might have been and we can do this by reading the texts that refer to them 
carefully. That was what I attempted to do. Maybe I am right, maybe the !yriG´ were 
those who never went into exile, or maybe I am totally wrong, but whatever way the 
argument goes, it would still be worthwhile to ask who they thought they were? Did 
they also think of themselves as having a relationship with JHWH? Maybe? 
In the previous chapter (see 7.3.4) I warned against an abuse of God in the sense 
that people portray God as “their” God as on “their” side. I do not think that we should 
stop talking about God, about who he is or about what his will for this earth might be. 
We should consistently explore and engage with these questions and we should 
attempt to construct theologies, but we may not forget that everything that we say 
about God is tainted with our own interests and our own ideologies. We should not 
stop talking about God, but we must talk carefully about him, for he is not our 
possession and it is actually the other way around.  We should also keep in mind that 
our language is limited and the metaphors with which we describe him are just that, 
metaphors, with their own creative potential, but also with their own limitations and 
exploitive dangers.  
In this light I think that despite the many dark sides to the text, the Jubilee year has 
some liberating potential. If the in-group could be enlarged to include all human 
beings and if the God of Leviticus 25 could become a God for all, then we might do 
liberating things with this text. If all could be equal before this YHWH, so that no 
human being can possess another, then this world will be a better place. If this text 
could provide a new start to every human being every half a century, then it truly 
would be a liberating text. Yet to do that we need to read the text critically and we 
need to enrich it with the values from our modern world, where more groups of 
people are “visible” than in the ancient world. We can, of course, also use the rest of 
the Canon and bring these texts into some kind of creative tension with Leviticus 25. 
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And from these texts we know the boundaries of the “in-group” has indeed been 
enlarged and that the JHWH of Leviticus 25 and surrounding texts is indeed a God 
for all the nations.  
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